What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5029228 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5029228?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5029228?

The primary dispute was Smoke alarms. Related themes: Healthy homes.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5029228?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12613480-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5029228 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5029228?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5029228?

The primary dispute was Smoke alarms. Related themes: Healthy homes.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5029228?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12613480-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

Unit/Flat Flat 1, 14 Benygloe Place, Highland Park, Tenancy Tribunal Case 5029228 — Smoke alarms

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant’s and Landlord’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings issued on 29 July 2025 is lifted. The original order dated 14 July 2025 is enforceable in its original form.

Reasons

On 14 July 2025, the Tribunal made an order requiring the landlord to pay the tenant $5,826.02 for various breaches of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA).
On 21 July 2025, the landlord applied for a rehearing.
A consideration hearing was originally scheduled for 30 September 2025. The hearing was adjourned to 23 October 2025 at the landlord’s request.
Both parties attended the hearing on 23 October 2025. [The landlord] appeared on behalf of the landlord and was assisted by a Mandarin interpreter. [The tenant] attended the hearing.

Should a rehearing be granted?

The law

Section 105(1) RTA provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made. Analysis
The landlord claims a rehearing should be granted for the following reasons: a. The Tribunal was wrong in its finding that the landlord breached their obligations under the Residential Tenancies (Smoke Alarms and Insulation) Regulations 2016. b. The Tribunal was wrong in its finding that the termination notice was retaliatory. c. The Tribunal was in its finding that the landlord terminated the tenancy without grounds.
[The landlord] claims it was the tenant’s responsibility to change the batteries in the smoke alarm. Further, [the landlord] claims the tenant purposely removed the smoke alarm from the ceiling. [The landlord] claims her husband, [the landlord], was present during interactions with the tenant about the smoke alarm and is able to give evidence to support these claims.
The reason I found the landlord failed to comply with the Residential Tenancies (Smoke Alarms and Insulation) Regulations 2016 during the tenancy, was because I found the smoke alarm would not attach to the ceiling correctly. I found the landlord knew about this on 3 September 2023 when the tenant sent the landlord a text advising them of the problem. I found the landlord did not fix the smoke alarm to ensure it attached to the ceiling correctly by the end of the tenancy on 26 October 2024. This is the basis upon which I found the landlord did not comply with the smoke alarm regulations, not the batteries.
[The landlord] is a landlord party to these proceedings and did not to attend the hearing in person. I gave [the landlord] an opportunity to call [the landlord] to give evidence on the issue of smoke alarms during the hearing however, he did not answer the phone. No written evidence from [the landlord] was submitted either.
The landlord knew about the hearing and the nature of the tenant’s claims as early as 28 March 2025. This is the date I issued an order clarifying the parties’ claims. The hearing took place on: a. 30 May 2025. b. 13 June 2025. c. 16 June 2025.
The landlord had more than enough time between 28 March 2025 and the dates of the hearing to prepare a response to the tenant’s claims and consider whether they needed to attend the hearing in person, make themselves available by telephone to give evidence or submit a written statement. No good reason was given as to why [the landlord] could not attend the hearing in person, give evidence by telephone or submit a written statement. An example of what might constitute a good reason would be if [the landlord] was in hospital at the time.
The evidence that [the landlord] can apparently give on the issue of the smoke alarm is not new, nor is it evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing.
The purpose of a rehearing is not to give a party a second opportunity to present their case, which is what the landlord appears to be trying to do.
The landlord also claims that I was wrong to conclude that the notice terminating the tenancy was retaliatory or that the landlord terminated the tenancy without grounds.
The landlord disagrees with my findings on these issues for a number of reasons, including: a. The landlord claims they completed repairs at the premises without complaint. The cost to complete the repairs and make the premises compliant with the healthy homes standards was minimal. The landlord claims it does not make sense that they would terminate an 11 year tenancy in response to a request for repairs that were not expensive. b. The landlord also claims I was wrong to find that their plans for their parents to travel back with them from China to New Zealand were uncertain. The landlord claims they were 99% certain their parents would travel back to New Zealand with them from China and live at the tenancy address for 6 months. The landlord claims they would not have purchased tickets to fly to Queenstown and booked accommodation if this were not the case.
None of these reasons amount to a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. This is because they reflect a disagreement with the findings of the Tribunal. As the District Court noted in Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, the words in section 105 RTA “do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law.”
The landlord received the notice of hearing and the tenant’s application well in advance of the hearing. A case conference was held on 28 March 2025 to clarify the parties’ claims. The landlord was aware of the nature of the tenant’s claims in advance of the hearing and had sufficient time to prepare a response and make themselves available to participate. [The landlord] attended the hearing and was assisted by a Mandarin interpreter. Nothing went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure in the lead up to or during the hearing that would warrant a rehearing being granted.
For all of these reasons, I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred.
The landlord’s application for a rehearing is dismissed and the stay of proceedings is lifted.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5029228 — Smoke alarms at Unit/Flat Flat 1, 14 Benygloe Place, Highland Park,

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5029228 — Smoke alarms at Unit/Flat Flat 1, 14 Benygloe Place, Highland Park,

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions