What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4943713 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4943713?

E In This Case, And The Tribunal Ord…: $337.88 awarded to tenant

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4943713?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4943713?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11779341-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4943713 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4943713?

E In This Case, And The Tribunal Ord…: $337.88 awarded to tenant

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4943713?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4943713?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11779341-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 4943713 — Tenancy dispute

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4943713 — net $337.88 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Tenant	Reason
e in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details. 2. Eun Lee to pay [The	$337.88	e in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details. 2. Eun Lee to pay [The
Net award	$337.88
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant	$337.88

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details.
Eun Lee to pay [The tenant/s] $337.88 immediately, representing the successful parties costs in connection with the proceedings.

Reasons

After considering the parties’ detailed submissions, the relevant law, and the background to this dispute, I decline the parties respective costs claims and award the tenant limited disbursements of $327.88.
At first glance I considered the Tenant unwise in declining the Calderbank offer (Draft Deed) of 21 October 2024 and was inclined to award costs against him. The settlement sum offered exceeded the sum I ultimately awarded, and litigation risk is never trivial.
However, I have carefully reviewed the relevant authorities, and have endeavoured to provide a careful and balanced decision showing why the applicable cost principles require me not to award costs against the Tenant in this case. Tribunal framework for costs
Section 102 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) tightly circumscribes when the Tribunal may award costs. Because the Landlord was represented by counsel, I do have jurisdiction under s 102(2)(b) to order costs. However, the section is discretionary: even where jurisdiction exists the Tribunal must be satisfied it is “appropriate” to make an order. The usual practice, endorsed in cases such as Holden Architectural Finishes 1 and French v Ryan, 2 is that a successful party receives at most a reasonable contribution to actual costs, and only where that contribution is justified in all the circumstances of the case.
The Landlord seeks $8,654.51, 80 percent of the legal fees incurred after 21 October 2024. She says the tenant behaved unreasonably by rejecting three “without-prejudice save as to costs” (“Calderbank”) offers made on 1 October, 15 October and 21 October 2024. The last of those offers would have seen the Tenant receiving $6,000 if he vacated within three weeks and abandoned all his Tribunal claims. Counsel argues that because that sum was higher than the $3,870.44 awarded at the rehearing, the Tenant should now pay most of the Landlord’s lawyer’s bill. Why those offers do not justify shifting costs
The Tribunal must decide whether, viewed at the time and in context, it was unreasonable for the tenant to refuse the Landlord’s settlement offers. Several factors are decisive.
The Courts treat Calderbank offers through the lens of reasonableness at the time, not with hindsight. In Bowden v Bowden the offer remained open for five weeks, gave the appellant “ample opportunity” to take advice and was “in hindsight ... generous”; Mander J held that, because it would have left her markedly better-off, “there was no reasonable justification for rejecting the offer” and ordinary costs were uplifted. 3 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd provides a practical checklist: when weighing a refusal the judge looks at (among other things) the size and timing of the offer, the parties’ ability to assess merit, preparation already done, and whether the case turned on uncertain law; the touch-stone is whether rejection “unnecessarily contributed to the time or expense of the proceeding”. 4 1 Holden Architectural Finishes Ltd v Holden [1997] 3 NZLR at 149-153. 2 French v Ryan [2011] NZDC 160, [2011] DCR 542. 3 Bowden v Bowden [2017] NZHC 1841 at [27]–[31]. 4 Weaver v Auckland Council [2016] NZHC 473 at [30]–[34]. Key guides to “reasonableness” include: (1) how the offer compares with likely party-and-party costs; (2) its proportion to the total claim; (3) what a rational litigant with the facts then known could expect to gain; (4) how far trial preparation had progressed; (5) any legal uncertainty; (6) the parties’ ability, given the information then available, to evaluate strengths and weaknesses; (7) the timing of the proposal; and (8) whether the offeror’s conduct promoted genuine compromise.
The first point is timing. The High Court in Bloor v IAG NZ Ltd 5 confirms that a two-day acceptance window is ordinarily inadequate even for represented parties. Magnify that difficulty for a self-represented renter with caregiving duties and the reasonableness of rejection becomes still clearer.
The $6,000 deed was not tabled until 21 October 2024 - at most, but likely less than, 48 hours before the scheduled merits hearing on 23 October 2024. The Applicant, confronted with a solicitor’s letter and a dense draft settlement deed that demanded vacant possession within 21 days, bond surrender and waivers, had no realistic chance to analyse the risks, obtain advice, or caucus with whānau and make an informed decision before the scheduled hearing. The Tenant’s instinct to press on to the hearing was understandable.
Context is important. Until mid-October the Landlord’s position was that the Act did not apply, her termination notices were valid, and she was not liable for any unlawful act (exemplary-damages). The Landlord relied on a clause of the flat- sharing agreement which purported to exclude the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, later found to be a prohibited transaction. With the legal ground still shifting, any settlement figure was impossible to precisely benchmark. The deed also required the Tenant to sacrifice his $1,000 bond, quit the premises within three weeks, and relieve the landlord of all statutory liability. For a working parent conducting his own case, and struggling to secure pro-bono advice, accepting such terms inside two days would have been impractical and risky. Add to this, the Tenant was already under significant pressure, having had his tenancy terminated (unlawfully), and he did not trust the Landlord.
The Landlord did not offer to set aside the invalid notices and continue the tenancy or change their conduct. If the Landlord had taken steps towards restoring their relationship with the Tenant and undoing the hardship caused, quite possibly the matter could have resolved without Tribunal intervention.
The Landlord’s earlier offers were no better. The 1 October deed proposed a “walk-away” at nil compensation; the 15 October version dangled $4,000 but still insisted on bond forfeiture and immediate departure. Signing any of the draft deeds would have buried public scrutiny and the Tenant’s attempts to obtain formal vindication after three invalid termination notices.
A litigant who spurns a generous, timely offer may be penalised, but the yardstick is always whether refusal “unnecessarily contributed to the time or expense of the proceeding”. Here, given the unresolved jurisdictional issue and the terms and circumstances surrounding the Landlord’s offers, rejection did not meet that threshold. 5 Bloor v IAG NZ Ltd [2007] NZHC 625.
The parties’ relative knowledge is another factor. The Landlord, advised by counsel, who demonstrated, in my estimation, a high level of organisation and competence during the hearing, should have known the true strength of the Tenant’s exemplary damages claims and the defects in her notices. The Tenant could not be said to have the same knowledge, and his unchallenged evidence suggests he did, albeit unsuccessfully, search for legal advice and representation. That information asymmetry undercuts any suggestion that his refusal was cynical or tactical.
The Landlord’s own conduct drove much of the avoidable cost: three invalid notices, a bond in limbo for 17 months, and a basement “flat-mate” contract designed to sidestep the Act. Those mis-steps required a rehearing and a District-Court appeal, on every point of which the Tenant ultimately prevailed. To shift 80 per cent of the Landlord’s legal bill onto the successful party would invert the usual rule that costs follow the event and would sit uneasily with s 102’s “appropriate in the circumstances” test.
I turn briefly to the parties’ attempt to settle while the Tribunal stood down midway through the hearing so they could confer privately.
I was not privy to those discussions and do not know what, if anything, was offered. Because the conversation was expressly “without prejudice”, it plays no part in my factual findings or the costs analysis. All that can be said is that, notwithstanding that opportunity, no agreement was reached; the dispute therefore had to be determined on the pleadings and evidence already before the Tribunal.
Conversely, the modest outlays the tenant was forced to incur are plainly recoverable under s 102(3)(b): a. District-Court appeal filing fee $260.00 b. Three Tenancy-Tribunal filing fees $67.88
Those sums are plainly “costs ... in connection with the proceedings” within s 102(3)(b) and, because he was wholly successful, their reimbursement aligns with s 102(4)(a).
I trust this explanation makes clear why, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Landlord does not succeed on costs.

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4943713 — net $337.88 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Tenant	Reason
e in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details. 2. Eun Lee to pay [The	$337.88	e in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details. 2. Eun Lee to pay [The
Net award	$337.88
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant	$337.88

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the [Tenant] name and identifying details.
Eun Lee to pay [The tenant/s] $337.88 immediately, representing the successful parties costs in connection with the proceedings.

Reasons

After considering the parties’ detailed submissions, the relevant law, and the background to this dispute, I decline the parties respective costs claims and award the tenant limited disbursements of $327.88.
At first glance I considered the Tenant unwise in declining the Calderbank offer (Draft Deed) of 21 October 2024 and was inclined to award costs against him. The settlement sum offered exceeded the sum I ultimately awarded, and litigation risk is never trivial.
However, I have carefully reviewed the relevant authorities, and have endeavoured to provide a careful and balanced decision showing why the applicable cost principles require me not to award costs against the Tenant in this case. Tribunal framework for costs
Section 102 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) tightly circumscribes when the Tribunal may award costs. Because the Landlord was represented by counsel, I do have jurisdiction under s 102(2)(b) to order costs. However, the section is discretionary: even where jurisdiction exists the Tribunal must be satisfied it is “appropriate” to make an order. The usual practice, endorsed in cases such as Holden Architectural Finishes 1 and French v Ryan, 2 is that a successful party receives at most a reasonable contribution to actual costs, and only where that contribution is justified in all the circumstances of the case.
The Landlord seeks $8,654.51, 80 percent of the legal fees incurred after 21 October 2024. She says the tenant behaved unreasonably by rejecting three “without-prejudice save as to costs” (“Calderbank”) offers made on 1 October, 15 October and 21 October 2024. The last of those offers would have seen the Tenant receiving $6,000 if he vacated within three weeks and abandoned all his Tribunal claims. Counsel argues that because that sum was higher than the $3,870.44 awarded at the rehearing, the Tenant should now pay most of the Landlord’s lawyer’s bill. Why those offers do not justify shifting costs
The Tribunal must decide whether, viewed at the time and in context, it was unreasonable for the tenant to refuse the Landlord’s settlement offers. Several factors are decisive.
The Courts treat Calderbank offers through the lens of reasonableness at the time, not with hindsight. In Bowden v Bowden the offer remained open for five weeks, gave the appellant “ample opportunity” to take advice and was “in hindsight ... generous”; Mander J held that, because it would have left her markedly better-off, “there was no reasonable justification for rejecting the offer” and ordinary costs were uplifted. 3 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd provides a practical checklist: when weighing a refusal the judge looks at (among other things) the size and timing of the offer, the parties’ ability to assess merit, preparation already done, and whether the case turned on uncertain law; the touch-stone is whether rejection “unnecessarily contributed to the time or expense of the proceeding”. 4 1 Holden Architectural Finishes Ltd v Holden [1997] 3 NZLR at 149-153. 2 French v Ryan [2011] NZDC 160, [2011] DCR 542. 3 Bowden v Bowden [2017] NZHC 1841 at [27]–[31]. 4 Weaver v Auckland Council [2016] NZHC 473 at [30]–[34]. Key guides to “reasonableness” include: (1) how the offer compares with likely party-and-party costs; (2) its proportion to the total claim; (3) what a rational litigant with the facts then known could expect to gain; (4) how far trial preparation had progressed; (5) any legal uncertainty; (6) the parties’ ability, given the information then available, to evaluate strengths and weaknesses; (7) the timing of the proposal; and (8) whether the offeror’s conduct promoted genuine compromise.
The first point is timing. The High Court in Bloor v IAG NZ Ltd 5 confirms that a two-day acceptance window is ordinarily inadequate even for represented parties. Magnify that difficulty for a self-represented renter with caregiving duties and the reasonableness of rejection becomes still clearer.
The $6,000 deed was not tabled until 21 October 2024 - at most, but likely less than, 48 hours before the scheduled merits hearing on 23 October 2024. The Applicant, confronted with a solicitor’s letter and a dense draft settlement deed that demanded vacant possession within 21 days, bond surrender and waivers, had no realistic chance to analyse the risks, obtain advice, or caucus with whānau and make an informed decision before the scheduled hearing. The Tenant’s instinct to press on to the hearing was understandable.
Context is important. Until mid-October the Landlord’s position was that the Act did not apply, her termination notices were valid, and she was not liable for any unlawful act (exemplary-damages). The Landlord relied on a clause of the flat- sharing agreement which purported to exclude the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, later found to be a prohibited transaction. With the legal ground still shifting, any settlement figure was impossible to precisely benchmark. The deed also required the Tenant to sacrifice his $1,000 bond, quit the premises within three weeks, and relieve the landlord of all statutory liability. For a working parent conducting his own case, and struggling to secure pro-bono advice, accepting such terms inside two days would have been impractical and risky. Add to this, the Tenant was already under significant pressure, having had his tenancy terminated (unlawfully), and he did not trust the Landlord.
The Landlord did not offer to set aside the invalid notices and continue the tenancy or change their conduct. If the Landlord had taken steps towards restoring their relationship with the Tenant and undoing the hardship caused, quite possibly the matter could have resolved without Tribunal intervention.
The Landlord’s earlier offers were no better. The 1 October deed proposed a “walk-away” at nil compensation; the 15 October version dangled $4,000 but still insisted on bond forfeiture and immediate departure. Signing any of the draft deeds would have buried public scrutiny and the Tenant’s attempts to obtain formal vindication after three invalid termination notices.
A litigant who spurns a generous, timely offer may be penalised, but the yardstick is always whether refusal “unnecessarily contributed to the time or expense of the proceeding”. Here, given the unresolved jurisdictional issue and the terms and circumstances surrounding the Landlord’s offers, rejection did not meet that threshold. 5 Bloor v IAG NZ Ltd [2007] NZHC 625.
The parties’ relative knowledge is another factor. The Landlord, advised by counsel, who demonstrated, in my estimation, a high level of organisation and competence during the hearing, should have known the true strength of the Tenant’s exemplary damages claims and the defects in her notices. The Tenant could not be said to have the same knowledge, and his unchallenged evidence suggests he did, albeit unsuccessfully, search for legal advice and representation. That information asymmetry undercuts any suggestion that his refusal was cynical or tactical.
The Landlord’s own conduct drove much of the avoidable cost: three invalid notices, a bond in limbo for 17 months, and a basement “flat-mate” contract designed to sidestep the Act. Those mis-steps required a rehearing and a District-Court appeal, on every point of which the Tenant ultimately prevailed. To shift 80 per cent of the Landlord’s legal bill onto the successful party would invert the usual rule that costs follow the event and would sit uneasily with s 102’s “appropriate in the circumstances” test.
I turn briefly to the parties’ attempt to settle while the Tribunal stood down midway through the hearing so they could confer privately.
I was not privy to those discussions and do not know what, if anything, was offered. Because the conversation was expressly “without prejudice”, it plays no part in my factual findings or the costs analysis. All that can be said is that, notwithstanding that opportunity, no agreement was reached; the dispute therefore had to be determined on the pleadings and evidence already before the Tribunal.
Conversely, the modest outlays the tenant was forced to incur are plainly recoverable under s 102(3)(b): a. District-Court appeal filing fee $260.00 b. Three Tenancy-Tribunal filing fees $67.88
Those sums are plainly “costs ... in connection with the proceedings” within s 102(3)(b) and, because he was wholly successful, their reimbursement aligns with s 102(4)(a).
I trust this explanation makes clear why, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Landlord does not succeed on costs.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4943713 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 4943713 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions