What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5356352 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5356352?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5356352?

The primary dispute was Mould & damp. Related themes: Cleanliness, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5356352?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13599067-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5356352 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5356352?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5356352?

The primary dispute was Mould & damp. Related themes: Cleanliness, Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5356352?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13599067-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5356352 — Mould & damp

Order

The application for a rehearing is dismissed.
The landlord is to file any costs submissions within 10 working days from the date of this order. The tenant is to file any reply submissions within 10 working days thereafter. Any submissions must be emailed to the email address taurangatt@justice.govt.nz and emailed to the other party. The Tribunal will then issue an order as to costs on the papers.
The Tribunal orders suppression of the landlord’s name and identifying details, the address of the property and the name of the MI report writer.
The stay in respect of publication of the order dated 2 April 2026 is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the remote hearing on 7 May 2026 in respect of whether a rehearing should be granted.
On 2 April 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s claims for compensation and exemplary damages, granting name suppression to the landlord, declining name suppression for the tenant and directing submissions in respect of costs.
On 9 April 2026 the tenant applied for a rehearing of the Tribunal order.
The tenant said in the application form the grounds for a rehearing are: A stay of proceedings is sought as the application raises substantive issues regarding the treatment of key expert evidence which may materially affect the outcome. It is appropriate that the order is not enforced while the rehearing application is determined. I apply for a rehearing on the basis that a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. The outcome was materially affected by the way key expert evidence was treated, and by findings that do not reconcile with the evidence before the Tribunal. In particular, key expert evidence was given limited weight due to the absence of the author for questioning. This directly affected findings relating to causation, timing of contamination, and the assessment of contaminated belongings and loss. The order confirms that expert evidence was not fully relied upon for this reason. This issue can now be resolved, as the relevant expert is available to provide clarification and be questioned if required. The treatment of expert evidence also affected multiple aspects of the decision, including findings regarding the development of contamination over time and whether affected belongings could be safely recovered. The conclusions reached do not reconcile with the consistent direction of the expert evidence before the Tribunal. Further, new evidence clarifies the context in which the May 2024 mould inspection report was prepared. This includes correspondence confirming landlord approval of report content relating to contaminated belongings, the need for remediation, and temporary relocation. This directly addresses concerns regarding the weight and consistency of that evidence and confirms that these issues were identified and accepted at the time. There is therefore a clear evidential issue which affected the outcome, and that issue can now be resolved. A rehearing would allow the evidence to be properly considered and reconciled on a complete evidential basis.
On 15 April 2026 the application for a rehearing was directed to a hearing and a stay was issued in relation to publication.
The landlord opposes the application for a rehearing.
Both parties provided oral submissions at the hearing and have submitted written submissions.
The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The Law - Rehearings
The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 1
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 2
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 3 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only 1 See s 105 of the RTA. 2 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 3 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 4 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 5 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 6 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Both parties filed lengthy submissions. I have summarised their positions below.
The tenant says: 4 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 5 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 6 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen a. the decision in this case was materially affected by the weight given to the expert evidence, b. the findings do not reconcile with the evidence, and c. consideration was not given to the expert advice and constraints she was under when she was required to assess and recover her belongings.
The tenant says that the outcome of the proceeding was affected by the limited weight given to the Virotech report and [Suppressed] (MI report).
The tenant says both reports go directly to central findings, including: a. the cause and source of mould contamination; b. the timing and extent of that contamination; and c. whether her belongings were reasonably recoverable (that is whether her belongings could be cleaned).
The tenant says the Tribunal’s findings are inconsistent with the evidence regarding contamination and uninhabitability.
The tenant emphasises the relevance of the Virotech report to support her position in respect of the timing of contamination and uninhabitability and notes the limited weight it was given because the Virotech report writer did not give evidence at the hearing. The tenant says she was unaware that the absence of the expert would limit the weight given to that evidence. The tenant says the Virotech report writer can now be made available for a hearing and provide clarification in respect of its findings.
The tenant says the limitation in weight given to that evidence directly affected the findings in respect of mould contamination. She says there is a real possibility the outcome could be different if the Virotech report writer is able to give further clarification at a rehearing.
The tenant says the expert evidence consistently indicated that from May 2024 (date of MI report) her belongings were contaminated and not recoverable without professional support or not at all.
The tenant says the MI report addressed the timing, extent, impact of contamination and effect on her belongings and habitability. The tenant says the finding that the premises were not uninhabitable prior to February 2025 does not reconcile with the evidence of the MI report.
The tenant says the context surrounding the amendments to the MI report has now been made available and should be considered in terms of assessing her claim for loss .
The tenant says the fact that the landlord agreed for the amended MI report to be used for an insurance claim by the tenant, shows the landlord was aware and effectively accepted her loss associated with mould contamination.
She also says email correspondence (submitted with the rehearing application) is new evidence that clarifies the context of the amendments to the MI report and a rehearing would allow the amended MI report to be properly considered.
The tenant said she was disadvantaged because she did not have all of the landlord’s counterclaim documents filed before the case conference. The tenant says as a result the order following the case conference affected her ability to recover her belongings and the finding in respect of mitigation of loss. The tenant says that I have made incorrect findings in respect of whether her belongings could be cleaned and mitigation of loss and that the findings do not reflect the expert evidence.
The tenant says there is a real possibility that the outcome would have been different if: • “the expert evidence had been properly tested • the evidence regarding contaminated belongings had been fully reconciled • the health and safety constraints affecting mitigation had been properly considered • the timing of uninhabitability had been assessed with expert clarification”
Finally, the tenant says a rehearing should be granted with respect to the decision to decline name suppression as it “materially prejudices her ability to secure future housing and exacerbates an existing health condition”. The tenant says publication creates a real risk that prospective landlords may decline her a tenancy. She says this prejudice is significant and outweighs the public interest in publication of her name. The tenant says the prejudice to her was not fully addressed and should be reconsidered.
The landlord emphasises the Tribunals role in resolving matters fairly and expeditiously. The landlord submits that the burden of proving the claim is for the tenant and she has had sufficient opportunity to do that.
The landlord says a rehearing should only be granted where a party can show a considerable, overwhelming and obvious wrong or a complete failure of justice, which has not occurred in this case. The landlord says the tenant being unhappy or dissatisfied with the decision is not grounds for rehearing.
In respect of the evidence that the tenant wants to provide the landlord says that the availability of the Virotech report writer to give evidence and the background and reasons for the MI report amendments are not new evidence.
The landlord says that the documentary evidence of the MI report and Virotech report was sufficient in that the report writers provided observations and findings that are similar findings to other assessments already in evidence.
The landlord says that they consider the MI report and Virotech report were provided at a specific point in time, so they do not consider they can offer much more in regard to evidence outside of that point of time.
In respect of the amendment to the MI report the landlord says their approval of the use of the amended MI report for the tenant’s insurance claim is not an admission of loss or contamination.
The landlord says there is no evidence of specific inspection of the tenants’ belongings and level of contamination of those, and that evidence should have been provided to support the claim for any loss of any possessions.
The landlord says there needs to be finality to this litigation and a rehearing should not be given to allow the tenant an opportunity to re-litigate her claim.
The landlord says no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.
The landlord notes the significant time and cost already expended in responding to the tenants’ claims. The landlord says that I should consider the potential costs the tenant may be responsible for if a rehearing is granted, and the tenant is unsuccessful. The landlord emphasises the concerns that the ongoing costs incurred are likely to be offset against the assets in the Trust which is likely to prejudice other beneficiaries. Outcome
For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred.
The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this.
There is no indication that any relevant or material evidence has been discovered that was not available at the time of hearing. The context of the MI report amendment was available and provided orally at the hearing, the issue remains that there was alternative information in that report in respect of cleaning mould contaminated belongings. I consider that evidence is not fresh, was provided orally at the hearing and considered. The tenants dispute with how that evidence is treated is in my view not a matter for a rehearing.
In respect of whether a rehearing should be granted to allow the tenant to have the writer of the Virotech report give evidence the notice of hearing provides information about evidence and witnesses. It says:

Can I bring a witness?

If you have witnesses, they can be called to give evidence. They usually wait outside the courtroom until they are called in. If you have a witness who does not agree to attend, they can be summoned. You will need to contact Tenancy Services at least five working days before the hearing to make this request. Statements or letters from witnesses may be admitted as evidence but will not carry as much weight as if the witness is present at the hearing. (emphasis added)

The tenant had notice of the degree of weight that may be given to evidence not provided directly from the expert at the hearing.
Further, the Virotech report writer did not attend the property prior to February 2025, and they are not likely to have direct knowledge of the history of the premises and be able to give persuasive evidence around the timing of uninhabitability. It is therefore not necessarily likely that the Virotech report writer’s evidence will change the findings in respect of the tenant’s claim.
I do not accept the tenant was disadvantaged by or following the case conference. It was agreed at that time that the tenant could access the property and remove her belongings. The tenant said that she used PPE to enter the premises, and the order reflected that acknowledged position and the arrangement was clear that she could collect her belongings as she was entitled to do so. The tenant also indicated she had entered the property prior to the case conference, I consider she therefore had sufficient time to uplift or assess her property with any professional support she saw fit. The tenant had information about this process (she had signed the ACNZ protocol referred to below) and a further recommendation to get advice about the collection of her belongings was provided in the order.
Even if the tenant’s belongings were contaminated, the Asbestos Consultants Mould Contaminated Property – Side Indication and Safety Protocol (the protocol), provided that an assessment of particular items could occur to determine whether they should be cleaned or disposed of. The tenant did not have this done. The evidence presented in respect of the tenant’s belongings as set out in her schedules for compensation, do not identify what might have required expert cleaning or to be disposed of in accordance with any expert assessment.
In my view the tenant had a fair opportunity to present her case, and she has not proven it to the required standard.
I consider the issues raised by the tenant do not relate to a procedural issue, but rather a challenge to the Tribunal findings, which she now seeks to relitigate with additional evidence that could have been provided for the hearing.
In respect of name suppression, section 95A of the RTA relates to suppression orders. The relevant provisions state: (1)The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case.... ...(4) The Tribunal may, on the application of any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. (5) An order under subsection (4) may be made subject to any conditions that the Tribunal considers appropriate. (6)An order under subsection (4), or a condition under subsection (5), must not be inconsistent with any of subsections (1) to (2) (to the extent that those subsections also apply to the proceedings).
The starting point is section 95A(1) RTA which makes it mandatory for the Tribunal to order name suppression where a party has wholly or substantially succeeded. The tenant did not succeed with her claim.
While section 95A(4) RTA allows for some discretion, section 95A(6) RTA provides that an order under section 95A(4) RTA must not be inconsistent with section 95A(1) RTA.
In this case I said in the reasons for declining name suppression: The tenant has been unsuccessful in her claim, and I consider the public interest in publication outweighs the tenant’s interests in suppression.
Any dispute about that decision is not a matter for a rehearing because I am not satisfied that the tenant has proven there may have been a substantial miscarriage of justice in this regard. Parliament enacted section 95A RTA for a reason. Successful parties are eligible for name suppression, unsuccessful parties are not. There is a public interest component in name suppression which I had to consider. The public (which includes other landlords and tenants) is entitled to know if particular parties have been unsuccessful in their Tenancy Tribunal applications. That enables them to make informed choices – for tenants entering tenancies with a particular landlord, and for landlords accepting particular tenants.
I accept that the publication of the order may have implications for the tenant finding another tenancy, however that is not unusual or exceptional. I am unclear how publication may impact her health but, in any event, both these matters cannot justify an order for name suppression. If it did, section 95A RTA would become redundant. Any party could seek name suppression simply because of later possible adverse consequences.
In conclusion, I have considered all the grounds advanced by the tenant for why a rehearing should be granted. My assessment is that it has not been established to the balance of probabilities that there was any possible miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong. The application for a rehearing is dismissed. Suppression and Costs
The landlord applied for name suppression. The suppression orders made in their favour and in respect of the MI report writer made in the previous order continue to apply to this order.
The tenant applied for name suppression. I acknowledge the tenant’s health issues and her desire to not have barriers when applying for tenancies, however the public interest in open justice outweighs the tenant’s interests. Name suppression for the tenant is declined.
I have redirected costs memoranda to be filed as set out in the order above.

Order

The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

The landlord is to file any costs submissions within 10 working days from the date of this order. The tenant is to file any reply submissions within 10 working days thereafter. Any submissions must be emailed to the email address taurangatt@justice.govt.nz and emailed to the other party. The Tribunal will then issue an order as to costs on the papers.

The Tribunal orders suppression of the landlord’s name and identifying details, the address of the property and the name of the MI report writer.

The stay in respect of publication of the order dated 2 April 2026 is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the remote hearing on 7 May 2026 in respect of whether a rehearing should be granted.

On 2 April 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s claims for compensation and exemplary damages, granting name suppression to the landlord, declining name suppression for the tenant and directing submissions in respect of costs.

On 9 April 2026 the tenant applied for a rehearing of the Tribunal order.

The tenant said in the application form the grounds for a rehearing are: A stay of proceedings is sought as the application raises substantive issues regarding the treatment of key expert evidence which may materially affect the outcome. It is appropriate that the order is not enforced while the rehearing application is determined. I apply for a rehearing on the basis that a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. The outcome was materially affected by the way key expert evidence was treated, and by findings that do not reconcile with the evidence before the Tribunal. In particular, key expert evidence was given limited weight due to the absence of the author for questioning. This directly affected findings relating to causation, timing of contamination, and the assessment of contaminated belongings and loss. The order confirms that expert evidence was not fully relied upon for this reason. This issue can now be resolved, as the relevant expert is available to provide clarification and be questioned if required. The treatment of expert evidence also affected multiple aspects of the decision, including findings regarding the development of contamination over time and whether affected belongings could be safely recovered. The conclusions reached do not reconcile with the consistent direction of the expert evidence before the Tribunal. Further, new evidence clarifies the context in which the May 2024 mould inspection report was prepared. This includes correspondence confirming landlord approval of report content relating to contaminated belongings, the need for remediation, and temporary relocation. This directly addresses concerns regarding the weight and consistency of that evidence and confirms that these issues were identified and accepted at the time. There is therefore a clear evidential issue which affected the outcome, and that issue can now be resolved. A rehearing would allow the evidence to be properly considered and reconciled on a complete evidential basis.

On 15 April 2026 the application for a rehearing was directed to a hearing and a stay was issued in relation to publication.

The landlord opposes the application for a rehearing.

Both parties provided oral submissions at the hearing and have submitted written submissions.

The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The Law - Rehearings

The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 1

Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 2

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 3 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only 1 See s 105 of the RTA. 2 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 3 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”

A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.

In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 4 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.

The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 5 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.

As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 6 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Both parties filed lengthy submissions. I have summarised their positions below.

The tenant says: 4 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 5 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 6 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen a. the decision in this case was materially affected by the weight given to the expert evidence, b. the findings do not reconcile with the evidence, and c. consideration was not given to the expert advice and constraints she was under when she was required to assess and recover her belongings.

The tenant says that the outcome of the proceeding was affected by the limited weight given to the Virotech report and [Suppressed] (MI report).

The tenant says both reports go directly to central findings, including: a. the cause and source of mould contamination; b. the timing and extent of that contamination; and c. whether her belongings were reasonably recoverable (that is whether her belongings could be cleaned).

The tenant says the Tribunal’s findings are inconsistent with the evidence regarding contamination and uninhabitability.

The tenant emphasises the relevance of the Virotech report to support her position in respect of the timing of contamination and uninhabitability and notes the limited weight it was given because the Virotech report writer did not give evidence at the hearing. The tenant says she was unaware that the absence of the expert would limit the weight given to that evidence. The tenant says the Virotech report writer can now be made available for a hearing and provide clarification in respect of its findings.

The tenant says the limitation in weight given to that evidence directly affected the findings in respect of mould contamination. She says there is a real possibility the outcome could be different if the Virotech report writer is able to give further clarification at a rehearing.

The tenant says the expert evidence consistently indicated that from May 2024 (date of MI report) her belongings were contaminated and not recoverable without professional support or not at all.

The tenant says the MI report addressed the timing, extent, impact of contamination and effect on her belongings and habitability. The tenant says the finding that the premises were not uninhabitable prior to February 2025 does not reconcile with the evidence of the MI report.

The tenant says the context surrounding the amendments to the MI report has now been made available and should be considered in terms of assessing her claim for loss .

The tenant says the fact that the landlord agreed for the amended MI report to be used for an insurance claim by the tenant, shows the landlord was aware and effectively accepted her loss associated with mould contamination.

She also says email correspondence (submitted with the rehearing application) is new evidence that clarifies the context of the amendments to the MI report and a rehearing would allow the amended MI report to be properly considered.

The tenant said she was disadvantaged because she did not have all of the landlord’s counterclaim documents filed before the case conference. The tenant says as a result the order following the case conference affected her ability to recover her belongings and the finding in respect of mitigation of loss. The tenant says that I have made incorrect findings in respect of whether her belongings could be cleaned and mitigation of loss and that the findings do not reflect the expert evidence.

The tenant says there is a real possibility that the outcome would have been different if: • “the expert evidence had been properly tested • the evidence regarding contaminated belongings had been fully reconciled • the health and safety constraints affecting mitigation had been properly considered • the timing of uninhabitability had been assessed with expert clarification”

Finally, the tenant says a rehearing should be granted with respect to the decision to decline name suppression as it “materially prejudices her ability to secure future housing and exacerbates an existing health condition”. The tenant says publication creates a real risk that prospective landlords may decline her a tenancy. She says this prejudice is significant and outweighs the public interest in publication of her name. The tenant says the prejudice to her was not fully addressed and should be reconsidered.

The landlord emphasises the Tribunals role in resolving matters fairly and expeditiously. The landlord submits that the burden of proving the claim is for the tenant and she has had sufficient opportunity to do that.

The landlord says a rehearing should only be granted where a party can show a considerable, overwhelming and obvious wrong or a complete failure of justice, which has not occurred in this case. The landlord says the tenant being unhappy or dissatisfied with the decision is not grounds for rehearing.

In respect of the evidence that the tenant wants to provide the landlord says that the availability of the Virotech report writer to give evidence and the background and reasons for the MI report amendments are not new evidence.

The landlord says that the documentary evidence of the MI report and Virotech report was sufficient in that the report writers provided observations and findings that are similar findings to other assessments already in evidence.

The landlord says that they consider the MI report and Virotech report were provided at a specific point in time, so they do not consider they can offer much more in regard to evidence outside of that point of time.

In respect of the amendment to the MI report the landlord says their approval of the use of the amended MI report for the tenant’s insurance claim is not an admission of loss or contamination.

The landlord says there is no evidence of specific inspection of the tenants’ belongings and level of contamination of those, and that evidence should have been provided to support the claim for any loss of any possessions.

The landlord says there needs to be finality to this litigation and a rehearing should not be given to allow the tenant an opportunity to re-litigate her claim.

The landlord says no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.

The landlord notes the significant time and cost already expended in responding to the tenants’ claims. The landlord says that I should consider the potential costs the tenant may be responsible for if a rehearing is granted, and the tenant is unsuccessful. The landlord emphasises the concerns that the ongoing costs incurred are likely to be offset against the assets in the Trust which is likely to prejudice other beneficiaries. Outcome

For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred.

The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this.

There is no indication that any relevant or material evidence has been discovered that was not available at the time of hearing. The context of the MI report amendment was available and provided orally at the hearing, the issue remains that there was alternative information in that report in respect of cleaning mould contaminated belongings. I consider that evidence is not fresh, was provided orally at the hearing and considered. The tenants dispute with how that evidence is treated is in my view not a matter for a rehearing.

In respect of whether a rehearing should be granted to allow the tenant to have the writer of the Virotech report give evidence the notice of hearing provides information about evidence and witnesses. It says:

Can I bring a witness?

The tenant had notice of the degree of weight that may be given to evidence not provided directly from the expert at the hearing.

Further, the Virotech report writer did not attend the property prior to February 2025, and they are not likely to have direct knowledge of the history of the premises and be able to give persuasive evidence around the timing of uninhabitability. It is therefore not necessarily likely that the Virotech report writer’s evidence will change the findings in respect of the tenant’s claim.

I do not accept the tenant was disadvantaged by or following the case conference. It was agreed at that time that the tenant could access the property and remove her belongings. The tenant said that she used PPE to enter the premises, and the order reflected that acknowledged position and the arrangement was clear that she could collect her belongings as she was entitled to do so. The tenant also indicated she had entered the property prior to the case conference, I consider she therefore had sufficient time to uplift or assess her property with any professional support she saw fit. The tenant had information about this process (she had signed the ACNZ protocol referred to below) and a further recommendation to get advice about the collection of her belongings was provided in the order.

Even if the tenant’s belongings were contaminated, the Asbestos Consultants Mould Contaminated Property – Side Indication and Safety Protocol (the protocol), provided that an assessment of particular items could occur to determine whether they should be cleaned or disposed of. The tenant did not have this done. The evidence presented in respect of the tenant’s belongings as set out in her schedules for compensation, do not identify what might have required expert cleaning or to be disposed of in accordance with any expert assessment.

In my view the tenant had a fair opportunity to present her case, and she has not proven it to the required standard.

I consider the issues raised by the tenant do not relate to a procedural issue, but rather a challenge to the Tribunal findings, which she now seeks to relitigate with additional evidence that could have been provided for the hearing.

In respect of name suppression, section 95A of the RTA relates to suppression orders. The relevant provisions state: (1)The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case.... ...(4) The Tribunal may, on the application of any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name or any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. (5) An order under subsection (4) may be made subject to any conditions that the Tribunal considers appropriate. (6)An order under subsection (4), or a condition under subsection (5), must not be inconsistent with any of subsections (1) to (2) (to the extent that those subsections also apply to the proceedings).

The starting point is section 95A(1) RTA which makes it mandatory for the Tribunal to order name suppression where a party has wholly or substantially succeeded. The tenant did not succeed with her claim.

While section 95A(4) RTA allows for some discretion, section 95A(6) RTA provides that an order under section 95A(4) RTA must not be inconsistent with section 95A(1) RTA.

In this case I said in the reasons for declining name suppression: The tenant has been unsuccessful in her claim, and I consider the public interest in publication outweighs the tenant’s interests in suppression.

Any dispute about that decision is not a matter for a rehearing because I am not satisfied that the tenant has proven there may have been a substantial miscarriage of justice in this regard. Parliament enacted section 95A RTA for a reason. Successful parties are eligible for name suppression, unsuccessful parties are not. There is a public interest component in name suppression which I had to consider. The public (which includes other landlords and tenants) is entitled to know if particular parties have been unsuccessful in their Tenancy Tribunal applications. That enables them to make informed choices – for tenants entering tenancies with a particular landlord, and for landlords accepting particular tenants.

I accept that the publication of the order may have implications for the tenant finding another tenancy, however that is not unusual or exceptional. I am unclear how publication may impact her health but, in any event, both these matters cannot justify an order for name suppression. If it did, section 95A RTA would become redundant. Any party could seek name suppression simply because of later possible adverse consequences.

In conclusion, I have considered all the grounds advanced by the tenant for why a rehearing should be granted. My assessment is that it has not been established to the balance of probabilities that there was any possible miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong. The application for a rehearing is dismissed. Suppression and Costs

The landlord applied for name suppression. The suppression orders made in their favour and in respect of the MI report writer made in the previous order continue to apply to this order.

The tenant applied for name suppression. I acknowledge the tenant’s health issues and her desire to not have barriers when applying for tenancies, however the public interest in open justice outweighs the tenant’s interests. Name suppression for the tenant is declined.

I have redirected costs memoranda to be filed as set out in the order above.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5356352 — Mould & damp

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5356352 — Mould & damp

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Can I bring a witness?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Can I bring a witness?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions