What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5103509 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5103509?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5103509?

The primary dispute was Property damage.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5103509?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11309343-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5103509 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5103509?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5103509?

The primary dispute was Property damage.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5103509?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11309343-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5103509 — Property damage

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the landlord’s name and identifying details.
The tenancy of Cheryl Gray at [Tenancy address suppressed] is terminated, and possession is granted to [The landlord/s], at 11:59pm on Friday 17 January 2025.
All other claims are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing today.
The landlord has applied for an order terminating the tenancy, and an order for the tenant to pay for damage to the premises. Application for termination of tenancy
The landlord seeks an order terminating the tenancy on a number of grounds. It is not necessary for me to set those out in this decision, because at the hearing today the tenant requested that the tenancy come to an end, because she has somewhere else she wants to live. The tenant requested the tenancy to end this Friday, which is the same day the landlord seeks possession to return.
Because both parties want the tenancy to end on Friday, I make that order by consent. Damage claim
The landlord seeks an order that the tenant pay for damage to the premises in relation to a broken ranch slider window. In particular: a. Costs to board the window of $450.00; and b. Costs to replace the ranch slider window of $2,070.00.
The tenant advised me that the damage was caused by someone at the tenancy, who hit the ranch slider with a spade. The tenant states on the day in question (which the landlord states was in July), she was ‘having a few drinks’ with that person at the premises, and he got up and went ‘crazy’, and that included smashing the window with a spade. The police were called, and the person was taken into custody after being tasered, but admitted that same day to a mental health facility, where he was for a ‘few months’.
With any claim for damage to the premises, the landlord must prove that damage occurred during the tenancy and is more than fair wear and tear. In this case there is no dispute between Ms Gray and the landlord that the damage occurred during the tenancy, and it was certainly not fair wear and tear, so those first two considerations are met.
If those two considerations are established, to avoid liability, the tenant must prove she did not carelessly or intentionally cause or permit the damage. Tenants are liable for the actions of people at the premises with their permission.
Where the damage is caused carelessly, and is covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to the lesser of the insurance excess or four weeks' rent (or four weeks' market rent in the case of a tenant paying income- related rent). I cannot see that this would be careless damage.
However, tenants are liable for the cost of repairing damage that is intentional or which results from any activity at the premises that is an imprisonable offence. This applies to anything the tenant does and anything done by a person they are responsible for, which would include the person who caused the damage in this case.
Damage is intentional where a person intends to cause damage and takes the necessary steps to achieve that purpose. Damage is also intentional where a person does something, or allows a situation to continue, knowing that damage is a certainty. See Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541.
The evidence around the state of mind of the person causing the damage is limited in this case. But what Ms Gray advised me, which I accept, is that this person was removed by the police to a mental health facility, where he remained for some months.
I note the earlier decision of the Tribunal of Housing New Zealand v Takarangi [1995] RTHNZ 12. In that case, Mr Takarangi painted his house red. Housing New Zealand sought to recover the repainting costs, but Mr Takarangi’s defence was that he was not of sound mind when he painted the dwelling. In that case there was compelling evidence from a psychiatrist supporting that to be the case, and the defence was accepted by the Tribunal. When considering what ‘intentional’ meant, reference was made to the Summary Offences Act 1981, with the adjudicators stating: A parallel provision can be found in S 11(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981. That makes any person “who intentionally damages any property” liable to penalty. The learned authors of Brookers Summary Offences state at para SO11.06 as follows: “Conduct will be intentional when it is deliberate, and not accidental, and the result of the damage ... will be intentional if the Defendant meant to cause it or (probably) knew that it was virtually certain to result.” The authors also refer to Adams on Criminal Law (Third Edition) at para CA20.19 dealing with intention as it applies in the criminal law area. It is stated at that reference: “Where an ‘intent’ to produce some result is required it must be made clear to the jury that it is the accused's actual state of mind that is in question ... but it has often been said that usually the jury will need no explanation of the meaning of the term ... where there is to be some explanation it appears that ‘intent’ should be given its ordinary meaning of ‘purpose’.” Although it must be remembered that the interpretation of this provision does not involve the application of the principles applicable in the area of criminal law, nevertheless the Tribunal considers that the approach adopted in dealing with the question of intent in that area can, and ought to be applied in interpreting the provisions of S 40(2)(a). It is the Tribunal's view that it must be established that not only was there damage, but that the person causing it actually intended to damage. That appears to be consistent with the wording of S 40(4) which clearly contemplates that there are circumstances where damage could be caused but not so as to make the tenant liable. The Tribunal considers that the lack of a clear intention to damage is one of those contemplated circumstances. From the evidence of Dr Aston, which was not contradicted by any other psychiatric evidence, it is clear that Mr Takarangi did not appreciate the consequences of his actions and clearly Dr Aston's overall view was that Mr Takarangi did not set out to intentionally damage the premises, even though that was the end result of his actions. ... If Mr Takarangi's mind was disturbed to such an extent that he could not be said to have formed the necessary intent to damage then he is not liable in terms of the relevant provision.
In the case before me, I will accept by a narrow margin, that the fact of the immediate admission to a mental health facility does support a conclusion that the person who caused the damage was not of sound mind when it was caused, sufficient to determine the damage was not likely to have been caused intentionally. Therefore I find the tenant is not liable for the damage to the door.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the landlord’s name and identifying details.
The tenancy of Cheryl Gray at [Tenancy address suppressed] is terminated, and possession is granted to [The landlord/s], at 11:59pm on Friday 17 January 2025.
All other claims are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing today.
The landlord has applied for an order terminating the tenancy, and an order for the tenant to pay for damage to the premises. Application for termination of tenancy
The landlord seeks an order terminating the tenancy on a number of grounds. It is not necessary for me to set those out in this decision, because at the hearing today the tenant requested that the tenancy come to an end, because she has somewhere else she wants to live. The tenant requested the tenancy to end this Friday, which is the same day the landlord seeks possession to return.
Because both parties want the tenancy to end on Friday, I make that order by consent. Damage claim
The landlord seeks an order that the tenant pay for damage to the premises in relation to a broken ranch slider window. In particular: a. Costs to board the window of $450.00; and b. Costs to replace the ranch slider window of $2,070.00.
The tenant advised me that the damage was caused by someone at the tenancy, who hit the ranch slider with a spade. The tenant states on the day in question (which the landlord states was in July), she was ‘having a few drinks’ with that person at the premises, and he got up and went ‘crazy’, and that included smashing the window with a spade. The police were called, and the person was taken into custody after being tasered, but admitted that same day to a mental health facility, where he was for a ‘few months’.
With any claim for damage to the premises, the landlord must prove that damage occurred during the tenancy and is more than fair wear and tear. In this case there is no dispute between Ms Gray and the landlord that the damage occurred during the tenancy, and it was certainly not fair wear and tear, so those first two considerations are met.
If those two considerations are established, to avoid liability, the tenant must prove she did not carelessly or intentionally cause or permit the damage. Tenants are liable for the actions of people at the premises with their permission.
Where the damage is caused carelessly, and is covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to the lesser of the insurance excess or four weeks' rent (or four weeks' market rent in the case of a tenant paying income- related rent). I cannot see that this would be careless damage.
However, tenants are liable for the cost of repairing damage that is intentional or which results from any activity at the premises that is an imprisonable offence. This applies to anything the tenant does and anything done by a person they are responsible for, which would include the person who caused the damage in this case.
Damage is intentional where a person intends to cause damage and takes the necessary steps to achieve that purpose. Damage is also intentional where a person does something, or allows a situation to continue, knowing that damage is a certainty. See Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541.
The evidence around the state of mind of the person causing the damage is limited in this case. But what Ms Gray advised me, which I accept, is that this person was removed by the police to a mental health facility, where he remained for some months.
I note the earlier decision of the Tribunal of Housing New Zealand v Takarangi [1995] RTHNZ 12. In that case, Mr Takarangi painted his house red. Housing New Zealand sought to recover the repainting costs, but Mr Takarangi’s defence was that he was not of sound mind when he painted the dwelling. In that case there was compelling evidence from a psychiatrist supporting that to be the case, and the defence was accepted by the Tribunal. When considering what ‘intentional’ meant, reference was made to the Summary Offences Act 1981, with the adjudicators stating: A parallel provision can be found in S 11(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981. That makes any person “who intentionally damages any property” liable to penalty. The learned authors of Brookers Summary Offences state at para SO11.06 as follows: “Conduct will be intentional when it is deliberate, and not accidental, and the result of the damage ... will be intentional if the Defendant meant to cause it or (probably) knew that it was virtually certain to result.” The authors also refer to Adams on Criminal Law (Third Edition) at para CA20.19 dealing with intention as it applies in the criminal law area. It is stated at that reference: “Where an ‘intent’ to produce some result is required it must be made clear to the jury that it is the accused's actual state of mind that is in question ... but it has often been said that usually the jury will need no explanation of the meaning of the term ... where there is to be some explanation it appears that ‘intent’ should be given its ordinary meaning of ‘purpose’.” Although it must be remembered that the interpretation of this provision does not involve the application of the principles applicable in the area of criminal law, nevertheless the Tribunal considers that the approach adopted in dealing with the question of intent in that area can, and ought to be applied in interpreting the provisions of S 40(2)(a). It is the Tribunal's view that it must be established that not only was there damage, but that the person causing it actually intended to damage. That appears to be consistent with the wording of S 40(4) which clearly contemplates that there are circumstances where damage could be caused but not so as to make the tenant liable. The Tribunal considers that the lack of a clear intention to damage is one of those contemplated circumstances. From the evidence of Dr Aston, which was not contradicted by any other psychiatric evidence, it is clear that Mr Takarangi did not appreciate the consequences of his actions and clearly Dr Aston's overall view was that Mr Takarangi did not set out to intentionally damage the premises, even though that was the end result of his actions. ... If Mr Takarangi's mind was disturbed to such an extent that he could not be said to have formed the necessary intent to damage then he is not liable in terms of the relevant provision.
In the case before me, I will accept by a narrow margin, that the fact of the immediate admission to a mental health facility does support a conclusion that the person who caused the damage was not of sound mind when it was caused, sufficient to determine the damage was not likely to have been caused intentionally. Therefore I find the tenant is not liable for the damage to the door.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5103509 — Property damage

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5103509 — Property damage

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions