What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5421581 about?

The tribunal order states: The landlord’s application for possession is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5421581?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5421581?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5421581?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13016463-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5421581 about?

The tribunal order states: The landlord’s application for possession is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5421581?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5421581?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5421581?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13016463-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

38 Balmoral Street, Levin, Levin 5510 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5421581 — Tenancy dispute

Order

The landlord’s application for possession is dismissed.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing on 22 January 2026. The tenant did not.
The tenancy began on 31 March 2022 and is a periodic tenancy. On 18 September 2025, the landlord sent the tenant two 90-day termination notices. The notices were sent by email and delivered to the tenancy address. They record the end date for the tenancy as being 18 December 2025. The tenant remains in possession of the premises. The landlord claims the tenancy has ended and seeks an order for possession.
As the applicant, the landlord must prove their claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

The law

On the application of any person entitled to possession of the premises following the termination of a tenancy, the Tribunal shall make an order granting possession of the premises to that person. 1
A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case by giving at least 90 days’ notice. 2
Section 136 RTA relates to service of documents. Subsection 1 relevantly states that, where any notice of other document is required or authorised by the RTA to be given to or served on a tenant, it shall be sufficient if it is given or served in any of the following ways: a. Personally. b. By post addressed to the tenant at the address or PO Box given by them as an address for service in accordance with the RTA. c. Delivered to the premises to which any address for service relates, and either placed in the mailbox or attached to the door in a prominent position. d. Transmitted to the electronic address given by the tenant as an address for service.
Subsection 2 expands upon this and provides further methods of service however, these are not relevant to this case and therefore, I do not list them below.
Section 13AB RTA defines an “address for service” as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act, an address for service means any address given by the landlord or tenants under this Act as an address for service at which notices and other documents relating to the tenancy will be accepted by or on behalf of the landlord or tenant, as the case may be. (2) Whenever a party is required to give an address for service, the party – (a) Must give an address of a physical place in New Zealand; and (b) May, in addition, specify a Post Office box number, email address, or facsimile number as one of the party’s address for service. 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 64(1). 2 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 51(1).
Section 16 RTA states: 16 Change of address (1) Where the name and contact address, or address for service, of any person has been notified to the other party to the tenancy agreement in accordance with this Act and that name or address subsequently changes (otherwise than in circumstances to which section 15 applies), the person shall, within 10 working days thereafter, cause notice of the new particulars to be given to the other party. (1A) In subsection (1), contact address incudes the following: (a) A person’s contact mobile telephone number: (b) A person’s contact email address. Analysis
I can only make a possession order in favour of the landlord if either one of the 90-day termination notices are valid.
I begin by considering the termination notice that was delivered to the tenancy address on 18 September 2025 first.
The tenancy agreement records the tenancy address as an address for service. Therefore, the notice was properly served on the tenant in accordance with section 136(1)(c) RTA.
The contents of the notice comply with the requirements in section 51(3) RTA.
Because the notice was delivered to the tenancy address, it is deemed to have been given or served on the tenant on the second working day after 18 September 2025, which is 22 September 2025. 3 The counting of 90 days for the notice period begins on 23 September 2025 and ends on the close of the 90 th day, which is 21 December 2025. 4 The termination notice records 18 December 2025 as being the last day of the tenancy, which is less than 90 days from 23 September 2025.
Because the termination notice that was delivered to the tenancy address does not give the tenant 90-days’ notice, it is invalid and of no effect.
I now turn to consider the 90-day termination notice that was sent to the tenant by email.
The contents of the notice comply with the requirements in section 51(3) RTA. 3 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 136(7). 4 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 136A.
The tenancy agreement records the following email as an address for service for the tenant: kaz_17@windowslive.com. The 90-day termination notice was sent to the tenant at the following email address: fraserverneece@gmail.com.
The landlord claims the email address of fraserverneece@gmail.com is the most up to date contact email address for the tenant. They claim they have sent the majority of inspection notices and other communications to the tenant at this email address during the tenancy. The landlord submitted confirmation from their software that the email containing the termination notice was sent and opened on 18 September 2025 at 3:07:37pm. The landlord claims the tenant knew about the termination notice although, they accept the tenant provided them with a different, updated email address on 18 December 2025.
The landlord did not submit any communication from the tenant confirming that the email address of “fraserverneece@gmail.com” should be used as an address for service for them. Whilst the landlord has regularly sent inspection notices and other types of communications to the tenant using this email address, no evidence of any reply email from the tenant was submitted.
In Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141, the Tribunal held that section 16(1) RTA makes a clear distinction between a contact address and an address for service. 5 In Handcock, the landlord sent the tenant a 90-day termination notice to an email address the tenant had used to communicate with the landlord but had never confirmed as their address for service. The Tribunal found the 90-day notice had not been given to or served on the tenant in accordance with the RTA and was therefore invalid.
I find this case to be similar to Handcock, although unlike the tenant in Handcock, the tenant in this case has not communicated with the landlord using the email address. In Handcock, the landlord submitted written confirmation from the tenant providing the email address as a contact address and a history of emails sent by the tenant to the landlord using the email address. Even in these circumstances, the Tribunal found there was insufficient evidence to establish that the email address became an address for service by default through common usage. The evidence as to usage in the present case is less than in Handcock. The landlord has unilaterally communicated with the tenant using the email address and their software system records all emails sent by the landlord as having been opened however, no evidence of any reply email sent by the tenant to the landlord from the email address was submitted. In fact, the landlord gave evidence that they have never received communication from the tenant using the email address. In these circumstances, I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that the email address of fraserverneece@gmail.com became an address for service for the tenant by default through common usage. 5 Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141 at [49] – [53].
The purpose of service is to bring a notice to the recipient’s attention. The landlord submitted evidence that the email sent on 18 September 2025 was opened on this date however, this alone is insufficient to establish actual service on the balance of probabilities. If the landlord had submitted evidence of an immediate reply from the tenant using the email address, my conclusion might have been different.
In Gary Ruck v Roger Rooke [2021] NZTT Ashburton 4315598, 4313709, the Tribunal found that a 90-day termination notice was validly served on the tenant, despite the fact that it was sent to the tenant via Facebook messenger. This was because the tenant accepted in evidence that they had received the termination notice and were aware of it. At paragraph [30], the Tribunal noted “[t]here is no need for the landlord to rely on section 136 to prove service because service is admitted.” In the current case, the tenant did not appear and no direct evidence from them was given about whether they in fact received the termination notice or when they became aware of it. In the absence of this kind of evidence, I am not convinced this was the case. My conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the landlord gave evidence that the tenant provided them with a new and different email address on 18 December 2025.
For all of these reasons, I find the 90-day termination notice dated 18 September 2025 that was emailed to the tenant was not properly served on them. For this reason, it is invalid and of no effect.
The landlord has not proven that either one of the 90-day termination notices are valid. Therefore, their application for an order for possession is dismissed.

Order

The landlord’s application for possession is dismissed.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing on 22 January 2026. The tenant did not.
The tenancy began on 31 March 2022 and is a periodic tenancy. On 18 September 2025, the landlord sent the tenant two 90-day termination notices. The notices were sent by email and delivered to the tenancy address. They record the end date for the tenancy as being 18 December 2025. The tenant remains in possession of the premises. The landlord claims the tenancy has ended and seeks an order for possession.
As the applicant, the landlord must prove their claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

The law

On the application of any person entitled to possession of the premises following the termination of a tenancy, the Tribunal shall make an order granting possession of the premises to that person. 1
A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case by giving at least 90 days’ notice. 2
Section 136 RTA relates to service of documents. Subsection 1 relevantly states that, where any notice of other document is required or authorised by the RTA to be given to or served on a tenant, it shall be sufficient if it is given or served in any of the following ways: a. Personally. b. By post addressed to the tenant at the address or PO Box given by them as an address for service in accordance with the RTA. c. Delivered to the premises to which any address for service relates, and either placed in the mailbox or attached to the door in a prominent position. d. Transmitted to the electronic address given by the tenant as an address for service.
Subsection 2 expands upon this and provides further methods of service however, these are not relevant to this case and therefore, I do not list them below.
Section 13AB RTA defines an “address for service” as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act, an address for service means any address given by the landlord or tenants under this Act as an address for service at which notices and other documents relating to the tenancy will be accepted by or on behalf of the landlord or tenant, as the case may be. (2) Whenever a party is required to give an address for service, the party – (a) Must give an address of a physical place in New Zealand; and (b) May, in addition, specify a Post Office box number, email address, or facsimile number as one of the party’s address for service. 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 64(1). 2 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 51(1).
Section 16 RTA states: 16 Change of address (1) Where the name and contact address, or address for service, of any person has been notified to the other party to the tenancy agreement in accordance with this Act and that name or address subsequently changes (otherwise than in circumstances to which section 15 applies), the person shall, within 10 working days thereafter, cause notice of the new particulars to be given to the other party. (1A) In subsection (1), contact address incudes the following: (a) A person’s contact mobile telephone number: (b) A person’s contact email address. Analysis
I can only make a possession order in favour of the landlord if either one of the 90-day termination notices are valid.
I begin by considering the termination notice that was delivered to the tenancy address on 18 September 2025 first.
The tenancy agreement records the tenancy address as an address for service. Therefore, the notice was properly served on the tenant in accordance with section 136(1)(c) RTA.
The contents of the notice comply with the requirements in section 51(3) RTA.
Because the notice was delivered to the tenancy address, it is deemed to have been given or served on the tenant on the second working day after 18 September 2025, which is 22 September 2025. 3 The counting of 90 days for the notice period begins on 23 September 2025 and ends on the close of the 90 th day, which is 21 December 2025. 4 The termination notice records 18 December 2025 as being the last day of the tenancy, which is less than 90 days from 23 September 2025.
Because the termination notice that was delivered to the tenancy address does not give the tenant 90-days’ notice, it is invalid and of no effect.
I now turn to consider the 90-day termination notice that was sent to the tenant by email.
The contents of the notice comply with the requirements in section 51(3) RTA. 3 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 136(7). 4 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 136A.
The tenancy agreement records the following email as an address for service for the tenant: kaz_17@windowslive.com. The 90-day termination notice was sent to the tenant at the following email address: fraserverneece@gmail.com.
The landlord claims the email address of fraserverneece@gmail.com is the most up to date contact email address for the tenant. They claim they have sent the majority of inspection notices and other communications to the tenant at this email address during the tenancy. The landlord submitted confirmation from their software that the email containing the termination notice was sent and opened on 18 September 2025 at 3:07:37pm. The landlord claims the tenant knew about the termination notice although, they accept the tenant provided them with a different, updated email address on 18 December 2025.
The landlord did not submit any communication from the tenant confirming that the email address of “fraserverneece@gmail.com” should be used as an address for service for them. Whilst the landlord has regularly sent inspection notices and other types of communications to the tenant using this email address, no evidence of any reply email from the tenant was submitted.
In Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141, the Tribunal held that section 16(1) RTA makes a clear distinction between a contact address and an address for service. 5 In Handcock, the landlord sent the tenant a 90-day termination notice to an email address the tenant had used to communicate with the landlord but had never confirmed as their address for service. The Tribunal found the 90-day notice had not been given to or served on the tenant in accordance with the RTA and was therefore invalid.
I find this case to be similar to Handcock, although unlike the tenant in Handcock, the tenant in this case has not communicated with the landlord using the email address. In Handcock, the landlord submitted written confirmation from the tenant providing the email address as a contact address and a history of emails sent by the tenant to the landlord using the email address. Even in these circumstances, the Tribunal found there was insufficient evidence to establish that the email address became an address for service by default through common usage. The evidence as to usage in the present case is less than in Handcock. The landlord has unilaterally communicated with the tenant using the email address and their software system records all emails sent by the landlord as having been opened however, no evidence of any reply email sent by the tenant to the landlord from the email address was submitted. In fact, the landlord gave evidence that they have never received communication from the tenant using the email address. In these circumstances, I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that the email address of fraserverneece@gmail.com became an address for service for the tenant by default through common usage. 5 Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141 at [49] – [53].
The purpose of service is to bring a notice to the recipient’s attention. The landlord submitted evidence that the email sent on 18 September 2025 was opened on this date however, this alone is insufficient to establish actual service on the balance of probabilities. If the landlord had submitted evidence of an immediate reply from the tenant using the email address, my conclusion might have been different.
In Gary Ruck v Roger Rooke [2021] NZTT Ashburton 4315598, 4313709, the Tribunal found that a 90-day termination notice was validly served on the tenant, despite the fact that it was sent to the tenant via Facebook messenger. This was because the tenant accepted in evidence that they had received the termination notice and were aware of it. At paragraph [30], the Tribunal noted “[t]here is no need for the landlord to rely on section 136 to prove service because service is admitted.” In the current case, the tenant did not appear and no direct evidence from them was given about whether they in fact received the termination notice or when they became aware of it. In the absence of this kind of evidence, I am not convinced this was the case. My conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the landlord gave evidence that the tenant provided them with a new and different email address on 18 December 2025.
For all of these reasons, I find the 90-day termination notice dated 18 September 2025 that was emailed to the tenant was not properly served on them. For this reason, it is invalid and of no effect.
The landlord has not proven that either one of the 90-day termination notices are valid. Therefore, their application for an order for possession is dismissed.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5421581 — Tenancy dispute at 38 Balmoral Street, Levin, Levin 5510

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5421581 — Tenancy dispute at 38 Balmoral Street, Levin, Levin 5510

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Property management

Frequently asked questions