What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5438621 about?

The tribunal order states: Snells Development Nz Limited must pay [The tenant/s] tenant/s] $6,028.57

How much money was awarded in case 5438621?

Individual award amounts are in the official MoJ PDF. Claim amounts appear on this page when claims and net totals reconcile.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5438621?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5438621?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13723126-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5438621 about?

The tribunal order states: Snells Development Nz Limited must pay [The tenant/s] tenant/s] $6,028.57

How much money was awarded in case 5438621?

Individual award amounts are in the official MoJ PDF. Claim amounts appear on this page when claims and net totals reconcile.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5438621?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5438621?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13723126-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

81 Grange Street, Warkworth, Warkworth 0982 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5438621 — Exemplary damages

Order

Snells Development Nz Limited must pay [The tenant/s] tenant/s] $6,028.57 immediately, calculated as shown in table below:
The District Court has confirmed that, for the purpose of exemplary damages arising from multiple breaches of the same unlawful act provision, the Tribunal must make a global award of exemplary damages, rather than awarding damages for each individual breach. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Hillis Shearing Limited [2024] NZDC 27583
The landlord is claiming rent arrears, of $17,536.29, and $2,311.50 for a repair invoice. Background:
This dispute concerns the tenancy at 81 Grange Street which commenced on the 5 th of July 2024. The property comprises approximately 4.2 hectares and contains a residential dwelling, together with a number of paddocks and sheds. The residential dwelling is separated from the remainder of the property by a farming fence, with the balance of the land comprising grazing areas and farm-related improvements.
The nature of that arrangement lies at the heart of this dispute. Throughout the tenancy, the parties adopted differing positions as to whether the property was rented as a whole, whether separate arrangements existed in relation to the house and the remainder of the land, and whether the tenancy was residential or commercial in nature.
Section 85 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides guidance as to how the Tribunal should exercise its jurisdiction. It states that the Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction in a manner most likely to ensure the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants. It further provides that the Tribunal shall determine each dispute according to the general principles of law and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall not be bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations, legal forms, or technicalities.
The guidance provided by s 85 has been front of mind in hearing and deciding this case because both the parties, have doggedly, sought to reframe events and present the evidence in a self-serving manner devoid of context. As a result, it has been necessary to step back from the individual allegations and consider the broader context.
The overall impression I formed from the evidence is that the parties entered into a residential tenancy in July 2024 for the property as a whole for a fixed term of six months. It is my finding that the landlord was aware, or ought to have been aware, that aspects of the property were not compliant with the Residential Tenancies Act. The rent agreed between the parties appears to have reflected, at least in part, the nature and condition of the property at the time.
At the end of the initial fixed term, when the tenant sought certainty regarding the continuation of the tenancy, the landlord took the opportunity to reframe the tenancy as a commercial lease. This has been addressed in more detail in the substantive decision below.
In April 2025, the tenant’s flatmates moved out and he experienced difficulty meeting the rent payments. Around this time, he began researching his rights and as a result began insisting on strict compliance with the Act. He was entitled to do so. However, the evidence suggests that from this point onwards the tenant was only partially motivated in achieving compliance and was primarily focused on maximising the award he hoped to seek in the tribunal.
As a result, the landlord found themselves in a difficult position of their own making. They were confronted with the need to address the compliance issues and extricate themselves from the situation whilst confronted with a tenant trying to maintain tenure, whilst seeking compliance and simultaneously undermining the landlord’s compliance efforts.
None of this excuses any breach of the Residential Tenancies Act. Where breaches are established, responsibility for those breaches remains with the party who committed them. However, s 85 requires the Tribunal to determine disputes according to their substantial merits and justice. In approaching this case, I have therefore considered not only the individual allegations advanced by the parties, but also the broader context in which those events occurred. History of the case:
The tenant’s application was originally scheduled for hearing on 27 August 2025. On that date, the landlord advised that they had only just received the tenant's application and sought an adjournment, which was granted.
The matter subsequently resumed before me as a case conference on 8 October 2025. The purpose of the case conference was to identify the nature of the case, the scope of the applications, the relief sought, and the issues requiring determination at the next hearing.
Following the case conference, I issued orders identifying the issues to be heard. Those issues included the question of jurisdiction, namely whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the applications, and the substantive matters to be determined at the next hearing, being a compensation claim for a full refund of rent and a claim for exemplary damages in respect of alleged unlawful acts by the landlord.
The tenant’s application was heard on the 21 st of January 2026 and an adjournment was granted to allow the landlord to make claims they raised in the hearing but which were not filed.
The landlord’s cross application was heard on the 8 th of June 2026.

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear this claim?

The landlord listed the property on the MyRent platform on 17 June 2024. The listing, titled "Simple Lifestyle Retreat," advertised a lifestyle property of 4.2 hectares with a three-bedroom house and views, at $500 per week. It offered two options: renting the entire property "by negotiation," or renting the house only.
At the time, the tenant was living in his car with his three dogs. He had been struggling to secure accommodation because of them. He attended the open home, was taken by the property, and wanted to rent it, he communicated this to Mingli Huang, one of the directors and shareholders of Snells Development NZ Limited.
After the viewing, the tenant heard nothing further and initiated contact himself. Mingli, told him there were other parties interested, including some who wanted the entire property, house and land together. Mingli says the tenant mentioned a farming background, and that she was also drawn to his youth. I inferred from that that she thought he would have the energy and motivation required to maintain a property of that size and type. She told him another party had offered $850 per week for the whole property, that the landlord preferred to let it as a whole rather than split it, and that if he agreed to take the entire property, the house would be his.
The parties agreed on that basis, and a residential tenancy agreement was generated. After this the parties agree that the tenant sought confirmation his dogs would be allowed, and that the landlord added a note to the agreement recording $500 as rent for the house and $350 for the land and shared areas. The landlord says this note split the arrangement into two tenancies, a residential one for the house and a commercial one for the rest of the land and sheds. The tenant says it remained a single agreement for the whole property at $850 per week.
The tenancy agreement was never signed. It records a commencement date of 5 July 2024, an end date of 5 January 2025, and lists Gim Hwee LIM as landlord.
On 6 January 2025, the day the fixed term tenancy ended, the tenant emailed Mingli asking her to send through the new tenancy agreement discussed at their last viewing. On 14 January 2025, she replied that Lim was happy to continue leasing the entire property for a one-year term, with two rights of renewal and an annual rent review, and that one month's notice would be needed if the tenant decided to move out. She added: "We do not need to draw another agreement, just keep it simple and carry on as it is. I can come to inspect it every six months. Any major issue, please let me know."
On 20 January 2025, the tenant replied that he was happy with what she'd communicated, but wanted the agreement rewritten with updated dates and signed by both parties. Further emails followed, and at some point during this period a commercial lease agreement was provided to him. On 25 February 2025, an Agreement to Lease was signed on the standard Auckland District Law Society Deed of Lease (6th Edition, 2024), providing for a one-year term with two rights of renewal and rent of $850 per week.
The question is whether this was a commercial lease outside the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, a residential tenancy within it, or two separate agreements, a residential tenancy for the house at $500 per week and a commercial tenancy for the rest.
Section 2(1) of the Act defines residential premises as any premises used or intended for occupation as a place of residence. Section 4 applies the Act to every residential tenancy except as provided in s 5(1), which excludes commercial tenancies. Under s 10, a party asserting that the Act does not apply bears the burden of establishing that on the facts, so a landlord relying on the commercial exemption in s 5(1) must prove it on the balance of probabilities.
Lifestyle blocks and live-work arrangements often carry some commercial element without displacing the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The courts have made clear that exemptions under s 5 are to be read narrowly, not liberally: the District Court took this approach in Adams v Massey University (Palmerston North TT 43/94, 10 October 1994), and the High Court confirmed it in Harding v Schellevis & Ors [2021] NZHC 1265, where Walker J described the Act as favouring "a generous approach to jurisdiction for the Tribunal and conversely a strict approach to exemptions." Section 2(3) reinforces this: where premises are used for both commercial and residential purposes, they are deemed residential unless it is shown they were let principally for some other purpose.
In short, if an arrangement looks like a tenancy and living at the property is the principle use intended for in the transaction, it is a residential tenancy, with the rights and obligations that follow.
The facts support the tenant's position. Although the landlord had initially contemplated letting the house and the rest of the property separately, the agreement actually reached was for the whole property, at $850 per week, with the tenant given possession of it all.
The primary purpose of the arrangement was residential: the tenant needed somewhere to live with his animals. He was living in his car with three dogs and struggling to find accommodation, and the property let him pursue the rural lifestyle he wanted. Any hope of selling animals or building some business from the land was not a substantial part of the arrangement.
The evidence also does not support the landlord’s position about two separate agreements. Before the dispute hardened in mid-2025, the parties' communications point to a clumsy but pragmatic negotiation of a single arrangement covering the whole property, not a deliberate attempt to create distinct residential and commercial tenancies. The landlord's own words in January 2025, to "keep it simple and carry on as it is", sit awkwardly with the position now advanced that a separate commercial tenancy existed alongside the residential one.
It was the tenant, not the landlord, who pushed for more certainty, asking that the agreement be rewritten and signed. Only after that did a commercial lease document appear. When the tenant later queried clause 7's one-month renewal notice, the landlord explained it simply meant he should give a month's notice if he intended to move out. The landlord now says this exchange shows the tenant acknowledging a fixed-term tenancy. I don't accept that. It shows only that the tenant was unsure what the clause meant and asked, more tellingly, the ambiguity that was introduced was by the landlord's choice to dress the arrangement up in a commercial lease form, when the underlying arrangement was plainly residential.
The commercial lease signed on 25 February 2025 doesn't alter my conclusion; in practice, it did little more than give the tenant the certainty he'd asked for that the existing arrangement would continue. Section 11 declares agreements purporting to contract out of the act to be of no effect. This in turn, requires the Tribunal to look at the substance of an arrangement rather than its form, where the wording of the agreement is found to be of no effect.
I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the parties entered into a residential tenancy. It was a fixed-term tenancy commencing 5 July 2024, which became periodic on its expiry on 5 January 2025. The Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies, and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear these claims.

Are these unlawful residential premises?

The tenant seeks a declaration that the premises are unlawful residential premises. They rely on s 78A(2), which defines unlawful residential premises as premises used for occupation as a place of residence that cannot lawfully be occupied for residential purposes by that person whether generally, or for the particular purposes for which occupation was granted, and where the landlord's failure to comply with s 36 or s 45(1)(c) has caused or contributed to that unlawful occupation.
During the hearing, I asked the tenant to clarify the basis of this claim. Counsel submitted that the premises were unlawful because of non-compliance with the Healthy Homes Standards, and because the toilet broke during the tenancy and was not repaired.
The Healthy Homes Standards and the toilet repair are dealt with later in this decision, and it is accepted that the premises did not comply with the Healthy Homes Standards. Non-compliance with the Healthy Homes provisions doesn't fall within s 45(1)(c), which requires a landlord to meet building, health, and safety requirements under any enactment applying to the premises. Healthy Homes compliance is a separate obligation under s 45(1)(bb). A breach of the Standards may give rise to remedies under the Act, but it doesn't, on its own, make premises unlawful residential premises for the purposes of s 78A.
The same goes for a failure to maintain the premises during the tenancy, that doesn't itself establish that the premises were unlawful. The question under s 78A is whether the premises could lawfully be occupied for residential purposes at all.
I asked the parties whether any other legal impediment made the premises unlawful for residential occupation, and specifically whether the dwelling was consented and compliant with council requirements. The landlord said it was, and produced a LIM report showing the dwelling was authorised, with no code compliance certificate required because the relevant permit predated the Building Act 1991.
The tenant raised discussions from April 2025 about renovating one of the sheds into a residential sleepout. Such a structure would likely not have been lawful for residential occupation but those discussions never went beyond proposals, and ultimately had no bearing on the tenancy. The sheds themselves were ancillary structures, not intended for residential occupation and not required to meet residential standards.
I am not satisfied that the tenant has established that the premises could not lawfully be occupied for residential purposes, or that any failure by the landlord under s 36 or s 45(1)(c) caused or contributed to unlawful occupation.
The claim for a declaration that the premises are unlawful residential premises is therefore dismissed.

Did the landlord encourage rent bidding?

Section 22F(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 requires a landlord to state the rent in any advertisement or offer of a tenancy. Section 22G prohibits a landlord from inviting or encouraging a prospective tenant, or anyone else, to offer rent exceeding that advertised amount.
The advertisement of 17 June 2024 offered the house alone for $500 per week, with the entire property available "by negotiation." The tenant says this amounted to encouraging rent bidding, pointing also to the landlord's later statement that another party had offered $850 per week for the whole property, combined with the landlord's stated preference to let it as a whole.
The landlord's position is that these were two separate tenancies: a fixed $500 for the house, with the land and sheds separate, and that "by negotiation" was no more than an invitation to treat rather than an offer capable of acceptance.
An invitation to treat is a contractual concept, inviting offers, rather than making an offer capable of immediate acceptance. Section 22G exists to promote an even playing field for prospective tenants and prevent landlords exploiting the power imbalance inherent in the relationship, by prohibiting landlords from inviting or encouraging competition between tenants that pushes rent upward for the landlord's financial gain.
In my view, the landlord's conduct encouraged rent bidding within the meaning of s 22G. The advertisement technically stated $500 per week for the house, but promoted the property as a whole in circumstances where it was never intended that the whole property would go for that figure, and no clear boundary was ever drawn between the house and the rest of the property.
The landlord also told the tenant that another party had offered $850 per week for the entire property, and that letting it as a package was preferable. Whether that offer genuinely existed is unclear, it may have, or it may have been raised simply to push the tenant toward agreeing to $850. Either way, its effect was to encourage the tenant to increase what he was prepared to pay, without giving him a genuine opportunity to consider renting the house alone. That conduct is consistent with the way the tenancy was negotiated more generally.
I am satisfied the landlord failed to advertise the correct rent amount, and encouraged rent bidding and, in doing so, committed an unlawful act under s 22G(3) and s 22F(3). I also accept that the conduct was intentional: the evidence supports a finding that the landlord's objective was to secure $850 per week or more for the property as a whole, while using the advertised $500 rent to attract prospective tenants.
Under s 109(2), an application for exemplary damages must be made within 12 months of the unlawful act. That act occurred on or before 5 July 2024, and the application was filed on 14 July 2025, outside the 12-month window. The application for exemplary damages is therefore out of time, and no award of exemplary damages can be made.
As a final note, s 109(3)(c) would in any event have required me to weigh the landlord's intent, the effect of the unlawful act, the tenant's interests, and the public interest in fixing any award. On that front, the tenant was in fact motivated to rent the entire property, drawn to the lifestyle it offered and to keeping animals there, and later negotiations, in which he resisted scaling the tenancy back to $400 per week for a smaller footprint because he valued the full property at $850 more highly, suggest that renting the whole property was the outcome he wanted regardless. Given the time-bar, though, it was unnecessary to reach a decision about quantum.

Was the tenancy agreement incomplete?

The tenant alleges a number of breaches of s 13A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and seeks exemplary damages in relation to those breaches.
Section 13A(1)(a) requires a tenancy agreement to include the landlord's full name and contact address. Section 13A(1A) requires a statement, made and signed by the landlord, specifying whether insulation is installed in the ceilings, floors, or walls of the premises. Section 13A(1CA) requires a statement, similarly made and signed, confirming the premises will comply with the Healthy Homes Standards on or after the tenancy's commencement. Section 13A(1F) provides that a landlord who fails to ensure the agreement includes this information commits an unlawful act.
The property is owned by Snells Development New Zealand Limited. Mingli and Gim Hwee Lim are both directors and shareholders of that company, but the tenancy agreement identifies the landlord as Gim Hwee Lim only. The tenant says that throughout the tenancy, Mingli maintained that she was not the owner and that the owner was in Singapore. Mingli accepted that this was what she told him, but says Gim Hwee Lim was named because he was the principal decision-maker and majority shareholder. He may have been, but it did not change Mingli’s status as a landlord.
I accept the tenant's evidence on this issue. The information given to him about the landlord's identity was misleading and created ambiguity about who was ultimately responsible for the tenancy. I infer that this ambiguity was maintained deliberately, and that it had the effect of obscuring who was actually responsible for decisions about the tenancy and the property. Section 13A exists to ensure tenants are given accurate and transparent information about the parties to the tenancy, and that did not happen here.
The remaining omissions are more straightforward. The landlord did not provide an insulation statement or a Healthy Homes statement, and I am satisfied these omissions were not inadvertent. The landlord used the Tenancy Services tenancy agreement template, which specifically prompts for this information, and had clearly reviewed the agreement, making additions and striking out particular provisions. I infer the landlord was aware of what the agreement was required to include.
Accordingly, I am satisfied the landlord failed to comply with ss 13A(1)(a), 13A(1A), and 13A(1CA), and committed an unlawful act under s 13A(1F) in each respect.
Under s 109(2), an application for exemplary damages must be made within 12 months of the unlawful act. The tenancy agreement was entered into on or about 5 July 2024, and the application was filed on 14 July 2025 outside that window. The application for exemplary damages in relation to these breaches is therefore out of time, and no award of exemplary damages can be made.

Did the landlord create the commercial lease agreement to evade liability?

The tenant alleges that the landlord breached s 137(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which prohibits a landlord from entering into any transaction for the purpose of directly or indirectly defeating, evading, or preventing the operation of any provision of the Act. Section 137(2) provides that requiring a person to enter into a transaction in breach of s 137(1) is an unlawful act.
The tenant submits that providing the commercial lease agreement was done for that purpose, consistent with the landlord's broader approach throughout the tenancy, promoting ambiguity over who the landlord was, the nature of the tenancy, and the landlord's obligations, and attempting to recharacterise the tenancy from residential to commercial in order to reduce or avoid liability under the Act.
The landlord says the nature of the arrangement had genuinely changed by February 2025: the number of goats on the property had grown from seven to fourteen, and the tenant had also acquired a pig, supporting their assertion that the nature of the arrangement had changed.
I don't accept that submission. Even allowing for the increase in animals, the evidence doesn't support a finding that the tenancy had become commercial. Keeping fourteen goats and a pig on a 4.2-hectare lifestyle property sits comfortably within the tenant's stated intention of pursuing a semi-rural lifestyle and raising animals. He may well have hoped to sell some animals occasionally, or draw some incidental income from them, but that doesn't change the essential nature of the arrangement. The tenant lived at the property as his home, and the animals were part of his use and enjoyment of it, consistent with the lifestyle that drew him to the tenancy in the first place. The growth in the herd didn't change the character of the tenancy in any substantial way and doesn't explain the decision to replace the residential arrangement with a commercial lease.
I accept the tenant's submission, and the chronology matters here. The parties originally entered into a residential tenancy agreement. Although it carried a notation splitting the rent between the house and the rest of the property, I've already found that the arrangement was, in substance, a residential tenancy for the whole property. In January 2025, when the tenant asked for clarity about the tenancy's future and a written agreement, the landlord's initial response was that there was no need for a new document and the parties should "keep it simple and carry on as it is." It was only after the tenant pushed for something formal that a commercial lease appeared.
I infer that the decision to formalise the arrangement as a commercial lease was deliberate. The timing of the document, its departure from the original residential agreement, the absence of any real change in how the tenant occupied the property, and the landlord's later reliance on it in these proceedings all point to it having been introduced to recharacterise the tenancy as commercial and avoid the Act's operation.
It follows that by entering into the commercial lease agreement for that purpose, the landlord breached s 137(1)(b). However, s 137(2) makes it an unlawful act only where a person is required to enter into such a transaction.
While I find the landlord did induce the tenant to sign the commercial agreement in breach of s 137(1), subsection (2) requires that the person be required to enter the arrangement before exemplary damages may be considered. To ‘require’ means the act must be necessary, essential, or compulsory.
To meet that threshold the tenant would need to show they had little or no real choice in entering into the agreement. That was not the case.
In this case, although the landlord presented the commercial lease, I am not satisfied that the tenant was required to enter into it. Rather, it was the tenant seeking a written agreement to provide certainty about the continuation of the tenancy, and the commercial lease was the landlord's response to that request.
While the landlord's purpose in entering into the transaction was to defeat, evade, or prevent the operation of the Act, the tenant was not required to enter into the transaction within the meaning of s 137(2). Accordingly, although the landlord breached s 137(1)(b), that breach does not constitute an unlawful act. It follows, that exemplary damages are not available.

Did the landlord fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

The tenant submits that a bond of $3,400 was paid for the tenancy and was never lodged with the Bond Centre, and seeks exemplary damages of $1,500. The landlord submits that, for the purposes of this breach, the bond should be treated as $2,000, on the basis that the residential tenancy related only to the house, rented at $500 per week. That submission is inconsistent with my findings. I am satisfied the bond paid was $3,400, and that it related to the tenancy of the property as a whole.
The landlord says the bond wasn't lodged because the tenancy was intended to be short-term, because they wanted to see how things progressed with the tenant, and because lodging it was inconvenient. None of these provide any justification for failing to comply with the Act. The failure to lodge the bond is a serious and flagrant breach, and an intentional unlawful act, one that sits towards the higher end of the scale.
I am satisfied that the bond lodgement falls within the 12-month period from the end of the tenancy for exemplary damages, which runs longer for this type of breach under s 109(2)(a)(i).
Taking those matters into account, I consider it appropriate to award exemplary damages of $1,200.
The parties have confirmed the bond of $3400.00 remains with the landlord. This amount must be repaid to the tenant immediately.
The landlord advised a deduction should be made for the rent. I have dealt with rent arrears separately, later in this order. Did the landlord fail in their obligations to meet the Healthy Homes Standards, maintain the premises, and provide the premises in a reasonable state of cleanliness?
The tenant alleges the landlord breached s 45 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 in three respects: failing to provide the premises in a reasonable state of cleanliness at the start of the tenancy(s45(1)(a)), failing to comply with the Healthy Homes Standards(s45(1)(bb)), and failing to adequately maintain the premises during the tenancy (s45(1)(b)). Cleanliness at commencement (s45(1)(a))
The tenant seeks exemplary damages of $7,200 for an alleged breach of s 45(1)(a), which requires a landlord to provide the premises in a reasonable state of cleanliness. He has produced photographs he says were taken at the start of the tenancy, largely close-up images of isolated areas that overlap with evidence relied on for his other claims.
The landlord has produced photographs and video from the same period showing the property in a reasonably clean and tidy state.
I prefer the landlord's evidence. The landlord did not breach s 45(1)(a), and this aspect of the claim is dismissed.
For completeness, I note that the claim is out of time for the exemplary damage award the tenant seeks given the commencement of the tenancy on 5 July 2024. Healthy Homes Standards (s45(1)(bb))
The tenant provided a Healthy Homes assessment dated 14 July 2025, finding the premises non-compliant on heating, ventilation, insulation, draught-stopping, and moisture and drainage. The landlord commissioned their own assessment through Encore Healthy Homes, which also found non-compliance, deficiencies in drainage and guttering, ventilation, draught-stopping, and moisture ingress, though it found the insulation compliant, likely because insulation work was carried out between the two assessments.
The landlord accepts the premises weren't compliant, but says they were unaware of their obligations until the tenant raised the issue. I don't accept that this significantly mitigates the breach. As discussed earlier in this decision, the landlord used the Tenancy Services tenancy agreement template, reviewed it closely enough to make amendments, and that template itself called for Healthy Homes information to be provided. The landlord ought to have known their obligations from the outset. In any case ignorance of the law is not a defence.
I am satisfied the premises were non-compliant when the tenancy began in July 2024 and remained so for a substantial period afterward, the breach ran from the start of the tenancy, not merely from when the tenant raised it. I am satisfied the landlord breached s 45(1)(bb). Failure to maintain (s45(1)(b)).
The tenant also alleges a failure to maintain the premises under s 45(1)(b) in relation to a toilet that he alleges was broken.
The landlord accepts it became loose and needed attention, but they say it was tightened and was fit for use.
The tenant’s account is that his flatmate leaned to one side to reach for toilet paper, the toilet dislodged from the floor entirely, discharged faeces across the bathroom, and left the toilet unusable for the remainder of the tenancy and that he was subsequently so consumed by cleaning that he didn’t think to take a photo. That account is implausible, and inconsistent with both the surrounding evidence and the practical reality of how the occupants continued to live there. The tenant doubled down on this account, saying he had taken to using the toilet at the gym or offsite for the remaining six months of the tenancy, but the landlord pointed out that there was an additional working toilet in the neighbouring shed. Repeated submissions like this one led me to treat the tenant’s uncorroborated evidence with caution.
I accept the landlord’s account. Assessment
The alleged breaches of ss 45(1)(a) and 45(1)(b) are not established on the balance of probabilities and are dismissed.
The breach of s 45(1)(bb), requiring compliance with the Healthy Homes Standards, is established. The property was required to be fully compliant within 120 days of the commencement of the tenancy, giving a compliance date of 2 November 2024.
I accept that the breach of the Healthy Homes Standards was clear and deliberate. As a result, the tenant lived in cold and unpleasant conditions. I also accept that those conditions plausibly contributed to the mould present in the property.
The Healthy Homes Standards are minimum public health and safety obligations imposed under the Residential Tenancies Act 1986. A breach of s 45(1)(bb) is an unlawful act. Exemplary damages are punitive in nature and are intended to mark the Tribunal's disapproval of a landlord's conduct (Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732).
An award of exemplary damages requires that the conduct giving rise to the unlawful act be deliberate. In Birch v Ōtautahi Community Housing Trust CIV-2018-009-002094 [2020] NZDC 17667, applying Chief Executive, ex parte Edmondson v Walls, the Court confirmed that the decision-maker must be satisfied the party turned their mind to the relevant conduct and deliberately carried it out. It is not necessary to establish that the landlord knew the conduct was unlawful; it is sufficient that the acts constituting the breach were intentional.
Taking into account the landlord's deliberate failure to ensure the property complied with the Healthy Homes Standards within the statutory timeframe, the effect of that failure on the tenant's living conditions, and the need to deter landlords from disregarding these minimum standards, I consider an award of exemplary damages of $4,000 to be appropriate.

Did the landlord breach the tenant's quiet enjoyment?

The tenant alleges a breach of quiet enjoyment under s 38(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which entitles a tenant to quiet enjoyment of the premises and prohibits a landlord from interfering with the tenant's reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy. Under s 38(3), such a breach only amounts to an unlawful act where the interference constitutes harassment.
The precise chronology is difficult to pin down, but around April 2025 the tenant's flatmates moved out, leaving him struggling to meet the rent. It was at this point that he began raising compliance issues. Although the tenant says he could no longer live at the property because of the maintenance issues, I find the landlord's account more plausible: that the tenant was at least partly motivated by the loss of his flatmates' contributions and his resulting inability to afford the rent. He and the landlord discussed alternative arrangements, including converting one of the sheds into a residential unit so he could relocate temporarily during renovations at a reduced rent.
As these discussions went on, communications between the parties increased sharply. The tenant became more specific and persistent in demanding repairs, improvements, and compliance with the Act, matters he was entitled to raise, though it is apparent they were also being advanced as part of a broader negotiating strategy. By this stage he was positioning himself for a possible Tribunal application: an arrangement that had run informally was increasingly being measured against the Act's formal requirements, and I infer his insistence on strict compliance was driven as much by a wish to document breaches for a future claim as by a genuine desire for compliance. That is relevant because it contributed to the landlord's difficulty in achieving compliance.
By then the landlord had put themselves in a difficult position, having let premises that weren't compliant with several statutory obligations. Under mounting pressure to address those issues, they responded in an ad hoc, unprofessional manner. Repairs and maintenance were arranged, sometimes with notice and consent and sometimes without. Contractors attended for matters such as insulation and garage door repairs. The exact number and timing of those visits is unclear, but I accept there were occasions when the landlord or contractors attended without proper notice or consent, interfering with the tenant's reasonable peace, comfort, and privacy. To that extent, s 38(1) was breached.
I approach the tenant's evidence on this issue with the same caution applied elsewhere in this decision. Genuine concerns existed, but aspects of his evidence were exaggerated. He told me that a contractor defecated in a paddock. He says that when his dog discovered it, it caused him considerable distress. He accepted he never witnessed any contractor doing this, but inferred it after finding human excrement. Unpleasant as that would be, the property ran to 4.2 hectares and carried a pig, numerous goats, and the tenant's own dogs. As such, the certainty with which he attributed it to a contractor isn't persuasive, and the incredulity with which he narrated the incident was not contagious.
He also alleged the landlord tried to lease part of a shed to someone else during the tenancy. There may have been discussions about using part of the shed, but the evidence shows the person involved was a contractor engaged to repair the shed doors, not a prospective tenant. Nothing supports the claim that the landlord was trying to let part of the property to someone else while it remained tenanted.
I am not satisfied the landlord's conduct amounted to harassment under s 38(3). The evidence doesn't show a pattern intended to intimidate, oppress, or coerce the tenant. Rather, the conduct is better characterised as disorganised, reactive, and unprofessional than as an attempt to harass. Many of the attendances occurred while the landlord was attempting, however imperfectly, to remedy the issues the tenant had raised. That doesn't excuse the failures of notice and consent, but it bears on how the conduct should be characterised.
I therefore find that the landlord breached s 38(1) by interfering with the tenant's reasonable peace, comfort, and privacy, but that this did not amount to harassment under s 38(3). Therefore exemplary damages are not available.

Did the landlord enter the property unlawfully?

The tenant seeks exemplary damages of $1,200 for an alleged breach of s 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, on the basis that the landlord entered the premises without the required notice to carry out repairs and other works. He gave evidence of several occasions where the landlord entered ostensibly to inspect insulation or carry out assessments, but then went on to do repair work, without the notice the Act requires. The landlord's position is that notice was generally given by text message, usually at least 24 hours before entry.
The tenant's evidence on this point is generally vague and lacking in specificity. Even so, viewed as a whole, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that on at least three occasions the landlord entered without complying with the notice requirements in s 48. The landlord frequently relied on text messages sent the day before entry, those may have told the tenant a visit was coming, but they didn't satisfy the statutory notice requirements, which continue to apply even where the purpose of the visit was inspection or Healthy Homes work.
I accept these entries happened while the landlord was trying to remedy defects and work through the growing list of issues the tenant was raising, at a point when the relationship had become increasingly adversarial. That context explains the conduct but doesn't excuse it. The repeated nature of the entries shows the landlord either knew, or ought to have known, what s 48 required.
I am satisfied the landlord intentionally breached s 48 for the purposes of s 109, and that an unlawful act is established.
In assessing the appropriate level of exemplary damages, I have weighed the landlord's intent, the effect of the unlawful act, the tenant's interests, and the public interest. The purpose of the entries wasn't to harass, intimidate, or inconvenience the tenant they were largely directed at repairs, inspections, and remedial work meant to address deficiencies at the property. That places this conduct towards the lower end of the scale for unlawful entry.
I've also considered the impact on the tenant. He alleged that contractors left gates open, letting animals escape, but the evidence on this was vague and didn't establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the landlord or their contractors were responsible. A neighbour reporting an escaped goat doesn't of itself establish that the landlord entered unlawfully. Goats are, by nature, adept at escaping confinement, and this evidence doesn't materially aggravate the breach. As with other aspects of the tenant's case, some of the alleged consequences were overstated. There was a genuine interference with the tenant's rights from the unlawful entries, but its practical impact was relatively limited.
Taking all of this into account, I consider an award of exemplary damages of $400 appropriate. Did the landlord give retaliatory notice or otherwise act to terminate the tenancy without lawful grounds?
The tenant seeks exemplary damages of $5,500 on the basis that the landlord gave retaliatory notice, and a further $6,500 for an alleged breach of s 60AA of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which prohibits a landlord from terminating a tenancy otherwise than in accordance with the Act. He says that between roughly April and July 2025, while he was pressing the landlord to remedy breaches of the Act and bring the premises up to the Healthy Homes Standards, the landlord made comments like "if you're not happy, you can leave" and "if you can't, we will sell the property and then you will have to leave anyway". These comments he says were retaliatory and intended to end the tenancy.
Section 54 applies where a landlord has given notice terminating a tenancy and the tenant alleges it was given in retaliation for asserting or enforcing rights under the Act. Section 60AA prohibits a landlord from terminating, or purporting to terminate, a tenancy except in accordance with the Act. The tenant confirmed the s 60AA claim rested on the same facts as the retaliatory notice claim.
The difficulty with both claims is the same: no notice terminating the tenancy was ever given. I accept that comments broadly along these lines were made they're consistent with the communications between the parties at that stage, when the relationship had deteriorated significantly. Against that background, a comment like "if you're not happy, you can leave" is unsurprising, it reflects frustration and a lack of professionalism.
The tenancy ultimately ended only when the tenant himself gave notice and chose to vacate, the landlord never issued a notice terminating it, nor took any step properly characterised as terminating or purporting to terminate it. Viewed in context, the comments relied on are part of the increasingly adversarial negotiations between the parties: they show frustration and poor communication, but they don't engage the threshold of s 54 or s 60AA.
No breach is established, and both claims are dismissed. Is the landlord entitled to $2,311.50 for the basement door and fence?
The landlord claims $2,311.50 for alleged damage to a basement door and for repairs to a farming fence separating the residential area from the grazing paddocks, producing end-of-tenancy photographs showing scratches and other marks on the door and a section of collapsed fencing.
There's no reliable evidence of the condition of either the door or the fence at the start of the tenancy, and nothing establishing when the damage occurred or linking it to anything the tenant did or failed to do. I also take into account the property's general condition, as discussed elsewhere in this decision, it was aged and carried a number of maintenance and compliance issues, and the state of the door and fence in the photographs is consistent with that broader condition.
The burden rests on the landlord to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the tenant is responsible. The evidence doesn't establish that the damage went beyond fair wear and tear, or that the tenant caused it.
I am not satisfied that the landlord has proven the tenant's liability for either repair. The claim for $2,311.50 is dismissed. Rent arrears
The landlord claims rent arrears of $17,536.29 to 17 November 2025 and a further $5,950 to 5 January 2026, on the basis that the tenancy remained fixed- term until 5 January 2026 and rent continued to accrue until then. Rent claimed beyond 17 November 2025
As addressed earlier in this decision, the commercial lease agreement signed in February 2025 was of no effect, and the tenancy remained a periodic tenancy. The tenant's notice to vacate on 17 November 2025 was therefore valid and brought the tenancy to an end. I also accept the tenant's submission that the parties had mutually agreed the tenancy would end on that date, against which the landlord's position that it remained fixed-term until January 2026 reads as a technical argument at odds with the practical reality of the parties' dealings.
No rent is payable after 17 November 2025, and the landlord's claim for rent beyond that date is dismissed. Was the rent reduced to $400 per week?
The remaining issue is the rent payable between April and November 2025. The rent summary shows the tenant stopped paying the full rent from April 2025, paying $400 per week thereafter until around 10 October 2025, with no rent paid at all between 25 April and 9 May 2025, and payments ceasing altogether as he prepared to vacate.
The landlord says the tenant unilaterally cut the rent from $850 to $400 per week, accepting that the parties discussed the tenant relocating to a shed while the house was renovated, but saying that arrangement never went ahead and $850 remained payable throughout. The tenant says the reduction was agreed, relying on a draft lease dated 9 May 2025 recording $400 per week, and on recorded conversations in which Mingli, albeit in frustration, acknowledges having given a significant rent reduction in response to his concerns about the property's condition.
Weighing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied the reduction to $400 per week was mutually agreed. The draft agreement, the recorded conversations, and the broader negotiations all point to the reduction forming part of the landlord's attempt to resolve an increasingly difficult situation. I find that the agreed rent from around 25 April 2025 onward was $400 per week. Calculating the arrears
No rent was paid between 25 April and 9 May 2025 producing arrears of $800 at the agreed rate. The tenant then stopped paying altogether for the final five weeks and three days of the tenancy, at the same $400 per week rate, which I calculate as $2,171.43 owing for those final 38 days.
Total rent arrears are established at $2,971.43, $800.00 for 25 April to 9 May 2025, and $2,171.43 for the final 38 days of the tenancy. The landlord is awarded $2,971.43 for rent arrears.

Should the tenant receive further compensation?

The tenant seeks a full rent abatement of $41,600.00 on the basis that the tenancy was unlawful. I have already dismissed the claim that the premises were unlawful residential premises under s 78A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, and that finding disposes of the claim to the extent it is advanced on that basis.
In addition, the tenant seeks compensation arising from the various breaches established in this decision, including the Healthy Homes breaches, maintenance issues, interference with quiet enjoyment, and the other matters discussed above.
In deciding whether any further compensatory award should be made, I have regard to the practical reality of the parties' dealings from around April 2025 onwards. As discussed in the rent arrears section, I found that the parties mutually agreed to reduce the rent from $850 to $400 per week. I am satisfied that this substantial reduction was agreed in response to the tenant's concerns about the property's condition, the maintenance issues that had arisen, and the increasingly difficult relationship between the parties.
The landlord claimed rent arrears of $17,536.29; I have awarded only $2,971.43 of that, a difference of $14,564.86.
Furthermore, the practical effect of the rent reduction was that the tenant occupied the property for a substantial period while paying less than half the originally agreed rent. That substantial financial benefit is something I take into account when considering whether any further compensatory award is appropriate.
I am satisfied that the agreed rent reduction more than adequately compensates the tenant for the loss of amenity, inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary consequences of the breaches established in this decision.
While I have taken those breaches into account in determining the various unlawful act claims and exemplary damages awards, I decline to make any further award of compensation for these

Reasons

. Costs

Neither party has been wholly or substantially successful, and each must bear their own filing fee and costs. Suppression
Neither party has been wholly or substantially successful, and there are no special circumstances that give rise to a suppression order as sought by the tenant.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5438621 — Exemplary damages at 81 Grange Street, Warkworth, Warkworth 0982

Tenancy Tribunal case 5438621 — Exemplary damages at 81 Grange Street, Warkworth, Warkworth 0982

Order

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear this claim?

Are these unlawful residential premises?

Did the landlord encourage rent bidding?

Was the tenancy agreement incomplete?

Did the landlord create the commercial lease agreement to evade liability?

Did the landlord fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

Did the landlord breach the tenant's quiet enjoyment?

Did the landlord enter the property unlawfully?

Should the tenant receive further compensation?

Reasons

Property management

Reduce avoidable tribunal risk with proper tenant checks.

Order

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear this claim?

Are these unlawful residential premises?

Did the landlord encourage rent bidding?

Was the tenancy agreement incomplete?

Did the landlord create the commercial lease agreement to evade liability?

Did the landlord fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

Did the landlord breach the tenant's quiet enjoyment?

Did the landlord enter the property unlawfully?

Should the tenant receive further compensation?

Reasons

Property management

Reduce avoidable tribunal risk with proper tenant checks.