Tenantcheck Insights · Case study

Tenancy Tribunal case 5379103 — Healthy homes at 134C Whakamarama Road, Whakamarama, RD 7,

Decided 7 April 2026 · Published 7 April 2026 · Application 5379103

Landlord favoured

Healthy homes
Exemplary damages

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Outcome

Landlord favoured

From published order

Location

Whakamarama

Tribunal region

Adjudicator

N Bradley

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.

Order

The application for a rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings in respect of the order dated 5 February 2026 is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing in respect of the landlord’s application for a rehearing.
On 5 February the Tribunal made an order that the landlord pay compensation and exemplary damages to the tenant in respect of the tenancy agreement, a unlawful entry, breach of quiet enjoyment, the termination notice and the healthy homes standards.
Om 9 February 2026 the landlord applied for a rehearing.
The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The Law - Rehearings
The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 1
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 2
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 3 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 4 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the 1 See s 105 of the RTA. 2 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 3 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 4 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 5 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 6 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The landlord applied for a rehearing on the basis that there was relevant information that was not available and provided at the hearing and therefore was not considered by the Tribunal.
For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 7
The landlord filed a significant amount of additional information and submissions for consideration. Text messages have been provided which could have been produced at the first hearing.
The landlord objected to the factual findings in relation to the claim that they harassed the tenant. As I explained, there was no finding that the landlord harassed the tenant. Further. any dispute about the factual findings is a matter for an appeal.
In addition, the fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing and a rehearing is not to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
In this case the landlord appears to want to relitigate all of the tenant’s claims – whether the tenant has been successful or not. 5 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 6 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen 7 See s 105 of the RTA.
The landlord says they do not think the close proximity of the parties’ homes was taken into account. I consider this point is not relevant to the tenant’s claims and any concern in this regard does not give rise to a potential miscarriage of justice.
The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had an opportunity to do this. While the hearing notice did not specifically refer to the claim that the termination notice was retaliatory, the tenant’s application did so clearly, and the landlord had the opportunity to respond to this matter. The comments they now make about the reasons for the termination were provided at the original hearing, therefore I do not consider the landlord was disadvantaged. In addition, no monetary order was made in respect of that claim in any event. There is no indication that any relevant or material evidence has been discovered that was not available and provided at the first hearing. The landlord has not provided any new evidence which may have changed the outcome, for example documentary evidence of now using the premises as an Air BnB.
The landlord has not suggested there has been the improper admission or rejection of evidence at the original hearing, or misconduct that would support a rehearing.
The grounds advanced by the landlord in support of a rehearing, are a challenge to the Tribunals findings and decisions.
The landlord also raises matters which would amount to a potential cross- application and whether the landlord’s complaints are breaches of the tenant’s obligations are a separate matter. For example, the landlord says all the tenant’s claims are retaliatory – however I am unclear how this could be a breach of the tenant’s obligations.
However, most significantly in this case the landlord did not appear to specifically dispute the actual monetary orders but the findings in respect of the facts (the landlord said their concerns were less about money and more about the principal). The parties continued to dispute factual details at this hearing.
The grounds relate to a complaint that the Tribunal was mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact.
The grounds set out by the landlord are not in my view grounds for a rehearing.
Accordingly, the application for a rehearing is dismissed.
The tenant does not seek name suppression.
The landlord applied for name suppression in respect of this order. Because the landlord has been unsuccessful with the application for a rehearing name suppression in respect of this order is declined. 8

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

Healthy homes Exemplary damages Whakamarama

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s105, s5, s95A

Key findings

Dispute theme: healthy homes
Dispute theme: exemplary damages

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 5379103?

The tribunal order states: The application for a rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5379103?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5379103?

The primary dispute was Healthy homes. Related themes: Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5379103?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13400886-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing in respect of the landlord’s application for a rehearing.

On 5 February the Tribunal made an order that the landlord pay compensation and exemplary damages to the tenant in respect of the tenancy agreement, a unlawful entry, breach of quiet enjoyment, the termination notice and the healthy homes standards.

Om 9 February 2026 the landlord applied for a rehearing.

The issue I must consider is whether a rehearing should be granted. The Law - Rehearings

The relevant law that applies is the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). The RTA states the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. 1

Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case.

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice. A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case. 2

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 3 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and said: ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”

A rehearing may be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.

In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd 4 , the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the 1 See s 105 of the RTA. 2 Yogeswaran v Doubletrees Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704 3 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50 4 Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190 public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial... ...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency.

The High Court in Angelo v Lehr 5 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.

As noted by the District Court in Loh v Puri 6 : In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearing’s are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

The landlord applied for a rehearing on the basis that there was relevant information that was not available and provided at the hearing and therefore was not considered by the Tribunal.

For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 7

The landlord filed a significant amount of additional information and submissions for consideration. Text messages have been provided which could have been produced at the first hearing.

The landlord objected to the factual findings in relation to the claim that they harassed the tenant. As I explained, there was no finding that the landlord harassed the tenant. Further. any dispute about the factual findings is a matter for an appeal.

In addition, the fact that the landlord disagrees with the decision is not a ground for a rehearing and a rehearing is not to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

In this case the landlord appears to want to relitigate all of the tenant’s claims – whether the tenant has been successful or not. 5 Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 6 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993 Judge Christiansen 7 See s 105 of the RTA.

The landlord says they do not think the close proximity of the parties’ homes was taken into account. I consider this point is not relevant to the tenant’s claims and any concern in this regard does not give rise to a potential miscarriage of justice.

The interests of justice require parties to put their best case forward at the hearing and both parties had an opportunity to do this. While the hearing notice did not specifically refer to the claim that the termination notice was retaliatory, the tenant’s application did so clearly, and the landlord had the opportunity to respond to this matter. The comments they now make about the reasons for the termination were provided at the original hearing, therefore I do not consider the landlord was disadvantaged. In addition, no monetary order was made in respect of that claim in any event. There is no indication that any relevant or material evidence has been discovered that was not available and provided at the first hearing. The landlord has not provided any new evidence which may have changed the outcome, for example documentary evidence of now using the premises as an Air BnB.

The landlord has not suggested there has been the improper admission or rejection of evidence at the original hearing, or misconduct that would support a rehearing.

The grounds advanced by the landlord in support of a rehearing, are a challenge to the Tribunals findings and decisions.

The landlord also raises matters which would amount to a potential cross- application and whether the landlord’s complaints are breaches of the tenant’s obligations are a separate matter. For example, the landlord says all the tenant’s claims are retaliatory – however I am unclear how this could be a breach of the tenant’s obligations.

However, most significantly in this case the landlord did not appear to specifically dispute the actual monetary orders but the findings in respect of the facts (the landlord said their concerns were less about money and more about the principal). The parties continued to dispute factual details at this hearing.

The grounds relate to a complaint that the Tribunal was mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact.

The grounds set out by the landlord are not in my view grounds for a rehearing.

Accordingly, the application for a rehearing is dismissed.

The tenant does not seek name suppression.

The landlord applied for name suppression in respect of this order. Because the landlord has been unsuccessful with the application for a rehearing name suppression in respect of this order is declined. 8