What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4630511 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4630511?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4630511?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4630511?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10482761-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4630511 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4630511?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4630511?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4630511?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10482761-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

72 Ruebe Road, Buckland, RD 2, Pukekohe 2677 Tenancy Tribunal Case 4630511 — Tenancy dispute

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The order of the 15 December 2024 stands.

Reasons

Both parties attended the telephone hearing on the 16 June 2024 to determine the tenant’s application for rehearing.
The tenant’s rehearing application relates to the Tribunal’s order made 15 December 2023.
The tenants have applied for a rehearing on two grounds: a) That the Adjudicator did not consider all the facts. b) That the landlord had fabricated their claim for rent and other claims. The law.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.
The High Court has confirmed that it is not a miscarriage of justice to decline rehearing just because evidence was not considered at original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at original hearing. 2 Analysis and submissions.
The landlord has submitted documents in support of the rehearing application. I confirm that I have read and considered all the submissions and evidence provided by both parties. I have also considered all of the submissions and evidence submitted in respect of the substantive decision.
The tenants say that I did not consider all the facts before determining the matter, the say that after the hearing that they found photographs which further supported their claim and which they submitted to the Tribunal on the 18 April 2024.
They say that many of their photographs and other documents were in storage at the time but did not present any evidence which supported their claims that the documents were not available or not accessible at the time of the hearing which was 5 months after they moved.
I am not satisfied that any of the evidence submitted on the 18 April was not available at the time of the hearing. The tenant was fully aware of what the landlords’ claim was about and could have presented the documents at that hearing. Following the High Court determination in Angelo v Lehr this is not a 2 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 ground for rehearing and therefore the tenant’s application for rehearing fails on this ground.
The tenant’s claim that I did not consider all the facts is incorrect. I considered all the evidence provide and made a determination based on the evidence. The tenant’s submission that I did not consider all the facts is a relitigation of a matter already determined and is not a ground for rehearing as per Loh v Puri.
The tenant claims that the landlord has submitted a different rent record for a pervious TT 4628630 application to that submitted in this application. The landlord filed a previous application for expediated abandonment. In that application, which was dismissed, the adjudicator made a finding that the tenant’s had told the landlord that they were leaving on the 2 July 2023. This is in accordance with my determination of the 15 December 2023 where I ordered rent to 30 July 2024 28 days after the tenant notified the landlord that they were leaving.
As the tenant has not succeeded on any grounds for rehearing then the rehearing application is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the telephone hearing on the 16 June 2024 to determine the tenant’s application for rehearing.

The tenant’s rehearing application relates to the Tribunal’s order made 15 December 2023.

The tenants have applied for a rehearing on two grounds: a) That the Adjudicator did not consider all the facts. b) That the landlord had fabricated their claim for rent and other claims. The law.

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.

A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.

As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

The High Court has confirmed that it is not a miscarriage of justice to decline rehearing just because evidence was not considered at original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at original hearing. 2 Analysis and submissions.

The landlord has submitted documents in support of the rehearing application. I confirm that I have read and considered all the submissions and evidence provided by both parties. I have also considered all of the submissions and evidence submitted in respect of the substantive decision.

The tenants say that I did not consider all the facts before determining the matter, the say that after the hearing that they found photographs which further supported their claim and which they submitted to the Tribunal on the 18 April 2024.

They say that many of their photographs and other documents were in storage at the time but did not present any evidence which supported their claims that the documents were not available or not accessible at the time of the hearing which was 5 months after they moved.

I am not satisfied that any of the evidence submitted on the 18 April was not available at the time of the hearing. The tenant was fully aware of what the landlords’ claim was about and could have presented the documents at that hearing. Following the High Court determination in Angelo v Lehr this is not a 2 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 ground for rehearing and therefore the tenant’s application for rehearing fails on this ground.

The tenant’s claim that I did not consider all the facts is incorrect. I considered all the evidence provide and made a determination based on the evidence. The tenant’s submission that I did not consider all the facts is a relitigation of a matter already determined and is not a ground for rehearing as per Loh v Puri.

The tenant claims that the landlord has submitted a different rent record for a pervious TT 4628630 application to that submitted in this application. The landlord filed a previous application for expediated abandonment. In that application, which was dismissed, the adjudicator made a finding that the tenant’s had told the landlord that they were leaving on the 2 July 2023. This is in accordance with my determination of the 15 December 2023 where I ordered rent to 30 July 2024 28 days after the tenant notified the landlord that they were leaving.

As the tenant has not succeeded on any grounds for rehearing then the rehearing application is dismissed.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4630511 — Tenancy dispute at 72 Ruebe Road, Buckland, RD 2, Pukekohe 2677

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 4630511 — Tenancy dispute at 72 Ruebe Road, Buckland, RD 2, Pukekohe 2677

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions