What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4859740 about?

The tribunal order states: The 63-day termination notice dated 20 March 2024, issued by Laurayno

How much money was awarded in case 4859740?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4859740?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4859740?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10685131-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4859740 about?

The tribunal order states: The 63-day termination notice dated 20 March 2024, issued by Laurayno

How much money was awarded in case 4859740?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4859740?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4859740?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10685131-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 4859740 — Tenancy dispute

Order

The 63-day termination notice dated 20 March 2024, issued by Laurayno Ngawhika And Robert Pihema As Trustees For R N R Trust is declared invalid.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing by remote, video-link. Mr Pihema attended by phone, part-way through the hearing, but he did not remain. [The tenant/s representative] appeared on behalf of the Tenant and filed helpful submissions.
The Tenant challenges the validity of a 63-day termination notice issued by the Landlord and requests a declaration from the Tribunal that the Landlord’s notice is invalid and of no effect.
Alternatively, the Tenant argues that notice was retaliatory, and should be set aside. The Tenant claims the Landlord sent it a frivolous and vexatious 14-day notice to remedy, evidence of the Landlord’s retaliatory intent.
The Tenant received a 63-day termination notice under s 51(1)(a) of the RTA, stating that the premises were required for occupation by a family member of the owner.
The Tribunal must determine the validity of the 63-day termination notice under s 51(1)(a).
Concurrently, if the Landlord’s true intention was to sell the property, has the Landlord knowingly acted to terminate the tenancy without grounds by giving the Tenant a 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) instead of a 90-day notice of termination under s 51(2)(a)? The Tenant did not seek relief under s 60AA in its pleadings. This claim was raised in oral submissions, as a by-product of discussions concerning the validity of the 63-day termination notice. I consider the Landlord did have adequate opportunity to respond to this claim, and I have dealt with it in this decision. Evidence and Submissions
The Tenant submitted an audio recording of a conversation with Robert Pihema from the second property inspection on 22 April 2024, where Mr Pihema indicates an intention to sell the property.
Mr Pihema gave evidence in respect of the recording in his affidavit of 8 May 2024, stating the Tenant did not make him aware he was being recorded, and the Tenant did not gain his consent to making the recording. He acknowledges, at paragraph 8 of his affidavit: “Yes, I had uttered, “You know we’re selling the house”. However, to give context to the statement, [The tenant/s] has prior knowledge with regards to his prior commitment to purchase [Tenancy address suppressed], passing comment was sarcastic in nature. Albeit, [The tenant/s] is also aware of our [daughter’s] situation. [Redacted]. My whanau and my mokopuna are my priority.”
I do not consider I need to consider the admissibility of the voice recording, as Mr Pihema has brought the relevant portion of it into evidence by responding to it in his affidavit. I have considered his remark, “You know we’re selling the house,” and his explanation of it.
The Respondent asserts that the 63-day termination notice was issued in good faith, a continuation of its unchanging position to sell the property to a family member as part of their customary practice (tikanga). Trust Minutes from 2022 were provided to support this intention. Tribunal’s Findings
Section 51(1)(a) of the RTA allows a landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy with 63 days’ notice if the premises are required as the principal place of residence for the owner or a family member for at least 90 days.
Section 51(2)(a) requires a 90-day notice if the premises are to be put on the market within 90 days after the termination date for sale or other disposition.
The Landlord claims the primary intention was for the Landlord’s daughter to reside in the property. Although there was an intention for the daughter to eventually purchase the property, the immediate need was for her to move in as a family member, the Landlord explains.
The Landlord provided affidavit evidence from her daughter to support the stated intention to move into the property. While her daughter was initially waiting to be admitted into the video call to give evidence, she exited the waiting room, and did not return, so I could not admit her into the hearing to give evidence. At the hearing, Ms Ngawhika and Mr Pihema both stated the intention was for their daughter to live at the home. Evidence of their daughter having obtained finance approval was provided in the form of a letter from her bank, sent to the Tribunal Registry during the hearing, the relevant parts excerpted below: “Dear [Redacted] We’re pleased to confirm that your [Bank] Home Loan has been approved as follows: Borrower(s): [Redacted] Amount: [Redacted] ... Your approval is subject to special conditions: -... -You must provide us a signed agreement for sale and purchase in respect of the property at [Tenancy address suppressed], specifying a purchase price of [redacted] with clause to confirm [redacted] is gifted equity from your parents Laurayno Ragiuia Ngawhika and Robert Neha Pihema, and satisfactory to us in all respects. -We recommend that Laurayno Ragiuia Ngawhika and Robert Neha Pihema obtain Independent Legal Advice prior to any part of this loan being drawn down.”
I asked the Landlord why they gave notice under s 51(1)(a). The Landlord explained she recalls looking at the termination grounds and thought s 51(1)(a) was correct, and if she was wrong, “it’s on us.” She further explained, her daughter was moving into the home, because she needed a place to live, and that appeared to align with the ground for termination as stated in s 51(1)(a), although I was unable to test her daughter’s evidence.
The Tenant suggests that s 51(1)(a) does not refer to a family member moving in who is also buying the property, arguing that a 90-day notice under s 51(2)(a) was the appropriate notice for the Landlord to issue, given its stated intention to sell the premises, or at least, that a 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) was improper and invalid. While I understand this argument, I am not sure the two intentions – to reside and to purchase – are mutually exclusive, and my difficulty with the Tenant’s submission is that none of the other grounds for termination squarely fit with the Landlord’s stated aims for the premises post-termination.
Additionally, there is no evidence which definitively points to the Landlord’s intention being to “put on the market... for the purposes of sale or other disposition”. In his recorded conversation with the Tenant, Mr Pihema referred to the Landlord’s intention to sell the property. However, he did not state it would be listed for sale on the open market, and while he does not tell the Tenant it was to be sold to their daughter, Mr Pihema confirmed, at the hearing, the Landlord was always going to sell the home to whanau, as is their customary practice. This is consistent with the parties Trust Minutes and previous evidence at other times, and before other decision-makers.
The property at [Tenancy address suppressed] is subject to a registered mortgage. The Landlord has presented a letter from the mortgagee’s solicitors indicating their intention to seek a sale of the premises if the mortgagor continues in default of its mortgage payments. I want to be clear I have not given this letter any weight in my determination as it invites speculation; the threat of foreclosure could reflect the Landlord’s genuine position of hardship, or it could merely be an artificially constructed state of affairs to bolster the Landlord’s claim of hardship.
The Tenant raised further contentions in its submissions of 12 April 2024: Paragraph 33: “The respondents have previously asserted before Judge Hollister-Jones that they intended to transfer ownership of the property to [the landlord’s daughter]. Paragraph 34. We consider it unusual that there have been drastic changes to the intention of the Trust in relation to this property.
The intention for the purposes of a notice issued pursuant to s 51 must be assessed at the time the notice is issued. This does not preclude a party from challenging the validity of a termination notice by calling into question the truthfulness of the Landlord’s stated intentions (grounds) for the notice. However, the Landlord’s statements to the Judge and to myself, would have to demonstrate a clear contradiction with the Landlord’s intention as evidenced in the notice. For the reasons at paragraph 16 above, I do not consider the Landlord’s statement to the Judge and to me are necessarily inconsistent with the Landlord’s notice. Paragraph 35: Within the past year, the respondents have alleged the following: (a) The property required extensive renovations; (b) The respondent had a buyer for the property; (c) The respondent had a family member wishing to buy the property.
The changes mentioned regarding the property’s intended use and potential sale could reflect inconsistency, or adjustments based on evolving circumstances. At various times, before and during this tenancy, aspects of the premises have required preparation for future use. What is important, for present purposes, is that the Tenant presents solid evidence challenging the Landlord’s stated intention concerning the termination notice. Paragraph 36: We submit that point 35 demonstrates that the respondent is leveraging s 51 as a mere procedural tool, resorting to any available tactics to effect the removal of [The tenant/s] from the premises.
I trust this perspective is genuinely held by the Tenant. From the Landlord’s perspective, they have been adapting to the financial and familial circumstances to ensure compliance with the Residential Tenancies Act while safeguarding their property interests, and further, they have a genuine and documented need for their daughter to reside in the property, consistent with the Landlord’s long-term plan for family occupation. While I respect the parties each have their own views, I have endeavoured to look at the evidence objectively, to confirm whether the Landlord’s stated intention was more likely than not valid.
In the end, I have found the Landlord’s stated intentions in the 63-day notice find strong support in the daughter’s Bank letter confirming conditional finance approval to purchase the property from the Landlord. This is because the letter provides tangible evidence that the daughter has both the intention and the financial means to purchase the property, aligning with the landlord’s stated intention for her to move in and eventually buy the home. The Bank’s conditional approval, specifying the purchase terms and the involvement of gifted equity from the parents, further corroborates the Landlord’s claim that the property is intended for family use and not for sale on the open market. Therefore, the 63-day notice issued under s 51(1)(a) is considered valid and in accordance with the Landlord’s genuine and documented intentions.
The Tribunal finds that the 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) was appropriate. The Landlord’s intent to eventually sell to the daughter does not invalidate the immediate need for her to reside in the premises.
As to whether the Landlord knowingly acted to terminate the tenancy without proper grounds by issuing a 63-day notice instead of a 90-day notice, I consider this claim has not been established. Notice Defects
Nevertheless, the notice also contained an incorrect notice period and vacate date, falling short of the requirements of s 51.
The Tribunal notes the decision in Charan v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd 1 which emphasises that the notice period requirements in s 51 are mandatory and not discretionary. Any deviation from these requirements renders the notice invalid, requiring a new notice to be issued.
The Tribunal finds that the Landlord’s 63-day termination notice does not comply with s 51(1)(a) of the RTA as it contained the incorrect notice period and vacate 1 Charan v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd DC Manukau CIV-2010-092-2100, 14 June 2010 date and the Landlord’s attempt to amend the notice by email does not cure this notice defect.
There is a provision in s 51(7) where an error has been made over the period of notice, or some delay has been incurred in serving the notice, for that 90 day period to be either waived by both parties, or alternatively if the agreement of the tenant cannot be obtained for the landlord to apply to the Tribunal for consent to issue a further notice varying the first notice, so as to bring the period of notice given up to or above the minimum so required.
No application was made under s 51(7), and the Landlord’s email purporting to rectify the defect in its termination notice, which must be sent after the making of an Order under s 51(7) abridging time, would not have complied with the notice requirements of s 51(3).
If the Landlord had applied under s 51(7), which it did not do, I would still have found the notice invalid because s 51 is prescriptive so as to afford the vacating tenant certainty, so they can plan and manage the timing of their exit, not be left guessing how long they have left to stay at the property and when they should be out by. They also, in most cases, will need to time their departure to coincide with contemporaneous entry into a new property. Costs
Under s 102(2) and s 102(3)(b) of the RTA, the Tribunal may order an unsuccessful party to pay reasonable costs to the other party when parties are represented by counsel.
The general principle is that costs should reflect a reasonable contribution to the successful party's expenses, considering the circumstances of the case.
In determining reasonable costs, the Tribunal considers factors such as the complexity of the issues, the conduct of the parties, the amount of preparation required, and the overall duration of the proceedings.
I note and endorse, for the Tribunal’s purposes, the comments of Inglis CJ in Innovative Landscapes Limited v Popkin, 2 and consider legal representation of a party by a Community Law Centre as applying with “equal force” as a lawyer appearing on a pro bono basis on behalf of a party.
The principles outlined in Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd are relevant. 3 Costs should represent a reasonable contribution to the successful party’s actual costs, typically ranging from 40% to 70%, calculated from the District Court cost schedules and proportionately scaled. 4 2 [2020] NZEmpC 96. 3 [1997] 3 NZLR 143 4 NZTT Hamilton 4300218, 4297500.
The Tenant was successful in challenging the validity of the 63-day notice, albeit not on all the grounds they contended. The primary reason for invalidity was a clear and straightforward defect in the notice period and vacate date, which did not necessitate the more complex arguments raised regarding retaliatory notice, s 51(7), and s 60AA. While these additional claims were not without merit, they were not required for the disposition of the matter.
The Tribunal must exercise its discretion judiciously and in accordance with s 85 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which emphasises resolving disputes fairly and expeditiously without being bound by strict legal forms or technicalities.
Granting representation often introduces legal formalities and technicalities, complicating and prolonging proceedings, and potentially escalating costs for both parties. It merits mention that the legal representation was of a very high standard in this particular case.
However, given that the Tenant’s success was based on a straightforward defect, it is appropriate for costs to lie where they fall, ensuring fairness and avoiding undue financial burden on either party.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing by remote, video-link. Mr Pihema attended by phone, part-way through the hearing, but he did not remain. [The tenant/s representative] appeared on behalf of the Tenant and filed helpful submissions.

The Tenant challenges the validity of a 63-day termination notice issued by the Landlord and requests a declaration from the Tribunal that the Landlord’s notice is invalid and of no effect.

Alternatively, the Tenant argues that notice was retaliatory, and should be set aside. The Tenant claims the Landlord sent it a frivolous and vexatious 14-day notice to remedy, evidence of the Landlord’s retaliatory intent.

The Tenant received a 63-day termination notice under s 51(1)(a) of the RTA, stating that the premises were required for occupation by a family member of the owner.

The Tribunal must determine the validity of the 63-day termination notice under s 51(1)(a).

Concurrently, if the Landlord’s true intention was to sell the property, has the Landlord knowingly acted to terminate the tenancy without grounds by giving the Tenant a 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) instead of a 90-day notice of termination under s 51(2)(a)? The Tenant did not seek relief under s 60AA in its pleadings. This claim was raised in oral submissions, as a by-product of discussions concerning the validity of the 63-day termination notice. I consider the Landlord did have adequate opportunity to respond to this claim, and I have dealt with it in this decision. Evidence and Submissions

The Tenant submitted an audio recording of a conversation with Robert Pihema from the second property inspection on 22 April 2024, where Mr Pihema indicates an intention to sell the property.

Mr Pihema gave evidence in respect of the recording in his affidavit of 8 May 2024, stating the Tenant did not make him aware he was being recorded, and the Tenant did not gain his consent to making the recording. He acknowledges, at paragraph 8 of his affidavit: “Yes, I had uttered, “You know we’re selling the house”. However, to give context to the statement, [The tenant/s] has prior knowledge with regards to his prior commitment to purchase [Tenancy address suppressed], passing comment was sarcastic in nature. Albeit, [The tenant/s] is also aware of our [daughter’s] situation. [Redacted]. My whanau and my mokopuna are my priority.”

I do not consider I need to consider the admissibility of the voice recording, as Mr Pihema has brought the relevant portion of it into evidence by responding to it in his affidavit. I have considered his remark, “You know we’re selling the house,” and his explanation of it.

The Respondent asserts that the 63-day termination notice was issued in good faith, a continuation of its unchanging position to sell the property to a family member as part of their customary practice (tikanga). Trust Minutes from 2022 were provided to support this intention. Tribunal’s Findings

Section 51(1)(a) of the RTA allows a landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy with 63 days’ notice if the premises are required as the principal place of residence for the owner or a family member for at least 90 days.

Section 51(2)(a) requires a 90-day notice if the premises are to be put on the market within 90 days after the termination date for sale or other disposition.

The Landlord claims the primary intention was for the Landlord’s daughter to reside in the property. Although there was an intention for the daughter to eventually purchase the property, the immediate need was for her to move in as a family member, the Landlord explains.

The Landlord provided affidavit evidence from her daughter to support the stated intention to move into the property. While her daughter was initially waiting to be admitted into the video call to give evidence, she exited the waiting room, and did not return, so I could not admit her into the hearing to give evidence. At the hearing, Ms Ngawhika and Mr Pihema both stated the intention was for their daughter to live at the home. Evidence of their daughter having obtained finance approval was provided in the form of a letter from her bank, sent to the Tribunal Registry during the hearing, the relevant parts excerpted below: “Dear [Redacted] We’re pleased to confirm that your [Bank] Home Loan has been approved as follows: Borrower(s): [Redacted] Amount: [Redacted] ... Your approval is subject to special conditions: -... -You must provide us a signed agreement for sale and purchase in respect of the property at [Tenancy address suppressed], specifying a purchase price of [redacted] with clause to confirm [redacted] is gifted equity from your parents Laurayno Ragiuia Ngawhika and Robert Neha Pihema, and satisfactory to us in all respects. -We recommend that Laurayno Ragiuia Ngawhika and Robert Neha Pihema obtain Independent Legal Advice prior to any part of this loan being drawn down.”

I asked the Landlord why they gave notice under s 51(1)(a). The Landlord explained she recalls looking at the termination grounds and thought s 51(1)(a) was correct, and if she was wrong, “it’s on us.” She further explained, her daughter was moving into the home, because she needed a place to live, and that appeared to align with the ground for termination as stated in s 51(1)(a), although I was unable to test her daughter’s evidence.

The Tenant suggests that s 51(1)(a) does not refer to a family member moving in who is also buying the property, arguing that a 90-day notice under s 51(2)(a) was the appropriate notice for the Landlord to issue, given its stated intention to sell the premises, or at least, that a 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) was improper and invalid. While I understand this argument, I am not sure the two intentions – to reside and to purchase – are mutually exclusive, and my difficulty with the Tenant’s submission is that none of the other grounds for termination squarely fit with the Landlord’s stated aims for the premises post-termination.

Additionally, there is no evidence which definitively points to the Landlord’s intention being to “put on the market... for the purposes of sale or other disposition”. In his recorded conversation with the Tenant, Mr Pihema referred to the Landlord’s intention to sell the property. However, he did not state it would be listed for sale on the open market, and while he does not tell the Tenant it was to be sold to their daughter, Mr Pihema confirmed, at the hearing, the Landlord was always going to sell the home to whanau, as is their customary practice. This is consistent with the parties Trust Minutes and previous evidence at other times, and before other decision-makers.

The property at [Tenancy address suppressed] is subject to a registered mortgage. The Landlord has presented a letter from the mortgagee’s solicitors indicating their intention to seek a sale of the premises if the mortgagor continues in default of its mortgage payments. I want to be clear I have not given this letter any weight in my determination as it invites speculation; the threat of foreclosure could reflect the Landlord’s genuine position of hardship, or it could merely be an artificially constructed state of affairs to bolster the Landlord’s claim of hardship.

The Tenant raised further contentions in its submissions of 12 April 2024: Paragraph 33: “The respondents have previously asserted before Judge Hollister-Jones that they intended to transfer ownership of the property to [the landlord’s daughter]. Paragraph 34. We consider it unusual that there have been drastic changes to the intention of the Trust in relation to this property.

The intention for the purposes of a notice issued pursuant to s 51 must be assessed at the time the notice is issued. This does not preclude a party from challenging the validity of a termination notice by calling into question the truthfulness of the Landlord’s stated intentions (grounds) for the notice. However, the Landlord’s statements to the Judge and to myself, would have to demonstrate a clear contradiction with the Landlord’s intention as evidenced in the notice. For the reasons at paragraph 16 above, I do not consider the Landlord’s statement to the Judge and to me are necessarily inconsistent with the Landlord’s notice. Paragraph 35: Within the past year, the respondents have alleged the following: (a) The property required extensive renovations; (b) The respondent had a buyer for the property; (c) The respondent had a family member wishing to buy the property.

The changes mentioned regarding the property’s intended use and potential sale could reflect inconsistency, or adjustments based on evolving circumstances. At various times, before and during this tenancy, aspects of the premises have required preparation for future use. What is important, for present purposes, is that the Tenant presents solid evidence challenging the Landlord’s stated intention concerning the termination notice. Paragraph 36: We submit that point 35 demonstrates that the respondent is leveraging s 51 as a mere procedural tool, resorting to any available tactics to effect the removal of [The tenant/s] from the premises.

I trust this perspective is genuinely held by the Tenant. From the Landlord’s perspective, they have been adapting to the financial and familial circumstances to ensure compliance with the Residential Tenancies Act while safeguarding their property interests, and further, they have a genuine and documented need for their daughter to reside in the property, consistent with the Landlord’s long-term plan for family occupation. While I respect the parties each have their own views, I have endeavoured to look at the evidence objectively, to confirm whether the Landlord’s stated intention was more likely than not valid.

In the end, I have found the Landlord’s stated intentions in the 63-day notice find strong support in the daughter’s Bank letter confirming conditional finance approval to purchase the property from the Landlord. This is because the letter provides tangible evidence that the daughter has both the intention and the financial means to purchase the property, aligning with the landlord’s stated intention for her to move in and eventually buy the home. The Bank’s conditional approval, specifying the purchase terms and the involvement of gifted equity from the parents, further corroborates the Landlord’s claim that the property is intended for family use and not for sale on the open market. Therefore, the 63-day notice issued under s 51(1)(a) is considered valid and in accordance with the Landlord’s genuine and documented intentions.

The Tribunal finds that the 63-day notice under s 51(1)(a) was appropriate. The Landlord’s intent to eventually sell to the daughter does not invalidate the immediate need for her to reside in the premises.

As to whether the Landlord knowingly acted to terminate the tenancy without proper grounds by issuing a 63-day notice instead of a 90-day notice, I consider this claim has not been established. Notice Defects

Nevertheless, the notice also contained an incorrect notice period and vacate date, falling short of the requirements of s 51.

The Tribunal notes the decision in Charan v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd 1 which emphasises that the notice period requirements in s 51 are mandatory and not discretionary. Any deviation from these requirements renders the notice invalid, requiring a new notice to be issued.

The Tribunal finds that the Landlord’s 63-day termination notice does not comply with s 51(1)(a) of the RTA as it contained the incorrect notice period and vacate 1 Charan v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd DC Manukau CIV-2010-092-2100, 14 June 2010 date and the Landlord’s attempt to amend the notice by email does not cure this notice defect.

There is a provision in s 51(7) where an error has been made over the period of notice, or some delay has been incurred in serving the notice, for that 90 day period to be either waived by both parties, or alternatively if the agreement of the tenant cannot be obtained for the landlord to apply to the Tribunal for consent to issue a further notice varying the first notice, so as to bring the period of notice given up to or above the minimum so required.

No application was made under s 51(7), and the Landlord’s email purporting to rectify the defect in its termination notice, which must be sent after the making of an Order under s 51(7) abridging time, would not have complied with the notice requirements of s 51(3).

If the Landlord had applied under s 51(7), which it did not do, I would still have found the notice invalid because s 51 is prescriptive so as to afford the vacating tenant certainty, so they can plan and manage the timing of their exit, not be left guessing how long they have left to stay at the property and when they should be out by. They also, in most cases, will need to time their departure to coincide with contemporaneous entry into a new property. Costs

Under s 102(2) and s 102(3)(b) of the RTA, the Tribunal may order an unsuccessful party to pay reasonable costs to the other party when parties are represented by counsel.

The general principle is that costs should reflect a reasonable contribution to the successful party's expenses, considering the circumstances of the case.

In determining reasonable costs, the Tribunal considers factors such as the complexity of the issues, the conduct of the parties, the amount of preparation required, and the overall duration of the proceedings.

I note and endorse, for the Tribunal’s purposes, the comments of Inglis CJ in Innovative Landscapes Limited v Popkin, 2 and consider legal representation of a party by a Community Law Centre as applying with “equal force” as a lawyer appearing on a pro bono basis on behalf of a party.

The principles outlined in Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd are relevant. 3 Costs should represent a reasonable contribution to the successful party’s actual costs, typically ranging from 40% to 70%, calculated from the District Court cost schedules and proportionately scaled. 4 2 [2020] NZEmpC 96. 3 [1997] 3 NZLR 143 4 NZTT Hamilton 4300218, 4297500.

The Tenant was successful in challenging the validity of the 63-day notice, albeit not on all the grounds they contended. The primary reason for invalidity was a clear and straightforward defect in the notice period and vacate date, which did not necessitate the more complex arguments raised regarding retaliatory notice, s 51(7), and s 60AA. While these additional claims were not without merit, they were not required for the disposition of the matter.

The Tribunal must exercise its discretion judiciously and in accordance with s 85 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which emphasises resolving disputes fairly and expeditiously without being bound by strict legal forms or technicalities.

Granting representation often introduces legal formalities and technicalities, complicating and prolonging proceedings, and potentially escalating costs for both parties. It merits mention that the legal representation was of a very high standard in this particular case.

However, given that the Tenant’s success was based on a straightforward defect, it is appropriate for costs to lie where they fall, ensuring fairness and avoiding undue financial burden on either party.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4859740 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 4859740 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions