What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5047728 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders continued non-publication of the Tenant’s name and

How much money was awarded in case 5047728?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5047728?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: Healthy homes, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5047728?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11956183-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5047728 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders continued non-publication of the Tenant’s name and

How much money was awarded in case 5047728?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5047728?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: Healthy homes, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5047728?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11956183-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5047728 — Rent arrears

Order

The Tribunal orders continued non-publication of the Tenant’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
An order is made restraining Ranolf Trust (Trustees: Stephen Chiman Bhana & Jasu Mati Bhana) as trustees and in their personal capacity or as controlling individuals, from committing further unlawful acts under: a. s 13A(1) (failure to provide an accurate chattels list), b. s 13A(1CA)(b) and s 13A(1F)(b) (failure to give, or giving false, Healthy Homes information), c. s 45(1A) and s 45(2) (failure to maintain and interference with services), and d. s 46 (failure to provide or maintain reasonable security) – for a period of six (6) years from the date of this Order, pursuant to s 109A RTA.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing fixture on 28 May 2025. Stephen Chiman Bhana and Jasu Mati Bhana appeared for the Landlord, Ranolf Trust. The Tenant appeared with her representative, [redacted].
On 19 March 2025 the Tribunal heard from the parties. By written order dated 28 March 2025 the Tribunal: a. awarded rent arrears of $2,110.00 after a global rent abatement; b. awarded the Tenant $10,877.00 in exemplary damages, plus the filing fee; c. directed that the $2,500.00 bond be refunded to the Tenant; and d. adjourned the Tenant's s 109A application for 120 minutes of further hearing time.
On 4 April 2025 the Landlord applied for a rehearing on the following grounds: 1 a. both trustees were unwell on 19 March 2025 and therefore unable to present their evidence or respond fully to the Tenant's cross-application; b. the Tribunal relied on a Sustainability Options “Healthy Homes” report from an unqualified author and on Tenant text-messages which the Landlord was unable to challenge with reference to their own text messages and emails; c. additional contradictory evidence now exists but could not be filed within the seven-day post-hearing timetable because of the trustees' ill-health; and d. the absence of that evidence has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and reputational harm to the Trust and its beneficiaries.
Section 105(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act (the Act) empowers the Tribunal to order a rehearing where “...a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The party seeking a rehearing must ordinarily demonstrate a procedural fault such as lack of notice or an inability to be heard, or new evidence that was genuinely unavailable and could reasonably have affected the outcome. A rehearing is not an appeal in disguise: Wellington City Council v McMillan DC Wellington CIV-2011-085-62 (15 December 2011) at [22]-[24].

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The Landlord's application fails to meet the statutory threshold for the following reasons. Adequate notice and opportunity to be heard:
The chronology shows five earlier fixtures, together with my notes in connection with those events: a. 13 November 2024: Both parties present; Landlord sought adjournment citing diverticulitis. Adjourned; Tribunal directed Landlord to appoint a representative. 1 Grounds as stated in submissions filed in support of Appeal/Rehearing and some raised in oral submissions at the rehearing consideration. b. 16 January 2025: 2 Landlord appeared by telephone, again unwell. Adjourned at 1 pm to allow medical appointment; hearing resumed; Landlord too unwell to continue; adjourned part heard. c. 5 February 2025: 3 Landlord requested adjournment for ill-health; confirmed both trustees would be ready late February. Adjourned. Mr Steens to seek hearing date on 5 March 2025 – no guarantees given as scheduling sits with the schedulers. d. 5 March 2025: A tentative hearing date, which could not in the end be scheduled because Mr Bhana did not communicate his availability to the registry. Parties were advised of next event date on 19 March 2025. e. 19 March 2025: Both parties present in person. The Landlord sought another adjournment: co-trustee ill; Mr Bhana had an eye graze diagnosed as conjunctivitis. Adjournment declined. Mr Bhana objected to hearing s 109A issue as he claimed he was not given notice of it. Substantive hearing proceeded. Section 109A issue adjourned to further hearing at future date to be confirmed.
Across four adjournments the Tribunal has tried to strike a fair balance between sympathy for the Landlord’s health issues against the Tenant's right to timely justice (see March Order at [15]-[16]). Each adjournment was granted on the Landlord's terms, and each came with clear directions to marshal evidence or appoint a representative. The Landlord chose not to comply.
At the 19 March hearing Mr Bhana confirmed that (i) key information was “on his phone or in his head,” and (ii) no one else had been authorised to present it. That was a conscious election, not a procedural deprivation or irregularity. The trustees’ present insistence that they “will be ready soon” merely repeats assurances made in November 2024, January 2025 and February 2025. The right to justice – which includes the right to be heard – safeguarded by s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, is to a fair opportunity, not limitless postponements: s 85(1)-(2) Act.
In declining the Landlord’s 19 March adjournment request, I followed the approach subsequently approved by Judge Clark in Robinson v Natali [2025] NZDC 9589. His Honour held that under s 85(1) - (2) RTA, the Tribunal must balance fairness with the statutory mandate for “expeditious resolution” and is therefore justified in refusing further postponements once a party has already had reasonable opportunity to prepare. 4 2 Tribunal Order erroneously dated 13 November 2024 (issued 23 January 2025) 3 Tribunal Order 8 February 2025. 4 Robinson v Natali [2025] NZDC 9589 at [66]–[70], [97]. New or unavailable evidence:
The Landlord says it now holds: a. a contrary expert opinion on Healthy Homes compliance (not provided at the rehearing consideration); and b. photographs and e-mails allegedly rebutting the Tenant's evidence (not provided at the rehearing consideration).
Both categories could, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained before 19 March 2025, and before the rehearing consideration on 28 May 2025.
The alleged Healthy Homes works were, by the Landlord’s own submission, completed prior to the Sustainability Options inspection (said to have occurred after notice was given). Therefore, any compliance certificate, invoice or contractor statement was within grasp of the Landlord at all times during the proceedings.
Photographs of the property at commencement were specifically directed by the Tribunal on 13 November 2024 and again on 16 January 2025. None were produced.
The Landlord’s new material is therefore not new evidence not reasonably available at the first hearing. It is late evidence the Landlord declined or failed to gather despite four adjournments and explicit directions. That does not justify a rehearing: see McMillan at [26]-[28]. Alleged reliance on unqualified expert and Tenant texts
The March Order expressly records (at [38]-[41], [46]-[48]) that the adjudicator relied on multiple strands: the Sustainability Options report and timestamped photographs, oral evidence of the Tenant, and the Landlord's failure to comply with maintenance and repair obligations.
Whether the report writer held a formal Healthy Homes Standards (HHS) qualification was never raised at any hearing. The Tribunal assessed the photographs and the report’s findings, concluded the Landlord had broadly breached s 45, and applied a global award reflecting the Tenant’s pleaded losses rather than isolating individual HHS breaches per the legislation and regulations.
Disagreement with the weight given to evidence is a matter for appeal, not rehearing. No procedural flaw is identified. Ill-health preventing post-hearing evidence
The Landlord was granted a generous seven-day window after the hearing to file any outstanding documentation (March Order at [18], [32]). Yet it concedes in its District Court notice of appeal (11 April 2025) that “both health recoveries are imminent”. While the trustees’ health excuses some delay, it cannot justify six months of silence on the Tenant’s claims, after four adjournments 5 and a clear direction, in January 2024, to appoint a representative. The Landlord nevertheless sought yet another adjournment at the rehearing consideration, citing the same health complaints it raised at the hearing on 19 March 2025.
I dealt with the severity of the Landlord’s health complaints in my March Order, concluding that, although the Trustees’ conditions (one with conjunctivitis, the other absent due to a respiratory illness) it did not justify another adjournment given the repeated delays and his failure to appoint a representative.
In Chief Executive MBIE v Aquastar Holdings Ltd [2024] NZTT 4922273, the Landlord (Aquastar Holdings Limited, directed by Jasu Mati Bhana, a trustee of the present landlord), sought last-minute adjournments on grounds of ill health, offered no evidence, then sought a rehearing. Adjudicator Woodhouse declined the rehearing application, holding serial postponements did not amount to any "procedural error" or "substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice,” a view later upheld by the District Court on appeal.
Those same delays (or tactics) have been repeated in this matter, yet s 85 requires disputes to be resolved "fairly and expeditiously," and that is what I have proceeded to do based on the clear guidance set before me. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Landlord has been afforded repeated, fair opportunities over a period of more than six months to present evidence or to appoint an advocate.
Its continuing failure to do so is not the product of Tribunal error but of its own election. No procedural irregularity meeting the McMillan threshold has been established. The application is, in substance, an attempt to re-argue the merits of findings already made. That is an appeal point, not a ground for rehearing.
Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, may occur, or is likely to occur if the March Order stands.

Should the Landlord make a non-publication order in favour of the Landlord?

The adjudicator granted the Tenant’s application for name suppression based on their successful outcome pursuant to s 95A(1). The Landlord did not seek name suppression. 5 Five, if counting 5 March 2025.
At the rehearing I invited the Landlord to apply for name suppression, as both of the Landlord trustees said their previously good reputation had been damaged by negative media coverage.
Open justice underpins public confidence by ensuring that court proceedings remain transparent and accountable. The Tribunal may, in its discretion, order name suppression where it is satisfied, having weighed the parties’ interests against the public interest, that publication of an adverse decision could, for example, prejudice an individual’s right to a fair trial. 6
Although I acknowledge that the Landlord has endured abusive public commentary, including, as the Registry has let me know, an unacceptable call for the Landlord trustees’ deportation, apparently on racial grounds – such personal distress does not meet the statutory threshold for name suppression under s 95A(4), because the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the identities of landlords who have been found to breach their obligations under the Act. Should the Tribunal make a restraining order pursuant to s 109A, against the

Landlord?

If the Tribunal makes an order against a person under s 109 on the ground that the person has committed an unlawful act, the Tribunal may, if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, make an order restraining the person from committing a further act of the same kind: s 109A RTA
I have been asked to make a restraining order against the Landlord.
The Tenant’s representative has directed me to decisions where the Landlord has found to be in breach of the Act. 7 I have read these decisions. Although ss 13A(1), 13A(1CA)(b) and 13A(1F)(b) were not yet in force when those earlier cases were decided, the decisions still record persistent s 45 maintenance breaches that seriously compromised tenants’ health and safety, which resulted in awards of exemplary damages. Accordingly, the Tribunal has already imposed exemplary damages on the Ranolf Trust for a serious breach of s 45(1A).
A strikingly similar pattern was exposed in Chief Executive MBIE v Aquastar Holdings Ltd [2024] NZTT 4922273, where Adjudicator Woodhouse found repeated breaches of ss 45 and 13A and, after awarding exemplary damages, made a three-year restraining order under s 109A.
Aquastar is controlled by Jasu Mati Bhana, who is also a trustee of the present Landlord. To read s 109A as allowing the same decision-makers to escape restraint merely by operating through a fresh corporate wrapper would thwart its 6 [2026] NZTT 5050237 7 Kaki v Bhana and Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4081239; Munro v Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4071822/4065306; Whitney v Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4073102/4080105. deterrent purpose and perpetuate the very mischief – serial unlawful acts – that Parliament meant to prevent. There is therefore just cause in the present case to read s 109A as allowing courts to pierce the corporate veil. Of course, any prosecution for contravening a restraining order – and any question of personal liability – rests with the District Court under s 109A(4)–(5), but I consider the Tribunal may still frame the order so that it cannot be sidestepped by the same decision-makers acting through another landlord entity.
On that footing the Ranolf Trust “committed” the current unlawful acts through trustees, one of whom has already been restrained for identical misconduct, and I find that a new six-year s 109A order must issue against the Trust itself.
A six-year restraint therefore aligns with the ordinary six-year limitation period and is needed to protect future tenants throughout that entire window.
Any intentional contravention of this order within the six-year term is an offence under s 109A(4)–(5), punishable on conviction by a fine of up to $3,600.

Order

The Tribunal orders continued non-publication of the Tenant’s name and identifying details.

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

An order is made restraining Ranolf Trust (Trustees: Stephen Chiman Bhana & Jasu Mati Bhana) as trustees and in their personal capacity or as controlling individuals, from committing further unlawful acts under: a. s 13A(1) (failure to provide an accurate chattels list), b. s 13A(1CA)(b) and s 13A(1F)(b) (failure to give, or giving false, Healthy Homes information), c. s 45(1A) and s 45(2) (failure to maintain and interference with services), and d. s 46 (failure to provide or maintain reasonable security) – for a period of six (6) years from the date of this Order, pursuant to s 109A RTA.

Reasons

Both parties attended the rehearing fixture on 28 May 2025. Stephen Chiman Bhana and Jasu Mati Bhana appeared for the Landlord, Ranolf Trust. The Tenant appeared with her representative, [redacted].

On 19 March 2025 the Tribunal heard from the parties. By written order dated 28 March 2025 the Tribunal: a. awarded rent arrears of $2,110.00 after a global rent abatement; b. awarded the Tenant $10,877.00 in exemplary damages, plus the filing fee; c. directed that the $2,500.00 bond be refunded to the Tenant; and d. adjourned the Tenant's s 109A application for 120 minutes of further hearing time.

On 4 April 2025 the Landlord applied for a rehearing on the following grounds: 1 a. both trustees were unwell on 19 March 2025 and therefore unable to present their evidence or respond fully to the Tenant's cross-application; b. the Tribunal relied on a Sustainability Options “Healthy Homes” report from an unqualified author and on Tenant text-messages which the Landlord was unable to challenge with reference to their own text messages and emails; c. additional contradictory evidence now exists but could not be filed within the seven-day post-hearing timetable because of the trustees' ill-health; and d. the absence of that evidence has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and reputational harm to the Trust and its beneficiaries.

Section 105(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act (the Act) empowers the Tribunal to order a rehearing where “...a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.

The party seeking a rehearing must ordinarily demonstrate a procedural fault such as lack of notice or an inability to be heard, or new evidence that was genuinely unavailable and could reasonably have affected the outcome. A rehearing is not an appeal in disguise: Wellington City Council v McMillan DC Wellington CIV-2011-085-62 (15 December 2011) at [22]-[24].

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The Landlord's application fails to meet the statutory threshold for the following reasons. Adequate notice and opportunity to be heard:

The chronology shows five earlier fixtures, together with my notes in connection with those events: a. 13 November 2024: Both parties present; Landlord sought adjournment citing diverticulitis. Adjourned; Tribunal directed Landlord to appoint a representative. 1 Grounds as stated in submissions filed in support of Appeal/Rehearing and some raised in oral submissions at the rehearing consideration. b. 16 January 2025: 2 Landlord appeared by telephone, again unwell. Adjourned at 1 pm to allow medical appointment; hearing resumed; Landlord too unwell to continue; adjourned part heard. c. 5 February 2025: 3 Landlord requested adjournment for ill-health; confirmed both trustees would be ready late February. Adjourned. Mr Steens to seek hearing date on 5 March 2025 – no guarantees given as scheduling sits with the schedulers. d. 5 March 2025: A tentative hearing date, which could not in the end be scheduled because Mr Bhana did not communicate his availability to the registry. Parties were advised of next event date on 19 March 2025. e. 19 March 2025: Both parties present in person. The Landlord sought another adjournment: co-trustee ill; Mr Bhana had an eye graze diagnosed as conjunctivitis. Adjournment declined. Mr Bhana objected to hearing s 109A issue as he claimed he was not given notice of it. Substantive hearing proceeded. Section 109A issue adjourned to further hearing at future date to be confirmed.

Across four adjournments the Tribunal has tried to strike a fair balance between sympathy for the Landlord’s health issues against the Tenant's right to timely justice (see March Order at [15]-[16]). Each adjournment was granted on the Landlord's terms, and each came with clear directions to marshal evidence or appoint a representative. The Landlord chose not to comply.

At the 19 March hearing Mr Bhana confirmed that (i) key information was “on his phone or in his head,” and (ii) no one else had been authorised to present it. That was a conscious election, not a procedural deprivation or irregularity. The trustees’ present insistence that they “will be ready soon” merely repeats assurances made in November 2024, January 2025 and February 2025. The right to justice – which includes the right to be heard – safeguarded by s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, is to a fair opportunity, not limitless postponements: s 85(1)-(2) Act.

In declining the Landlord’s 19 March adjournment request, I followed the approach subsequently approved by Judge Clark in Robinson v Natali [2025] NZDC 9589. His Honour held that under s 85(1) - (2) RTA, the Tribunal must balance fairness with the statutory mandate for “expeditious resolution” and is therefore justified in refusing further postponements once a party has already had reasonable opportunity to prepare. 4 2 Tribunal Order erroneously dated 13 November 2024 (issued 23 January 2025) 3 Tribunal Order 8 February 2025. 4 Robinson v Natali [2025] NZDC 9589 at [66]–[70], [97]. New or unavailable evidence:

The Landlord says it now holds: a. a contrary expert opinion on Healthy Homes compliance (not provided at the rehearing consideration); and b. photographs and e-mails allegedly rebutting the Tenant's evidence (not provided at the rehearing consideration).

Both categories could, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained before 19 March 2025, and before the rehearing consideration on 28 May 2025.

The alleged Healthy Homes works were, by the Landlord’s own submission, completed prior to the Sustainability Options inspection (said to have occurred after notice was given). Therefore, any compliance certificate, invoice or contractor statement was within grasp of the Landlord at all times during the proceedings.

Photographs of the property at commencement were specifically directed by the Tribunal on 13 November 2024 and again on 16 January 2025. None were produced.

The Landlord’s new material is therefore not new evidence not reasonably available at the first hearing. It is late evidence the Landlord declined or failed to gather despite four adjournments and explicit directions. That does not justify a rehearing: see McMillan at [26]-[28]. Alleged reliance on unqualified expert and Tenant texts

The March Order expressly records (at [38]-[41], [46]-[48]) that the adjudicator relied on multiple strands: the Sustainability Options report and timestamped photographs, oral evidence of the Tenant, and the Landlord's failure to comply with maintenance and repair obligations.

Whether the report writer held a formal Healthy Homes Standards (HHS) qualification was never raised at any hearing. The Tribunal assessed the photographs and the report’s findings, concluded the Landlord had broadly breached s 45, and applied a global award reflecting the Tenant’s pleaded losses rather than isolating individual HHS breaches per the legislation and regulations.

Disagreement with the weight given to evidence is a matter for appeal, not rehearing. No procedural flaw is identified. Ill-health preventing post-hearing evidence

The Landlord was granted a generous seven-day window after the hearing to file any outstanding documentation (March Order at [18], [32]). Yet it concedes in its District Court notice of appeal (11 April 2025) that “both health recoveries are imminent”. While the trustees’ health excuses some delay, it cannot justify six months of silence on the Tenant’s claims, after four adjournments 5 and a clear direction, in January 2024, to appoint a representative. The Landlord nevertheless sought yet another adjournment at the rehearing consideration, citing the same health complaints it raised at the hearing on 19 March 2025.

I dealt with the severity of the Landlord’s health complaints in my March Order, concluding that, although the Trustees’ conditions (one with conjunctivitis, the other absent due to a respiratory illness) it did not justify another adjournment given the repeated delays and his failure to appoint a representative.

In Chief Executive MBIE v Aquastar Holdings Ltd [2024] NZTT 4922273, the Landlord (Aquastar Holdings Limited, directed by Jasu Mati Bhana, a trustee of the present landlord), sought last-minute adjournments on grounds of ill health, offered no evidence, then sought a rehearing. Adjudicator Woodhouse declined the rehearing application, holding serial postponements did not amount to any "procedural error" or "substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice,” a view later upheld by the District Court on appeal.

Those same delays (or tactics) have been repeated in this matter, yet s 85 requires disputes to be resolved "fairly and expeditiously," and that is what I have proceeded to do based on the clear guidance set before me. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Landlord has been afforded repeated, fair opportunities over a period of more than six months to present evidence or to appoint an advocate.

Its continuing failure to do so is not the product of Tribunal error but of its own election. No procedural irregularity meeting the McMillan threshold has been established. The application is, in substance, an attempt to re-argue the merits of findings already made. That is an appeal point, not a ground for rehearing.

Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, may occur, or is likely to occur if the March Order stands.

Should the Landlord make a non-publication order in favour of the Landlord?

The adjudicator granted the Tenant’s application for name suppression based on their successful outcome pursuant to s 95A(1). The Landlord did not seek name suppression. 5 Five, if counting 5 March 2025.

At the rehearing I invited the Landlord to apply for name suppression, as both of the Landlord trustees said their previously good reputation had been damaged by negative media coverage.

Open justice underpins public confidence by ensuring that court proceedings remain transparent and accountable. The Tribunal may, in its discretion, order name suppression where it is satisfied, having weighed the parties’ interests against the public interest, that publication of an adverse decision could, for example, prejudice an individual’s right to a fair trial. 6

Although I acknowledge that the Landlord has endured abusive public commentary, including, as the Registry has let me know, an unacceptable call for the Landlord trustees’ deportation, apparently on racial grounds – such personal distress does not meet the statutory threshold for name suppression under s 95A(4), because the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the identities of landlords who have been found to breach their obligations under the Act. Should the Tribunal make a restraining order pursuant to s 109A, against the

Landlord?

If the Tribunal makes an order against a person under s 109 on the ground that the person has committed an unlawful act, the Tribunal may, if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, make an order restraining the person from committing a further act of the same kind: s 109A RTA

I have been asked to make a restraining order against the Landlord.

The Tenant’s representative has directed me to decisions where the Landlord has found to be in breach of the Act. 7 I have read these decisions. Although ss 13A(1), 13A(1CA)(b) and 13A(1F)(b) were not yet in force when those earlier cases were decided, the decisions still record persistent s 45 maintenance breaches that seriously compromised tenants’ health and safety, which resulted in awards of exemplary damages. Accordingly, the Tribunal has already imposed exemplary damages on the Ranolf Trust for a serious breach of s 45(1A).

A strikingly similar pattern was exposed in Chief Executive MBIE v Aquastar Holdings Ltd [2024] NZTT 4922273, where Adjudicator Woodhouse found repeated breaches of ss 45 and 13A and, after awarding exemplary damages, made a three-year restraining order under s 109A.

Aquastar is controlled by Jasu Mati Bhana, who is also a trustee of the present Landlord. To read s 109A as allowing the same decision-makers to escape restraint merely by operating through a fresh corporate wrapper would thwart its 6 [2026] NZTT 5050237 7 Kaki v Bhana and Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4081239; Munro v Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4071822/4065306; Whitney v Ranolf Trust [2017] NZTT Rotorua 4073102/4080105. deterrent purpose and perpetuate the very mischief – serial unlawful acts – that Parliament meant to prevent. There is therefore just cause in the present case to read s 109A as allowing courts to pierce the corporate veil. Of course, any prosecution for contravening a restraining order – and any question of personal liability – rests with the District Court under s 109A(4)–(5), but I consider the Tribunal may still frame the order so that it cannot be sidestepped by the same decision-makers acting through another landlord entity.

On that footing the Ranolf Trust “committed” the current unlawful acts through trustees, one of whom has already been restrained for identical misconduct, and I find that a new six-year s 109A order must issue against the Trust itself.

A six-year restraint therefore aligns with the ordinary six-year limitation period and is needed to protect future tenants throughout that entire window.

Any intentional contravention of this order within the six-year term is an offence under s 109A(4)–(5), punishable on conviction by a fine of up to $3,600.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5047728 — Rent arrears

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5047728 — Rent arrears

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Should the Landlord make a non-publication order in favour of the Landlord?

Landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Should the Landlord make a non-publication order in favour of the Landlord?

Landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions