What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5162476 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5162476?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5162476?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: 14-day notice.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5162476?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11749499-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5162476 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5162476?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5162476?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: 14-day notice.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5162476?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/11749499-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5162476 — Rent arrears

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay is lifted on the Order of the Tribunal dated 26 February 2025.
A further 90 day extension from today is granted to Kāinga Ora–Homes And Communities to enforce the termination.

Reasons

The landlord and the tenant’s representative both attended the hearing, by telephone.
On 26/2/2025 the Tribunal made an order for termination of the tenancy pursuant to sections 55(1)(a) and 56.
On 19/3/2025 the tenant’s representative applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred because of an incorrect calculation of rent arrears, procedural errors in the tenant’s son’s application for caregiver status and the effect termination would have on him.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant’s representative has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The evidence provided by the tenant’s representative about rent payments does not alter the calculation in the original hearing that the Tribunal had no discretion but to terminate the tenancy under section 55(1)(a). b. The procedural issues the tenant’s representative relied on relate to her brother’s discussions with the landlord in 2022 and 2023 about his status for social housing. c. The tenant’s son was not a party to the application and his appeal to the District Court failed on the grounds of status. d. The landlord did not want a rehearing because the tenant had not been in possession of the premises since October 2024.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, and a rehearing is not appropriate.
An extension of time for enforcement of the termination Order is granted due to the delays caused by the rehearing, appeal, and adjournment process.
Suppression is granted for the tenant, to be consistent with the previous Order.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay is lifted on the Order of the Tribunal dated 26 February 2025.
A further 90 day extension from today is granted to Kāinga Ora–Homes And Communities to enforce the termination.

Reasons

The landlord and the tenant’s representative both attended the hearing, by telephone.
On 26/2/2025 the Tribunal made an order for termination of the tenancy pursuant to sections 55(1)(a) and 56.
On 19/3/2025 the tenant’s representative applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred because of an incorrect calculation of rent arrears, procedural errors in the tenant’s son’s application for caregiver status and the effect termination would have on him.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant’s representative has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The evidence provided by the tenant’s representative about rent payments does not alter the calculation in the original hearing that the Tribunal had no discretion but to terminate the tenancy under section 55(1)(a). b. The procedural issues the tenant’s representative relied on relate to her brother’s discussions with the landlord in 2022 and 2023 about his status for social housing. c. The tenant’s son was not a party to the application and his appeal to the District Court failed on the grounds of status. d. The landlord did not want a rehearing because the tenant had not been in possession of the premises since October 2024.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred, and a rehearing is not appropriate.
An extension of time for enforcement of the termination Order is granted due to the delays caused by the rehearing, appeal, and adjournment process.
Suppression is granted for the tenant, to be consistent with the previous Order.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5162476 — Rent arrears

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5162476 — Rent arrears

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions