What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4894446 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing by Maddi Roberts is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4894446?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4894446?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4894446?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10968186-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4894446 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing by Maddi Roberts is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 4894446?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4894446?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4894446?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10968186-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

17 Haig Street, Mornington, Dunedin 9011 Tenancy Tribunal Case 4894446 — Exemplary damages

Order

The application for rehearing by Maddi Roberts is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On 29 August 2024 the Tribunal made an order that the landlord pay the tenant compensation and exemplary damages of $2,520.44, that W Smith was also landlord and the application by the landlord for compensation of $650.00 was withdrawn.
The same day M Roberts applied for a rehearing on the grounds that she did not know what was going on during the hearing, was nervous and had further evidence.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons Maddi Roberts has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. b. The tenant did not want a rehearing. c. Although the landlord may not have understood very well the Tribunal process, she was not disadvantaged in any way. d. The landlord had a support person with her and an interpreter available to her. e. In addition, the landlord was offered an adjournment to allow her to obtain further evidence, which she declined. f. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the initial hearings and both parties had the opportunity to do this. g. Granting a rehearing on the basis of the limited and less than compelling new evidence provided by the landlord would amount to a de nova re- litigation of the merits of the case.
It is unfortunate that the witness whom the landlord advised she had brought with her to the rehearing hearing was not available in the waiting room when the Registrar checked, twice.
The fact that the landlord was unable to remember withdrawing her compensation application at the original hearing is also unfortunate.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, and a rehearing is not appropriate.
The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between landlords and tenants.
If the landlord does not agree with the decision of the Tribunal the appropriate course of action would be an appeal, and I note that the landlord confirmed she had received legal advice.
As the tenant was granted name suppression in the Order dated 29 August 2024, I have continued that suppression.

Order

The application for rehearing by Maddi Roberts is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On 29 August 2024 the Tribunal made an order that the landlord pay the tenant compensation and exemplary damages of $2,520.44, that W Smith was also landlord and the application by the landlord for compensation of $650.00 was withdrawn.
The same day M Roberts applied for a rehearing on the grounds that she did not know what was going on during the hearing, was nervous and had further evidence.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons Maddi Roberts has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. b. The tenant did not want a rehearing. c. Although the landlord may not have understood very well the Tribunal process, she was not disadvantaged in any way. d. The landlord had a support person with her and an interpreter available to her. e. In addition, the landlord was offered an adjournment to allow her to obtain further evidence, which she declined. f. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the initial hearings and both parties had the opportunity to do this. g. Granting a rehearing on the basis of the limited and less than compelling new evidence provided by the landlord would amount to a de nova re- litigation of the merits of the case.
It is unfortunate that the witness whom the landlord advised she had brought with her to the rehearing hearing was not available in the waiting room when the Registrar checked, twice.
The fact that the landlord was unable to remember withdrawing her compensation application at the original hearing is also unfortunate.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, and a rehearing is not appropriate.
The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between landlords and tenants.
If the landlord does not agree with the decision of the Tribunal the appropriate course of action would be an appeal, and I note that the landlord confirmed she had received legal advice.
As the tenant was granted name suppression in the Order dated 29 August 2024, I have continued that suppression.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4894446 — Exemplary damages at 17 Haig Street, Mornington, Dunedin 9011

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 4894446 — Exemplary damages at 17 Haig Street, Mornington, Dunedin 9011

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions