What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4693643?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4693643?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4693643?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4693643?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10517219-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4693643?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4693643?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4693643?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4693643?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10517219-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Room 2, 3A Memorial Avenue, Ilam, Christchurch 8053 Tenancy Tribunal Case 4693643 — Exemplary damages

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The Tribunal’s order dated 18 April 2024 is amended. The correct date of the order is 8 May 2024, and the order is amended to show that.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing which I held by phone.
On 8 May 2024 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application for compensation and exemplary damages. It made orders on the landlord’s application, but they are not subject to an application for rehearing.
The order was incorrectly dated. The system on which the Tribunal works does not automatically update orders written over time. The date has to be manually changed. I neglected to do that. I have formally changed the date of the order to the correct date of 8 May 2024.
The tenant applied for a rehearing on 12 May 2024. He set out his reasons for the application in detail. He is profoundly unhappy with the Tribunal’s order. And he wants the order withdrawn from publication, stating that The New Zealand Judicial System has not only infringed and trampled upon my rights but also is jeopardizing my reputation by publicly defaming and tarnishing my name. The law on rehearings
Section 105(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”
In order to find that grounds for a rehearing exist, the applicant does not need to prove that an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong occurred, but merely that prima facie such a situation exists, (Nixon v Brown (1989) DCR 404,406).
In Wellington City Council v McMillan (2003) DCR 50, His Honour Judge Tuohy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice” set a high standard, stating; “They must obviously apply....to cases of procedural error e.g. A hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; or the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available.... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First, the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable the parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for a rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
And in Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993, the Court said: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.
So, what does the case law establish? Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, that they were not able to properly present their case, or that there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing. They will also have to establish that the information that they wish to present could affect the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact or its application of the law, that is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, to give a party a second opportunity to present their case or as an alternative to an appeal.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Today, the tenant stated more than once that the basis of his rehearing application is that he does not agree with the Tribunal’s conclusions; he does not accept the order.
As he put it, the order was against the law, profoundly wrong, violates and is biased against the RTA, and was purposely designed to destroy his life.
Mr Nadoushani said he had alerted national and international authorities about the order which the New Zealand judicial system is responsible and accountable for.
Mr Nadoushani said the Tribunal was wrong to refer to the ‘alleged breaches’ by the landlord and the order was therefore a nonsense. He said his case was based on facts, supported by evidence. He said the order was made to tarnish, defame and torture an innocent victim, himself.
I noted in my order the inflammatory language Mr Nadoushani used at the hearing. He continued that today.
The Tribunal has not defamed him, tarnished his reputation, or tortured him. All it did was assess the evidence and issue a decision based on its findings.
An application for rehearing is not granted because one party is unhappy with the decision. Indeed, Mr Ward said he was unhappy with aspects of the decision as they affected him, but he accepted the Tribunal’s findings.
Often parties confuse an unfavourable decision with bias. The two are not connected. The Tribunal had no reasons to be biased against Mr Nadoushani. Indeed, it took every precaution to ensure it determined his application carefully, delaying the decision so it could fully understand the tenant’s position.
Mr Nadoushani has not put forward anything that would support a rehearing being granted. He attended the hearing and was fully heard. The Tribunal considered everything he had to say. He simply does not accept the outcome. Name suppression
The Tribunal did not suppress Mr Nadoushani’s name. Why not? Because it must consider and apply section 95A RTA. Section 95A(1) states: The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case.
Mr Nadoushani did not succeed wholly or substantially in his proceedings; his application was dismissed.
While the Tribunal can suppress some or all of the evidence, or the names and identifying details of witnesses, it was not required to consider suppression for those reasons.
The Tribunal correctly declined Mr Nadoushani’s application for name suppression. Result
For the reasons given, the application for rehearing is dismissed.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The Tribunal’s order dated 18 April 2024 is amended. The correct date of the order is 8 May 2024, and the order is amended to show that.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing which I held by phone.
On 8 May 2024 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application for compensation and exemplary damages. It made orders on the landlord’s application, but they are not subject to an application for rehearing.
The order was incorrectly dated. The system on which the Tribunal works does not automatically update orders written over time. The date has to be manually changed. I neglected to do that. I have formally changed the date of the order to the correct date of 8 May 2024.
The tenant applied for a rehearing on 12 May 2024. He set out his reasons for the application in detail. He is profoundly unhappy with the Tribunal’s order. And he wants the order withdrawn from publication, stating that The New Zealand Judicial System has not only infringed and trampled upon my rights but also is jeopardizing my reputation by publicly defaming and tarnishing my name. The law on rehearings
Section 105(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”
In order to find that grounds for a rehearing exist, the applicant does not need to prove that an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong occurred, but merely that prima facie such a situation exists, (Nixon v Brown (1989) DCR 404,406).
In Wellington City Council v McMillan (2003) DCR 50, His Honour Judge Tuohy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice” set a high standard, stating; “They must obviously apply....to cases of procedural error e.g. A hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; or the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available.... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First, the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable the parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for a rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
And in Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993, the Court said: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.
So, what does the case law establish? Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, that they were not able to properly present their case, or that there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing. They will also have to establish that the information that they wish to present could affect the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact or its application of the law, that is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, to give a party a second opportunity to present their case or as an alternative to an appeal.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Today, the tenant stated more than once that the basis of his rehearing application is that he does not agree with the Tribunal’s conclusions; he does not accept the order.
As he put it, the order was against the law, profoundly wrong, violates and is biased against the RTA, and was purposely designed to destroy his life.
Mr Nadoushani said he had alerted national and international authorities about the order which the New Zealand judicial system is responsible and accountable for.
Mr Nadoushani said the Tribunal was wrong to refer to the ‘alleged breaches’ by the landlord and the order was therefore a nonsense. He said his case was based on facts, supported by evidence. He said the order was made to tarnish, defame and torture an innocent victim, himself.
I noted in my order the inflammatory language Mr Nadoushani used at the hearing. He continued that today.
The Tribunal has not defamed him, tarnished his reputation, or tortured him. All it did was assess the evidence and issue a decision based on its findings.
An application for rehearing is not granted because one party is unhappy with the decision. Indeed, Mr Ward said he was unhappy with aspects of the decision as they affected him, but he accepted the Tribunal’s findings.
Often parties confuse an unfavourable decision with bias. The two are not connected. The Tribunal had no reasons to be biased against Mr Nadoushani. Indeed, it took every precaution to ensure it determined his application carefully, delaying the decision so it could fully understand the tenant’s position.
Mr Nadoushani has not put forward anything that would support a rehearing being granted. He attended the hearing and was fully heard. The Tribunal considered everything he had to say. He simply does not accept the outcome. Name suppression
The Tribunal did not suppress Mr Nadoushani’s name. Why not? Because it must consider and apply section 95A RTA. Section 95A(1) states: The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case.
Mr Nadoushani did not succeed wholly or substantially in his proceedings; his application was dismissed.
While the Tribunal can suppress some or all of the evidence, or the names and identifying details of witnesses, it was not required to consider suppression for those reasons.
The Tribunal correctly declined Mr Nadoushani’s application for name suppression. Result
For the reasons given, the application for rehearing is dismissed.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4693643 — Exemplary damages at Room 2, 3A Memorial Avenue, Ilam, Christchurch 8053

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 4693643 — Exemplary damages at Room 2, 3A Memorial Avenue, Ilam, Christchurch 8053

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions