What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4933174 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4933174?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4933174?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4933174?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12909456-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4933174 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4933174?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4933174?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4933174?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12909456-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

110 Chapel Road, Flat Bush, Auckland 2019 Tenancy Tribunal Case 4933174 — Tenancy dispute

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenants and witnesses’ name and identifying details as per the orders of the 28 September 2025
The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing consideration hearing held on the 26 November 2025.
On 28 September 2025 the Tribunal made orders. One of the orders made was The names of the landlord and any person who worked for Barfoot & Thompson are not suppressed. The reasons given in the decision for this order were set out at paragraph 99 of the decision:
The landlord also sought name suppression for the property manager Ms Chiu and Ms Luan. I decline name suppression for the landlord and the property managers for the following reasons: a. It is in the public interest to know the names and identities of property managers who the Tribunal has made finding of facts against. This allows members of the public to make informed decisions when choosing a rental. b. These managers were tasked with defending these claims and they failed to produce documents when requested and told the Tribunal that they had no record of previous complaints from previous tenants when that was blatantly incorrect.
On the 6 October 2025 the respondents applied for a rehearing solely relating to the above order only: The respondents say in its application: The law relating to rehearings.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error e.g. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Having considered all the evidence and submissions I am not satisfied that the serious wrong or miscarriage of justice is likely to occur I say this for the following reasons: Insufficient time and unfair process. a. At the end of the hearing, I gave both parties sufficient time to address me on the issue of name suppression. The issue of name suppression was live throughout the numerous hearings in respect of this case. The landlord could have made submissions in writing about name suppression at any time before the conclusion of the hearings and had a specific opportunity to address me on name suppression at the end of the hearings. The agent made submissions that she wanted her name and the names of Barfoot and Thompson, or their employees suppressed. b. At the end of the substantive hearing, I repeatedly asked the parties if there was anything else they wanted to add. Ms Luan had ample opportunity to address me on this point again at that time if she had anything further to add. Ms Luan did not seek further time to file written submissions on the issue of name suppression. c. Ms Luan and Ms O’Callaghan acknowledged at the rehearing consideration hearing that Ms Luan had been a senior property manger for years and that she had discussed the claim before attending the hearings with Ms O’Callaghan as legal counsel for Barfoot and Thompson. As such I consider that Barfoot and Thompson should have anticipated the issue of name suppression and prepared accordingly. d. The landlord submits that I should have allowed further time for each party to file written submissions on suppression. I disagree, the landlord is a professional landlord who is regularly in front of the Tribunal. The landlord should have prepared for submissions on this point. The Tribunal is required to deal with its claims expeditiously. This matter had already had numerous hearings. It would have further delayed the hearing to allow written submissions on this issue.

Were relevant factors not considered?

e. Section 95A requires the Tribunal to: The Tribunal may, on the application of any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. The submissions made by Barfoot and Thompson are the Tribunal erred in decision because it failed to take into account relevant evidence or legal principles are in effect submissions that the Tribunal got it wrong. A challenge to the Tribunal’s findings is not a matter for rehearing it is a matter for appeal. In any case the reasons at paragraph 99 of my decision clearly show that I took into account the named parties private interests and balanced those with the public interest as I was required to do under s95A. f. There is no special right to suppression given to employees of a landlord pursuant to s 95A. The starting point in all Tribunal hearings is that they are in public, and all names will be published unless the winning party has requested suppression. g. The purpose of s95A is to ensure that those parties that are successful in bringing claims to the Tribunal are not jeopardised by having their names published. It means that parties can bring claims to the Tribunal and if successful ensure that there are no ongoing repercussions for them. The corollary is true as well ,parties who are unsuccessful should expect that their names are published, unless there are special reasons that they should not be.

Was evidence of the previous tenancy improperly considered?

h. Again, this is a challenge to the decision of the Tribunal. The tenant’s submitted evidence relating to the previous tenancy well in advance of the hearing. The landlord should have considered this evidence before the hearing.

The landlord’s claim for a rehearing is dismissed.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenants and witnesses’ name and identifying details as per the orders of the 28 September 2025
The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing consideration hearing held on the 26 November 2025.
On 28 September 2025 the Tribunal made orders. One of the orders made was The names of the landlord and any person who worked for Barfoot & Thompson are not suppressed. The reasons given in the decision for this order were set out at paragraph 99 of the decision:
The landlord also sought name suppression for the property manager Ms Chiu and Ms Luan. I decline name suppression for the landlord and the property managers for the following reasons: a. It is in the public interest to know the names and identities of property managers who the Tribunal has made finding of facts against. This allows members of the public to make informed decisions when choosing a rental. b. These managers were tasked with defending these claims and they failed to produce documents when requested and told the Tribunal that they had no record of previous complaints from previous tenants when that was blatantly incorrect.
On the 6 October 2025 the respondents applied for a rehearing solely relating to the above order only: The respondents say in its application: The law relating to rehearings.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error e.g. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Having considered all the evidence and submissions I am not satisfied that the serious wrong or miscarriage of justice is likely to occur I say this for the following reasons: Insufficient time and unfair process. a. At the end of the hearing, I gave both parties sufficient time to address me on the issue of name suppression. The issue of name suppression was live throughout the numerous hearings in respect of this case. The landlord could have made submissions in writing about name suppression at any time before the conclusion of the hearings and had a specific opportunity to address me on name suppression at the end of the hearings. The agent made submissions that she wanted her name and the names of Barfoot and Thompson, or their employees suppressed. b. At the end of the substantive hearing, I repeatedly asked the parties if there was anything else they wanted to add. Ms Luan had ample opportunity to address me on this point again at that time if she had anything further to add. Ms Luan did not seek further time to file written submissions on the issue of name suppression. c. Ms Luan and Ms O’Callaghan acknowledged at the rehearing consideration hearing that Ms Luan had been a senior property manger for years and that she had discussed the claim before attending the hearings with Ms O’Callaghan as legal counsel for Barfoot and Thompson. As such I consider that Barfoot and Thompson should have anticipated the issue of name suppression and prepared accordingly. d. The landlord submits that I should have allowed further time for each party to file written submissions on suppression. I disagree, the landlord is a professional landlord who is regularly in front of the Tribunal. The landlord should have prepared for submissions on this point. The Tribunal is required to deal with its claims expeditiously. This matter had already had numerous hearings. It would have further delayed the hearing to allow written submissions on this issue.

Were relevant factors not considered?

Was evidence of the previous tenancy improperly considered?

The landlord’s claim for a rehearing is dismissed.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4933174 — Tenancy dispute at 110 Chapel Road, Flat Bush, Auckland 2019

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 4933174 — Tenancy dispute at 110 Chapel Road, Flat Bush, Auckland 2019

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Were relevant factors not considered?

Was evidence of the previous tenancy improperly considered?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Were relevant factors not considered?

Was evidence of the previous tenancy improperly considered?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions