What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5396532 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5396532?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5396532?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5396532?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13124864-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5396532 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5396532?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5396532?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5396532?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13124864-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5396532 — Tenancy dispute

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the applicant’s and respondent’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing. The respondent appeared with his appointed representative.
On 23 January 2026 the Tribunal made an order granting possession to the applicant and the other registered owner.
On 30 January 2026, the respondent applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. They query the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this matter. b. There was the appearance of bias in the decision, as the decision states that the outcome of the possession application was a forgone conclusion. c. The Tribunal appears to have relied on material provided by the applicant (including invoices, correspondence and letters from the police) which was not notified or accessed by the respondent prior to the hearing. d. There was a departure from the notice of hearing in that the second notice of hearing stated that the hearing would only be to determine jurisdiction. As a result, there was procedural unfairness in the Tribunal considering the possession element of the application. e. There was an error of law in the application of section 65 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). f. There was procedural unfairness in allowing both registered owners to speak at the hearing, when only one was listed in the application form, and this was a process failure by the Tribunal. g. The Tribunal did not adequately consider the complex evidence provided to it by the respondent during the hearing and prior to issuing a decision.
In summary, the respondent says that some of these issues individually warrant a rehearing, however when considered collectively, a miscarriage of justice may or has occurred.
The applicant disputes the rehearing application and at the rehearing consideration hearing responded to each of the respondent’s points.
In summary the applicant says: All relevant documents were provided well in advance of the hearing and any failure to view these was by choice; the earlier notice of hearing had made it clear that the hearing was for jurisdiction, termination and possession; that both registered owners were entitled to be heard at the hearing; that they weren’t aware who would be attending on behalf of the respondent until they arrived; that the decision took two days to be issued and had clearly considered the issues. The law
Section 105(1) of the RTA relates to rehearings and confirms that: The Tribunal shall in all proceedings have the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 1 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford, 2 the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri: 3 In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made. 1 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50. 2 Jemma Trust v Rutherford, DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999. 3 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993.
In other words, usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the respondent has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between parties. b. The fact that the respondent disagrees with any aspect of the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. c. Both parties received notice of the hearing, appeared and gave evidence during the hearing and there was no evidence provided during the hearing by the respondent that was not accepted by the Tribunal. d. The interests of justice require parties to put their best foot forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this. This included the granting of an adjournment in late 2025 to enable the respondent more time to appoint a representative and a scheduling amendment to enable an in person hearing as requested. e. The respondent has not referred to or provided any new evidence that may have changed the outcome of the decision. f. All relevant material provided by the applicant and considered by the Tribunal in the determination of the Order and granting possession was provided in advance of the hearing. g. Errors of law are not a ground for a rehearing, they are grounds for an appeal and a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. h. An appearance of bias in the decision, a belief that complex evidence was not property considered and granting possession to both registered owners are not grounds for rehearing. i. The Tribunal’s Order determined that it was appropriate to consider jurisdiction and possession, despite the second notice of hearing. Any disagreement with this approach, is a disagreement with the decision itself and therefore is not a ground for a rehearing.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Order of the Tribunal dated 23 January 2026 remains in full force and effect.
The previous order granted name suppression to both parties and for consistency, that is also granted here. R Harvey-Lane 13 February 2026

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the applicant’s and respondent’s name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing. The respondent appeared with his appointed representative.
On 23 January 2026 the Tribunal made an order granting possession to the applicant and the other registered owner.
On 30 January 2026, the respondent applied for a rehearing on the grounds that: a. They query the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this matter. b. There was the appearance of bias in the decision, as the decision states that the outcome of the possession application was a forgone conclusion. c. The Tribunal appears to have relied on material provided by the applicant (including invoices, correspondence and letters from the police) which was not notified or accessed by the respondent prior to the hearing. d. There was a departure from the notice of hearing in that the second notice of hearing stated that the hearing would only be to determine jurisdiction. As a result, there was procedural unfairness in the Tribunal considering the possession element of the application. e. There was an error of law in the application of section 65 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). f. There was procedural unfairness in allowing both registered owners to speak at the hearing, when only one was listed in the application form, and this was a process failure by the Tribunal. g. The Tribunal did not adequately consider the complex evidence provided to it by the respondent during the hearing and prior to issuing a decision.
In summary, the respondent says that some of these issues individually warrant a rehearing, however when considered collectively, a miscarriage of justice may or has occurred.
The applicant disputes the rehearing application and at the rehearing consideration hearing responded to each of the respondent’s points.
In summary the applicant says: All relevant documents were provided well in advance of the hearing and any failure to view these was by choice; the earlier notice of hearing had made it clear that the hearing was for jurisdiction, termination and possession; that both registered owners were entitled to be heard at the hearing; that they weren’t aware who would be attending on behalf of the respondent until they arrived; that the decision took two days to be issued and had clearly considered the issues. The law
Section 105(1) of the RTA relates to rehearings and confirms that: The Tribunal shall in all proceedings have the power to order a rehearing of the whole or any part of the proceedings on the ground that a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan, 1 Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford, 2 the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri: 3 In this Court’s view the Tribunal’s reasons for refusing a rehearing are correct. Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made. 1 Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50. 2 Jemma Trust v Rutherford, DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999. 3 Loh v Puri [2019] NZDC 1993.
In other words, usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the respondent has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The objective of the Tribunal is to determine expeditiously disputes arising between parties. b. The fact that the respondent disagrees with any aspect of the decision is not a ground for a rehearing. c. Both parties received notice of the hearing, appeared and gave evidence during the hearing and there was no evidence provided during the hearing by the respondent that was not accepted by the Tribunal. d. The interests of justice require parties to put their best foot forward at the hearing and both parties had ample opportunity to do this. This included the granting of an adjournment in late 2025 to enable the respondent more time to appoint a representative and a scheduling amendment to enable an in person hearing as requested. e. The respondent has not referred to or provided any new evidence that may have changed the outcome of the decision. f. All relevant material provided by the applicant and considered by the Tribunal in the determination of the Order and granting possession was provided in advance of the hearing. g. Errors of law are not a ground for a rehearing, they are grounds for an appeal and a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. h. An appearance of bias in the decision, a belief that complex evidence was not property considered and granting possession to both registered owners are not grounds for rehearing. i. The Tribunal’s Order determined that it was appropriate to consider jurisdiction and possession, despite the second notice of hearing. Any disagreement with this approach, is a disagreement with the decision itself and therefore is not a ground for a rehearing.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Order of the Tribunal dated 23 January 2026 remains in full force and effect.
The previous order granted name suppression to both parties and for consistency, that is also granted here. R Harvey-Lane 13 February 2026

Tenancy Tribunal case 5396532 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5396532 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions