What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5241332 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5241332?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5241332?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5241332?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12765196-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5241332 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5241332?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5241332?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5241332?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12765196-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5241332 — Tenancy dispute

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of both parties’ names and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On the 25 September following a hearing with me, the parties agreed to settle the matter, and it was recorded in orders by consent dated 25 September 2025.
On the 29 September 20025 the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. A witness at the hearing had lied in her evidence and submitted false evidence which the tenant says adversely impacted on her. b. That the tenant had new evidence which she wished to bring to the tribunal.
At today’s hearing the tenant advanced the following grounds for a rehearing: a. That the witness had lied in her evidence and submitted false documents. b. That the tenant felt concerned about her name being published and that was the primary reason she had agreed to a settlement. c. That the tenant had new evidence to bring to the Tribunal.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. The law relating to rehearings in the Tribunal.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.
The High Court has confirmed that it is not a miscarriage of justice to decline rehearing just because evidence was not considered at original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at original hearing. 2

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The parties made the agreement between them. They did so after I had conducted most of the hearing. They were given time to consider their positions and whether they wanted to agree with each other or not. I do not consider that there was any procedural unfairness in the way that they reached settlement. b. The tenant’s concerns appear to mainly be about the conduct of the witnesses at the hearing and the alleged presentation of false evidence. As the parties made their own agreement, I was not called upon to make a decision on the credibility or otherwise of the witness. In other words what the witness said or did ultimately had no impact on the outcome of the case because the parties settled. c. The evidence of the water invoices would have been available to the tenant, or the tenant could have requested it before the hearing. In any case because the parties entered into a settlement, I was not called upon to make a determination on the evidence. d. The parties made an agreement with each other, the tenant confirmed that she had gone home and changed her mind about the settlement. It would be unjust and unfair to allow parties to agree to settle with each other only to grant a rehearing if they change their mind. There must be an end to litigation and certainty when parties reach agreement; to allow a rehearing on the basis that a party changed their mind about a settlement, would give the tenant a second opportunity to present their case.
I observe that the tenant’s concerns largely seem to be about the conduct of the witness and the presentation of tenant’s signature on a document, which the tenant says she did not sign and which the witness has falsified. The tenant says that the witness has taken her signature from immigration documents and added that to the flatmate agreement. The tenant says that she has complained to the Police about the witness cutting and pasting her signature into a document. The Police have told the tenant that they cannot do anything as the ‘matter is before the courts’. I have told the tenant today that the Tribunal has 2 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 no jurisdiction to determine if false evidence is given to it. The Police are the correct agency for investigating her complaint.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.

On the 25 September following a hearing with me, the parties agreed to settle the matter, and it was recorded in orders by consent dated 25 September 2025.

On the 29 September 20025 the tenant applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. A witness at the hearing had lied in her evidence and submitted false evidence which the tenant says adversely impacted on her. b. That the tenant had new evidence which she wished to bring to the tribunal.

At today’s hearing the tenant advanced the following grounds for a rehearing: a. That the witness had lied in her evidence and submitted false documents. b. That the tenant felt concerned about her name being published and that was the primary reason she had agreed to a settlement. c. That the tenant had new evidence to bring to the Tribunal.

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.

Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. The law relating to rehearings in the Tribunal.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.

A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.

As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC. In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

The High Court has confirmed that it is not a miscarriage of justice to decline rehearing just because evidence was not considered at original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at original hearing. 2

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The parties made the agreement between them. They did so after I had conducted most of the hearing. They were given time to consider their positions and whether they wanted to agree with each other or not. I do not consider that there was any procedural unfairness in the way that they reached settlement. b. The tenant’s concerns appear to mainly be about the conduct of the witnesses at the hearing and the alleged presentation of false evidence. As the parties made their own agreement, I was not called upon to make a decision on the credibility or otherwise of the witness. In other words what the witness said or did ultimately had no impact on the outcome of the case because the parties settled. c. The evidence of the water invoices would have been available to the tenant, or the tenant could have requested it before the hearing. In any case because the parties entered into a settlement, I was not called upon to make a determination on the evidence. d. The parties made an agreement with each other, the tenant confirmed that she had gone home and changed her mind about the settlement. It would be unjust and unfair to allow parties to agree to settle with each other only to grant a rehearing if they change their mind. There must be an end to litigation and certainty when parties reach agreement; to allow a rehearing on the basis that a party changed their mind about a settlement, would give the tenant a second opportunity to present their case.

I observe that the tenant’s concerns largely seem to be about the conduct of the witness and the presentation of tenant’s signature on a document, which the tenant says she did not sign and which the witness has falsified. The tenant says that the witness has taken her signature from immigration documents and added that to the flatmate agreement. The tenant says that she has complained to the Police about the witness cutting and pasting her signature into a document. The Police have told the tenant that they cannot do anything as the ‘matter is before the courts’. I have told the tenant today that the Tribunal has 2 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 no jurisdiction to determine if false evidence is given to it. The Police are the correct agency for investigating her complaint.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5241332 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5241332 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions