Tenantcheck Insights · Case study
Tenancy Tribunal case 5422674 — 14-day notice
Decided 10 Feb 2026 · Published 10 Feb 2026 · Application 5422674
- 14-day notice
At a glance
Key facts from the published tribunal order.
Adjudicator
M Edison
Claims & awards
What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.
No individual claim amounts were reconciled for this order. View the official Ministry of Justice PDF for full detail.
Order
- An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the landlord’s name and identifying details.
- [The landlord/s] is granted possession of the premises at [Tenancy address suppressed] at 5pm on Tuesday 17 February 2026.
- The tenant is directed to comply with section 40(1)(e) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, including but not limited to (a) removing all his goods from the premises, (b) returning all keys, security or pass cards or other such devices provided by the landlord, and (c) leaving at the premises all other chattels provided by the landlord for the tenant’s use.
- The tenant must pay the filing fee of $28.00 to the landlord immediately.
Reasons
- Both parties attended the hearing in person today, 10 February 2026. Background
- The tenant was employed by the landlord as a caretaker at a holiday camp (the premises) from October 2019. The tenant lived in a 3-bedroom house on the premises. It was a term of the employment agreement that part of the remuneration for the role was an entitlement to accommodation on site at no charge.
- On 17 November 2025 the landlord confirmed disestablishment of the caretaker role. The camp was closing “indefinitely” for development. The tenant’s employment was terminated for redundancy on 21 November 2025.
- Also on 21 November 2025, the landlord gave notice to end the tenancy. Although the tenancy could be terminated on not less than 14 days’ notice, the landlord had decided to give more time for the tenant to arrange alternative accommodation and remove fixtures. The last day of the tenancy would be 19 December 2025.
- On 18 December 2025 the landlord’s solicitor wrote to the tenant, agreeing to hold off from enforcement action until 5 January 2026, on certain conditions. If the tenant did not vacate by then, an application would be made to the Tribunal.
- The landlord applied to the Tribunal on 13 January 2026. The tenant also made an application to the Tribunal, on 2 December 2025. Relevant Law
- The Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) applies to every tenancy for residential purposes except as specifically provided (section 4). “Residential premises” are any premises used or intended for occupation as a place of residence. The house occupied by the tenant as caretaker is residential.
- The Act defines a “service tenancy” as follows (in part): ...a tenancy granted under a term of, or otherwise as an incident of, a contract of service or a contract for services between the landlord as employer and the tenant as employee or contractor, whether or not a separate tenancy agreement is concluded in writing between the parties, and whether or not any rent is payable for the tenancy...
- The meaning of the words “as an incident of” can be said to denote an expected if perhaps not inevitable relationship between two things (see NZ Railways Corporation v Te Aonui (HC Wellington, AP 26/92, Gallen J, 3 February 1993)).
- There are special provisions for the termination of service tenancies. Section 53 of the Act provides that the landlord or the tenant can terminate a service tenancy by giving at least 14 days’ notice if the employment contract has been terminated, or either party has given notice to terminate the employment contract. A service tenancy cannot be terminated prior to termination of the employment contract. Analysis
- The issue is whether the landlord granted a service tenancy. The tenant says there was a separate, stand-alone tenancy and therefore 90 days’ notice had to be given to terminate. The tenant pointed out that the employment agreement does not state that it is granting a service tenancy.
- The employment agreement could have stated that a service tenancy was intended and could have provided that the tenancy would end at the same time as the tenant’s employment. However, I consider it is reasonably clear that this was a service tenancy. The tenancy was granted as a term of the employment agreement. Alternatively, it was granted “as an incident of” the employment agreement, because the evidence before the Tribunal was that the caretaker needed to live on site to perform the role. The tenant acknowledged his role involved management of the site and security, as well as maintenance services, with a large increase in workload over summer.
- The definition of “service tenancy” in the Act means that the lack of a separate tenancy agreement does not preclude the existence of a service tenancy. Because the employment relationship has ended, logically the right to accommodation at the premises - which was granted as a term of the employment agreement - also ceases.
- The employment agreement stated that the accommodation was free. The payslips show that an allowance of $154.00 per fortnight ($77.00 per week) was paid to the tenant as taxable earnings. At the same time, $154.00 was deducted for housing. The landlord said this was done for tax purposes. The Tribunal has no specialist expertise in tax or accounting, but I consider this effectively meant there was no cost for accommodation charged to the tenant. It is a key feature of a residential tenancy that the right to occupy is acquired in consideration for the payment of rent. Here, notwithstanding the accounting treatment, I am not satisfied that the tenant was paying rent. I find that there was no separate tenancy, only a service tenancy.
- The termination notice was in writing, identified the premises, specified the date by which the tenant was to vacate, gave a reason for termination (redundancy) and generally complied with the requirements of section 51(3) of the Act. It follows that the notice was valid, and that the tenancy has been terminated. The tenancy ended on 5 January 2026, which is less than 90 days ago. The requirements for a possession order under section 64 of the Act are satisfied.
- The tenant submitted that these issues were before the Employment Relations Authority, and he intends to remain on site until all the employment issues have been addressed. I consider that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in respect to issues concerning the service tenancy, while the Employment Relations Authority has jurisdiction over the employment dispute. There is no reason not to make a possession order now (Morunga v Waterford Holdings Limited [2014] NZERA Christchurch 128 5446364, 22 August 2014, at [63]).
- The tenant said there was no disadvantage to the landlord if he remains on site. The landlord says it cannot redevelop the site if the tenant continues to live there. I acknowledge that the parties have different interests and the adverse effect that my order may have on the tenant, who clearly cares deeply about the camp. However, these considerations cannot detract from what I consider to be the correct legal outcome. Ancillary Orders
- The landlord sought orders that the tenant return security devices and all chattels provided to him, that he removes all additional structures and all personal property. There may be an issue over what property belongs to the tenant and what belongs to the landlord. The tenant said he has been reimbursed for some tools but not others. I direct that the tenant removes all belongings which he reasonably believes are owned by him.
- The structures concern a boat shed and a storage shed. It seems that these structures are situated on land owned by third parties. The landlord said these structures were constructed by the tenant without their permission as employer. The question for the Tribunal is whether it has jurisdiction to direct the removal of structures on land not included in the tenancy. I decline to deal with this issue, on the basis that the Tribunal might be interfering with the ownership rights of parties not before me.
- The tenant said he would be applying for a stay of proceedings. This order gives the tenant a short period to do so. Filing Fee and Name Suppression
- The landlord’s application has succeeded. The landlord must be awarded the filing fee.
- The landlord requested suppression pursuant to section 95A. The Tribunal can decline to grant suppression if it considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the circumstances of the case.
- While the dispute is of intense significance to the tenant, and perhaps also to the local area around the camp, I do not consider this overrides the usual position, which is that a successful party is entitled to suppression. Further, this application is focussed on only one aspect of a wider employment dispute and relates to private legal rights rather than issues of public concern. I grant suppression.
- The tenant did not request suppression in the application form.