What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5437502 about?

The tribunal order states: By consent, the tenancy of [The tenant/s] and [The tenant/s] at 52

How much money was awarded in case 5437502?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5437502?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5437502?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13197145-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5437502 about?

The tribunal order states: By consent, the tenancy of [The tenant/s] and [The tenant/s] at 52

How much money was awarded in case 5437502?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5437502?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5437502?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13197145-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

52 Bowen Street, Cambridge, Cambridge 3434 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5437502 — Tenancy dispute

Order

By consent, the tenancy of [The tenant/s] and [The tenant/s] at 52 Bowen Street, Cambridge 3434 is terminated, and possession is granted to [The landlord/s] and Sue Wrigley, as trustees of the Skerries Trust, at 11:59 pm on Thursday, 5 March 2026.

Reasons

This matter concerns an application by the landlord, the Skerries Trust, for termination of the tenancy at 52 Bowen Street, Cambridge, pursuant to section 51(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“the Act”).
The hearing proceeded by telephone after initial technical difficulties with the remote audio-visual platform. Both parties were ultimately present and able to participate fully.
Mrs Susan Wrigley appeared on behalf of the Skerries Trust. She is one of the trustees. The other trustee, Ms [The landlord/s], was not present. Mrs Susan Wrigley confirmed she had authority to represent the Trust and to proceed with the hearing.
Ms [The tenant/s] appeared as the tenant. Mr [The tenant/s], the other tenant, was also present during parts of the hearing. Ms [The tenant/s] addressed me on behalf of the tenants.
I am satisfied that Mrs Susan Wrigley had authority to represent the Skerries Trust in these proceedings. She confirmed that the co-trustee, Ms [The landlord/s], was aware of the matter and agreeable to Mrs Susan Wrigley conducting the hearing.
No objection was taken by the tenants to Mrs Susan Wrigley’s standing to proceed. The termination notice
Mrs Susan Wrigley relies on a written termination notice issued pursuant to section 51(1) of the Act.
The copy of the termination notice filed with the Tribunal records an issuing date of 2 February 2026 and requires the tenants to vacate on that date.
On its face, that document appears internally inconsistent, as the issuing date and the vacate date are the same.
Mrs Susan Wrigley submitted that her solicitor issued the termination notice providing 90 days’ notice, calculated back from 2 February 2026.
Ms [The tenant/s] confirmed in evidence that she received the termination notice by email on 5 November 2025.
I therefore find as fact that: a. The notice was sent to the tenants by email on 5 November 2025; b. The tenants received it on that date; c. The termination notice provided 90 days’ notice; d. The vacate date specified was 2 February 2026; and e. The termination was signed by Mrs Susan Wrigley or her lawyer.
The incorrect “issuing date” recorded on the copy filed with the Tribunal appears to be a drafting or typographical error. Validity of the termination notice
Section 51(1) of the Act permits a landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy by giving at least 90 days’ notice, without the need to state a reason.
Section 51(4) of the Act provides that a termination notice must not be held invalid for failure to comply strictly with the requirements in paragraph 12 above, provided the notice is in writing, and the intention to terminate the tenancy on a particular date is clearly stated in the notice.
In this case: a. The notice was in writing; b. It was communicated to the tenants; c. The tenants received the full 90-day notice period; and d. Ms [The tenant/s] acknowledged receipt and did not dispute receiving the notice on 5 November 2025.
The error in the issuing date on the filed copy did not deprive the tenants of notice, nor did it shorten the notice period.
I therefore conclude that the termination notice is valid and enforceable. Sale and purchase agreement
During the hearing, the tenants advised that a sale and purchase agreement had been entered into in respect of the property, conditional upon finance.
It was common ground that: a. The agreement had been signed; b. The purchaser was seeking finance through business lending; c. The contract had been extended more than once pending finance approval; and d. A valuation of the property had recently been commissioned.
Ms [The tenant/s] sought an adjournment to allow time for the finance condition to be satisfied.
Mrs Susan Wrigley opposed further indefinite extensions, noting that previous extensions had not resulted in the sale and purchase agreement becoming unconditional and expressing concern about uncertainty. My approach
I do not have the jurisdiction to supervise the contractual finance process between the vendor and the purchaser.
However, where a termination notice is valid but the parties indicate a practical resolution may be imminent, it is appropriate to consider whether an agreed termination date can be formalised.
After discussion with both parties, I proposed a finite termination date which would: a. Provide certainty to Mrs Susan Wrigley; b. Allow a short, defined period for the finance condition to be satisfied; and c. Avoid ongoing uncertainty or repeated adjournments.
On the basis of the proposed approach, both parties agreed on a termination date of 5 March 2026.
Ms [The tenant/s] accepted that if the sale and purchase agreement was not declared unconditional by that date, the tenancy would terminate.
Mrs Susan Wrigley agreed to that finite date and confirmed willingness to provide a short contractual extension to allow the finance condition to be satisfied.
On this issue, I thank both parties for their sensible approach to resolving the dispute. The tenants’ cross-application 5446714
Ms [The tenant/s] filed a cross-application (5446714) on 18 February 2026.
The cross-application had not been joined to this proceeding and had not been assessed or scheduled by Tenancy Services at the time of the hearing.
I did not have the full file before me in respect of the cross-application.
Accordingly, the cross-application should be handled in the usual way once Tenancy Services have assessed the application. Filing fee
As both parties agreed to a termination date, costs lie where they fall.

Reasons

This matter concerns an application by the landlord, the Skerries Trust, for termination of the tenancy at 52 Bowen Street, Cambridge, pursuant to section 51(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“the Act”).

The hearing proceeded by telephone after initial technical difficulties with the remote audio-visual platform. Both parties were ultimately present and able to participate fully.

Mrs Susan Wrigley appeared on behalf of the Skerries Trust. She is one of the trustees. The other trustee, Ms [The landlord/s], was not present. Mrs Susan Wrigley confirmed she had authority to represent the Trust and to proceed with the hearing.

Ms [The tenant/s] appeared as the tenant. Mr [The tenant/s], the other tenant, was also present during parts of the hearing. Ms [The tenant/s] addressed me on behalf of the tenants.

I am satisfied that Mrs Susan Wrigley had authority to represent the Skerries Trust in these proceedings. She confirmed that the co-trustee, Ms [The landlord/s], was aware of the matter and agreeable to Mrs Susan Wrigley conducting the hearing.

No objection was taken by the tenants to Mrs Susan Wrigley’s standing to proceed. The termination notice

Mrs Susan Wrigley relies on a written termination notice issued pursuant to section 51(1) of the Act.

The copy of the termination notice filed with the Tribunal records an issuing date of 2 February 2026 and requires the tenants to vacate on that date.

On its face, that document appears internally inconsistent, as the issuing date and the vacate date are the same.

Mrs Susan Wrigley submitted that her solicitor issued the termination notice providing 90 days’ notice, calculated back from 2 February 2026.

Ms [The tenant/s] confirmed in evidence that she received the termination notice by email on 5 November 2025.

I therefore find as fact that: a. The notice was sent to the tenants by email on 5 November 2025; b. The tenants received it on that date; c. The termination notice provided 90 days’ notice; d. The vacate date specified was 2 February 2026; and e. The termination was signed by Mrs Susan Wrigley or her lawyer.

The incorrect “issuing date” recorded on the copy filed with the Tribunal appears to be a drafting or typographical error. Validity of the termination notice

Section 51(1) of the Act permits a landlord to terminate a periodic tenancy by giving at least 90 days’ notice, without the need to state a reason.

Section 51(4) of the Act provides that a termination notice must not be held invalid for failure to comply strictly with the requirements in paragraph 12 above, provided the notice is in writing, and the intention to terminate the tenancy on a particular date is clearly stated in the notice.

In this case: a. The notice was in writing; b. It was communicated to the tenants; c. The tenants received the full 90-day notice period; and d. Ms [The tenant/s] acknowledged receipt and did not dispute receiving the notice on 5 November 2025.

The error in the issuing date on the filed copy did not deprive the tenants of notice, nor did it shorten the notice period.

I therefore conclude that the termination notice is valid and enforceable. Sale and purchase agreement

During the hearing, the tenants advised that a sale and purchase agreement had been entered into in respect of the property, conditional upon finance.

It was common ground that: a. The agreement had been signed; b. The purchaser was seeking finance through business lending; c. The contract had been extended more than once pending finance approval; and d. A valuation of the property had recently been commissioned.

Ms [The tenant/s] sought an adjournment to allow time for the finance condition to be satisfied.

Mrs Susan Wrigley opposed further indefinite extensions, noting that previous extensions had not resulted in the sale and purchase agreement becoming unconditional and expressing concern about uncertainty. My approach

I do not have the jurisdiction to supervise the contractual finance process between the vendor and the purchaser.

However, where a termination notice is valid but the parties indicate a practical resolution may be imminent, it is appropriate to consider whether an agreed termination date can be formalised.

After discussion with both parties, I proposed a finite termination date which would: a. Provide certainty to Mrs Susan Wrigley; b. Allow a short, defined period for the finance condition to be satisfied; and c. Avoid ongoing uncertainty or repeated adjournments.

On the basis of the proposed approach, both parties agreed on a termination date of 5 March 2026.

Ms [The tenant/s] accepted that if the sale and purchase agreement was not declared unconditional by that date, the tenancy would terminate.

Mrs Susan Wrigley agreed to that finite date and confirmed willingness to provide a short contractual extension to allow the finance condition to be satisfied.

On this issue, I thank both parties for their sensible approach to resolving the dispute. The tenants’ cross-application 5446714

Ms [The tenant/s] filed a cross-application (5446714) on 18 February 2026.

The cross-application had not been joined to this proceeding and had not been assessed or scheduled by Tenancy Services at the time of the hearing.

I did not have the full file before me in respect of the cross-application.

Accordingly, the cross-application should be handled in the usual way once Tenancy Services have assessed the application. Filing fee

As both parties agreed to a termination date, costs lie where they fall.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5437502 — Tenancy dispute at 52 Bowen Street, Cambridge, Cambridge 3434

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5437502 — Tenancy dispute at 52 Bowen Street, Cambridge, Cambridge 3434

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Property management

Frequently asked questions