What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5329884 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5329884?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5329884?

The primary dispute was Smoke alarms. Related themes: Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5329884?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12786739-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5329884 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5329884?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5329884?

The primary dispute was Smoke alarms. Related themes: Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5329884?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12786739-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

27 Fea Street, Dalmore, Dunedin 9010 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5329884 — Smoke alarms

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of enforcement on the Order dated 23 October 2025 is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing, the landlord by telephone.
On 23/10/2025 the Tribunal made an order requiring the landlord to pay the tenant exemplary damages and the filing fee reimbursement amounting to $7,228.00.
On 31/10/2025 the landlord applied for a rehearing on the following summarised grounds: a. The tenant’s claim was filed on 20/8/2025 but the evidence and new claims were not available until 6/10/2025 – giving the landlord insufficient time, only 16 days to prepare for the hearing. b. The adjournment request sought two days before the hearing meant the landlord had insufficient time to prepare. c. Material evidence is available which would affect the decision, for example an electrician’s statement about the oven, the dry air technician’s statement and the statement from chem dry. d. The adjudicator was biased because she previously heard a matter for involving the same parties and the same tenancy. In addition, the tenant’s partner was asked to leave as a witness but allowed to stay as a support person. e. In determining quantum, the Adjudicator applied the wrong test for intent – negligence is not intention.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenants have failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between landlords and tenants. b. The landlord had adequate time to prepare for the hearing, being 16 days between when the notices were sent to the parties on 6/10/2025 and the date of hearing on 22/10/2025. c. The landlord has not provided any new credible evidence which may have changed the outcome. d. The Tribunal process did not disadvantage the landlord in any way, e. Nor is there any evidence to support that the Adjudicator was in any way biased towards the landlord or predetermined the applications, f. Adjudicators regularly hear matters between the same parties and from the same parties who frequently appear in the Tribunal, g. In making any decision it is for the Adjudicator to determine whose evidence is preferred, h. Both parties provided evidence during the hearing, and had the opportunity to respond to the evidence of the other party, i. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this, j. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing or to give him a second opportunity to present his case, k. The adjudicator carefully considered the quantum of exemplary damages based on the legal tests and indeed did not award exemplary damages for the failure to lodge the bond due to lack of intent. l. It would be remiss of an adjudicator to ignore the important issue of lack of smoke alarms when raised at a hearing, particularly when the landlord was allowed the opportunity to give evidence on the matter. m. It is standard practice in the Tribunal that if a person is called as a witness, they are required to wait outside the hearing room until they give evidence. Once this has happened a person may stay as support but is not allowed to comment any further. In this case the procedure was made clear to the parties.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred which justifies a rehearing.
A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. If the landlord is dissatisfied with the decision, then the appropriate course of action would have been for him to appeal the decision.
For the avoidance of doubt the Order of the Tribunal dated 23 October 2025 remains in full force and effect.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of enforcement on the Order dated 23 October 2025 is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing, the landlord by telephone.
On 23/10/2025 the Tribunal made an order requiring the landlord to pay the tenant exemplary damages and the filing fee reimbursement amounting to $7,228.00.
On 31/10/2025 the landlord applied for a rehearing on the following summarised grounds: a. The tenant’s claim was filed on 20/8/2025 but the evidence and new claims were not available until 6/10/2025 – giving the landlord insufficient time, only 16 days to prepare for the hearing. b. The adjournment request sought two days before the hearing meant the landlord had insufficient time to prepare. c. Material evidence is available which would affect the decision, for example an electrician’s statement about the oven, the dry air technician’s statement and the statement from chem dry. d. The adjudicator was biased because she previously heard a matter for involving the same parties and the same tenancy. In addition, the tenant’s partner was asked to leave as a witness but allowed to stay as a support person. e. In determining quantum, the Adjudicator applied the wrong test for intent – negligence is not intention.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenants have failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between landlords and tenants. b. The landlord had adequate time to prepare for the hearing, being 16 days between when the notices were sent to the parties on 6/10/2025 and the date of hearing on 22/10/2025. c. The landlord has not provided any new credible evidence which may have changed the outcome. d. The Tribunal process did not disadvantage the landlord in any way, e. Nor is there any evidence to support that the Adjudicator was in any way biased towards the landlord or predetermined the applications, f. Adjudicators regularly hear matters between the same parties and from the same parties who frequently appear in the Tribunal, g. In making any decision it is for the Adjudicator to determine whose evidence is preferred, h. Both parties provided evidence during the hearing, and had the opportunity to respond to the evidence of the other party, i. The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this, j. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing or to give him a second opportunity to present his case, k. The adjudicator carefully considered the quantum of exemplary damages based on the legal tests and indeed did not award exemplary damages for the failure to lodge the bond due to lack of intent. l. It would be remiss of an adjudicator to ignore the important issue of lack of smoke alarms when raised at a hearing, particularly when the landlord was allowed the opportunity to give evidence on the matter. m. It is standard practice in the Tribunal that if a person is called as a witness, they are required to wait outside the hearing room until they give evidence. Once this has happened a person may stay as support but is not allowed to comment any further. In this case the procedure was made clear to the parties.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred which justifies a rehearing.
A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. If the landlord is dissatisfied with the decision, then the appropriate course of action would have been for him to appeal the decision.
For the avoidance of doubt the Order of the Tribunal dated 23 October 2025 remains in full force and effect.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5329884 — Smoke alarms at 27 Fea Street, Dalmore, Dunedin 9010

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5329884 — Smoke alarms at 27 Fea Street, Dalmore, Dunedin 9010

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions