What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5154713 about?

The tribunal order states: The tenant’s name and identifying details are suppressed.

How much money was awarded in case 5154713?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5154713?

The primary dispute was Boarding House.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5154713?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11638950-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5154713 about?

The tribunal order states: The tenant’s name and identifying details are suppressed.

How much money was awarded in case 5154713?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5154713?

The primary dispute was Boarding House.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5154713?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11638950-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

46 Bollard Avenue, New Windsor, Auckland 0600 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5154713 — Boarding House

Order

The tenant’s name and identifying details are suppressed.
It is declared that [the applicant] is a tenant of the sites she occupies at Avondale Motor Park 46 Bollard Avenue, New Windsor, Auckland and that the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies to her situation.
It is further declared that the landlord’s eviction notice dated 3 February 2025 is invalid and of no effect.
Huayin Investment Limited must pay [the applicant] $27 filing fee immediately.

Reasons

The hearing was conducted by telephone. Both parties attended. Johnny Tiam represented the landlord.
The tenant seeks declarations that she has a tenancy subject to the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and that the landlord’s eviction notice dated 3 February 2025 is invalid and of no effect. Background
The tenant came to Avondale Motor Park (AMP) seeking a place for her mobile home and a container used to store her possessions. She had been living in her mobile home on private property, which was sold, and she was required to leave by the new owner. She did not have the protection of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act). She was looking for a place to live where she had the security of tenure provided by the Act.
When she came to AMP, she dealt with Bob Oyang who is the son of one of the owners of Huayin Investment Limited which owns AMP. She gave evidence that she discussed her requirements with Mr Oyang and it was agreed that she would be granted a tenancy of unpowered sites to accommodate her mobile home and container.
The only written evidence of the agreement are two letters written by AMP dated 26 and 28 February 2024 to WINZ seeking rent and bond to be paid to AMP. Both letters refer to her as “a permanent tenant” at AMP.
She duly moved her mobile home and container onto the sites, and she has been there ever since.
From January 2025 there was some unpleasantness between the tenant and others living at AMP. Cross accusations were made by those involved and it resulted in the landlord serving a 28-day eviction notice on the tenant. Jurisdiction
There is a preliminary issue whether the Tribunal can hear the claim. Section 77(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims between landlords and tenants relating to any tenancy to which the Act applies. Section 4 provides that the Act applies to all residential tenancies unless specifically excluded. Law
Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. The terms ’residential premises’, ‘tenancy’, and ‘tenancy agreement’ are defined as follows.
Residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful.
Tenancy, in relation to any residential premises, means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent; and includes any tenancy of residential premises implied or created by any enactment; and, where appropriate, also includes a former tenancy.
Tenancy agreement, in relation to any residential premises, means any express or implied agreement under which any person, for rent, grants or agrees to grant to any other person a tenancy of the premises; and, where appropriate, includes a former tenancy agreement and any variation of a tenancy agreement. Discussion and Decision
I find that the tenant did have a tenancy of the bare land for her mobile home. There was an agreement whereby the landlord granted her the right to occupy the land for residential purposes for payment of rent. Land can be premises for the purposes of the Act. Were that not so, there would be no need for the exclusion for bare land that I must now consider.
Section 5 of the Act sets out a variety of circumstances where a tenancy is excluded from the Act.
Section 5(1)(t) of the Act provides that where the premises comprise bare land (with or without facilities) on which the tenant has the right under the tenancy agreement to place or erect a mobile home, caravan, or other means of shelter the Act will not apply.
Plainly, that is the situation here and therefore that exclusion applies.
Section 8 of the Act provides that, where the Act is excluded by sections 5 to 7, if the premises are used for residential purposes, the parties can contract back into some or all the provisions of the Act.
I am satisfied that the parties did contract into the Act when they made their agreement for the tenant to occupy the bare land and put her mobile home on it for her to live in.
The fact, alone, that the landlord wrote to WINZ stating that the tenant was a “permanent tenant” is enough for me to infer that it was their intention that the tenant would have the protections provided by the Act. The landlord wrote to WINZ to obtain payment from them of bond and rent. It is reasonable to assume that the use of the words “permanent tenant” was intended to assist in achieving that purpose. It would be repugnant to accept that the landlord did so, and then to find that their intention was not to accept her as a tenant with rights under the Act.
As well, I accept the tenant’s evidence that she and Mr Oyang discussed her situation and her wish to have the protection of the Act and that he told her that she would be treated as a tenant. That, in my view, is clear evidence that both parties understood, or should have understood, that the Act would apply to her occupation of the land.
I have therefore declared that the Act applies to her situation.
It follows that the landlord’s eviction notice is invalid and is of no effect. Landlords cannot give 28 days’ notice to terminate a tenancy that is not a boarding house tenancy. Plainly this is not a boarding house tenancy.
The tenant has succeeded and so I have awarded her the filing fee.

Order

The tenant’s name and identifying details are suppressed.
It is declared that [the applicant] is a tenant of the sites she occupies at Avondale Motor Park 46 Bollard Avenue, New Windsor, Auckland and that the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies to her situation.
It is further declared that the landlord’s eviction notice dated 3 February 2025 is invalid and of no effect.
Huayin Investment Limited must pay [the applicant] $27 filing fee immediately.

Reasons

The hearing was conducted by telephone. Both parties attended. Johnny Tiam represented the landlord.
The tenant seeks declarations that she has a tenancy subject to the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and that the landlord’s eviction notice dated 3 February 2025 is invalid and of no effect. Background
The tenant came to Avondale Motor Park (AMP) seeking a place for her mobile home and a container used to store her possessions. She had been living in her mobile home on private property, which was sold, and she was required to leave by the new owner. She did not have the protection of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act). She was looking for a place to live where she had the security of tenure provided by the Act.
When she came to AMP, she dealt with Bob Oyang who is the son of one of the owners of Huayin Investment Limited which owns AMP. She gave evidence that she discussed her requirements with Mr Oyang and it was agreed that she would be granted a tenancy of unpowered sites to accommodate her mobile home and container.
The only written evidence of the agreement are two letters written by AMP dated 26 and 28 February 2024 to WINZ seeking rent and bond to be paid to AMP. Both letters refer to her as “a permanent tenant” at AMP.
She duly moved her mobile home and container onto the sites, and she has been there ever since.
From January 2025 there was some unpleasantness between the tenant and others living at AMP. Cross accusations were made by those involved and it resulted in the landlord serving a 28-day eviction notice on the tenant. Jurisdiction
There is a preliminary issue whether the Tribunal can hear the claim. Section 77(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims between landlords and tenants relating to any tenancy to which the Act applies. Section 4 provides that the Act applies to all residential tenancies unless specifically excluded. Law
Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. The terms ’residential premises’, ‘tenancy’, and ‘tenancy agreement’ are defined as follows.
Residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful.
Tenancy, in relation to any residential premises, means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent; and includes any tenancy of residential premises implied or created by any enactment; and, where appropriate, also includes a former tenancy.
Tenancy agreement, in relation to any residential premises, means any express or implied agreement under which any person, for rent, grants or agrees to grant to any other person a tenancy of the premises; and, where appropriate, includes a former tenancy agreement and any variation of a tenancy agreement. Discussion and Decision
I find that the tenant did have a tenancy of the bare land for her mobile home. There was an agreement whereby the landlord granted her the right to occupy the land for residential purposes for payment of rent. Land can be premises for the purposes of the Act. Were that not so, there would be no need for the exclusion for bare land that I must now consider.
Section 5 of the Act sets out a variety of circumstances where a tenancy is excluded from the Act.
Section 5(1)(t) of the Act provides that where the premises comprise bare land (with or without facilities) on which the tenant has the right under the tenancy agreement to place or erect a mobile home, caravan, or other means of shelter the Act will not apply.
Plainly, that is the situation here and therefore that exclusion applies.
Section 8 of the Act provides that, where the Act is excluded by sections 5 to 7, if the premises are used for residential purposes, the parties can contract back into some or all the provisions of the Act.
I am satisfied that the parties did contract into the Act when they made their agreement for the tenant to occupy the bare land and put her mobile home on it for her to live in.
The fact, alone, that the landlord wrote to WINZ stating that the tenant was a “permanent tenant” is enough for me to infer that it was their intention that the tenant would have the protections provided by the Act. The landlord wrote to WINZ to obtain payment from them of bond and rent. It is reasonable to assume that the use of the words “permanent tenant” was intended to assist in achieving that purpose. It would be repugnant to accept that the landlord did so, and then to find that their intention was not to accept her as a tenant with rights under the Act.
As well, I accept the tenant’s evidence that she and Mr Oyang discussed her situation and her wish to have the protection of the Act and that he told her that she would be treated as a tenant. That, in my view, is clear evidence that both parties understood, or should have understood, that the Act would apply to her occupation of the land.
I have therefore declared that the Act applies to her situation.
It follows that the landlord’s eviction notice is invalid and is of no effect. Landlords cannot give 28 days’ notice to terminate a tenancy that is not a boarding house tenancy. Plainly this is not a boarding house tenancy.
The tenant has succeeded and so I have awarded her the filing fee.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5154713 — Boarding House at 46 Bollard Avenue, New Windsor, Auckland 0600

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5154713 — Boarding House at 46 Bollard Avenue, New Windsor, Auckland 0600

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions