What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5013588?

The tribunal order states: The application by the tenant for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5013588?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5013588?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5013588?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11235193-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5013588?

The tribunal order states: The application by the tenant for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5013588?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5013588?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5013588?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11235193-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

45 Garfield Avenue, Roslyn, Dunedin 9010 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5013588 — Tenancy dispute

Order

The application by the tenant for a rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing, the tenant by telephone.
On 13 November the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application for a reduction in the term of the fixed term tenancy.
The same day the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.
The tenant was particularly unhappy because she felt her health issues and the fact she could not afford to live at the property had not been considered.
In support of the application for rehearing the tenant’s grandmother provided an email about what she believed was a “Mistrial of Justice”.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case, Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the tenant disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. b. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the initial hearings and both parties had the opportunity to do this. c. Although the evidence provided by the tenant about her successful application for withdrawal from the University following the death of her grandmother on 17 November 2024 was new, I do not consider this evidence would have affected the outcome. d. While I acknowledge the bereavement did significantly affect the tenant, the evidence does not support that it was an unforeseen change in her circumstances. e. Financial hardship by itself is not a ground for the Tribunal to reduce the term of a fixed term tenancy. f. The landlord did not want a rehearing.

Order

The application by the tenant for a rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing, the tenant by telephone.
On 13 November the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application for a reduction in the term of the fixed term tenancy.
The same day the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.
The tenant was particularly unhappy because she felt her health issues and the fact she could not afford to live at the property had not been considered.
In support of the application for rehearing the tenant’s grandmother provided an email about what she believed was a “Mistrial of Justice”.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case, Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the tenant disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. b. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the initial hearings and both parties had the opportunity to do this. c. Although the evidence provided by the tenant about her successful application for withdrawal from the University following the death of her grandmother on 17 November 2024 was new, I do not consider this evidence would have affected the outcome. d. While I acknowledge the bereavement did significantly affect the tenant, the evidence does not support that it was an unforeseen change in her circumstances. e. Financial hardship by itself is not a ground for the Tribunal to reduce the term of a fixed term tenancy. f. The landlord did not want a rehearing.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5013588 — Tenancy dispute at 45 Garfield Avenue, Roslyn, Dunedin 9010

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5013588 — Tenancy dispute at 45 Garfield Avenue, Roslyn, Dunedin 9010

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions