What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5422093 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5422093?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5422093?

The primary dispute was Illegal Lockout.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5422093?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13002063-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5422093 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5422093?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5422093?

The primary dispute was Illegal Lockout.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5422093?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13002063-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5422093 — Illegal Lockout

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord’s and Tenant’s name and identifying details.
The Tribunal declares that [the tenant] stopped being a tenant on 6 March 2025.
The 90-day termination notice dated 3 October 2025 is invalid and of no effect.
The application for possession is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 20 January 2026.
The tenancy began on 26 November 2021. There were initially two tenants on the tenancy agreement, [the tenant] and [the tenant]. Around early 2025, [the tenant] advised the landlord that she was the victim of family violence while a tenant of the premises. The proper process for withdrawing from the tenancy under section 56B of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) was not followed however, on 6 March 2025, the landlord sent [the tenant] an email agreeing to release her from the tenancy on this date. [The tenant] was included in the landlord’s application and attended the hearing. The parties seek clarification about whether [the tenant] is a tenant. The Tribunal declares that [the tenant] is not a tenant. [The tenant] stopped being a tenant on 6 March 2025 when the landlord agreed to release her from the tenancy.
The landlord sent [the tenant] a 90-day termination notice on 3 October 2025. The end date record in the notice is 4 January 2026. [The tenant] remains in possession of the premises. The landlord claims the tenancy has terminated and seeks an order for possession.
As the applicant, the landlord must prove their claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

The law

On the application of any person entitled to possession of the premises following the termination of a tenancy, the Tribunal shall make an order granting possession of the premises to that person. 1
A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case by giving at least 90 days’ notice. 2
Section 136 RTA relates to service of documents. Subsection 1 relevantly states that, where any notice of other document is required or authorised by the RTA to be given to or served on a tenant, it shall be sufficient if it is given or served in any of the following ways: a. Personally. b. By post addressed to the tenant at the address or PO Box given by them as an address for service in accordance with the RTA. c. Delivered to the premises to which any address for service relates, and either placed in the mailbox or attached to the door in a prominent position. d. Transmitted to the electronic address given by the tenant as an address for service.
Subsection 2 expands upon this and provides further methods of service however, these are not relevant to this case and therefore, I do not list them below.
Section 13AB RTA defines an “address for service” as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act, an address for service means any address given by the landlord or tenants under this Act 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 64(1). 2 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 51(1). as an address for service at which notices and other documents relating to the tenancy will be accepted by or on behalf of the landlord or tenant, as the case may be. (2) Whenever a party is required to give an address for service, the party – (a) Must give an address of a physical place in New Zealand; and (b) May, in addition, specify a Post Office box number, email address, or facsimile number as one of the party’s address for service.
Section 16 RTA states: 16 Change of address (1) Where the name and contact address, or address for service, of any person has been notified to the other party to the tenancy agreement in accordance with this Act and that name or address subsequently changes (otherwise than in circumstances to which section 15 applies), the person shall, within 10 working days thereafter, cause notice of the new particulars to be given to the other party. (1A) In subsection (1), contact address incudes the following: (a) A person’s contact mobile telephone number: (b) A person’s contact email address. Analysis
The tenancy agreement records the following email as an address for service for the tenant: [email address suppressed].
The 90-day termination notice was sent to the tenant by email to the following email address: [email address suppressed]. The tenant gave evidence that whilst they have used this email to communicate with the landlord, they were locked out of it at the time the 90-day notice was sent. The tenant claims they did not get access back into the email address until 3 December 2025, which is when they saw the 90-day notice.
The landlord claims the email address of [email address suppressed] is the most up to date contact email address for the tenant. They claim they have regularly communicated with the tenant via this email address.
The landlord did not submit any communication from the tenant confirming the email address of “[email address suppressed]” as an address for service for them. Whilst the landlord claims they have regularly communicated with the tenant using this email address, only a small amount of evidence to this effect was submitted in the form of emails sent by the tenant to the landlord between 12 – 15 January 2026. The landlord also did not submit any evidence confirming the date and time the tenant opened the 90-day termination notice sent via email sent on 3 October 2025.
In Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141, the Tribunal held that section 16(1) RTA makes a clear distinction between a contact address and an address for service. 3 In Handcock, the landlord sent the tenant a 90-day termination notice to an email address the tenant had used to communicate with the landlord but had never confirmed as their address for service. The Tribunal found the 90-day notice had not been given to or served on the tenant in accordance with the RTA and was therefore invalid.
I find this case to be similar to Handcock. Although the tenant has communicated with the landlord using the email address of “[email address suppressed]”, they have never specifically confirmed this as their address for service. Insufficient evidence was submitted by the landlord to convince me that the email address became an address for service for the tenant by default through common usage. The purpose of service is to bring a notice to the recipient’s attention. The tenant claims they only became aware of the notice on 3 December 2025 and no evidence to the contrary was submitted by the landlord. For all of these reasons, I find the 90-day termination notice was not properly served on the tenant and is therefore invalid and of no effect. Filing fee & name suppression
The landlord has not been wholly or substantially successful with their claim. Therefore, I do not order the tenant to reimburse the filing fee.
Because this decision discusses an allegation of family violence in respect of a former tenant, I order suppression of both parties’ names and identifying details. 4

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord’s and Tenant’s name and identifying details.
The Tribunal declares that [the tenant] stopped being a tenant on 6 March 2025.
The 90-day termination notice dated 3 October 2025 is invalid and of no effect.
The application for possession is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 20 January 2026.
The tenancy began on 26 November 2021. There were initially two tenants on the tenancy agreement, [the tenant] and [the tenant]. Around early 2025, [the tenant] advised the landlord that she was the victim of family violence while a tenant of the premises. The proper process for withdrawing from the tenancy under section 56B of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) was not followed however, on 6 March 2025, the landlord sent [the tenant] an email agreeing to release her from the tenancy on this date. [The tenant] was included in the landlord’s application and attended the hearing. The parties seek clarification about whether [the tenant] is a tenant. The Tribunal declares that [the tenant] is not a tenant. [The tenant] stopped being a tenant on 6 March 2025 when the landlord agreed to release her from the tenancy.
The landlord sent [the tenant] a 90-day termination notice on 3 October 2025. The end date record in the notice is 4 January 2026. [The tenant] remains in possession of the premises. The landlord claims the tenancy has terminated and seeks an order for possession.
As the applicant, the landlord must prove their claim to the civil law standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

The law

On the application of any person entitled to possession of the premises following the termination of a tenancy, the Tribunal shall make an order granting possession of the premises to that person. 1
A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy in any case by giving at least 90 days’ notice. 2
Section 136 RTA relates to service of documents. Subsection 1 relevantly states that, where any notice of other document is required or authorised by the RTA to be given to or served on a tenant, it shall be sufficient if it is given or served in any of the following ways: a. Personally. b. By post addressed to the tenant at the address or PO Box given by them as an address for service in accordance with the RTA. c. Delivered to the premises to which any address for service relates, and either placed in the mailbox or attached to the door in a prominent position. d. Transmitted to the electronic address given by the tenant as an address for service.
Subsection 2 expands upon this and provides further methods of service however, these are not relevant to this case and therefore, I do not list them below.
Section 13AB RTA defines an “address for service” as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act, an address for service means any address given by the landlord or tenants under this Act 1 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 64(1). 2 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, section 51(1). as an address for service at which notices and other documents relating to the tenancy will be accepted by or on behalf of the landlord or tenant, as the case may be. (2) Whenever a party is required to give an address for service, the party – (a) Must give an address of a physical place in New Zealand; and (b) May, in addition, specify a Post Office box number, email address, or facsimile number as one of the party’s address for service.
Section 16 RTA states: 16 Change of address (1) Where the name and contact address, or address for service, of any person has been notified to the other party to the tenancy agreement in accordance with this Act and that name or address subsequently changes (otherwise than in circumstances to which section 15 applies), the person shall, within 10 working days thereafter, cause notice of the new particulars to be given to the other party. (1A) In subsection (1), contact address incudes the following: (a) A person’s contact mobile telephone number: (b) A person’s contact email address. Analysis
The tenancy agreement records the following email as an address for service for the tenant: [email address suppressed].
The 90-day termination notice was sent to the tenant by email to the following email address: [email address suppressed]. The tenant gave evidence that whilst they have used this email to communicate with the landlord, they were locked out of it at the time the 90-day notice was sent. The tenant claims they did not get access back into the email address until 3 December 2025, which is when they saw the 90-day notice.
The landlord claims the email address of [email address suppressed] is the most up to date contact email address for the tenant. They claim they have regularly communicated with the tenant via this email address.
The landlord did not submit any communication from the tenant confirming the email address of “[email address suppressed]” as an address for service for them. Whilst the landlord claims they have regularly communicated with the tenant using this email address, only a small amount of evidence to this effect was submitted in the form of emails sent by the tenant to the landlord between 12 – 15 January 2026. The landlord also did not submit any evidence confirming the date and time the tenant opened the 90-day termination notice sent via email sent on 3 October 2025.
In Handcock v Monarch Realty Limited [2021] NZTT Hamilton 4278989, 4293141, the Tribunal held that section 16(1) RTA makes a clear distinction between a contact address and an address for service. 3 In Handcock, the landlord sent the tenant a 90-day termination notice to an email address the tenant had used to communicate with the landlord but had never confirmed as their address for service. The Tribunal found the 90-day notice had not been given to or served on the tenant in accordance with the RTA and was therefore invalid.
I find this case to be similar to Handcock. Although the tenant has communicated with the landlord using the email address of “[email address suppressed]”, they have never specifically confirmed this as their address for service. Insufficient evidence was submitted by the landlord to convince me that the email address became an address for service for the tenant by default through common usage. The purpose of service is to bring a notice to the recipient’s attention. The tenant claims they only became aware of the notice on 3 December 2025 and no evidence to the contrary was submitted by the landlord. For all of these reasons, I find the 90-day termination notice was not properly served on the tenant and is therefore invalid and of no effect. Filing fee & name suppression
The landlord has not been wholly or substantially successful with their claim. Therefore, I do not order the tenant to reimburse the filing fee.
Because this decision discusses an allegation of family violence in respect of a former tenant, I order suppression of both parties’ names and identifying details. 4

Tenancy Tribunal case 5422093 — Illegal Lockout

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5422093 — Illegal Lockout

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Should a possession order be made in favour of the landlord?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions