What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5443397 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5443397?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5443397?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5443397?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13614767-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5443397 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5443397?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5443397?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5443397?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13614767-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

26 Cedar Terrace, Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa 0932 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5443397 — Rent arrears

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings is lifted. The tenancy has terminated because the tenant failed to pay the full payment due on or before Wednesday 15 April 2026.
Possession is granted to the landlord. The landlord can enforce the termination.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing held today by telephone.
On 11 April 2026 I made a conditional termination order. That order required the tenant to pay the rent when it was due and to file her cross application by a certain date. If the tenant failed to pay rent on time or file her cross application within the time specified, then the tenancy would terminate.
The tenant filed her cross application within the time period specified in the order.
The tenant was required to pay weekly rent of $730.00 on or before each Wednesday commencing on Wednesday 15 April 2026.
The tenant’s rent was not received by the landlord until Thursday 16 April 2026. This meant the tenant had not met the conditions set out in the conditional termination. In addition the rent due the following week, on Wednesday 22 April, was not received by the landlord until Thursday 23 April 2026.
The landlord obtained a warrant to evict the tenant as a result of the late payment of rent due before or on 15 April 2026. The eviction was due to take place at noon on 28 April 2026. The tenant filed a rehearing application on 22 April 2026 and sought a rehearing and a stay of the termination order until such time as the rehearing application was determined.
I granted a stay of proceedings until the rehearing was determined. I did so to protect the position of both parties. The granting of the stay did not predetermine the outcome of the rehearing application.
The tenant disputes that the tenancy should terminate. The tenant does not accept that she has breached the conditional termination order.
Her rehearing application states: I have complied with the substance of the order dated 9th April. I initiated the required rent payment of $730 on Wednesday 15th April, following my pay at 7:00pm. Due to standard interbank processing times beyond my control the bank did not process the transaction until 4:00am on 16 th April. This overnight delay was a technicality and did not cause the landlord any financial prejudice. Furthermore I was never served the possession order dated 11th April and was unaware the tenancy had been terminated until I received the eviction notice on 22nd April. Enforcing in eviction for an overnight bank delay while I have fully complied with my cross-application filing would be a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The tenant reiterated at the hearing that she had processed her rent payments before the time required and that she had no control over the fact that they had been processed the next day, on the Thursday. The law relating to rehearings
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019]

NZDC

Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenants have failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The tenant’s grounds for rehearing questions the Tribunal’s decision to grant a conditional termination order requiring the tenant to pay rent by a due date and time. This is a ground questioning the outcome/ decision of a hearing, not the process. b. The landlord was entitled to a termination order as at the date of the hearing the rent was more than 21 days in arrears. See s56 and 55(1)(a) RTA. It was my decision to make the conditional termination for the reasons given in my order of 11 April 2026. c. The tenancy terminated by operation of law when the tenant did not make the full payment on or before the date stated. d. The tenant was made aware at both the hearing and in my order of 11 April that if rent payments were not paid by the date they fell due then the tenancy would terminate. The 11 April order clarified that rent is considered to be paid when it is received by the landlord, not when it is said to be paid by the tenant 1 . e. Whether the tenancy terminated was therefore within the control of the tenant. Whilst the tenant has argued this is not the case and that by paying late termination is unfair, that was the term the order was made. It was for the tenant to ensure rent was paid before the end of the day on each Wednesday, which means the landlord must have received it before the end of each Wednesday. That was the order regardless of what time the tenant was paid her wages, or when on each Wednesday she made the payment to the landlord. If the tenant did not want her tenancy to end, then she should made sure she made her payments so that they were received on time. f. There is no miscarriage of justice. The law allowed me to make a conditional termination and I did so due to the persistent rent arrears which were more than 21 days in arrears at the date of hearing. The conditional termination order was primarily made to afford the tenant the opportunity of having the issues she raised as a set off to the landlord’s termination application heard and determined. It was fully within the tenant’s control to ensure that the payments were made on time and if they under the tenant’s cross application was heard then the conditional termination would lapse. g. In relation to the possession order, this was served on the tenant as it was in my order of 11 April 2026. Order 6 of that order states: If [The tenant/s] fails to file her cross application or pay rent as set out in order 4. above: a. The tenancy at 26 Cedar Terrace, Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa 0932 will terminate and the landlord will have immediate possession of the premises. that if the tenant fails to file her cross application or pay her rent as set out in order 4 the tenancy will terminate and the landlord will have immediate possession of the premises. 1 See paragraph 20 of the my order dated 11 April 2026.
I do not mean for my decision to sound harsh. However the terms of the conditional termination were clear and the tenant had been made aware of the need to ensure the landlord had received the rent before the end of the day on each Wednesday. The tenant has breached the condition termination order and the landlord is entitled to termination of the tenancy.
For the above reasons I find a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has not occurred or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The application for rehearing is declined. The stay of proceedings is lifted and the landlord is entitled to enforce the order of 11 April 2026.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of proceedings is lifted. The tenancy has terminated because the tenant failed to pay the full payment due on or before Wednesday 15 April 2026.
Possession is granted to the landlord. The landlord can enforce the termination.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing held today by telephone.
On 11 April 2026 I made a conditional termination order. That order required the tenant to pay the rent when it was due and to file her cross application by a certain date. If the tenant failed to pay rent on time or file her cross application within the time specified, then the tenancy would terminate.
The tenant filed her cross application within the time period specified in the order.
The tenant was required to pay weekly rent of $730.00 on or before each Wednesday commencing on Wednesday 15 April 2026.
The tenant’s rent was not received by the landlord until Thursday 16 April 2026. This meant the tenant had not met the conditions set out in the conditional termination. In addition the rent due the following week, on Wednesday 22 April, was not received by the landlord until Thursday 23 April 2026.
The landlord obtained a warrant to evict the tenant as a result of the late payment of rent due before or on 15 April 2026. The eviction was due to take place at noon on 28 April 2026. The tenant filed a rehearing application on 22 April 2026 and sought a rehearing and a stay of the termination order until such time as the rehearing application was determined.
I granted a stay of proceedings until the rehearing was determined. I did so to protect the position of both parties. The granting of the stay did not predetermine the outcome of the rehearing application.
The tenant disputes that the tenancy should terminate. The tenant does not accept that she has breached the conditional termination order.
Her rehearing application states: I have complied with the substance of the order dated 9th April. I initiated the required rent payment of $730 on Wednesday 15th April, following my pay at 7:00pm. Due to standard interbank processing times beyond my control the bank did not process the transaction until 4:00am on 16 th April. This overnight delay was a technicality and did not cause the landlord any financial prejudice. Furthermore I was never served the possession order dated 11th April and was unaware the tenancy had been terminated until I received the eviction notice on 22nd April. Enforcing in eviction for an overnight bank delay while I have fully complied with my cross-application filing would be a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The tenant reiterated at the hearing that she had processed her rent payments before the time required and that she had no control over the fact that they had been processed the next day, on the Thursday. The law relating to rehearings
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.
The applicant need not establish an actual miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, only that it may have occurred. However, in the District Court judgment of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, Judge Tuohy held that the statutory language set a high standard, and that: [18] ... They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. [19] In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. [20] Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal any decision twice: once to the very Tribunal which made it by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does that offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.
As noted by Judge Christiansen in the District Court appeal of Loh v Puri [2019]

NZDC

Rehearings are about challenges to processes and procedures and are not about what the adjudicator found or the decisions the adjudicator made.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenants have failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing. a. The tenant’s grounds for rehearing questions the Tribunal’s decision to grant a conditional termination order requiring the tenant to pay rent by a due date and time. This is a ground questioning the outcome/ decision of a hearing, not the process. b. The landlord was entitled to a termination order as at the date of the hearing the rent was more than 21 days in arrears. See s56 and 55(1)(a) RTA. It was my decision to make the conditional termination for the reasons given in my order of 11 April 2026. c. The tenancy terminated by operation of law when the tenant did not make the full payment on or before the date stated. d. The tenant was made aware at both the hearing and in my order of 11 April that if rent payments were not paid by the date they fell due then the tenancy would terminate. The 11 April order clarified that rent is considered to be paid when it is received by the landlord, not when it is said to be paid by the tenant 1 . e. Whether the tenancy terminated was therefore within the control of the tenant. Whilst the tenant has argued this is not the case and that by paying late termination is unfair, that was the term the order was made. It was for the tenant to ensure rent was paid before the end of the day on each Wednesday, which means the landlord must have received it before the end of each Wednesday. That was the order regardless of what time the tenant was paid her wages, or when on each Wednesday she made the payment to the landlord. If the tenant did not want her tenancy to end, then she should made sure she made her payments so that they were received on time. f. There is no miscarriage of justice. The law allowed me to make a conditional termination and I did so due to the persistent rent arrears which were more than 21 days in arrears at the date of hearing. The conditional termination order was primarily made to afford the tenant the opportunity of having the issues she raised as a set off to the landlord’s termination application heard and determined. It was fully within the tenant’s control to ensure that the payments were made on time and if they under the tenant’s cross application was heard then the conditional termination would lapse. g. In relation to the possession order, this was served on the tenant as it was in my order of 11 April 2026. Order 6 of that order states: If [The tenant/s] fails to file her cross application or pay rent as set out in order 4. above: a. The tenancy at 26 Cedar Terrace, Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa 0932 will terminate and the landlord will have immediate possession of the premises. that if the tenant fails to file her cross application or pay her rent as set out in order 4 the tenancy will terminate and the landlord will have immediate possession of the premises. 1 See paragraph 20 of the my order dated 11 April 2026.
I do not mean for my decision to sound harsh. However the terms of the conditional termination were clear and the tenant had been made aware of the need to ensure the landlord had received the rent before the end of the day on each Wednesday. The tenant has breached the condition termination order and the landlord is entitled to termination of the tenancy.
For the above reasons I find a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has not occurred or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The application for rehearing is declined. The stay of proceedings is lifted and the landlord is entitled to enforce the order of 11 April 2026.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5443397 — Rent arrears at 26 Cedar Terrace, Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa 0932

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5443397 — Rent arrears at 26 Cedar Terrace, Stanmore Bay, Whangaparaoa 0932

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

NZDC

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

NZDC

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions