Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421 — 14-day notice in Ormondville, Ormondville

Decided 6 January 2026 · Published 6 January 2026 · Application 5366421

Mixed / unclear

14-day notice
Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Mixed / unclear

From published order

Location

Ormondville

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

R Woodhouse

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road, RD 7, Ormondville 4977 as of 11:59 pm on 27 January 2026.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for a possession order under section 65. Section 65 allows the Tribunal to make orders granting possession when the premises are occupied by ‘squatters’.
As will be discussed further below, in 2019 a private arrangement was made for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ property. The sale has not been completed, as only part payment has been made but more importantly, no title has been provided to the purchaser, Kevin Clayton. Kevin Clayton has occupied the premises since the 2019 agreement. The vendor (the Knights) moved to cancel the agreement and has required that possession of the premises return to them. It is the possession dispute that the Tribunal must consider.
Kevin Clayton (the respondent) has requested not to have any title or honorific applied to him, and simply to be referred to as Kevin, so that is the approach I will take in this written decision from this point.

BACKGROUND

The disputed premises are rural.
Kevin and the Knights entered into a private arrangement for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ Property. That is recorded in handwriting, as follows: Deposit on 9500 M 2 land plus woolshed and hayshed @ approx 210 Ruam Road Total Price $30000 plus GST Further $15000 due on issue of title Balance over one or two years interest free as initially agreeable.
As far as I am aware, that constituted the whole of the written agreement.
I further understand that Kevin paid a deposit of $5,000, and then in January 2020 a further $19,500. Kevin has also paid the Knights $35 per month toward power.
However, the premises have not been subdivided. There are differing perspectives from the parties as to why that is, but it would appear to be in part due to factors including an adverse environmental assessment report, and needing to move a water pipe. But whatever the reason, the land has not been subdivided, and therefore no separate title could be issued.
The file indicates that over the course of time, the relationship between the parties has deteriorated. In more recent times, the Knights, via their legal representatives, have sought to cancel the agreement. Various offers have been made to Kevin, including a refund of the money that has been paid by him, including for the environmental report he paid for. That offer was not accepted by Kevin.
More recently still, on 10 June 2025 the Tararua District Council issued the Knights a notice to fix in relation to the premises. The notice records that there had been a range of breaches including: a. Converting the woolshed to a residential dwelling (sleeping single home). b. Undertaking building work without a consent (installing sanitary facilities in the building). c. Undertaking building work that did not comply with the Building Act 2004. d. Failing to obtain a resource consent for the building work.
The notice required the Knights to comply with the notice by 17 October 2025, or warned of a fine of $200,000 and a further fine of up to $20,000 for each day there is failure to comply with the notice.
On 14 October 2025, an application was filed with the Tribunal seeking a possession order. The application was filed on Mr Knight’s behalf, by his legal representative, Mr Cameron.
A telephone hearing was convened on 18 November 2025. In attendance was Mr and Mrs Knight, Mr Cameron and Kevin.
An issue arose where it appeared that Kevin had not received all of the relevant documents filed for the Knights. At my direction, a full copy of the file was sent to Kevin, and he was given until 3 December 2025 to file any further submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that Kevin has received a copy of all of the documents filed by the Applicant, which I have considered in this case. Further submissions and evidence were filed by Kevin, and I considered the hearing closed as of 4 December 2025. I confirm that in considering this case, I have considered all information and submissions provided, including the later submission and information from Kevin. Representation
Kevin’s position is that Mr Cameron was not approved as a representative by him or the Tribunal, so should not be representing the applicant.
As I explained, where the claim is over $6,000.00 in value, parties have an automatic right to representation. In this case, I consider the dispute would be in excess of $6,000 in value. The effect of Kevin’s position is that he has a legal right to effectively limitless possession of the premises. The value of the land is plainly well over $6,000.
However, even if I were wrong in that, given the complexity and issues that arise in this case, representation would be approved, and I confirmed that at the hearing. APPLICANT’S CASE
Mr Cameron submitted that the Claytons no longer have a legal right to occupation of the premises, as any authority has been withdrawn.
Mr Cameron states that the Knights are the legal owners of the premises. There was discussion about the Claytons’ purchasing part of the property and eventually, the Claytons moved into the woolshed.
The Claytons do not pay rent, they pay $35 per month for power.
There was an agreement that the sale price would be $30,000. The Claytons paid a deposit of $5,000, but nothing further.
There was work undertaken with a subdivision. When that process took place, there were some issues that arose and the parties found there was more involved with the subdivision than was originally expected, including the outcome of soil testing and other remediation necessary before the premises would be safe to subdivide.
Mr Clayton was not engaging with the processes necessary to subdivide.
Ultimately, the Claytons were given the option to proceed with the subdivision at their cost or their deposit would be refunded.
The Council considered that the woolshed was being used for residential purposes and issued a notice to fix, so there is action needed in that regard.
There is no prospect of the parties proceeding with the original agreement, and any authority to remain on the premises has been withdrawn. KEVIN’S CASE
At the hearing, Kevin asked the applicant a range of questions in relation to the application form which refers to the parties as being ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’. I confirmed that the application form the Tribunal provides is the same form for claims for possession orders for squatters, as it is for landlord and tenant disputes. The situation is not ideal, but any reference to tenant and landlord in the form has nothing to do with elections from the Knight’s, it is simply the form that the Tribunal provides.
Kevin confirmed that he is not a tenant. He disputes that he is a squatter because of the $35 per month he pays. Kevin submits that the money he pays is accepted as consideration for the right to live on the premises.
There is a sale and purchase agreement in place, and as part of that there is a right to live on the land (albeit that was a verbal agreement).
Kevin submits that he has never given consent to amend the contract, so the sale and purchase agreement remains in place.
Kevin referred to the communications between the parties where the applicants had told him that the property was his.
I raised with Kevin that a key issue I will need to consider is whether the right to occupy (which I accept there was), has been withdrawn. Again Kevin referred to the above arguments. Jurisdiction
Kevin disputes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider this case on two particular grounds.
Kevin refers to section 5 of the RTA, which confirms that the RTA does not apply when there is a sale and purchase agreement that is not revocable at will.
It is also disputed that the premises are residential premises, Kevin lives in Napier as reflected in the correspondence he has provided with the Napier address. He only “camps temporarily” at the premises. APPLICANT’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
Mr Cameron submits that the sale and purchase agreement has been frustrated, but that is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
There was no more than a licence to occupy that has been withdrawn.
Any issue with the address of the premises is a side issue.
The sale and purchase agreement is no longer in play because it has been frustrated.
The premises must either be residential or commercial, and it is residential in this case. KEVIN’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
As above, an extension was provided for Kevin to file concluding submissions. Kevin filed a 19 page written document, which he states was not a submission but a claim. I summarise the additional points as follows (that are additional to the points raised at the hearing): a. There continues to be a purchase agreement for the land in dispute. b. The Knights have breached that agreement. c. Kevin sold his house in reliance of the purchase of the disputed property. d. There is no record of the original agreement being cancelled. e. The Knights have provided little if any evidence to support their claims such as around the Council’s determination around use of the property. f. Kevin indicates that he is a tenant, and the Knights landlords.
Kevin raised a range of procedural issues. I do not intend to address them beyond saying that I am entirely satisfied that Kevin has had a fair opportunity to engage in the hearing and be heard, which included having the ability to file concluding submissions after the oral hearing had concluded.
Kevin also states that in the event I were to make any order in favour of the Knights, that he would treat me personally as being a threat to the property.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
It is the applicant that must prove their case. As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.
There is an exception to that, when a party is arguing that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim. In that case, it is the person claiming there is no jurisdiction, who must establish that is the case (see section 10 of the RTA).

ANALYSIS

I consider that the Tribunal must consider the following questions: a. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider this claim; if it does b. Can the Tribunal order possession to return to the Knights? Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Kevin submitted that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim for two particular reasons Excluded under section 5
Kevin submitted that this claim is excluded from the Residential Tenancies Act because it falls within section 5, which relates to the situation where there is a sale and purchase agreement for the premises.
Section 5 of the RTA sets out a range of circumstances, where, if they apply, the RTA would be excluded. That includes at section 5(1)(o): where the tenant is the purchaser of the premises under an agreement for sale and purchase with the landlord as vendor, not being an agreement that is revocable at will by the vendor:
I find this exclusion does not apply, because Kevin is not a tenant, and the Knights are not landlords. At the hearing both parties confirmed that they are not in a tenant/landlord relationship, Although in his concluding submissions / response, Kevin suggests that he would be a tenant. On the evidence available, I find this is not a landlord / tenant situation. That is for a number of reasons including these: a. In order to find a tenancy agreement existed, I would need to accept that the parties intended to enter into a tenancy agreement, and plainly neither party did. It is clear the intention was for a sale of the land and buildings to Kevin and his partner. I note for example, a communication from Kevin to the Knights from 16 November 2025, in which he states: I believe no contract exists, either verbal or written, in which I, did consent to a tenancy; I say, if consent is assumed, I, hereby rebut any and all assumption and remove any and all assumed consent of I, to accept any title other than man. b. Kevin does not pay rent, which is a requirement in order to find there is a tenancy. Rent is defined in section 2 as being money paid under the tenancy agreement, and here there is no tenancy agreement. I do not accept that the $35 payments toward power are intended for rent, plainly they are compensatory, that is, they pay for the power consumed in the buildings. Residential premises
Kevin further submitted that these are not residential premises. Section 65 confirms that the Tribunal can make a possession order for residential premises – if the premises were not residential, the Tribunal could not make the order.
Kevin says that he lives in the Hawkes Bay, and provided letters which support that. That may well be the case, but the test is not where the occupier resides, but rather whether the premises are residential premises. The evidence points to the premises being residential premises, as supported by the council’s assessment, as demonstrated in the notice to fix.
There is also evidence from Kevin that he was living in the premises. I note three communications to the landlord on 18 March 2025, 25 March 2025 and 1 April 2025, which refers that the actions of the landlord as leaving Kevin and his family ‘homeless’. Having a ‘home’ at the premises denotes residential use of the premises. In the 25 March 2025 communication for example, Kevin states: i, say i, take this to mean if i, do not pay for completion of your subdivision, you, intend to harm i, and the family of i, in this case the wife and son and daughter of i, by to have us removed from the property, thereby rendering us homeless; i, require you, to withdraw what i, consider a threat of harm and or extortion within 14 days or i, say, i would consider that trespass by way of harm and or extortion for which i, will seek compensation of $100,000.00 plus $1 per minute trespass continues plus expenses, per instance; i, ask is it your intent to now remove what i, consider a threat of harm or extortion or is it your intent to wrong i, by way of harm or extortion; further, you, claim you reserve the right to have us removed from the property;
I discuss what is meant by the term ‘residential premises’, further below.
For those reasons, I find that Kevin has not proven that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is excluded.

Can possession to the Knights be ordered?

Section 65 of the RTA relates to the eviction of squatters. A squatter is a person in possession of premises when they are not a lawful tenant or otherwise in lawful occupation. Section 65 holds:
Eviction of squatters (1) Where, on the application of any person entitled to possession of any residential premises, the Tribunal is satisfied that any other person is in possession of the premises as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to that person by any person having lawful authority to grant that right to that other person, the Tribunal shall make a possession order granting possession of the premises to the applicant. (2). ... (3). To avoid doubt, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under this section even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Section 65 was considered by the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro and Tapsell [2019] NZHC 328. The Court held [at 74] that there are three conditions which have to be met before a possession order can be made: (a) The premises which are the subject of the application must be residential premises; and (b) The applicant for possession must be entitled to possession of those premises; and (c) Another person or persons are in possession as squatters, trespassers, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to do so.
If the Knights can prove (a) and (b) then the onus will move to the Kevin to prove on the balance of probabilities that they have a right of occupation granted by any person with lawful authority to grant it and that the right has not been terminated.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro, in paragraphs [91], [92], [93] and [94] confirmed that the Tribunal is not entitled to take in to account the fact that there may be a claim in another court when considering the possession application. Gordon J states at paragraph 94 of the decision “It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession”.
I will now consider this case in light of that three part test.

Are the premises residential premises?

As discussed above, I am satisfied that the premises are residential premises. To be found residential premises, I do not need to find that the premises are lawful. That is confirmed by the very definition of ‘residential premises’ in section 2: residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful
In this case I am satisfied that the premises are intended to be for occupation as a place of residence. That is reflected in the changes made to the shed to turn it into a dwelling, as evidenced by the Council assessment, and the reference from Kevin to being ‘homeless’ if removed from the premises.

Is the applicant entitled to possession of the premises?

There is no dispute between the parties that the Knights are the owners of the premises, so there is an assumption that they are entitled to possess the land and associated buildings on it.
I have not seen any evidence that the Knights have leased the premises to Kevin. Otherwise I have not seen any other legal instrument that provides Kevin and his family a right to occupy the premises. There is nothing in the written sale and purchase agreement that vests Kevin a right of occupation.
There is no doubt that the Knights knew that Kevin was in occupation of the premises, and based on the emails and other communication, they undoubtedly consented to Kevin and his family having an exclusive right of occupation, but I consider that was by way of a bare licence. A bare licence simply means permission to be on the premises.
In Paraire v Paraire — Part Mangatawa 10 Block (2015) 105 Waikato Maniapoto MB 67 (105 WMN 67) Judge Clark discussed the revocation of a bare licence as follows: A bare licence is revocable at will. The decision to revoke a bare licence must be communicated to the licensee for effective revocation. This may be by express or implicit notice, or by the licensor doing some act inconsistent with the continuance of the licence, or by threatening proceedings for trespass.
I am in no doubt that the licence that the Knights gave to Kevin has been revoked. If Kevin was in any doubt on that point, the filing of the application for a possession order with the Tribunal should have clarified any uncertainty on that point
I find therefore, that while Kevin did have a right to occupy, that has been revoked, and there is no continuing right of occupation existing.

Does Kevin otherwise have a right to occupy the premises?

The onus now shifts to Kevin to prove that he does have a right to occupy, and I find he has not established that.
Kevin argues that he had a contractual right to occupy, which he has not agreed to vary. I have set out the written sale and purchase agreement above, but there is nothing in that written agreement giving Kevin a continued right to occupy the premises, or in fact any right to occupy the premises prior to settlement occurring.
There is no evidence that the $35 paid each month is consideration for staying in the premises; it seems most likely that is compensation for power usage – not in exchange for a right to occupy.
This is not to say that Kevin does not have rights that he may be able to exercise around the cancellation of the sale and purchase agreement, or in relation to the money he has already paid to the Knights. But the problem he faces is that the Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any remedy should be available to him. The extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is as set out above, that is, determining the three points from the Sergeant decision above.
I note the High Court decision of Willigers v Churchill Fishing International Limited [2020] NZHC 2212. That was a case where the occupier, like in the case before myself, argued that a possession order could not be granted, because they had an interest in the premises, in that case a resulting trust. That was not accepted by the Court, which held: Second, the reason why the Tribunal and the District Court are wrong has not been persuasively set out to this Court. Ms Haszard argued that the Tribunal was wrong not to consider the evidence that Mr Willigers had an interest by way of resulting trust in the property. But even if this is established I am unclear why that would give rise to right of possession to the property, certainly possession in the nature of a tenancy. Any claim to an equitable interest will need to be established in the High Court first before the question of equitable remedy is addressed, and I note that only a percentage interest is sought by Mr Willigers. Effective relief could still be granted even if the present claims in relation to possession fail. It is also relevant that a caveat is presently in place and this exists to protect Mr Willigers’ claims to an equitable interest. [Adjudicators emphasis]
I again note the High Court decision in Sergeant v Nigro. In that case, the Tribunal had in effect considered whether the occupier had a right to possess the premises, an argued property sharing agreement, when that was a matter for the High Court to determine. The District Court and High Court were critical of the Tribunal’s approach.
The High Court went on to consider whether section 85 of the RTA (which looks to the Tribunal reaching fair outcomes based on the substantial merits and justice of the case), but did not accept that allowed the Tenancy Tribunal to determine a matter that is otherwise within the High Court’s jurisdiction. The Court confirmed: [93] ...Section 85, when interpreted in that way, does not provide the opportunity to infuse considerations from the High Court claim into the Tribunal’s factual determinations under s 65. [94] It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession and/or if Mr Sergeant was in possession as a squatter or trespasser or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to him. The Judge was correct to hold that the Tribunal had erred in its approach in this regard.
I finally note the High Court decision of Davis v Gwilliam [2002] NZHC 2228, in which the High Court supported a decision of the Tribunal, which granted possession of the premises to an estate, when the occupier was the beneficiary of the estate. Cooke J confirmed that: The first point is that the plaintiff and her daughter have no right of occupation of the property in question. They are only beneficiaries of the estate. There is no right to the property itself.
Accordingly, just having some associated rights around the premises, does not translate into a right of occupation.
In this case, Mr Cameron submitted that the contract had become frustrated. That is not a finding that the Tribunal can reach, that would be a matter for a court to decide. But it is not particularly relevant. What is relevant is that the Knights have title to the land, Kevin does not. Title vests an ability to exclude others from the land, when there is otherwise no superior right to hold possession of the land.
Kevin submitted that there was a verbal agreement to stay on the land as part of the overall sale and purchase agreement. There is another problem that Kevin faces with that argument, and that is that contracts for the sale and purchase of land in New Zealand must be in writing. Section 24 of the Property Law Act 2007 confirms: 24 Contracts for disposition of land not enforceable unless in writing (1) A contract for the disposition of land is not enforceable by action unless— (a) the contract is in writing or its terms are recorded in writing; and (b) the contract or written record is signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced.

CONCLUSION

I find that the evidence supports that the Knights as owners of the land, have a right to possess the premises. There is insufficient evidence to show that Kevin or his family has a superior right of occupation.
The focus of Kevin’s case, is that he has a valid sale and purchase agreement for the premises, he has complied with it, but the Knights have breached the agreement. I express no view on that, because the Tenancy Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make such findings. Normally, it would be the High Court that would consider such claims. Because those are not matters this Tribunal can consider, I have determined that the fair approach is to make the order for possession to return to the owner, but to fix the date for that as being 27 January 2026. That will allow Kevin the opportunity to commence proceedings in the Court around the sale and purchase dispute, and should the Court wish to do so, order a stay to apply to this order. But unless a stay is ordered, then the Tribunal orders that possession of these premises return to the Knights on 27 January 2026, and that could therefore be enforced.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

14-day notice Harassment Ormondville

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s10, s2, s24, s36, s41, s44, s48, s5, s5(1), s53, s65, s85

Key findings

Dispute theme: termination 14day
Dispute theme: harassment

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421?

The tribunal order states: Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road,

How much money was awarded in case 5366421?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5366421?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5366421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12934305-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421 — 14-day notice in Ormondville, Ormondville

Decided 6 January 2026 · Published 6 January 2026 · Application 5366421

Mixed / unclear

14-day notice
Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Mixed / unclear

From published order

Location

Ormondville

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

R Woodhouse

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road, RD 7, Ormondville 4977 as of 11:59 pm on 27 January 2026.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for a possession order under section 65. Section 65 allows the Tribunal to make orders granting possession when the premises are occupied by ‘squatters’.
As will be discussed further below, in 2019 a private arrangement was made for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ property. The sale has not been completed, as only part payment has been made but more importantly, no title has been provided to the purchaser, Kevin Clayton. Kevin Clayton has occupied the premises since the 2019 agreement. The vendor (the Knights) moved to cancel the agreement and has required that possession of the premises return to them. It is the possession dispute that the Tribunal must consider.
Kevin Clayton (the respondent) has requested not to have any title or honorific applied to him, and simply to be referred to as Kevin, so that is the approach I will take in this written decision from this point.

BACKGROUND

The disputed premises are rural.
Kevin and the Knights entered into a private arrangement for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ Property. That is recorded in handwriting, as follows: Deposit on 9500 M 2 land plus woolshed and hayshed @ approx 210 Ruam Road Total Price $30000 plus GST Further $15000 due on issue of title Balance over one or two years interest free as initially agreeable.
As far as I am aware, that constituted the whole of the written agreement.
I further understand that Kevin paid a deposit of $5,000, and then in January 2020 a further $19,500. Kevin has also paid the Knights $35 per month toward power.
However, the premises have not been subdivided. There are differing perspectives from the parties as to why that is, but it would appear to be in part due to factors including an adverse environmental assessment report, and needing to move a water pipe. But whatever the reason, the land has not been subdivided, and therefore no separate title could be issued.
The file indicates that over the course of time, the relationship between the parties has deteriorated. In more recent times, the Knights, via their legal representatives, have sought to cancel the agreement. Various offers have been made to Kevin, including a refund of the money that has been paid by him, including for the environmental report he paid for. That offer was not accepted by Kevin.
More recently still, on 10 June 2025 the Tararua District Council issued the Knights a notice to fix in relation to the premises. The notice records that there had been a range of breaches including: a. Converting the woolshed to a residential dwelling (sleeping single home). b. Undertaking building work without a consent (installing sanitary facilities in the building). c. Undertaking building work that did not comply with the Building Act 2004. d. Failing to obtain a resource consent for the building work.
The notice required the Knights to comply with the notice by 17 October 2025, or warned of a fine of $200,000 and a further fine of up to $20,000 for each day there is failure to comply with the notice.
On 14 October 2025, an application was filed with the Tribunal seeking a possession order. The application was filed on Mr Knight’s behalf, by his legal representative, Mr Cameron.
A telephone hearing was convened on 18 November 2025. In attendance was Mr and Mrs Knight, Mr Cameron and Kevin.
An issue arose where it appeared that Kevin had not received all of the relevant documents filed for the Knights. At my direction, a full copy of the file was sent to Kevin, and he was given until 3 December 2025 to file any further submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that Kevin has received a copy of all of the documents filed by the Applicant, which I have considered in this case. Further submissions and evidence were filed by Kevin, and I considered the hearing closed as of 4 December 2025. I confirm that in considering this case, I have considered all information and submissions provided, including the later submission and information from Kevin. Representation
Kevin’s position is that Mr Cameron was not approved as a representative by him or the Tribunal, so should not be representing the applicant.
As I explained, where the claim is over $6,000.00 in value, parties have an automatic right to representation. In this case, I consider the dispute would be in excess of $6,000 in value. The effect of Kevin’s position is that he has a legal right to effectively limitless possession of the premises. The value of the land is plainly well over $6,000.
However, even if I were wrong in that, given the complexity and issues that arise in this case, representation would be approved, and I confirmed that at the hearing. APPLICANT’S CASE
Mr Cameron submitted that the Claytons no longer have a legal right to occupation of the premises, as any authority has been withdrawn.
Mr Cameron states that the Knights are the legal owners of the premises. There was discussion about the Claytons’ purchasing part of the property and eventually, the Claytons moved into the woolshed.
The Claytons do not pay rent, they pay $35 per month for power.
There was an agreement that the sale price would be $30,000. The Claytons paid a deposit of $5,000, but nothing further.
There was work undertaken with a subdivision. When that process took place, there were some issues that arose and the parties found there was more involved with the subdivision than was originally expected, including the outcome of soil testing and other remediation necessary before the premises would be safe to subdivide.
Mr Clayton was not engaging with the processes necessary to subdivide.
Ultimately, the Claytons were given the option to proceed with the subdivision at their cost or their deposit would be refunded.
The Council considered that the woolshed was being used for residential purposes and issued a notice to fix, so there is action needed in that regard.
There is no prospect of the parties proceeding with the original agreement, and any authority to remain on the premises has been withdrawn. KEVIN’S CASE
At the hearing, Kevin asked the applicant a range of questions in relation to the application form which refers to the parties as being ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’. I confirmed that the application form the Tribunal provides is the same form for claims for possession orders for squatters, as it is for landlord and tenant disputes. The situation is not ideal, but any reference to tenant and landlord in the form has nothing to do with elections from the Knight’s, it is simply the form that the Tribunal provides.
Kevin confirmed that he is not a tenant. He disputes that he is a squatter because of the $35 per month he pays. Kevin submits that the money he pays is accepted as consideration for the right to live on the premises.
There is a sale and purchase agreement in place, and as part of that there is a right to live on the land (albeit that was a verbal agreement).
Kevin submits that he has never given consent to amend the contract, so the sale and purchase agreement remains in place.
Kevin referred to the communications between the parties where the applicants had told him that the property was his.
I raised with Kevin that a key issue I will need to consider is whether the right to occupy (which I accept there was), has been withdrawn. Again Kevin referred to the above arguments. Jurisdiction
Kevin disputes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider this case on two particular grounds.
Kevin refers to section 5 of the RTA, which confirms that the RTA does not apply when there is a sale and purchase agreement that is not revocable at will.
It is also disputed that the premises are residential premises, Kevin lives in Napier as reflected in the correspondence he has provided with the Napier address. He only “camps temporarily” at the premises. APPLICANT’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
Mr Cameron submits that the sale and purchase agreement has been frustrated, but that is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
There was no more than a licence to occupy that has been withdrawn.
Any issue with the address of the premises is a side issue.
The sale and purchase agreement is no longer in play because it has been frustrated.
The premises must either be residential or commercial, and it is residential in this case. KEVIN’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
As above, an extension was provided for Kevin to file concluding submissions. Kevin filed a 19 page written document, which he states was not a submission but a claim. I summarise the additional points as follows (that are additional to the points raised at the hearing): a. There continues to be a purchase agreement for the land in dispute. b. The Knights have breached that agreement. c. Kevin sold his house in reliance of the purchase of the disputed property. d. There is no record of the original agreement being cancelled. e. The Knights have provided little if any evidence to support their claims such as around the Council’s determination around use of the property. f. Kevin indicates that he is a tenant, and the Knights landlords.
Kevin raised a range of procedural issues. I do not intend to address them beyond saying that I am entirely satisfied that Kevin has had a fair opportunity to engage in the hearing and be heard, which included having the ability to file concluding submissions after the oral hearing had concluded.
Kevin also states that in the event I were to make any order in favour of the Knights, that he would treat me personally as being a threat to the property.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
It is the applicant that must prove their case. As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.
There is an exception to that, when a party is arguing that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim. In that case, it is the person claiming there is no jurisdiction, who must establish that is the case (see section 10 of the RTA).

ANALYSIS

I consider that the Tribunal must consider the following questions: a. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider this claim; if it does b. Can the Tribunal order possession to return to the Knights? Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Kevin submitted that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim for two particular reasons Excluded under section 5
Kevin submitted that this claim is excluded from the Residential Tenancies Act because it falls within section 5, which relates to the situation where there is a sale and purchase agreement for the premises.
Section 5 of the RTA sets out a range of circumstances, where, if they apply, the RTA would be excluded. That includes at section 5(1)(o): where the tenant is the purchaser of the premises under an agreement for sale and purchase with the landlord as vendor, not being an agreement that is revocable at will by the vendor:
I find this exclusion does not apply, because Kevin is not a tenant, and the Knights are not landlords. At the hearing both parties confirmed that they are not in a tenant/landlord relationship, Although in his concluding submissions / response, Kevin suggests that he would be a tenant. On the evidence available, I find this is not a landlord / tenant situation. That is for a number of reasons including these: a. In order to find a tenancy agreement existed, I would need to accept that the parties intended to enter into a tenancy agreement, and plainly neither party did. It is clear the intention was for a sale of the land and buildings to Kevin and his partner. I note for example, a communication from Kevin to the Knights from 16 November 2025, in which he states: I believe no contract exists, either verbal or written, in which I, did consent to a tenancy; I say, if consent is assumed, I, hereby rebut any and all assumption and remove any and all assumed consent of I, to accept any title other than man. b. Kevin does not pay rent, which is a requirement in order to find there is a tenancy. Rent is defined in section 2 as being money paid under the tenancy agreement, and here there is no tenancy agreement. I do not accept that the $35 payments toward power are intended for rent, plainly they are compensatory, that is, they pay for the power consumed in the buildings. Residential premises
Kevin further submitted that these are not residential premises. Section 65 confirms that the Tribunal can make a possession order for residential premises – if the premises were not residential, the Tribunal could not make the order.
Kevin says that he lives in the Hawkes Bay, and provided letters which support that. That may well be the case, but the test is not where the occupier resides, but rather whether the premises are residential premises. The evidence points to the premises being residential premises, as supported by the council’s assessment, as demonstrated in the notice to fix.
There is also evidence from Kevin that he was living in the premises. I note three communications to the landlord on 18 March 2025, 25 March 2025 and 1 April 2025, which refers that the actions of the landlord as leaving Kevin and his family ‘homeless’. Having a ‘home’ at the premises denotes residential use of the premises. In the 25 March 2025 communication for example, Kevin states: i, say i, take this to mean if i, do not pay for completion of your subdivision, you, intend to harm i, and the family of i, in this case the wife and son and daughter of i, by to have us removed from the property, thereby rendering us homeless; i, require you, to withdraw what i, consider a threat of harm and or extortion within 14 days or i, say, i would consider that trespass by way of harm and or extortion for which i, will seek compensation of $100,000.00 plus $1 per minute trespass continues plus expenses, per instance; i, ask is it your intent to now remove what i, consider a threat of harm or extortion or is it your intent to wrong i, by way of harm or extortion; further, you, claim you reserve the right to have us removed from the property;
I discuss what is meant by the term ‘residential premises’, further below.
For those reasons, I find that Kevin has not proven that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is excluded.

Can possession to the Knights be ordered?

Section 65 of the RTA relates to the eviction of squatters. A squatter is a person in possession of premises when they are not a lawful tenant or otherwise in lawful occupation. Section 65 holds:
Eviction of squatters (1) Where, on the application of any person entitled to possession of any residential premises, the Tribunal is satisfied that any other person is in possession of the premises as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to that person by any person having lawful authority to grant that right to that other person, the Tribunal shall make a possession order granting possession of the premises to the applicant. (2). ... (3). To avoid doubt, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under this section even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Section 65 was considered by the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro and Tapsell [2019] NZHC 328. The Court held [at 74] that there are three conditions which have to be met before a possession order can be made: (a) The premises which are the subject of the application must be residential premises; and (b) The applicant for possession must be entitled to possession of those premises; and (c) Another person or persons are in possession as squatters, trespassers, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to do so.
If the Knights can prove (a) and (b) then the onus will move to the Kevin to prove on the balance of probabilities that they have a right of occupation granted by any person with lawful authority to grant it and that the right has not been terminated.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro, in paragraphs [91], [92], [93] and [94] confirmed that the Tribunal is not entitled to take in to account the fact that there may be a claim in another court when considering the possession application. Gordon J states at paragraph 94 of the decision “It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession”.
I will now consider this case in light of that three part test.

Are the premises residential premises?

As discussed above, I am satisfied that the premises are residential premises. To be found residential premises, I do not need to find that the premises are lawful. That is confirmed by the very definition of ‘residential premises’ in section 2: residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful
In this case I am satisfied that the premises are intended to be for occupation as a place of residence. That is reflected in the changes made to the shed to turn it into a dwelling, as evidenced by the Council assessment, and the reference from Kevin to being ‘homeless’ if removed from the premises.

Is the applicant entitled to possession of the premises?

There is no dispute between the parties that the Knights are the owners of the premises, so there is an assumption that they are entitled to possess the land and associated buildings on it.
I have not seen any evidence that the Knights have leased the premises to Kevin. Otherwise I have not seen any other legal instrument that provides Kevin and his family a right to occupy the premises. There is nothing in the written sale and purchase agreement that vests Kevin a right of occupation.
There is no doubt that the Knights knew that Kevin was in occupation of the premises, and based on the emails and other communication, they undoubtedly consented to Kevin and his family having an exclusive right of occupation, but I consider that was by way of a bare licence. A bare licence simply means permission to be on the premises.
In Paraire v Paraire — Part Mangatawa 10 Block (2015) 105 Waikato Maniapoto MB 67 (105 WMN 67) Judge Clark discussed the revocation of a bare licence as follows: A bare licence is revocable at will. The decision to revoke a bare licence must be communicated to the licensee for effective revocation. This may be by express or implicit notice, or by the licensor doing some act inconsistent with the continuance of the licence, or by threatening proceedings for trespass.
I am in no doubt that the licence that the Knights gave to Kevin has been revoked. If Kevin was in any doubt on that point, the filing of the application for a possession order with the Tribunal should have clarified any uncertainty on that point
I find therefore, that while Kevin did have a right to occupy, that has been revoked, and there is no continuing right of occupation existing.

Does Kevin otherwise have a right to occupy the premises?

The onus now shifts to Kevin to prove that he does have a right to occupy, and I find he has not established that.
Kevin argues that he had a contractual right to occupy, which he has not agreed to vary. I have set out the written sale and purchase agreement above, but there is nothing in that written agreement giving Kevin a continued right to occupy the premises, or in fact any right to occupy the premises prior to settlement occurring.
There is no evidence that the $35 paid each month is consideration for staying in the premises; it seems most likely that is compensation for power usage – not in exchange for a right to occupy.
This is not to say that Kevin does not have rights that he may be able to exercise around the cancellation of the sale and purchase agreement, or in relation to the money he has already paid to the Knights. But the problem he faces is that the Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any remedy should be available to him. The extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is as set out above, that is, determining the three points from the Sergeant decision above.
I note the High Court decision of Willigers v Churchill Fishing International Limited [2020] NZHC 2212. That was a case where the occupier, like in the case before myself, argued that a possession order could not be granted, because they had an interest in the premises, in that case a resulting trust. That was not accepted by the Court, which held: Second, the reason why the Tribunal and the District Court are wrong has not been persuasively set out to this Court. Ms Haszard argued that the Tribunal was wrong not to consider the evidence that Mr Willigers had an interest by way of resulting trust in the property. But even if this is established I am unclear why that would give rise to right of possession to the property, certainly possession in the nature of a tenancy. Any claim to an equitable interest will need to be established in the High Court first before the question of equitable remedy is addressed, and I note that only a percentage interest is sought by Mr Willigers. Effective relief could still be granted even if the present claims in relation to possession fail. It is also relevant that a caveat is presently in place and this exists to protect Mr Willigers’ claims to an equitable interest. [Adjudicators emphasis]
I again note the High Court decision in Sergeant v Nigro. In that case, the Tribunal had in effect considered whether the occupier had a right to possess the premises, an argued property sharing agreement, when that was a matter for the High Court to determine. The District Court and High Court were critical of the Tribunal’s approach.
The High Court went on to consider whether section 85 of the RTA (which looks to the Tribunal reaching fair outcomes based on the substantial merits and justice of the case), but did not accept that allowed the Tenancy Tribunal to determine a matter that is otherwise within the High Court’s jurisdiction. The Court confirmed: [93] ...Section 85, when interpreted in that way, does not provide the opportunity to infuse considerations from the High Court claim into the Tribunal’s factual determinations under s 65. [94] It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession and/or if Mr Sergeant was in possession as a squatter or trespasser or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to him. The Judge was correct to hold that the Tribunal had erred in its approach in this regard.
I finally note the High Court decision of Davis v Gwilliam [2002] NZHC 2228, in which the High Court supported a decision of the Tribunal, which granted possession of the premises to an estate, when the occupier was the beneficiary of the estate. Cooke J confirmed that: The first point is that the plaintiff and her daughter have no right of occupation of the property in question. They are only beneficiaries of the estate. There is no right to the property itself.
Accordingly, just having some associated rights around the premises, does not translate into a right of occupation.
In this case, Mr Cameron submitted that the contract had become frustrated. That is not a finding that the Tribunal can reach, that would be a matter for a court to decide. But it is not particularly relevant. What is relevant is that the Knights have title to the land, Kevin does not. Title vests an ability to exclude others from the land, when there is otherwise no superior right to hold possession of the land.
Kevin submitted that there was a verbal agreement to stay on the land as part of the overall sale and purchase agreement. There is another problem that Kevin faces with that argument, and that is that contracts for the sale and purchase of land in New Zealand must be in writing. Section 24 of the Property Law Act 2007 confirms: 24 Contracts for disposition of land not enforceable unless in writing (1) A contract for the disposition of land is not enforceable by action unless— (a) the contract is in writing or its terms are recorded in writing; and (b) the contract or written record is signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced.

CONCLUSION

I find that the evidence supports that the Knights as owners of the land, have a right to possess the premises. There is insufficient evidence to show that Kevin or his family has a superior right of occupation.
The focus of Kevin’s case, is that he has a valid sale and purchase agreement for the premises, he has complied with it, but the Knights have breached the agreement. I express no view on that, because the Tenancy Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make such findings. Normally, it would be the High Court that would consider such claims. Because those are not matters this Tribunal can consider, I have determined that the fair approach is to make the order for possession to return to the owner, but to fix the date for that as being 27 January 2026. That will allow Kevin the opportunity to commence proceedings in the Court around the sale and purchase dispute, and should the Court wish to do so, order a stay to apply to this order. But unless a stay is ordered, then the Tribunal orders that possession of these premises return to the Knights on 27 January 2026, and that could therefore be enforced.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

14-day notice Harassment Ormondville

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s10, s2, s24, s36, s41, s44, s48, s5, s5(1), s53, s65, s85

Key findings

Dispute theme: termination 14day
Dispute theme: harassment

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421?

The tribunal order states: Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road,

How much money was awarded in case 5366421?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5366421?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5366421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12934305-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421 — 14-day notice in Ormondville, Ormondville

Decided 6 January 2026 · Published 6 January 2026 · Application 5366421

Mixed / unclear

14-day notice
Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Mixed / unclear

From published order

Location

Ormondville

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

R Woodhouse

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road, RD 7, Ormondville 4977 as of 11:59 pm on 27 January 2026.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for a possession order under section 65. Section 65 allows the Tribunal to make orders granting possession when the premises are occupied by ‘squatters’.
As will be discussed further below, in 2019 a private arrangement was made for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ property. The sale has not been completed, as only part payment has been made but more importantly, no title has been provided to the purchaser, Kevin Clayton. Kevin Clayton has occupied the premises since the 2019 agreement. The vendor (the Knights) moved to cancel the agreement and has required that possession of the premises return to them. It is the possession dispute that the Tribunal must consider.
Kevin Clayton (the respondent) has requested not to have any title or honorific applied to him, and simply to be referred to as Kevin, so that is the approach I will take in this written decision from this point.

BACKGROUND

The disputed premises are rural.
Kevin and the Knights entered into a private arrangement for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ Property. That is recorded in handwriting, as follows: Deposit on 9500 M 2 land plus woolshed and hayshed @ approx 210 Ruam Road Total Price $30000 plus GST Further $15000 due on issue of title Balance over one or two years interest free as initially agreeable.
As far as I am aware, that constituted the whole of the written agreement.
I further understand that Kevin paid a deposit of $5,000, and then in January 2020 a further $19,500. Kevin has also paid the Knights $35 per month toward power.
However, the premises have not been subdivided. There are differing perspectives from the parties as to why that is, but it would appear to be in part due to factors including an adverse environmental assessment report, and needing to move a water pipe. But whatever the reason, the land has not been subdivided, and therefore no separate title could be issued.
The file indicates that over the course of time, the relationship between the parties has deteriorated. In more recent times, the Knights, via their legal representatives, have sought to cancel the agreement. Various offers have been made to Kevin, including a refund of the money that has been paid by him, including for the environmental report he paid for. That offer was not accepted by Kevin.
More recently still, on 10 June 2025 the Tararua District Council issued the Knights a notice to fix in relation to the premises. The notice records that there had been a range of breaches including: a. Converting the woolshed to a residential dwelling (sleeping single home). b. Undertaking building work without a consent (installing sanitary facilities in the building). c. Undertaking building work that did not comply with the Building Act 2004. d. Failing to obtain a resource consent for the building work.
The notice required the Knights to comply with the notice by 17 October 2025, or warned of a fine of $200,000 and a further fine of up to $20,000 for each day there is failure to comply with the notice.
On 14 October 2025, an application was filed with the Tribunal seeking a possession order. The application was filed on Mr Knight’s behalf, by his legal representative, Mr Cameron.
A telephone hearing was convened on 18 November 2025. In attendance was Mr and Mrs Knight, Mr Cameron and Kevin.
An issue arose where it appeared that Kevin had not received all of the relevant documents filed for the Knights. At my direction, a full copy of the file was sent to Kevin, and he was given until 3 December 2025 to file any further submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that Kevin has received a copy of all of the documents filed by the Applicant, which I have considered in this case. Further submissions and evidence were filed by Kevin, and I considered the hearing closed as of 4 December 2025. I confirm that in considering this case, I have considered all information and submissions provided, including the later submission and information from Kevin. Representation
Kevin’s position is that Mr Cameron was not approved as a representative by him or the Tribunal, so should not be representing the applicant.
As I explained, where the claim is over $6,000.00 in value, parties have an automatic right to representation. In this case, I consider the dispute would be in excess of $6,000 in value. The effect of Kevin’s position is that he has a legal right to effectively limitless possession of the premises. The value of the land is plainly well over $6,000.
However, even if I were wrong in that, given the complexity and issues that arise in this case, representation would be approved, and I confirmed that at the hearing. APPLICANT’S CASE
Mr Cameron submitted that the Claytons no longer have a legal right to occupation of the premises, as any authority has been withdrawn.
Mr Cameron states that the Knights are the legal owners of the premises. There was discussion about the Claytons’ purchasing part of the property and eventually, the Claytons moved into the woolshed.
The Claytons do not pay rent, they pay $35 per month for power.
There was an agreement that the sale price would be $30,000. The Claytons paid a deposit of $5,000, but nothing further.
There was work undertaken with a subdivision. When that process took place, there were some issues that arose and the parties found there was more involved with the subdivision than was originally expected, including the outcome of soil testing and other remediation necessary before the premises would be safe to subdivide.
Mr Clayton was not engaging with the processes necessary to subdivide.
Ultimately, the Claytons were given the option to proceed with the subdivision at their cost or their deposit would be refunded.
The Council considered that the woolshed was being used for residential purposes and issued a notice to fix, so there is action needed in that regard.
There is no prospect of the parties proceeding with the original agreement, and any authority to remain on the premises has been withdrawn. KEVIN’S CASE
At the hearing, Kevin asked the applicant a range of questions in relation to the application form which refers to the parties as being ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’. I confirmed that the application form the Tribunal provides is the same form for claims for possession orders for squatters, as it is for landlord and tenant disputes. The situation is not ideal, but any reference to tenant and landlord in the form has nothing to do with elections from the Knight’s, it is simply the form that the Tribunal provides.
Kevin confirmed that he is not a tenant. He disputes that he is a squatter because of the $35 per month he pays. Kevin submits that the money he pays is accepted as consideration for the right to live on the premises.
There is a sale and purchase agreement in place, and as part of that there is a right to live on the land (albeit that was a verbal agreement).
Kevin submits that he has never given consent to amend the contract, so the sale and purchase agreement remains in place.
Kevin referred to the communications between the parties where the applicants had told him that the property was his.
I raised with Kevin that a key issue I will need to consider is whether the right to occupy (which I accept there was), has been withdrawn. Again Kevin referred to the above arguments. Jurisdiction
Kevin disputes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider this case on two particular grounds.
Kevin refers to section 5 of the RTA, which confirms that the RTA does not apply when there is a sale and purchase agreement that is not revocable at will.
It is also disputed that the premises are residential premises, Kevin lives in Napier as reflected in the correspondence he has provided with the Napier address. He only “camps temporarily” at the premises. APPLICANT’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
Mr Cameron submits that the sale and purchase agreement has been frustrated, but that is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
There was no more than a licence to occupy that has been withdrawn.
Any issue with the address of the premises is a side issue.
The sale and purchase agreement is no longer in play because it has been frustrated.
The premises must either be residential or commercial, and it is residential in this case. KEVIN’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
As above, an extension was provided for Kevin to file concluding submissions. Kevin filed a 19 page written document, which he states was not a submission but a claim. I summarise the additional points as follows (that are additional to the points raised at the hearing): a. There continues to be a purchase agreement for the land in dispute. b. The Knights have breached that agreement. c. Kevin sold his house in reliance of the purchase of the disputed property. d. There is no record of the original agreement being cancelled. e. The Knights have provided little if any evidence to support their claims such as around the Council’s determination around use of the property. f. Kevin indicates that he is a tenant, and the Knights landlords.
Kevin raised a range of procedural issues. I do not intend to address them beyond saying that I am entirely satisfied that Kevin has had a fair opportunity to engage in the hearing and be heard, which included having the ability to file concluding submissions after the oral hearing had concluded.
Kevin also states that in the event I were to make any order in favour of the Knights, that he would treat me personally as being a threat to the property.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
It is the applicant that must prove their case. As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.
There is an exception to that, when a party is arguing that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim. In that case, it is the person claiming there is no jurisdiction, who must establish that is the case (see section 10 of the RTA).

ANALYSIS

I consider that the Tribunal must consider the following questions: a. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider this claim; if it does b. Can the Tribunal order possession to return to the Knights? Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Kevin submitted that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim for two particular reasons Excluded under section 5
Kevin submitted that this claim is excluded from the Residential Tenancies Act because it falls within section 5, which relates to the situation where there is a sale and purchase agreement for the premises.
Section 5 of the RTA sets out a range of circumstances, where, if they apply, the RTA would be excluded. That includes at section 5(1)(o): where the tenant is the purchaser of the premises under an agreement for sale and purchase with the landlord as vendor, not being an agreement that is revocable at will by the vendor:
I find this exclusion does not apply, because Kevin is not a tenant, and the Knights are not landlords. At the hearing both parties confirmed that they are not in a tenant/landlord relationship, Although in his concluding submissions / response, Kevin suggests that he would be a tenant. On the evidence available, I find this is not a landlord / tenant situation. That is for a number of reasons including these: a. In order to find a tenancy agreement existed, I would need to accept that the parties intended to enter into a tenancy agreement, and plainly neither party did. It is clear the intention was for a sale of the land and buildings to Kevin and his partner. I note for example, a communication from Kevin to the Knights from 16 November 2025, in which he states: I believe no contract exists, either verbal or written, in which I, did consent to a tenancy; I say, if consent is assumed, I, hereby rebut any and all assumption and remove any and all assumed consent of I, to accept any title other than man. b. Kevin does not pay rent, which is a requirement in order to find there is a tenancy. Rent is defined in section 2 as being money paid under the tenancy agreement, and here there is no tenancy agreement. I do not accept that the $35 payments toward power are intended for rent, plainly they are compensatory, that is, they pay for the power consumed in the buildings. Residential premises
Kevin further submitted that these are not residential premises. Section 65 confirms that the Tribunal can make a possession order for residential premises – if the premises were not residential, the Tribunal could not make the order.
Kevin says that he lives in the Hawkes Bay, and provided letters which support that. That may well be the case, but the test is not where the occupier resides, but rather whether the premises are residential premises. The evidence points to the premises being residential premises, as supported by the council’s assessment, as demonstrated in the notice to fix.
There is also evidence from Kevin that he was living in the premises. I note three communications to the landlord on 18 March 2025, 25 March 2025 and 1 April 2025, which refers that the actions of the landlord as leaving Kevin and his family ‘homeless’. Having a ‘home’ at the premises denotes residential use of the premises. In the 25 March 2025 communication for example, Kevin states: i, say i, take this to mean if i, do not pay for completion of your subdivision, you, intend to harm i, and the family of i, in this case the wife and son and daughter of i, by to have us removed from the property, thereby rendering us homeless; i, require you, to withdraw what i, consider a threat of harm and or extortion within 14 days or i, say, i would consider that trespass by way of harm and or extortion for which i, will seek compensation of $100,000.00 plus $1 per minute trespass continues plus expenses, per instance; i, ask is it your intent to now remove what i, consider a threat of harm or extortion or is it your intent to wrong i, by way of harm or extortion; further, you, claim you reserve the right to have us removed from the property;
I discuss what is meant by the term ‘residential premises’, further below.
For those reasons, I find that Kevin has not proven that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is excluded.

Can possession to the Knights be ordered?

Section 65 of the RTA relates to the eviction of squatters. A squatter is a person in possession of premises when they are not a lawful tenant or otherwise in lawful occupation. Section 65 holds:
Eviction of squatters (1) Where, on the application of any person entitled to possession of any residential premises, the Tribunal is satisfied that any other person is in possession of the premises as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to that person by any person having lawful authority to grant that right to that other person, the Tribunal shall make a possession order granting possession of the premises to the applicant. (2). ... (3). To avoid doubt, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under this section even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Section 65 was considered by the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro and Tapsell [2019] NZHC 328. The Court held [at 74] that there are three conditions which have to be met before a possession order can be made: (a) The premises which are the subject of the application must be residential premises; and (b) The applicant for possession must be entitled to possession of those premises; and (c) Another person or persons are in possession as squatters, trespassers, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to do so.
If the Knights can prove (a) and (b) then the onus will move to the Kevin to prove on the balance of probabilities that they have a right of occupation granted by any person with lawful authority to grant it and that the right has not been terminated.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro, in paragraphs [91], [92], [93] and [94] confirmed that the Tribunal is not entitled to take in to account the fact that there may be a claim in another court when considering the possession application. Gordon J states at paragraph 94 of the decision “It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession”.
I will now consider this case in light of that three part test.

Are the premises residential premises?

As discussed above, I am satisfied that the premises are residential premises. To be found residential premises, I do not need to find that the premises are lawful. That is confirmed by the very definition of ‘residential premises’ in section 2: residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful
In this case I am satisfied that the premises are intended to be for occupation as a place of residence. That is reflected in the changes made to the shed to turn it into a dwelling, as evidenced by the Council assessment, and the reference from Kevin to being ‘homeless’ if removed from the premises.

Is the applicant entitled to possession of the premises?

There is no dispute between the parties that the Knights are the owners of the premises, so there is an assumption that they are entitled to possess the land and associated buildings on it.
I have not seen any evidence that the Knights have leased the premises to Kevin. Otherwise I have not seen any other legal instrument that provides Kevin and his family a right to occupy the premises. There is nothing in the written sale and purchase agreement that vests Kevin a right of occupation.
There is no doubt that the Knights knew that Kevin was in occupation of the premises, and based on the emails and other communication, they undoubtedly consented to Kevin and his family having an exclusive right of occupation, but I consider that was by way of a bare licence. A bare licence simply means permission to be on the premises.
In Paraire v Paraire — Part Mangatawa 10 Block (2015) 105 Waikato Maniapoto MB 67 (105 WMN 67) Judge Clark discussed the revocation of a bare licence as follows: A bare licence is revocable at will. The decision to revoke a bare licence must be communicated to the licensee for effective revocation. This may be by express or implicit notice, or by the licensor doing some act inconsistent with the continuance of the licence, or by threatening proceedings for trespass.
I am in no doubt that the licence that the Knights gave to Kevin has been revoked. If Kevin was in any doubt on that point, the filing of the application for a possession order with the Tribunal should have clarified any uncertainty on that point
I find therefore, that while Kevin did have a right to occupy, that has been revoked, and there is no continuing right of occupation existing.

Does Kevin otherwise have a right to occupy the premises?

The onus now shifts to Kevin to prove that he does have a right to occupy, and I find he has not established that.
Kevin argues that he had a contractual right to occupy, which he has not agreed to vary. I have set out the written sale and purchase agreement above, but there is nothing in that written agreement giving Kevin a continued right to occupy the premises, or in fact any right to occupy the premises prior to settlement occurring.
There is no evidence that the $35 paid each month is consideration for staying in the premises; it seems most likely that is compensation for power usage – not in exchange for a right to occupy.
This is not to say that Kevin does not have rights that he may be able to exercise around the cancellation of the sale and purchase agreement, or in relation to the money he has already paid to the Knights. But the problem he faces is that the Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any remedy should be available to him. The extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is as set out above, that is, determining the three points from the Sergeant decision above.
I note the High Court decision of Willigers v Churchill Fishing International Limited [2020] NZHC 2212. That was a case where the occupier, like in the case before myself, argued that a possession order could not be granted, because they had an interest in the premises, in that case a resulting trust. That was not accepted by the Court, which held: Second, the reason why the Tribunal and the District Court are wrong has not been persuasively set out to this Court. Ms Haszard argued that the Tribunal was wrong not to consider the evidence that Mr Willigers had an interest by way of resulting trust in the property. But even if this is established I am unclear why that would give rise to right of possession to the property, certainly possession in the nature of a tenancy. Any claim to an equitable interest will need to be established in the High Court first before the question of equitable remedy is addressed, and I note that only a percentage interest is sought by Mr Willigers. Effective relief could still be granted even if the present claims in relation to possession fail. It is also relevant that a caveat is presently in place and this exists to protect Mr Willigers’ claims to an equitable interest. [Adjudicators emphasis]
I again note the High Court decision in Sergeant v Nigro. In that case, the Tribunal had in effect considered whether the occupier had a right to possess the premises, an argued property sharing agreement, when that was a matter for the High Court to determine. The District Court and High Court were critical of the Tribunal’s approach.
The High Court went on to consider whether section 85 of the RTA (which looks to the Tribunal reaching fair outcomes based on the substantial merits and justice of the case), but did not accept that allowed the Tenancy Tribunal to determine a matter that is otherwise within the High Court’s jurisdiction. The Court confirmed: [93] ...Section 85, when interpreted in that way, does not provide the opportunity to infuse considerations from the High Court claim into the Tribunal’s factual determinations under s 65. [94] It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession and/or if Mr Sergeant was in possession as a squatter or trespasser or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to him. The Judge was correct to hold that the Tribunal had erred in its approach in this regard.
I finally note the High Court decision of Davis v Gwilliam [2002] NZHC 2228, in which the High Court supported a decision of the Tribunal, which granted possession of the premises to an estate, when the occupier was the beneficiary of the estate. Cooke J confirmed that: The first point is that the plaintiff and her daughter have no right of occupation of the property in question. They are only beneficiaries of the estate. There is no right to the property itself.
Accordingly, just having some associated rights around the premises, does not translate into a right of occupation.
In this case, Mr Cameron submitted that the contract had become frustrated. That is not a finding that the Tribunal can reach, that would be a matter for a court to decide. But it is not particularly relevant. What is relevant is that the Knights have title to the land, Kevin does not. Title vests an ability to exclude others from the land, when there is otherwise no superior right to hold possession of the land.
Kevin submitted that there was a verbal agreement to stay on the land as part of the overall sale and purchase agreement. There is another problem that Kevin faces with that argument, and that is that contracts for the sale and purchase of land in New Zealand must be in writing. Section 24 of the Property Law Act 2007 confirms: 24 Contracts for disposition of land not enforceable unless in writing (1) A contract for the disposition of land is not enforceable by action unless— (a) the contract is in writing or its terms are recorded in writing; and (b) the contract or written record is signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced.

CONCLUSION

I find that the evidence supports that the Knights as owners of the land, have a right to possess the premises. There is insufficient evidence to show that Kevin or his family has a superior right of occupation.
The focus of Kevin’s case, is that he has a valid sale and purchase agreement for the premises, he has complied with it, but the Knights have breached the agreement. I express no view on that, because the Tenancy Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make such findings. Normally, it would be the High Court that would consider such claims. Because those are not matters this Tribunal can consider, I have determined that the fair approach is to make the order for possession to return to the owner, but to fix the date for that as being 27 January 2026. That will allow Kevin the opportunity to commence proceedings in the Court around the sale and purchase dispute, and should the Court wish to do so, order a stay to apply to this order. But unless a stay is ordered, then the Tribunal orders that possession of these premises return to the Knights on 27 January 2026, and that could therefore be enforced.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

14-day notice Harassment Ormondville

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s10, s2, s24, s36, s41, s44, s48, s5, s5(1), s53, s65, s85

Key findings

Dispute theme: termination 14day
Dispute theme: harassment

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421?

The tribunal order states: Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road,

How much money was awarded in case 5366421?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5366421?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5366421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12934305-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421 — 14-day notice in Ormondville, Ormondville

Decided 6 January 2026 · Published 6 January 2026 · Application 5366421

Mixed / unclear

14-day notice
Harassment

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Mixed / unclear

From published order

Location

Ormondville

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

R Woodhouse

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road, RD 7, Ormondville 4977 as of 11:59 pm on 27 January 2026.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider an application for a possession order under section 65. Section 65 allows the Tribunal to make orders granting possession when the premises are occupied by ‘squatters’.
As will be discussed further below, in 2019 a private arrangement was made for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ property. The sale has not been completed, as only part payment has been made but more importantly, no title has been provided to the purchaser, Kevin Clayton. Kevin Clayton has occupied the premises since the 2019 agreement. The vendor (the Knights) moved to cancel the agreement and has required that possession of the premises return to them. It is the possession dispute that the Tribunal must consider.
Kevin Clayton (the respondent) has requested not to have any title or honorific applied to him, and simply to be referred to as Kevin, so that is the approach I will take in this written decision from this point.

BACKGROUND

The disputed premises are rural.
Kevin and the Knights entered into a private arrangement for the sale and purchase of part of the Knights’ Property. That is recorded in handwriting, as follows: Deposit on 9500 M 2 land plus woolshed and hayshed @ approx 210 Ruam Road Total Price $30000 plus GST Further $15000 due on issue of title Balance over one or two years interest free as initially agreeable.
As far as I am aware, that constituted the whole of the written agreement.
I further understand that Kevin paid a deposit of $5,000, and then in January 2020 a further $19,500. Kevin has also paid the Knights $35 per month toward power.
However, the premises have not been subdivided. There are differing perspectives from the parties as to why that is, but it would appear to be in part due to factors including an adverse environmental assessment report, and needing to move a water pipe. But whatever the reason, the land has not been subdivided, and therefore no separate title could be issued.
The file indicates that over the course of time, the relationship between the parties has deteriorated. In more recent times, the Knights, via their legal representatives, have sought to cancel the agreement. Various offers have been made to Kevin, including a refund of the money that has been paid by him, including for the environmental report he paid for. That offer was not accepted by Kevin.
More recently still, on 10 June 2025 the Tararua District Council issued the Knights a notice to fix in relation to the premises. The notice records that there had been a range of breaches including: a. Converting the woolshed to a residential dwelling (sleeping single home). b. Undertaking building work without a consent (installing sanitary facilities in the building). c. Undertaking building work that did not comply with the Building Act 2004. d. Failing to obtain a resource consent for the building work.
The notice required the Knights to comply with the notice by 17 October 2025, or warned of a fine of $200,000 and a further fine of up to $20,000 for each day there is failure to comply with the notice.
On 14 October 2025, an application was filed with the Tribunal seeking a possession order. The application was filed on Mr Knight’s behalf, by his legal representative, Mr Cameron.
A telephone hearing was convened on 18 November 2025. In attendance was Mr and Mrs Knight, Mr Cameron and Kevin.
An issue arose where it appeared that Kevin had not received all of the relevant documents filed for the Knights. At my direction, a full copy of the file was sent to Kevin, and he was given until 3 December 2025 to file any further submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that Kevin has received a copy of all of the documents filed by the Applicant, which I have considered in this case. Further submissions and evidence were filed by Kevin, and I considered the hearing closed as of 4 December 2025. I confirm that in considering this case, I have considered all information and submissions provided, including the later submission and information from Kevin. Representation
Kevin’s position is that Mr Cameron was not approved as a representative by him or the Tribunal, so should not be representing the applicant.
As I explained, where the claim is over $6,000.00 in value, parties have an automatic right to representation. In this case, I consider the dispute would be in excess of $6,000 in value. The effect of Kevin’s position is that he has a legal right to effectively limitless possession of the premises. The value of the land is plainly well over $6,000.
However, even if I were wrong in that, given the complexity and issues that arise in this case, representation would be approved, and I confirmed that at the hearing. APPLICANT’S CASE
Mr Cameron submitted that the Claytons no longer have a legal right to occupation of the premises, as any authority has been withdrawn.
Mr Cameron states that the Knights are the legal owners of the premises. There was discussion about the Claytons’ purchasing part of the property and eventually, the Claytons moved into the woolshed.
The Claytons do not pay rent, they pay $35 per month for power.
There was an agreement that the sale price would be $30,000. The Claytons paid a deposit of $5,000, but nothing further.
There was work undertaken with a subdivision. When that process took place, there were some issues that arose and the parties found there was more involved with the subdivision than was originally expected, including the outcome of soil testing and other remediation necessary before the premises would be safe to subdivide.
Mr Clayton was not engaging with the processes necessary to subdivide.
Ultimately, the Claytons were given the option to proceed with the subdivision at their cost or their deposit would be refunded.
The Council considered that the woolshed was being used for residential purposes and issued a notice to fix, so there is action needed in that regard.
There is no prospect of the parties proceeding with the original agreement, and any authority to remain on the premises has been withdrawn. KEVIN’S CASE
At the hearing, Kevin asked the applicant a range of questions in relation to the application form which refers to the parties as being ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’. I confirmed that the application form the Tribunal provides is the same form for claims for possession orders for squatters, as it is for landlord and tenant disputes. The situation is not ideal, but any reference to tenant and landlord in the form has nothing to do with elections from the Knight’s, it is simply the form that the Tribunal provides.
Kevin confirmed that he is not a tenant. He disputes that he is a squatter because of the $35 per month he pays. Kevin submits that the money he pays is accepted as consideration for the right to live on the premises.
There is a sale and purchase agreement in place, and as part of that there is a right to live on the land (albeit that was a verbal agreement).
Kevin submits that he has never given consent to amend the contract, so the sale and purchase agreement remains in place.
Kevin referred to the communications between the parties where the applicants had told him that the property was his.
I raised with Kevin that a key issue I will need to consider is whether the right to occupy (which I accept there was), has been withdrawn. Again Kevin referred to the above arguments. Jurisdiction
Kevin disputes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to consider this case on two particular grounds.
Kevin refers to section 5 of the RTA, which confirms that the RTA does not apply when there is a sale and purchase agreement that is not revocable at will.
It is also disputed that the premises are residential premises, Kevin lives in Napier as reflected in the correspondence he has provided with the Napier address. He only “camps temporarily” at the premises. APPLICANT’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
Mr Cameron submits that the sale and purchase agreement has been frustrated, but that is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
There was no more than a licence to occupy that has been withdrawn.
Any issue with the address of the premises is a side issue.
The sale and purchase agreement is no longer in play because it has been frustrated.
The premises must either be residential or commercial, and it is residential in this case. KEVIN’S CONCLUDING SUBMISSIONS
As above, an extension was provided for Kevin to file concluding submissions. Kevin filed a 19 page written document, which he states was not a submission but a claim. I summarise the additional points as follows (that are additional to the points raised at the hearing): a. There continues to be a purchase agreement for the land in dispute. b. The Knights have breached that agreement. c. Kevin sold his house in reliance of the purchase of the disputed property. d. There is no record of the original agreement being cancelled. e. The Knights have provided little if any evidence to support their claims such as around the Council’s determination around use of the property. f. Kevin indicates that he is a tenant, and the Knights landlords.
Kevin raised a range of procedural issues. I do not intend to address them beyond saying that I am entirely satisfied that Kevin has had a fair opportunity to engage in the hearing and be heard, which included having the ability to file concluding submissions after the oral hearing had concluded.
Kevin also states that in the event I were to make any order in favour of the Knights, that he would treat me personally as being a threat to the property.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations. That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
It is the applicant that must prove their case. As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.
There is an exception to that, when a party is arguing that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider a claim. In that case, it is the person claiming there is no jurisdiction, who must establish that is the case (see section 10 of the RTA).

ANALYSIS

I consider that the Tribunal must consider the following questions: a. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider this claim; if it does b. Can the Tribunal order possession to return to the Knights? Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Kevin submitted that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider this claim for two particular reasons Excluded under section 5
Kevin submitted that this claim is excluded from the Residential Tenancies Act because it falls within section 5, which relates to the situation where there is a sale and purchase agreement for the premises.
Section 5 of the RTA sets out a range of circumstances, where, if they apply, the RTA would be excluded. That includes at section 5(1)(o): where the tenant is the purchaser of the premises under an agreement for sale and purchase with the landlord as vendor, not being an agreement that is revocable at will by the vendor:
I find this exclusion does not apply, because Kevin is not a tenant, and the Knights are not landlords. At the hearing both parties confirmed that they are not in a tenant/landlord relationship, Although in his concluding submissions / response, Kevin suggests that he would be a tenant. On the evidence available, I find this is not a landlord / tenant situation. That is for a number of reasons including these: a. In order to find a tenancy agreement existed, I would need to accept that the parties intended to enter into a tenancy agreement, and plainly neither party did. It is clear the intention was for a sale of the land and buildings to Kevin and his partner. I note for example, a communication from Kevin to the Knights from 16 November 2025, in which he states: I believe no contract exists, either verbal or written, in which I, did consent to a tenancy; I say, if consent is assumed, I, hereby rebut any and all assumption and remove any and all assumed consent of I, to accept any title other than man. b. Kevin does not pay rent, which is a requirement in order to find there is a tenancy. Rent is defined in section 2 as being money paid under the tenancy agreement, and here there is no tenancy agreement. I do not accept that the $35 payments toward power are intended for rent, plainly they are compensatory, that is, they pay for the power consumed in the buildings. Residential premises
Kevin further submitted that these are not residential premises. Section 65 confirms that the Tribunal can make a possession order for residential premises – if the premises were not residential, the Tribunal could not make the order.
Kevin says that he lives in the Hawkes Bay, and provided letters which support that. That may well be the case, but the test is not where the occupier resides, but rather whether the premises are residential premises. The evidence points to the premises being residential premises, as supported by the council’s assessment, as demonstrated in the notice to fix.
There is also evidence from Kevin that he was living in the premises. I note three communications to the landlord on 18 March 2025, 25 March 2025 and 1 April 2025, which refers that the actions of the landlord as leaving Kevin and his family ‘homeless’. Having a ‘home’ at the premises denotes residential use of the premises. In the 25 March 2025 communication for example, Kevin states: i, say i, take this to mean if i, do not pay for completion of your subdivision, you, intend to harm i, and the family of i, in this case the wife and son and daughter of i, by to have us removed from the property, thereby rendering us homeless; i, require you, to withdraw what i, consider a threat of harm and or extortion within 14 days or i, say, i would consider that trespass by way of harm and or extortion for which i, will seek compensation of $100,000.00 plus $1 per minute trespass continues plus expenses, per instance; i, ask is it your intent to now remove what i, consider a threat of harm or extortion or is it your intent to wrong i, by way of harm or extortion; further, you, claim you reserve the right to have us removed from the property;
I discuss what is meant by the term ‘residential premises’, further below.
For those reasons, I find that Kevin has not proven that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is excluded.

Can possession to the Knights be ordered?

Section 65 of the RTA relates to the eviction of squatters. A squatter is a person in possession of premises when they are not a lawful tenant or otherwise in lawful occupation. Section 65 holds:
Eviction of squatters (1) Where, on the application of any person entitled to possession of any residential premises, the Tribunal is satisfied that any other person is in possession of the premises as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to that person by any person having lawful authority to grant that right to that other person, the Tribunal shall make a possession order granting possession of the premises to the applicant. (2). ... (3). To avoid doubt, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under this section even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Section 65 was considered by the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro and Tapsell [2019] NZHC 328. The Court held [at 74] that there are three conditions which have to be met before a possession order can be made: (a) The premises which are the subject of the application must be residential premises; and (b) The applicant for possession must be entitled to possession of those premises; and (c) Another person or persons are in possession as squatters, trespassers, or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to do so.
If the Knights can prove (a) and (b) then the onus will move to the Kevin to prove on the balance of probabilities that they have a right of occupation granted by any person with lawful authority to grant it and that the right has not been terminated.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court in Sergeant v Nigro, in paragraphs [91], [92], [93] and [94] confirmed that the Tribunal is not entitled to take in to account the fact that there may be a claim in another court when considering the possession application. Gordon J states at paragraph 94 of the decision “It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession”.
I will now consider this case in light of that three part test.

Are the premises residential premises?

As discussed above, I am satisfied that the premises are residential premises. To be found residential premises, I do not need to find that the premises are lawful. That is confirmed by the very definition of ‘residential premises’ in section 2: residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful
In this case I am satisfied that the premises are intended to be for occupation as a place of residence. That is reflected in the changes made to the shed to turn it into a dwelling, as evidenced by the Council assessment, and the reference from Kevin to being ‘homeless’ if removed from the premises.

Is the applicant entitled to possession of the premises?

There is no dispute between the parties that the Knights are the owners of the premises, so there is an assumption that they are entitled to possess the land and associated buildings on it.
I have not seen any evidence that the Knights have leased the premises to Kevin. Otherwise I have not seen any other legal instrument that provides Kevin and his family a right to occupy the premises. There is nothing in the written sale and purchase agreement that vests Kevin a right of occupation.
There is no doubt that the Knights knew that Kevin was in occupation of the premises, and based on the emails and other communication, they undoubtedly consented to Kevin and his family having an exclusive right of occupation, but I consider that was by way of a bare licence. A bare licence simply means permission to be on the premises.
In Paraire v Paraire — Part Mangatawa 10 Block (2015) 105 Waikato Maniapoto MB 67 (105 WMN 67) Judge Clark discussed the revocation of a bare licence as follows: A bare licence is revocable at will. The decision to revoke a bare licence must be communicated to the licensee for effective revocation. This may be by express or implicit notice, or by the licensor doing some act inconsistent with the continuance of the licence, or by threatening proceedings for trespass.
I am in no doubt that the licence that the Knights gave to Kevin has been revoked. If Kevin was in any doubt on that point, the filing of the application for a possession order with the Tribunal should have clarified any uncertainty on that point
I find therefore, that while Kevin did have a right to occupy, that has been revoked, and there is no continuing right of occupation existing.

Does Kevin otherwise have a right to occupy the premises?

The onus now shifts to Kevin to prove that he does have a right to occupy, and I find he has not established that.
Kevin argues that he had a contractual right to occupy, which he has not agreed to vary. I have set out the written sale and purchase agreement above, but there is nothing in that written agreement giving Kevin a continued right to occupy the premises, or in fact any right to occupy the premises prior to settlement occurring.
There is no evidence that the $35 paid each month is consideration for staying in the premises; it seems most likely that is compensation for power usage – not in exchange for a right to occupy.
This is not to say that Kevin does not have rights that he may be able to exercise around the cancellation of the sale and purchase agreement, or in relation to the money he has already paid to the Knights. But the problem he faces is that the Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any remedy should be available to him. The extent of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is as set out above, that is, determining the three points from the Sergeant decision above.
I note the High Court decision of Willigers v Churchill Fishing International Limited [2020] NZHC 2212. That was a case where the occupier, like in the case before myself, argued that a possession order could not be granted, because they had an interest in the premises, in that case a resulting trust. That was not accepted by the Court, which held: Second, the reason why the Tribunal and the District Court are wrong has not been persuasively set out to this Court. Ms Haszard argued that the Tribunal was wrong not to consider the evidence that Mr Willigers had an interest by way of resulting trust in the property. But even if this is established I am unclear why that would give rise to right of possession to the property, certainly possession in the nature of a tenancy. Any claim to an equitable interest will need to be established in the High Court first before the question of equitable remedy is addressed, and I note that only a percentage interest is sought by Mr Willigers. Effective relief could still be granted even if the present claims in relation to possession fail. It is also relevant that a caveat is presently in place and this exists to protect Mr Willigers’ claims to an equitable interest. [Adjudicators emphasis]
I again note the High Court decision in Sergeant v Nigro. In that case, the Tribunal had in effect considered whether the occupier had a right to possess the premises, an argued property sharing agreement, when that was a matter for the High Court to determine. The District Court and High Court were critical of the Tribunal’s approach.
The High Court went on to consider whether section 85 of the RTA (which looks to the Tribunal reaching fair outcomes based on the substantial merits and justice of the case), but did not accept that allowed the Tenancy Tribunal to determine a matter that is otherwise within the High Court’s jurisdiction. The Court confirmed: [93] ...Section 85, when interpreted in that way, does not provide the opportunity to infuse considerations from the High Court claim into the Tribunal’s factual determinations under s 65. [94] It is not open to the Tribunal to consider the fact of a claim or the contents of the claim in another court when deciding if the trustees were entitled to possession and/or if Mr Sergeant was in possession as a squatter or trespasser or otherwise than pursuant to any right of occupation granted to him. The Judge was correct to hold that the Tribunal had erred in its approach in this regard.
I finally note the High Court decision of Davis v Gwilliam [2002] NZHC 2228, in which the High Court supported a decision of the Tribunal, which granted possession of the premises to an estate, when the occupier was the beneficiary of the estate. Cooke J confirmed that: The first point is that the plaintiff and her daughter have no right of occupation of the property in question. They are only beneficiaries of the estate. There is no right to the property itself.
Accordingly, just having some associated rights around the premises, does not translate into a right of occupation.
In this case, Mr Cameron submitted that the contract had become frustrated. That is not a finding that the Tribunal can reach, that would be a matter for a court to decide. But it is not particularly relevant. What is relevant is that the Knights have title to the land, Kevin does not. Title vests an ability to exclude others from the land, when there is otherwise no superior right to hold possession of the land.
Kevin submitted that there was a verbal agreement to stay on the land as part of the overall sale and purchase agreement. There is another problem that Kevin faces with that argument, and that is that contracts for the sale and purchase of land in New Zealand must be in writing. Section 24 of the Property Law Act 2007 confirms: 24 Contracts for disposition of land not enforceable unless in writing (1) A contract for the disposition of land is not enforceable by action unless— (a) the contract is in writing or its terms are recorded in writing; and (b) the contract or written record is signed by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced.

CONCLUSION

I find that the evidence supports that the Knights as owners of the land, have a right to possess the premises. There is insufficient evidence to show that Kevin or his family has a superior right of occupation.
The focus of Kevin’s case, is that he has a valid sale and purchase agreement for the premises, he has complied with it, but the Knights have breached the agreement. I express no view on that, because the Tenancy Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make such findings. Normally, it would be the High Court that would consider such claims. Because those are not matters this Tribunal can consider, I have determined that the fair approach is to make the order for possession to return to the owner, but to fix the date for that as being 27 January 2026. That will allow Kevin the opportunity to commence proceedings in the Court around the sale and purchase dispute, and should the Court wish to do so, order a stay to apply to this order. But unless a stay is ordered, then the Tribunal orders that possession of these premises return to the Knights on 27 January 2026, and that could therefore be enforced.

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

14-day notice Harassment Ormondville

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s10, s2, s24, s36, s41, s44, s48, s5, s5(1), s53, s65, s85

Key findings

Dispute theme: termination 14day
Dispute theme: harassment

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5366421?

The tribunal order states: Bruce Knight is granted possession of the premises at 210 / 240 Ruanui Road,

How much money was awarded in case 5366421?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5366421?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5366421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12934305-Tribunal_Order.pdf.