What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5396167 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5396167?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5396167?

The primary dispute was Mould & damp. Related themes: Leaks.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5396167?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13458106-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5396167 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5396167?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5396167?

The primary dispute was Mould & damp. Related themes: Leaks.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5396167?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13458106-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

8 Reiman Street, New Lynn, Auckland 0600 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5396167 — Mould & damp

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings ordered on 31 March 2026 is lifted.
The order dated 16 March 2026 is enforceable in its original form.

Reasons

The substantive hearing occurred on 9 March 2026 with both parties in attendance.
On 16 March 2026, the Tribunal made an order requiring the landlord to pay the tenant $2,928.00.
On 27 March 2026, more than 5 working days after the date of the order, the landlord applied for a rehearing. A consideration hearing was held on 10 April 2026 with both parties in attendance.
The landlord claims a rehearing should be granted for the following reasons: a. They did not have enough time to prepare for the hearing, which meant they could not produce all of the evidence they wanted to. b. The Tribunal did not consider relevant evidence, namely a report from White Knight Electrical clarifying the safety status of the hob. c. The landlord would like to submit new evidence from tradespeople, which they believe would alter the outcome.
The issues I must determine are: a. Should the Tribunal permit the landlord to file their application for a rehearing out of time? b. If so, should a rehearing be granted? Should the Tribunal permit the tenant to file their application for a rehearing out of time? The law
Section 105(2) RTA provides that applications for rehearing must be filed within 5 working days of the date of the order. The purpose of this time limit is to ensure finality of Tenancy Tribunal orders and certainty of the position from the point of view of both parties.
Section 105(2) RTA also allows the Tribunal to give further time for the filing of an application for a rehearing. This recognises the rare situation where there may be good grounds for a rehearing application being filed late. The Tribunal will usually consider the following factors: a. Length of the delay. b. Reason for the delay. c. Merits of the application. d. Whether allowing the application will unfairly prejudice the other party. e. The overall interests of justice. Analysis
The length of the delay in this case is small. The landlord filed their application 9 working days after the date of the order.
The reason for the delay is understandable. The landlord believed they had 10 working days, not 5. The information sheet regarding rehearings and appeals states that the timeframe for filing an appeal is 10 working days and a rehearing is 5 working days. The landlord is not legally trained. It is understandable that they may have mistaken the timeframe for filing an appeal with a rehearing.
Allowing the application will not unfairly prejudice the tenant, because they have not altered their position in reliance on the order dated 16 March 2026.
Taking these matters into account, I consider the overall interests of justice lean in favour of granting the landlord an extension of time to file their application for a rehearing.

Should a rehearing be granted?

The law

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704. to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. Analysis
The notice of hearing was sent to the landlord on 19 February 2026 and the hearing was scheduled for 9 March 2026. The landlord had 17 days to prepare for the hearing, 11 of which were working days. On 24 February 2026, the landlord sent a request for an adjournment to the Registry, which was forwarded to me. I declined the landlord’s request for an adjournment. The nature of the tenant’s application was not particularly complex, and I considered the landlord had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.
The landlord received the notice of hearing, which clearly outlined the tenant’s claims. They attended the hearing on 9 March 2026 and were given an opportunity to submit their evidence and make submissions. The landlord did not advance another request for an adjournment at the beginning of the hearing. If the landlord still believed an adjournment was required, this was the appropriate time to make the request, not after the hearing once the Tribunal had made its decision.
The landlord was appropriately informed about the nature of the hearing and tenant’s application. Nothing went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure that would warrant the granting of a rehearing.
The landlord’s claim that I did not consider all relevant evidence is incorrect. No report from White Knight Electrical was submitted by the landlord before or during the hearing. The landlord submitted a copy of an Electrical Safety Certificate (ESC) from White Knight Electrical, dated 6 March 2026 at the consideration hearing. The ESC pre-dates the date of the hearing and could have been produced at the hearing with reasonable diligence. Even if the ESC had been produced, it would not have affected the outcome. This is because the ESC states that the electrician fitted 4 new hob clamps on 29 November 2025. This is the date the hob was fixed. The ESC does not state that the fact the hob was loose beforehand was not a safety issue. Even if it did state this, it still would not have materially affected the outcome. This is because the hob was in a state of disrepair due to it being loose, irrespective of whether or not this posed a safety risk. The landlord took too long to fix the hob, and the aspect of safety was only minimally factored into the amount of compensation ordered.
The landlord claims they have other new evidence such as, evidence from tradespeople they would like to submit. For example, the landlord claims that an electrician replaced the seals on the oven and did not report that it was loose or that there was a safety issue with it. The difficulty for the landlord is that they gave evidence at the hearing themselves accepting the oven was loose. This makes any evidence the electrician might give on this issue redundant. Further, I found that the markings on the oven buttons were faded to such an extent that the tenant could not use the oven properly. The landlord claims the electrician will give evidence that the state of the oven did not pose a safety risk however, whether the oven posed a safety risk was not relevant to my decision that it was in a state of disrepair. Evidence that the oven did not pose a safety risk would not materially affect the outcome, because this issue was only minimally factored into the amount of compensation ordered.
The landlord also disagrees with my finding that they did not act within a reasonable timeframe to investigate and remedy the downstairs rumpus room. They claim that they immediately instructed contractors to investigate the issue and once it was confirmed that there was no leak, they organised for the carpet to be professionally dried. This reflects a disagreement with the substance of the decision, which does not amount to a miscarriage of justice. Rehearings will not be granted because the applicant seeks a second opportunity to relitigate the dispute. 2 Further, the landlord filed additional evidence from Optimus Construction, which confirms the evidence given at the hearing. This is that Optimus Construction undertook remedial work in respect of a previous roof leak and completed a moisture test in the basement on 12 November 2025. This is consistent with the evidence given at the first hearing and would not change the outcome.
The landlord received the notice of hearing and tenant’s application in advance of the hearing. They did not advance a request for an adjournment on the day. They attended the hearing and were given an opportunity to respond to the tenants claims. There was no procedural error that would warrant the granting of a rehearing.
The evidence that the landlord wants a second opportunity to submit is not new evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the first hearing, nor is it evidence that would have affected the outcome.
For all of these reasons, I am not convinced a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.
The landlord’s application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

The substantive hearing occurred on 9 March 2026 with both parties in attendance.

On 16 March 2026, the Tribunal made an order requiring the landlord to pay the tenant $2,928.00.

On 27 March 2026, more than 5 working days after the date of the order, the landlord applied for a rehearing. A consideration hearing was held on 10 April 2026 with both parties in attendance.

The landlord claims a rehearing should be granted for the following reasons: a. They did not have enough time to prepare for the hearing, which meant they could not produce all of the evidence they wanted to. b. The Tribunal did not consider relevant evidence, namely a report from White Knight Electrical clarifying the safety status of the hob. c. The landlord would like to submit new evidence from tradespeople, which they believe would alter the outcome.

The issues I must determine are: a. Should the Tribunal permit the landlord to file their application for a rehearing out of time? b. If so, should a rehearing be granted? Should the Tribunal permit the tenant to file their application for a rehearing out of time? The law

Section 105(2) RTA provides that applications for rehearing must be filed within 5 working days of the date of the order. The purpose of this time limit is to ensure finality of Tenancy Tribunal orders and certainty of the position from the point of view of both parties.

Section 105(2) RTA also allows the Tribunal to give further time for the filing of an application for a rehearing. This recognises the rare situation where there may be good grounds for a rehearing application being filed late. The Tribunal will usually consider the following factors: a. Length of the delay. b. Reason for the delay. c. Merits of the application. d. Whether allowing the application will unfairly prejudice the other party. e. The overall interests of justice. Analysis

The length of the delay in this case is small. The landlord filed their application 9 working days after the date of the order.

The reason for the delay is understandable. The landlord believed they had 10 working days, not 5. The information sheet regarding rehearings and appeals states that the timeframe for filing an appeal is 10 working days and a rehearing is 5 working days. The landlord is not legally trained. It is understandable that they may have mistaken the timeframe for filing an appeal with a rehearing.

Allowing the application will not unfairly prejudice the tenant, because they have not altered their position in reliance on the order dated 16 March 2026.

Taking these matters into account, I consider the overall interests of justice lean in favour of granting the landlord an extension of time to file their application for a rehearing.

Should a rehearing be granted?

The law

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.”

The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. 1 Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court Judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties 1 Yogeswaran v Doubletree Properties Ltd [2021] NZDC 15704. to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.

A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. Analysis

The notice of hearing was sent to the landlord on 19 February 2026 and the hearing was scheduled for 9 March 2026. The landlord had 17 days to prepare for the hearing, 11 of which were working days. On 24 February 2026, the landlord sent a request for an adjournment to the Registry, which was forwarded to me. I declined the landlord’s request for an adjournment. The nature of the tenant’s application was not particularly complex, and I considered the landlord had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.

The landlord received the notice of hearing, which clearly outlined the tenant’s claims. They attended the hearing on 9 March 2026 and were given an opportunity to submit their evidence and make submissions. The landlord did not advance another request for an adjournment at the beginning of the hearing. If the landlord still believed an adjournment was required, this was the appropriate time to make the request, not after the hearing once the Tribunal had made its decision.

The landlord was appropriately informed about the nature of the hearing and tenant’s application. Nothing went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure that would warrant the granting of a rehearing.

The landlord’s claim that I did not consider all relevant evidence is incorrect. No report from White Knight Electrical was submitted by the landlord before or during the hearing. The landlord submitted a copy of an Electrical Safety Certificate (ESC) from White Knight Electrical, dated 6 March 2026 at the consideration hearing. The ESC pre-dates the date of the hearing and could have been produced at the hearing with reasonable diligence. Even if the ESC had been produced, it would not have affected the outcome. This is because the ESC states that the electrician fitted 4 new hob clamps on 29 November 2025. This is the date the hob was fixed. The ESC does not state that the fact the hob was loose beforehand was not a safety issue. Even if it did state this, it still would not have materially affected the outcome. This is because the hob was in a state of disrepair due to it being loose, irrespective of whether or not this posed a safety risk. The landlord took too long to fix the hob, and the aspect of safety was only minimally factored into the amount of compensation ordered.

The landlord claims they have other new evidence such as, evidence from tradespeople they would like to submit. For example, the landlord claims that an electrician replaced the seals on the oven and did not report that it was loose or that there was a safety issue with it. The difficulty for the landlord is that they gave evidence at the hearing themselves accepting the oven was loose. This makes any evidence the electrician might give on this issue redundant. Further, I found that the markings on the oven buttons were faded to such an extent that the tenant could not use the oven properly. The landlord claims the electrician will give evidence that the state of the oven did not pose a safety risk however, whether the oven posed a safety risk was not relevant to my decision that it was in a state of disrepair. Evidence that the oven did not pose a safety risk would not materially affect the outcome, because this issue was only minimally factored into the amount of compensation ordered.

The landlord also disagrees with my finding that they did not act within a reasonable timeframe to investigate and remedy the downstairs rumpus room. They claim that they immediately instructed contractors to investigate the issue and once it was confirmed that there was no leak, they organised for the carpet to be professionally dried. This reflects a disagreement with the substance of the decision, which does not amount to a miscarriage of justice. Rehearings will not be granted because the applicant seeks a second opportunity to relitigate the dispute. 2 Further, the landlord filed additional evidence from Optimus Construction, which confirms the evidence given at the hearing. This is that Optimus Construction undertook remedial work in respect of a previous roof leak and completed a moisture test in the basement on 12 November 2025. This is consistent with the evidence given at the first hearing and would not change the outcome.

The landlord received the notice of hearing and tenant’s application in advance of the hearing. They did not advance a request for an adjournment on the day. They attended the hearing and were given an opportunity to respond to the tenants claims. There was no procedural error that would warrant the granting of a rehearing.

The evidence that the landlord wants a second opportunity to submit is not new evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the first hearing, nor is it evidence that would have affected the outcome.

For all of these reasons, I am not convinced a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred.

The landlord’s application for rehearing is dismissed.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5396167 — Mould & damp at 8 Reiman Street, New Lynn, Auckland 0600

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5396167 — Mould & damp at 8 Reiman Street, New Lynn, Auckland 0600

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Should a rehearing be granted?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions