What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5353146 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5353146?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5353146?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: Smoke alarms.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5353146?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13450802-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5353146 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5353146?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5353146?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: Smoke alarms.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5353146?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13450802-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5353146 — Rent arrears

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

The landlord rents three properties to the tenant: a. 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. b. 2D Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. c. 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062.
The landlord filed one application for all three properties with the Tribunal on 26 September 2025. A case conference was held on 10 November 2025. The Tribunal required the landlord to confine their application to one property, namely 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. The landlord was advised to file two separate applications for the other two properties, which they did. The Tribunal also required the landlord to confirm the total amount of compensation sought for 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062 and to file specific evidence by 1 December 2025.
The substantive hearing occurred on 19 January 2026. I issued my decision in an order dated 29 January 2026. The landlord applied for a rehearing that same day.
A consideration hearing was held on 8 April 2026 with both parties in attendance. The landlord was represented by [The party] and the tenant was represented by Huri Dennis.
The landlord claims a rehearing should be granted for the following reasons: a. The intituling on the order dated 29 January 2026 refers to “2C and 2D and 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062” when it should only refer to 2C. b. I improperly rejected the landlord’s evidence and accepted the tenant’s evidence. c. The order does not deal with the landlord’s claims for rent arrears and compensation for methamphetamine contamination. d. There is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, which could have affected the outcome.
The tenant opposes the landlord’s application for a rehearing. They claim the landlord did not raise any claims for rent arrears or compensation for methamphetamine contamination at the hearing. Further, they claim the evidence the landlord is referring to should have been presented at the first hearing. The tenant also claims these proceedings have taken a long time to reach a conclusion and an end must come to the litigation.

Should a rehearing be granted?

The law

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704. Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. Analysis
The fact that the intituling on the order dated 29 January 2026 refers to “2C and 2D and 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062” when it should only refer to 2C is not a good ground to grant a rehearing. The order prepopulated in this manner, because the landlord’s original application referred to all three addresses. This is an administrative error, which can be fixed by recalling, amending and reissuing the original order. I intend to deal with the issue in this way. Any miscarriage of justice that would otherwise occur is able to be remedied without a rehearing.
The landlord’s claim that I improperly rejected their evidence and accepted the tenant’s evidence is a mischaracterisation of the decision. What the landlord is really saying is that they disagree with the substance of the decision. For example, the landlord claims that my decision to dismiss some of their claims due to a lack of supporting evidence such as, entry and exit inspection reports was wrong. They also claim that I was wrong to find that most of the damage is fair wear and tear. Further, they claim that the amounts of compensation ordered are too small and that I was incorrect to dismiss their claim in relation to the flooring, because the landlord only provided a quote, not an invoice. The landlord says that in reaching these conclusions, I improperly rejected their oral evidence at the hearing and accepted the tenant’s evidence or, at the very least, gave the tenant the benefit of the doubt, which is unfair. This submission is incorrect. I did not reject the landlord’s oral evidence however, in the face of conflicting oral evidence given by the tenant, I found the landlord had not proven their case on the balance of probabilities. This was because the landlord did not submit sufficient supporting evidence.
The landlord also claims that I was wrong to find that they did not provide an exit inspection report or photographs of damage to the flooring. I disagree. Whilst the landlord submitted photographs taken at the end of the tenancy, a detailed exit inspection report recording the number of keys returned at the end of the tenancy was not provided. This is what I meant when I referred to an entry and exit inspection in the decision. Further, photographs of the flooring were not provided at the hearing, and the landlord gave evidence that they were unsure whether the flooring had been fixed at the date of the hearing. For these reasons, I found the landlord had not proven that the flooring was damaged or that they had incurred a cost to fix it.
The fact that the landlord disagrees with my findings is not a good reason to grant a rehearing. Rehearings will not be granted because the applicant seeks a second opportunity to relitigate the dispute. 2
The landlord did not advance claims for rent arrears or compensation for methamphetamine contamination at the hearing. This is the reason these two matters are not referred to in the decision. The landlord’s written application does not refer to these matters either. At the hearing, the landlord worked their way through the matters listed in an invoice from Emmanuel Construction Limited only. This is understandable, because at the hearing on 8 April 2026, the landlord said that they initially tried to sort out the issue of rent arrears personally with the tenant. They also said that they only received a quote to decontaminate the premises very recently. The decision to pursue claims for rent arrears and methamphetamine decontamination were made by the landlord quite late in the piece. The landlord only sent the registry methamphetamine test results on 15 January 2026, 4 days before the hearing. There is nothing to stop the landlord from filing a fresh application for rent arrears and compensation for methamphetamine contamination in these circumstances. The fact that these matters were not advanced at the hearing on 19 January 2026 does not amount to a procedural error or miscarriage of justice.
The landlord claims that they have new evidence that they would like to present, namely evidence from tradespeople who visited the premises. The landlord claims this evidence will support the landlord’s oral evidence about matters such as, the number of keys provided at the beginning of the tenancy, the fact that the smoke alarm batteries were dead, and the fact that the damage to the kitchen cupboards was caused from repetitive slamming. This is evidence that was reasonably available at the time of the first hearing. The landlord called a real estate agent to give evidence at the first hearing and could have called these people as well but did not. The landlord claims they did not call the tradespeople because they did not think they needed it. The landlord did not anticipate the Tribunal would make the decision it did. In light of the decision made, the landlord is now seeking a second opportunity to better present their case. This is not the purpose of a rehearing. The evidence the landlord seeks to submit is not fresh, because it could have been produced with reasonable diligence at the first hearing. There are no exceptional or compelling grounds to admit the evidence after the fact. 2 Ross v Putteman [2025] NZDC 28757.
The landlord received the notice of hearing and attended the hearing on 19 January 2026. They were given an opportunity to advance their claims and submit their evidence. The landlord submitted 201 photographs and videos on the day of the hearing. There was no procedural error that would warrant the granting of a rehearing. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the substance of the decision does not amount to a miscarriage of justice. The additional evidence the landlord seeks to admit is not fresh and there are no exceptional or compelling reasons to admit it after the fact. For all of these reasons, I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.
The landlord’s application for a rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings ordered on 30 January 2026 is lifted.
The parties will receive a fresh copy of the original order shortly, which refers to the correct address, namely 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062.

Reasons

The landlord rents three properties to the tenant: a. 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. b. 2D Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. c. 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062.

The landlord filed one application for all three properties with the Tribunal on 26 September 2025. A case conference was held on 10 November 2025. The Tribunal required the landlord to confine their application to one property, namely 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062. The landlord was advised to file two separate applications for the other two properties, which they did. The Tribunal also required the landlord to confirm the total amount of compensation sought for 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062 and to file specific evidence by 1 December 2025.

The substantive hearing occurred on 19 January 2026. I issued my decision in an order dated 29 January 2026. The landlord applied for a rehearing that same day.

A consideration hearing was held on 8 April 2026 with both parties in attendance. The landlord was represented by [The party] and the tenant was represented by Huri Dennis.

The landlord claims a rehearing should be granted for the following reasons: a. The intituling on the order dated 29 January 2026 refers to “2C and 2D and 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062” when it should only refer to 2C. b. I improperly rejected the landlord’s evidence and accepted the tenant’s evidence. c. The order does not deal with the landlord’s claims for rent arrears and compensation for methamphetamine contamination. d. There is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, which could have affected the outcome.

The tenant opposes the landlord’s application for a rehearing. They claim the landlord did not raise any claims for rent arrears or compensation for methamphetamine contamination at the hearing. Further, they claim the evidence the landlord is referring to should have been presented at the first hearing. The tenant also claims these proceedings have taken a long time to reach a conclusion and an end must come to the litigation.

Should a rehearing be granted?

The law

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704. Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.

A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. Analysis

The fact that the intituling on the order dated 29 January 2026 refers to “2C and 2D and 92E Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062” when it should only refer to 2C is not a good ground to grant a rehearing. The order prepopulated in this manner, because the landlord’s original application referred to all three addresses. This is an administrative error, which can be fixed by recalling, amending and reissuing the original order. I intend to deal with the issue in this way. Any miscarriage of justice that would otherwise occur is able to be remedied without a rehearing.

The landlord’s claim that I improperly rejected their evidence and accepted the tenant’s evidence is a mischaracterisation of the decision. What the landlord is really saying is that they disagree with the substance of the decision. For example, the landlord claims that my decision to dismiss some of their claims due to a lack of supporting evidence such as, entry and exit inspection reports was wrong. They also claim that I was wrong to find that most of the damage is fair wear and tear. Further, they claim that the amounts of compensation ordered are too small and that I was incorrect to dismiss their claim in relation to the flooring, because the landlord only provided a quote, not an invoice. The landlord says that in reaching these conclusions, I improperly rejected their oral evidence at the hearing and accepted the tenant’s evidence or, at the very least, gave the tenant the benefit of the doubt, which is unfair. This submission is incorrect. I did not reject the landlord’s oral evidence however, in the face of conflicting oral evidence given by the tenant, I found the landlord had not proven their case on the balance of probabilities. This was because the landlord did not submit sufficient supporting evidence.

The landlord also claims that I was wrong to find that they did not provide an exit inspection report or photographs of damage to the flooring. I disagree. Whilst the landlord submitted photographs taken at the end of the tenancy, a detailed exit inspection report recording the number of keys returned at the end of the tenancy was not provided. This is what I meant when I referred to an entry and exit inspection in the decision. Further, photographs of the flooring were not provided at the hearing, and the landlord gave evidence that they were unsure whether the flooring had been fixed at the date of the hearing. For these reasons, I found the landlord had not proven that the flooring was damaged or that they had incurred a cost to fix it.

The fact that the landlord disagrees with my findings is not a good reason to grant a rehearing. Rehearings will not be granted because the applicant seeks a second opportunity to relitigate the dispute. 2

The landlord did not advance claims for rent arrears or compensation for methamphetamine contamination at the hearing. This is the reason these two matters are not referred to in the decision. The landlord’s written application does not refer to these matters either. At the hearing, the landlord worked their way through the matters listed in an invoice from Emmanuel Construction Limited only. This is understandable, because at the hearing on 8 April 2026, the landlord said that they initially tried to sort out the issue of rent arrears personally with the tenant. They also said that they only received a quote to decontaminate the premises very recently. The decision to pursue claims for rent arrears and methamphetamine decontamination were made by the landlord quite late in the piece. The landlord only sent the registry methamphetamine test results on 15 January 2026, 4 days before the hearing. There is nothing to stop the landlord from filing a fresh application for rent arrears and compensation for methamphetamine contamination in these circumstances. The fact that these matters were not advanced at the hearing on 19 January 2026 does not amount to a procedural error or miscarriage of justice.

The landlord claims that they have new evidence that they would like to present, namely evidence from tradespeople who visited the premises. The landlord claims this evidence will support the landlord’s oral evidence about matters such as, the number of keys provided at the beginning of the tenancy, the fact that the smoke alarm batteries were dead, and the fact that the damage to the kitchen cupboards was caused from repetitive slamming. This is evidence that was reasonably available at the time of the first hearing. The landlord called a real estate agent to give evidence at the first hearing and could have called these people as well but did not. The landlord claims they did not call the tradespeople because they did not think they needed it. The landlord did not anticipate the Tribunal would make the decision it did. In light of the decision made, the landlord is now seeking a second opportunity to better present their case. This is not the purpose of a rehearing. The evidence the landlord seeks to submit is not fresh, because it could have been produced with reasonable diligence at the first hearing. There are no exceptional or compelling grounds to admit the evidence after the fact. 2 Ross v Putteman [2025] NZDC 28757.

The landlord received the notice of hearing and attended the hearing on 19 January 2026. They were given an opportunity to advance their claims and submit their evidence. The landlord submitted 201 photographs and videos on the day of the hearing. There was no procedural error that would warrant the granting of a rehearing. The fact that the landlord disagrees with the substance of the decision does not amount to a miscarriage of justice. The additional evidence the landlord seeks to admit is not fresh and there are no exceptional or compelling reasons to admit it after the fact. For all of these reasons, I am not convinced on the balance of probabilities that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.

The landlord’s application for a rehearing is dismissed.

The stay of proceedings ordered on 30 January 2026 is lifted.

The parties will receive a fresh copy of the original order shortly, which refers to the correct address, namely 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5353146 — Rent arrears at 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5353146 — Rent arrears at 2C Convoy Lane, Otahuhu, Auckland 1062

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions