What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5444835 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5444835?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5444835?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5444835?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13838251-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5444835 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5444835?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5444835?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5444835?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13838251-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5444835 — Tenancy dispute

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay is lifted on the Order of the Tribunal dated 14 May 2026 and it remains in full force and effect.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing.
Unfortunately, the tenant was unable to attend but provided written submissions.
On 14/5/2026 the Tribunal made an order for the tenant to pay compensation to the landlord of $347.90 after deduction of the bond.
The tenant applied on 21/5/2026 for a rehearing on the following grounds: a. The asbestos investiagion of garage contents remains unresolved, b. Garage access and property works may have contributed to deterioration and contamination, c. Quiet enjoyment was breached, due to the landlord’s father, d. The neighbour cannot be regarded as an independent witness due to his attendance at the property, e. The kitchen benchtop did not comply with manufacturer’s specifications, f. Keys were returned.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible, and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the tenant disagrees with the decision and now wishes to engage in the Tribunal process is not a ground for a rehearing, b. The landlord provided significant evidence, which the tenant had been provided copies of before the hearing, c. While the tenant has now provided an email from a third party and technical data about Laminex, there is no suggestion that these could not have been available at the hearing. d. I consider there is nothing in the information provided by the tenant which may have changed the outcome, in particular the reasons were made clear at the hearing why only the mattress was tested for asbestos. e. If the tenant wishes to make a claim for breach of his quiet enjoyment, then he needs to file an application because the issue cannot be ‘tagged onto’ the landlord’s claim, without notice or agreement, f. It is for the Adjudicator to determine the weight to be given to the evidence of any witnesses and an unsigned email received half an hour before a hearing about the suitability of formica for splashbacks lacks a certain amount of credibility, g. The tenant provided no evidence to support that the keys were left in the premises.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred which justifies a rehearing.
A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. If the tenant is dissatisfied with the decision, then the appropriate course of action would be for him to appeal the decision.
For the avoidance of doubt the Order of the Tribunal dated 14 May 2026 remains in full force and effect.
Suppression is granted to the landlord pursuant to section 95A to remain consistent with the previous Order.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord name and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay is lifted on the Order of the Tribunal dated 14 May 2026 and it remains in full force and effect.

Reasons

The landlord attended the hearing.
Unfortunately, the tenant was unable to attend but provided written submissions.
On 14/5/2026 the Tribunal made an order for the tenant to pay compensation to the landlord of $347.90 after deduction of the bond.
The tenant applied on 21/5/2026 for a rehearing on the following grounds: a. The asbestos investiagion of garage contents remains unresolved, b. Garage access and property works may have contributed to deterioration and contamination, c. Quiet enjoyment was breached, due to the landlord’s father, d. The neighbour cannot be regarded as an independent witness due to his attendance at the property, e. The kitchen benchtop did not comply with manufacturer’s specifications, f. Keys were returned.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
In the District Court judgement of Wellington City Council v McMillan [2003] DCR 50, His Honour Judge Touhy confirmed that the words “substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice”, set a high standard, stating: “They most obviously apply ... to cases of procedural error eg. a hearing which takes place in the absence of a party who has not been given notice of it; the improper admission or rejection of evidence; misconduct by the adjudicator or by one of the parties or a witness. The words may also encompass the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available. ... In my view, however, the words do not cover a complaint that the Tribunal was merely mistaken or wrong in its findings of fact or in its application of the law. There are two reasons for this. First the strength of the language in s 105 is such that something more than a mere wrong decision must be shown. The section does not speak of a decision being wrong, but of a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurring. This implies obvious injustice, not merely an erroneous decision. Secondly, if a mere erroneous decision is enough, whether the error is factual or legal or both, it would enable parties to in effect appeal by way of an application for rehearing, and then again to the District Court against the grant or refusal of the application for rehearing. Not only does this offend the general hierarchical nature of the appeal system, it would also make the time limit for filing notice of appeal against an original decision nugatory.”
The High Court in Angelo v Lehr [2022] NZHC 3033 confirmed that it was not a miscarriage of justice to decline a rehearing just because evidence was not considered at the original hearing, when that evidence could have been produced at the original hearing.
A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing if it could have affected the outcome. In Jemma Trust v Rutherford (DC North Shore, CIV-2009-044-2056, 11 December 1999), the District Court quoted an extract from the Court of Appeal outlining the relevant considerations: The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite party is on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as is possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible, and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial....While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing, or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing: a. The fact that the tenant disagrees with the decision and now wishes to engage in the Tribunal process is not a ground for a rehearing, b. The landlord provided significant evidence, which the tenant had been provided copies of before the hearing, c. While the tenant has now provided an email from a third party and technical data about Laminex, there is no suggestion that these could not have been available at the hearing. d. I consider there is nothing in the information provided by the tenant which may have changed the outcome, in particular the reasons were made clear at the hearing why only the mattress was tested for asbestos. e. If the tenant wishes to make a claim for breach of his quiet enjoyment, then he needs to file an application because the issue cannot be ‘tagged onto’ the landlord’s claim, without notice or agreement, f. It is for the Adjudicator to determine the weight to be given to the evidence of any witnesses and an unsigned email received half an hour before a hearing about the suitability of formica for splashbacks lacks a certain amount of credibility, g. The tenant provided no evidence to support that the keys were left in the premises.
I consider no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred which justifies a rehearing.
A rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. If the tenant is dissatisfied with the decision, then the appropriate course of action would be for him to appeal the decision.
For the avoidance of doubt the Order of the Tribunal dated 14 May 2026 remains in full force and effect.
Suppression is granted to the landlord pursuant to section 95A to remain consistent with the previous Order.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5444835 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5444835 — Tenancy dispute

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions