What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4775022 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4775022?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4775022?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4775022?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11089344-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4775022 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4775022?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4775022?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4775022?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11089344-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

276 Clarks Beach Road, Clarks Beach, RD 4, Clarks Beach Tenancy Tribunal Case 4775022 — Tenancy dispute

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The order of the 25 August 2024 remains. The stay is lifted and the order may be enforced.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing today. The tenant was called twice but both calls went to answerphone.
On 25 August 2024 the Tribunal made an order for compensation in favour of the tenant for landlord breaches.
On 28 August 2024 the landlord applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. That there were sperate meters to the property that could be read which would have allowed for an accurate calculation of the electricity meters between each residence. b. That the amount awarded was excessive. The law.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the landlord has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
The grounds advanced that I was wrong in my determination that as there was no separate meters for each residence fails because at today’s hearing the landlord confirmed that there was only the main meter for the house and a separate metre for the cottage and barn. This misses the point that the tenant is only required to make payment for the water they use, they are not required to manage or calculate water rates owed by other residents in other premises on the property and seek reimbursement from them. That is the landlord’s obligation. This matter was transversed at hearing and I have made a determination on it.
The ground that the compensation was excessive is a complaint that the Tribunal was wrong in its determination.
As the grounds advanced for rehearing are complaints that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law, 2 then the grounds for rehearing is not made out and the rehearing is refused.
The order of the 25 August 2024 remains, and the stay of proceedings is lifted.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The order of the 25 August 2024 remains. The stay is lifted and the order may be enforced.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing today. The tenant was called twice but both calls went to answerphone.
On 25 August 2024 the Tribunal made an order for compensation in favour of the tenant for landlord breaches.
On 28 August 2024 the landlord applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. That there were sperate meters to the property that could be read which would have allowed for an accurate calculation of the electricity meters between each residence. b. That the amount awarded was excessive. The law.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the landlord has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
The grounds advanced that I was wrong in my determination that as there was no separate meters for each residence fails because at today’s hearing the landlord confirmed that there was only the main meter for the house and a separate metre for the cottage and barn. This misses the point that the tenant is only required to make payment for the water they use, they are not required to manage or calculate water rates owed by other residents in other premises on the property and seek reimbursement from them. That is the landlord’s obligation. This matter was transversed at hearing and I have made a determination on it.
The ground that the compensation was excessive is a complaint that the Tribunal was wrong in its determination.
As the grounds advanced for rehearing are complaints that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law, 2 then the grounds for rehearing is not made out and the rehearing is refused.
The order of the 25 August 2024 remains, and the stay of proceedings is lifted.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4775022 — Tenancy dispute at 276 Clarks Beach Road, Clarks Beach, RD 4, Clarks Beach

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 4775022 — Tenancy dispute at 276 Clarks Beach Road, Clarks Beach, RD 4, Clarks Beach

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions