What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5348829 about?

The tribunal order states: The application is dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

How much money was awarded in case 5348829?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5348829?

The primary dispute was Boarding House.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5348829?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12876969-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5348829 about?

The tribunal order states: The application is dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

How much money was awarded in case 5348829?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5348829?

The primary dispute was Boarding House.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5348829?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12876969-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

28 Girrahween Drive, Totara Vale, 28C, Auckland 0629 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5348829 — Boarding House

Order

The application is dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 16 December 2025.
On 9 September 2025, [The tenant/s] entered into an agreement with [The landlord/s] to rent a bedroom at 28C Girrahween Drive, Totara Vale, Auckland. Ms Huang owns and lives in the premises. She rents out two downstairs bedrooms. The parties signed an agreement titled “Flat/house – sharing agreement.” The rent was $240.00 per week and Mr Li paid a bond of $720.00. Mr Li only lived in the premises for a short time before leaving. Ms Huang has withheld Mr Li’s bond, which he seeks to recover. The sole issue I must determine is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim.

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction?

The law

Section 77(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims between landlords and tenants relating to any tenancy to which the Act applies. Section 4 RTA provides that the Act applies to every tenancy for residential purposes except as specifically provided.
Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. Residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence. Tenancy in relation to any residential premises means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent. The applicant lived in a residential house and paid the respondent $240.00 per week. This sounds like a residential tenancy.
Section 5 RTA sets out a variety of circumstances in which a tenancy is excluded from the Act.
Section 5(1)(n) states the RTA does not apply “where the premises, not being a boarding house, continue to be used, during the tenancy, principally as a place of residence by the landlord or the owner of the premises or by any member of the landlord’s or owner’s family.”
Section 10 RTA provides that, where a party to proceedings contends the RTA does not apply, they must establish the facts supporting their contention. In other words, the respondent has the burden of proving the RTA does not apply to the living arrangement involving the applicant.
When determining whether the RTA applies, the Tribunal considers the substance of the agreement between the parties rather than the labels they have applied. The fact that the parties signed a “flat/house – sharing agreement” and not a tenancy agreement is not determinative, neither is the fact the respondent is recorded as “landlord” on the agreement. The Tribunal looks behind labels to establish the true nature of the living situation.
In Musson v Dobrisek & Ors DC Lower Hutt CIV-2006-032-36, the District Court considered tenancy premises where the owner lived in one bedroom and rented the other eight bedrooms out to people. Everyone shared the use of the kitchen, lounge and bathroom, known as the “common areas.” The District Court held that the relevant question in cases where the landlord lives at the property they also rent out, is whether the principal use of the premises is as a place of residence by the landlord. “[39]... So the question to be asked is – Is the principal use of these premises as a place of residence by the landlord? [40] Put in this way, the clear answer, on the cases of both sides, is “no.” Mr Musson occupied one bedroom out of nine, and shared the common area equally with the other occupants. Far from Mr Musson’s use of the property being “principal”, it was commensurate with that of the other occupants. [41] I consider that this interpretation reflects what I perceive to be the policy objectives of the Act. Relevantly, it is intended to govern landlord/tenant relationships which are primarily commercial. Section 5(n) appears to me intended to cover the situation of the owner or tenant of a house letting out a bedroom or bedsitting room to a tenant or sub-tenant while the principal use of the house remains accommodation for the landlord and the landlord’s family. On this reading, the exception could only apply to small scale and limited letting, because the principal use of the property would have to be as a residence for the landlord and the landlord could have only one or perhaps two properties which could be so described.” Analysis
The first issue I must determine is whether the premises are a boarding house. The respondent rented two bedrooms to single occupants during the tenancy. I find the maximum number of people the respondent intended to occupy these bedrooms was two, not six or more. Therefore, the premises do not constitute a boarding house. 1
The second issue I must determine is whether the relevant premises to be assessed are the entire house or the downstairs area where the applicant’s bedroom was located. The downstairs area comprises of two bedrooms and a shared bathroom. The kitchen, living room and laundry are located upstairs and shared by everyone, including Ms Huang. The downstairs area is not “self- contained,” “fully functioning” or “independent” like the granny flat in Harding v Shellevis & Ors [2021] NZHC 1265. This is not a case where there were two separate and distinct household units within one premises. I find the relevant premises to be assessed is the entire house, not just the downstairs area.
Having identified the relevant premises, the third issue I must determine is whether the respondent used the premises principally as a place of residence during the tenancy. For the following reasons, I find it they did: a. The respondent owned and lived in the premises during the tenancy as their main home. b. The respondent shared the kitchen, living room and laundry with the occupants of the downstairs bedrooms. 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 66B. c. The premises comprise of four bedrooms and the respondent only rented out two. This is significantly less than the eight bedrooms the respondent rented out in Musson. The fact that only two bedrooms were rented to a maximum of two people indicates that the respondent’s principal use of the premises during the tenancy was as a place of residence, rather than a commercial arrangement. It meets the definition of “small scale and limited letting” identified in Musson.
For these reasons, I find section 5(1)(n) RTA applies and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. Filing fee and name suppression
The applicant has not been wholly or substantially successful with their application. Therefore, I do not order the respondent to reimburse the filing fee.
The applicant seeks name suppression. They have not been wholly or substantially successful with their application, therefore, there is no presumption in favour of suppression.
I have a residual discretion to grant the parties name suppression under section 95A(4) RTA. This section requires me to consider the interests of the parties and public. In Lewis v Wilson & Horton [2003] 3 NZLR 546 at paragraph 43, The Court of Appeal endorsed the approach taken in the High Court, which held: ...that the principle of open justice dictates that there should be no restriction on publication of information about a case ‘except in very special circumstances.’
This case does not discuss any sensitive matters such as, family violence or personal health details that would indicate suppression is required. I cannot identify any extraordinary or special circumstances that would lean in favour of suppression being granted. I find the public’s interest in publication outweighs the parties’ interests in suppression. For this reason, I decline to grant either party name suppression.

Order

The application is dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 16 December 2025.
On 9 September 2025, [The tenant/s] entered into an agreement with [The landlord/s] to rent a bedroom at 28C Girrahween Drive, Totara Vale, Auckland. Ms Huang owns and lives in the premises. She rents out two downstairs bedrooms. The parties signed an agreement titled “Flat/house – sharing agreement.” The rent was $240.00 per week and Mr Li paid a bond of $720.00. Mr Li only lived in the premises for a short time before leaving. Ms Huang has withheld Mr Li’s bond, which he seeks to recover. The sole issue I must determine is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim.

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction?

The law

Section 77(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims between landlords and tenants relating to any tenancy to which the Act applies. Section 4 RTA provides that the Act applies to every tenancy for residential purposes except as specifically provided.
Section 2(1) RTA defines a landlord as the grantor of a tenancy under a tenancy agreement of residential premises. A tenant is the grantee of the tenancy. Residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence. Tenancy in relation to any residential premises means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent. The applicant lived in a residential house and paid the respondent $240.00 per week. This sounds like a residential tenancy.
Section 5 RTA sets out a variety of circumstances in which a tenancy is excluded from the Act.
Section 5(1)(n) states the RTA does not apply “where the premises, not being a boarding house, continue to be used, during the tenancy, principally as a place of residence by the landlord or the owner of the premises or by any member of the landlord’s or owner’s family.”
Section 10 RTA provides that, where a party to proceedings contends the RTA does not apply, they must establish the facts supporting their contention. In other words, the respondent has the burden of proving the RTA does not apply to the living arrangement involving the applicant.
When determining whether the RTA applies, the Tribunal considers the substance of the agreement between the parties rather than the labels they have applied. The fact that the parties signed a “flat/house – sharing agreement” and not a tenancy agreement is not determinative, neither is the fact the respondent is recorded as “landlord” on the agreement. The Tribunal looks behind labels to establish the true nature of the living situation.
In Musson v Dobrisek & Ors DC Lower Hutt CIV-2006-032-36, the District Court considered tenancy premises where the owner lived in one bedroom and rented the other eight bedrooms out to people. Everyone shared the use of the kitchen, lounge and bathroom, known as the “common areas.” The District Court held that the relevant question in cases where the landlord lives at the property they also rent out, is whether the principal use of the premises is as a place of residence by the landlord. “[39]... So the question to be asked is – Is the principal use of these premises as a place of residence by the landlord? [40] Put in this way, the clear answer, on the cases of both sides, is “no.” Mr Musson occupied one bedroom out of nine, and shared the common area equally with the other occupants. Far from Mr Musson’s use of the property being “principal”, it was commensurate with that of the other occupants. [41] I consider that this interpretation reflects what I perceive to be the policy objectives of the Act. Relevantly, it is intended to govern landlord/tenant relationships which are primarily commercial. Section 5(n) appears to me intended to cover the situation of the owner or tenant of a house letting out a bedroom or bedsitting room to a tenant or sub-tenant while the principal use of the house remains accommodation for the landlord and the landlord’s family. On this reading, the exception could only apply to small scale and limited letting, because the principal use of the property would have to be as a residence for the landlord and the landlord could have only one or perhaps two properties which could be so described.” Analysis
The first issue I must determine is whether the premises are a boarding house. The respondent rented two bedrooms to single occupants during the tenancy. I find the maximum number of people the respondent intended to occupy these bedrooms was two, not six or more. Therefore, the premises do not constitute a boarding house. 1
The second issue I must determine is whether the relevant premises to be assessed are the entire house or the downstairs area where the applicant’s bedroom was located. The downstairs area comprises of two bedrooms and a shared bathroom. The kitchen, living room and laundry are located upstairs and shared by everyone, including Ms Huang. The downstairs area is not “self- contained,” “fully functioning” or “independent” like the granny flat in Harding v Shellevis & Ors [2021] NZHC 1265. This is not a case where there were two separate and distinct household units within one premises. I find the relevant premises to be assessed is the entire house, not just the downstairs area.
Having identified the relevant premises, the third issue I must determine is whether the respondent used the premises principally as a place of residence during the tenancy. For the following reasons, I find it they did: a. The respondent owned and lived in the premises during the tenancy as their main home. b. The respondent shared the kitchen, living room and laundry with the occupants of the downstairs bedrooms. 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 66B. c. The premises comprise of four bedrooms and the respondent only rented out two. This is significantly less than the eight bedrooms the respondent rented out in Musson. The fact that only two bedrooms were rented to a maximum of two people indicates that the respondent’s principal use of the premises during the tenancy was as a place of residence, rather than a commercial arrangement. It meets the definition of “small scale and limited letting” identified in Musson.
For these reasons, I find section 5(1)(n) RTA applies and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. Filing fee and name suppression
The applicant has not been wholly or substantially successful with their application. Therefore, I do not order the respondent to reimburse the filing fee.
The applicant seeks name suppression. They have not been wholly or substantially successful with their application, therefore, there is no presumption in favour of suppression.
I have a residual discretion to grant the parties name suppression under section 95A(4) RTA. This section requires me to consider the interests of the parties and public. In Lewis v Wilson & Horton [2003] 3 NZLR 546 at paragraph 43, The Court of Appeal endorsed the approach taken in the High Court, which held: ...that the principle of open justice dictates that there should be no restriction on publication of information about a case ‘except in very special circumstances.’
This case does not discuss any sensitive matters such as, family violence or personal health details that would indicate suppression is required. I cannot identify any extraordinary or special circumstances that would lean in favour of suppression being granted. I find the public’s interest in publication outweighs the parties’ interests in suppression. For this reason, I decline to grant either party name suppression.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5348829 — Boarding House at 28 Girrahween Drive, Totara Vale, 28C, Auckland 0629

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5348829 — Boarding House at 28 Girrahween Drive, Totara Vale, 28C, Auckland 0629

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions