Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5224132 — Harassment at Unit/Flat Unit 12, 59 Spring Street, Onehunga, Auckland

Decided 22 Dec 2025 · Published 22 Dec 2025 · Application 5224132

Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Location

Auckland

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

K Henry

Dispute themes

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5224132. Verify amounts on MoJ.
Claim	Category	Amount	Awarded to	Reason

Order

The application for a rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings issued on 25 September 2025 is lifted.

Reasons

This is a reserved decision. The hearing was conducted via telephone on 18 December 2025. The purpose of the hearing was to consider the tenant’s application for a rehearing. The tenant attended the hearing. Ms Booker, representative of the landlord, attended the hearing for the landlord.
On 22 September 2025, Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s claim that the landlord had breached section 38 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) and the tenant’s claim for suppression.
On 22 September 2025, the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial miscarriage of justice had or was likely to occur.
On 25 September 2025, the Tribunal made an order that there would be a hearing before me to determine if the tenant should be given a rehearing. That Order stated that if the tenant’s application for a rehearing was granted, the would be heard by a different Adjudicator.
Unfortunately, there was an administrative error, and the matter was listed as a rehearing (as opposed to a hearing to consider if the tenant’s application for a rehearing should be granted) before a new Adjudicator. That hearing took place on 24 November 2025. Once the Tribunal became aware of the error, the matter was referred back to me.
At the hearing on 18 December 2025, I apologised to the parties on behalf of the Tribunal for the error and any inconvenience caused. The law relating to rehearings:
Section 105(1) of the RTA provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”. The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice as a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1
Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court decision of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory. 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The tenant says they should be granted a rehearing because: a. Their evidence was overlooked, and the landlord’s evidence was believed without question; b. They were told that the advice they had received from Tenancy Services was incorrect; c. Their claim that the landlord changed the end date of the tenancy was not addressed; d. The start date of the tenancy was incorrectly recorded in the Order as 14 July 2023; and e. The impact of the decision to dismiss their application for suppression will have a significant impact on the tenant’s ability to secure future tenancies.
For the reasons set out below, the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
With regard to the tenant’s claim that the date of the start of the tenancy was incorrectly recorded in the Order, it transpired during the hearing that the tenant had uploaded the wrong tenancy agreement to the file. The tenant provided the correct tenancy agreement during the hearing on 18 December 2025.
As set out above at paragraph 4 above, for a rehearing to be granted on the basis of new evidence, the evidence must not have been able to be obtained with reasonable diligence for the original hearing. This is not an absolute rule. However, if the evidence is not fresh, a rehearing should not be granted “unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling”.
In this case, I consider, and the tenant accepted during the hearing, that had the Tribunal had the correct tenancy agreement during the hearing, this would not have in resulted in a different finding of fact. For this reason, this fact that the tenancy agreement was not considered during the hearing on 18 December 2025 is not a grounds for a rehearing.
The tenant claim that name suppression should have been granted because of the impact of publication of the Order with the tenant’s name may have on the tenant’s ability to secure future housing. The grounds for granting suppression are set out in section 95A of the RTA. Broadly, if a party applies for name suppression and is successful or substantially successful in the proceedings, the Tribunal must order name suppression. 2 The Tribunal may order suppression where: ... having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. 3
This was not a point that was raised by the tenant at or before the hearing on 18 December 2025 and is not grounds for a rehearing. That said, for completeness, I note that it is unlikely that if the tenant had raised this point at the hearing the Order regarding suppression would have been different. This is because the presumption of open justice is strong. In Victim X v Television New Zealand Ltd 73 NZLR 220, the Court of Appeal confirmed that when considering applications for suppression, the starting point must be on the principle of open justice, and approved the approach taken by the High Court, which stated: ...that the principle of open justice dictates that there should be no restriction on publication of information about a case, ‘except in very special circumstances’. 2 Section 95A(1) of the RTA. The only exception to this is if the Tribunal considers that “... publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case. 3 Section 95A(4) of the RTA.
In the Tribunal Order of Landlord v Hohipa [2021] NZTT 4296635, the tenant was the unsuccessful party. The landlord asked the Tribunal to suppress the tenant’s name to be suppressed on the grounds that if the Tribunal did not do so it would be difficult for the tenant to secure public housing. The Tribunal held that this was not grounds for suppression saying: The suggestion that publication may affect her ability to get housing in the public sector is insufficient reason to grant suppression. A person in the public sector who abandons a property may similarly find it difficult to rent in the public sector.
During the hearing the tenant also said that the Tribunal had focused on a breach of their right to quiet enjoyment not harassment. I explained during the hearing that under section 38 (Quiet Enjoyment) of the RTA, it is first necessary to establish if the right to quiet enjoyment had been breached and, if so, if the circumstances amounted to harassment. 4 This is not grounds for a rehearing.
During the hearing, the tenant also referred to new evidence in respect of a claim relating to the landlord’s actions during or after the hearing. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider matters that occur after the tenancy ends. In addition, as the act complained of during or after the hearing, this was not one of the tenant’s claim. This is not grounds for a rehearing.
The tenant’s remaining grounds for a rehearing set out at paragraph 6(a) and (b) above are are essentially challenges to the Tribunal’s factual determinations and the reasoning behind them. Following the decisions of the higher courts noted above, these grounds are a matter for appeal, not a rehearing application.
The tenant’s claim for a rehearing is dismissed.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

Harassment Auckland

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s105, s105(1), s14, s38, s38(2), s38(3), s95A, s95A(1), s95A(4)

Key findings

Dispute theme: harassment

Property management

KAKARIKI PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LIMITED (respondent)

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5224132 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5224132?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5224132?

The primary dispute was Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5224132?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12902494-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

For landlords & property managers

Reduce avoidable tribunal risk with proper tenant checks.

Tenantcheck reports take minutes: a small step before a dispute ends up at tribunal.

Order a Tenantcheck →

Reasons

This is a reserved decision. The hearing was conducted via telephone on 18 December 2025. The purpose of the hearing was to consider the tenant’s application for a rehearing. The tenant attended the hearing. Ms Booker, representative of the landlord, attended the hearing for the landlord.

On 22 September 2025, Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s claim that the landlord had breached section 38 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) and the tenant’s claim for suppression.

On 22 September 2025, the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that a substantial miscarriage of justice had or was likely to occur.

On 25 September 2025, the Tribunal made an order that there would be a hearing before me to determine if the tenant should be given a rehearing. That Order stated that if the tenant’s application for a rehearing was granted, the would be heard by a different Adjudicator.

Unfortunately, there was an administrative error, and the matter was listed as a rehearing (as opposed to a hearing to consider if the tenant’s application for a rehearing should be granted) before a new Adjudicator. That hearing took place on 24 November 2025. Once the Tribunal became aware of the error, the matter was referred back to me.

At the hearing on 18 December 2025, I apologised to the parties on behalf of the Tribunal for the error and any inconvenience caused. The law relating to rehearings:

Section 105(1) of the RTA provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”. The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice as a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1

Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court decision of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory. 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704.

A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.

As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC: In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The tenant says they should be granted a rehearing because: a. Their evidence was overlooked, and the landlord’s evidence was believed without question; b. They were told that the advice they had received from Tenancy Services was incorrect; c. Their claim that the landlord changed the end date of the tenancy was not addressed; d. The start date of the tenancy was incorrectly recorded in the Order as 14 July 2023; and e. The impact of the decision to dismiss their application for suppression will have a significant impact on the tenant’s ability to secure future tenancies.

For the reasons set out below, the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.

With regard to the tenant’s claim that the date of the start of the tenancy was incorrectly recorded in the Order, it transpired during the hearing that the tenant had uploaded the wrong tenancy agreement to the file. The tenant provided the correct tenancy agreement during the hearing on 18 December 2025.

As set out above at paragraph 4 above, for a rehearing to be granted on the basis of new evidence, the evidence must not have been able to be obtained with reasonable diligence for the original hearing. This is not an absolute rule. However, if the evidence is not fresh, a rehearing should not be granted “unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling”.

In this case, I consider, and the tenant accepted during the hearing, that had the Tribunal had the correct tenancy agreement during the hearing, this would not have in resulted in a different finding of fact. For this reason, this fact that the tenancy agreement was not considered during the hearing on 18 December 2025 is not a grounds for a rehearing.

The tenant claim that name suppression should have been granted because of the impact of publication of the Order with the tenant’s name may have on the tenant’s ability to secure future housing. The grounds for granting suppression are set out in section 95A of the RTA. Broadly, if a party applies for name suppression and is successful or substantially successful in the proceedings, the Tribunal must order name suppression. 2 The Tribunal may order suppression where: ... having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. 3

This was not a point that was raised by the tenant at or before the hearing on 18 December 2025 and is not grounds for a rehearing. That said, for completeness, I note that it is unlikely that if the tenant had raised this point at the hearing the Order regarding suppression would have been different. This is because the presumption of open justice is strong. In Victim X v Television New Zealand Ltd 73 NZLR 220, the Court of Appeal confirmed that when considering applications for suppression, the starting point must be on the principle of open justice, and approved the approach taken by the High Court, which stated: ...that the principle of open justice dictates that there should be no restriction on publication of information about a case, ‘except in very special circumstances’. 2 Section 95A(1) of the RTA. The only exception to this is if the Tribunal considers that “... publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case. 3 Section 95A(4) of the RTA.

In the Tribunal Order of Landlord v Hohipa [2021] NZTT 4296635, the tenant was the unsuccessful party. The landlord asked the Tribunal to suppress the tenant’s name to be suppressed on the grounds that if the Tribunal did not do so it would be difficult for the tenant to secure public housing. The Tribunal held that this was not grounds for suppression saying: The suggestion that publication may affect her ability to get housing in the public sector is insufficient reason to grant suppression. A person in the public sector who abandons a property may similarly find it difficult to rent in the public sector.

During the hearing the tenant also said that the Tribunal had focused on a breach of their right to quiet enjoyment not harassment. I explained during the hearing that under section 38 (Quiet Enjoyment) of the RTA, it is first necessary to establish if the right to quiet enjoyment had been breached and, if so, if the circumstances amounted to harassment. 4 This is not grounds for a rehearing.

During the hearing, the tenant also referred to new evidence in respect of a claim relating to the landlord’s actions during or after the hearing. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider matters that occur after the tenancy ends. In addition, as the act complained of during or after the hearing, this was not one of the tenant’s claim. This is not grounds for a rehearing.

The tenant’s remaining grounds for a rehearing set out at paragraph 6(a) and (b) above are are essentially challenges to the Tribunal’s factual determinations and the reasoning behind them. Following the decisions of the higher courts noted above, these grounds are a matter for appeal, not a rehearing application.

The tenant’s claim for a rehearing is dismissed.