Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5263539 — Rent arrears at 15 Copinsha Street, Palmerston, Palmerston 9430

Decided 12 February 2026 · Published 12 February 2026 · Application 5263539

Landlord favoured

Rent arrears
Healthy homes
Exemplary damages

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Landlord favoured

From published order

Location

Palmerston

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

N Bradley

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 9 February 2026.
The landlord’s attended remotely. The tenant attended by phone from Dunedin Court.
The tenant has applied for a rehearing of the Tribunal order dated 4 December 2025.
For ease of reference, I will refer to the landlords in the singular. Relevant events:
The tenancy commenced in March 2015.
On 14 April 2025 the landlord applied for termination of the tenancy and rent arrears. The hearing of that application was on 20 May 2025 by phone. Both parties attended that hearing. The Tribunal made an order that day for rent arrears. The order recorded that the parties agreed that the tenancy ended on 26 April 2025. Enforcement of that order was stayed pending a Tribunal order in respect of the tenant’s application. 1
On 18 May 2025 the tenant applied for a refund of the bond, orders in respect of the Healthy Homes Standards, $10,000.00 compensation and exemplary damages. Tenancy Services wrote to the tenant seeking further information, including a full description of the compensation the tenant was claiming. This additional information was not provided by the tenant and the application was unable to be processed at that time.
On 10 June 2025 the landlord applied for compensation and payment of the bond (second landlord application) 2 .
On 24 June 2025 Tenancy Services advised the parties that as required information had not been received, the tenant’s application would still not be progressed at that time.
On 10 September 2025 the first hearing of the second landlord application was held remotely. The tenant attended this hearing by phone. There was not enough time to hear all of the landlord’s claims that day. I directed that a further hearing be scheduled in respect of the second landlord application and the tenant’s claim (despite the tenant not having provided the additional information requested by Tenancy Services). At the hearing I made it clear to the tenant that he could post any evidence. At this hearing I proposed part-hearing the landlord’s claims and adjourning the remainder of the landlord’s claims and the tenant’s claims to a remote hearing. The tenant did not object to my proposal to adjourn to a remote hearing.
A further remote hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2025; however, this was adjourned as one of the landlord’s had work commitments. The tenant opposed the landlord’s request to adjourn the remote hearing.
On 20 October 2025 the tenant called Tenancy Services to ask if the hearing can be in person instead of teleconference. The tenant said he struggles with technology and wanted to attend at court with copies of his documents. The tenant also his phone will not be in use during the month of December 2025. The tenant also requested that his ADHD is considered, as after an hour his concentration will drop, and he requested hourly breaks if possible. No medical certificate was provided, and no supporting documentary evidence was provided as to why the tenant’s phone would not work in December 2025.
On 17 November 2025 the tenant was advised that he may deliver any documents he wanted to submit to the Dunedin court by 24 November 2025 and 1 Application number 5263539. 2 Application number 5269020 once the level of evidence had been reviewed, I indicated I would make a determination on the request for a face-to-face hearing thereafter.
On 20 November 2025 the landlord emailed submissions and opposed a face- to-face hearing due to concerns about delay and safety concerns. The tenant did not file any additional evidence. I declined to adjourn the hearing to an in-person hearing. I considered the level of evidence submitted would not at a level to warrant a face-to-face hearing. The tenant was offered the option of attending the hearing by phone from the local Court house.
On 2 December 2025 the hearing proceeded. The tenant did not attend that hearing. I issued an order following that hearing on 4 December 2025. That order required the tenant to pay compensation to the landlord and for the bond to be paid to the landlord to off-set the amounts ordered. The tenant’s claim was dismissed.
On 5 December 2025 the tenant applied for a rehearing and stay of proceedings.
The tenant said in his application for a rehearing that he did not get a chance to speak at the hearing because the hearing proceeded with a phone conference despite him making the tribunal aware that his phone would not be capable of attending a teleconference due to the 2G/ 3G network shutting down.
The tenant says an addition he wanted a face-to-face hearing so that he would be able to present his evidence in paper and in person due to a lack of technological skills.
The tenant also says that he objected to me hearing the matter for a number of reasons. The tenant also says he objected to the landlord’s application proceeding when his application had been filed first. The tenant also says that consideration should have been given to his disability and the matter continued to be set down for over 3 hours which would make it very difficult for him to manage.
On 9 December 2025, on receipt of the application for a re-hearing, I directed that a hearing was to be scheduled by remote hearing to consider whether a rehearing of the original matter will be granted. I declined to refer this matter to another adjudicator and set out my reasons for refusing to do so.
On 9 December 2025 Tenancy Services received a phone call from the tenant to request the rehearing be a face-to-face hearing as he had no access to be able to upload any documents/ photos. On 10 December 2025 the rehearing hearing was scheduled for 9 February 2026. On 14 January 2025 the tenant called Tenancy Services again to request a face-to-face hearing. The tenant said he suffers from several health challenges which would affect his ability to attend the hearing by teleconference. The registry requested that the tenant provide a medical certificate in support of the request for a face-to-face hearing and for the medical certificate to be provided by 22 January 2026. On 26 January 2026 I declined to grant the tenants request for a face-to-face hearing for health-related reasons because no medical certificate had been provided and this matter required expeditious resolution. The tenant was reminded that arrangements may be made for him to attend at his local court to attend the hearing by phone.
The tenant has now filed new evidence in support of his claim. On 4 February 2026 the tenant filed two photographs of the cooktop which appears to be very dirty, and the photographs are undated. The tenant has also filed bank statements from February and March 2015. On 5 March 2015 there is a withdrawal of $750 for the Bond.
The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The landlord opposes the application for a rehearing. Both parties provided oral submissions at the hearing. The Law - Rehearings
The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 3
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 4
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 5 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. 3 See s 105 of the RTA. 4 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 5 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 6 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 7 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing. 6 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 7 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033
As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 8 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 9
The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this.
The tenant did not raise any concern about the matter progressing to a remote hearing at the first hearing.
Most of the landlord’s claims were address at the first hearing and the tenant had an opportunity to respond to the landlord’s evidence at that hearing.
The tenant has not provided any evidence which would likely alter the findings in respect of the landlord’s claims.
In terms of the tenant’s claim’s, I consider the Tribunal gave the tenant the opportunity to progress his case, despite his application initially not be progressed by Tenancy Services as additional information that was requested from the tenant was not provided. The tenant was aware that his claim had been scheduled for hearing.
The tenant has provided no documentary evidence as to why his phone would not work only in December 2025. I note that his phone was working for the September 2025 hearing and this rehearing hearing in February 2026 and was noted as a phone number to contact the tenant on when he filed his rehearing application 2 days after the hearing. I therefore consider the tenant has not proven that he did not have use of a phone for the December 2025 hearing.
Directions were made for the tenant to file documentary evidence in his local Court and to attend by phone from his local court if he did not have access to a phone.
Putting aside whether he did or did not have access to a phone for the second hearing, the situation remains that he could have attended that hearing from his local Court, but he did not respond to the Tribunal to make arrangements for this to occur.
No medical certificates have been provided to date. 8 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen 9 See s 105 of the RTA.
I consider the documentary evidence now provided by the tenant could likely have been obtained and submitted when the application was filed. I am not satisfied that the tenant’s claim is at a level that warrants a second opportunity to present it, when the tenant has failed to progress it. Any miscarriage of justice must be substantial and in this case, I do not consider the tenant has proven that a substantial miscarriage of justice may or is likely to have occurred.
Accordingly, the application for a rehearing is dismissed. Suppression
The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case. 10
The Tribunal may, on the application of any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published and may attach any conditions to that order the Tribunal considers appropriate. 11
The landlord did not seek name suppression.
The tenant applied for name suppression but as he has been unsuccessful in seeking a rehearing, I decline to grant the tenant name suppression.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

Rent arrears Healthy homes Exemplary damages Palmerston

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s105, s24, s95A

Key findings

Dispute theme: rent arrears
Dispute theme: healthy homes
Dispute theme: exemplary damages

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5263539?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5263539?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5263539?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: Healthy homes, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5263539?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13103228-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 9 February 2026.

The landlord’s attended remotely. The tenant attended by phone from Dunedin Court.

The tenant has applied for a rehearing of the Tribunal order dated 4 December 2025.

For ease of reference, I will refer to the landlords in the singular. Relevant events:

The tenancy commenced in March 2015.

On 14 April 2025 the landlord applied for termination of the tenancy and rent arrears. The hearing of that application was on 20 May 2025 by phone. Both parties attended that hearing. The Tribunal made an order that day for rent arrears. The order recorded that the parties agreed that the tenancy ended on 26 April 2025. Enforcement of that order was stayed pending a Tribunal order in respect of the tenant’s application. 1

On 18 May 2025 the tenant applied for a refund of the bond, orders in respect of the Healthy Homes Standards, $10,000.00 compensation and exemplary damages. Tenancy Services wrote to the tenant seeking further information, including a full description of the compensation the tenant was claiming. This additional information was not provided by the tenant and the application was unable to be processed at that time.

On 10 June 2025 the landlord applied for compensation and payment of the bond (second landlord application) 2 .

On 24 June 2025 Tenancy Services advised the parties that as required information had not been received, the tenant’s application would still not be progressed at that time.

On 10 September 2025 the first hearing of the second landlord application was held remotely. The tenant attended this hearing by phone. There was not enough time to hear all of the landlord’s claims that day. I directed that a further hearing be scheduled in respect of the second landlord application and the tenant’s claim (despite the tenant not having provided the additional information requested by Tenancy Services). At the hearing I made it clear to the tenant that he could post any evidence. At this hearing I proposed part-hearing the landlord’s claims and adjourning the remainder of the landlord’s claims and the tenant’s claims to a remote hearing. The tenant did not object to my proposal to adjourn to a remote hearing.

A further remote hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2025; however, this was adjourned as one of the landlord’s had work commitments. The tenant opposed the landlord’s request to adjourn the remote hearing.

On 20 October 2025 the tenant called Tenancy Services to ask if the hearing can be in person instead of teleconference. The tenant said he struggles with technology and wanted to attend at court with copies of his documents. The tenant also his phone will not be in use during the month of December 2025. The tenant also requested that his ADHD is considered, as after an hour his concentration will drop, and he requested hourly breaks if possible. No medical certificate was provided, and no supporting documentary evidence was provided as to why the tenant’s phone would not work in December 2025.

On 17 November 2025 the tenant was advised that he may deliver any documents he wanted to submit to the Dunedin court by 24 November 2025 and 1 Application number 5263539. 2 Application number 5269020 once the level of evidence had been reviewed, I indicated I would make a determination on the request for a face-to-face hearing thereafter.

On 20 November 2025 the landlord emailed submissions and opposed a face- to-face hearing due to concerns about delay and safety concerns. The tenant did not file any additional evidence. I declined to adjourn the hearing to an in-person hearing. I considered the level of evidence submitted would not at a level to warrant a face-to-face hearing. The tenant was offered the option of attending the hearing by phone from the local Court house.

On 2 December 2025 the hearing proceeded. The tenant did not attend that hearing. I issued an order following that hearing on 4 December 2025. That order required the tenant to pay compensation to the landlord and for the bond to be paid to the landlord to off-set the amounts ordered. The tenant’s claim was dismissed.

On 5 December 2025 the tenant applied for a rehearing and stay of proceedings.

The tenant said in his application for a rehearing that he did not get a chance to speak at the hearing because the hearing proceeded with a phone conference despite him making the tribunal aware that his phone would not be capable of attending a teleconference due to the 2G/ 3G network shutting down.

The tenant says an addition he wanted a face-to-face hearing so that he would be able to present his evidence in paper and in person due to a lack of technological skills.

The tenant also says that he objected to me hearing the matter for a number of reasons. The tenant also says he objected to the landlord’s application proceeding when his application had been filed first. The tenant also says that consideration should have been given to his disability and the matter continued to be set down for over 3 hours which would make it very difficult for him to manage.

On 9 December 2025, on receipt of the application for a re-hearing, I directed that a hearing was to be scheduled by remote hearing to consider whether a rehearing of the original matter will be granted. I declined to refer this matter to another adjudicator and set out my reasons for refusing to do so.

On 9 December 2025 Tenancy Services received a phone call from the tenant to request the rehearing be a face-to-face hearing as he had no access to be able to upload any documents/ photos. On 10 December 2025 the rehearing hearing was scheduled for 9 February 2026. On 14 January 2025 the tenant called Tenancy Services again to request a face-to-face hearing. The tenant said he suffers from several health challenges which would affect his ability to attend the hearing by teleconference. The registry requested that the tenant provide a medical certificate in support of the request for a face-to-face hearing and for the medical certificate to be provided by 22 January 2026. On 26 January 2026 I declined to grant the tenants request for a face-to-face hearing for health-related reasons because no medical certificate had been provided and this matter required expeditious resolution. The tenant was reminded that arrangements may be made for him to attend at his local court to attend the hearing by phone.

The tenant has now filed new evidence in support of his claim. On 4 February 2026 the tenant filed two photographs of the cooktop which appears to be very dirty, and the photographs are undated. The tenant has also filed bank statements from February and March 2015. On 5 March 2015 there is a withdrawal of $750 for the Bond.

The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The landlord opposes the application for a rehearing. Both parties provided oral submissions at the hearing. The Law - Rehearings

The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 3

Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 4

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 5 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. 3 See s 105 of the RTA. 4 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 5 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”

A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.

In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 6 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.

The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 7 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing. 6 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 7 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033

As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 8 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 9

The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this.

The tenant did not raise any concern about the matter progressing to a remote hearing at the first hearing.

Most of the landlord’s claims were address at the first hearing and the tenant had an opportunity to respond to the landlord’s evidence at that hearing.

The tenant has not provided any evidence which would likely alter the findings in respect of the landlord’s claims.

In terms of the tenant’s claim’s, I consider the Tribunal gave the tenant the opportunity to progress his case, despite his application initially not be progressed by Tenancy Services as additional information that was requested from the tenant was not provided. The tenant was aware that his claim had been scheduled for hearing.

The tenant has provided no documentary evidence as to why his phone would not work only in December 2025. I note that his phone was working for the September 2025 hearing and this rehearing hearing in February 2026 and was noted as a phone number to contact the tenant on when he filed his rehearing application 2 days after the hearing. I therefore consider the tenant has not proven that he did not have use of a phone for the December 2025 hearing.

Directions were made for the tenant to file documentary evidence in his local Court and to attend by phone from his local court if he did not have access to a phone.

Putting aside whether he did or did not have access to a phone for the second hearing, the situation remains that he could have attended that hearing from his local Court, but he did not respond to the Tribunal to make arrangements for this to occur.

No medical certificates have been provided to date. 8 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen 9 See s 105 of the RTA.

I consider the documentary evidence now provided by the tenant could likely have been obtained and submitted when the application was filed. I am not satisfied that the tenant’s claim is at a level that warrants a second opportunity to present it, when the tenant has failed to progress it. Any miscarriage of justice must be substantial and in this case, I do not consider the tenant has proven that a substantial miscarriage of justice may or is likely to have occurred.

Accordingly, the application for a rehearing is dismissed. Suppression

The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case. 10

The Tribunal may, on the application of any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published and may attach any conditions to that order the Tribunal considers appropriate. 11

The landlord did not seek name suppression.

The tenant applied for name suppression but as he has been unsuccessful in seeking a rehearing, I decline to grant the tenant name suppression.