What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5506569 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders suppression of the parties’ names and identifying details.

How much money was awarded in case 5506569?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5506569?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5506569?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13869312-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5506569 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders suppression of the parties’ names and identifying details.

How much money was awarded in case 5506569?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5506569?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5506569?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13869312-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

88A Linton Street, West End, Palmerston North 4410 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5506569 — Tenancy dispute

Order

The Tribunal orders suppression of the parties’ names and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s Order is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On 15 June 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application to have the landlord’s termination notice declared retaliatory under section 54 Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA).
On 22 June 2026 the tenant applied for a rehearing on the following grounds that: a. She “was disadvantaged by not having an in-person hearing and I believe it materially impacted the decision that adjudicator came to... Particularly given the fact that I could not adequately listen and communicate throughout the duration of the remote hearing, restricting the efficacy of my participation”. b. She has “new evidence that supports my legal position” being an email from the local council dated 17 June 2026 that states “A Council Compliance Officer visited the property last year and did not identify any health or safety concerns associated with the existing shed. The property owner was subsequently advised that the Council records do not show approval for the conversion of the building into multiple flats.” (the Council email). She claims that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the hearing. c. The landlord did not give any reasons for issuing the termination notice when they did, despite the tenant having lived in the premises for over nine years. d. The Adjudicator was wrong in her conclusion based on the evidence presented at the hearing.
Section 105(1) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
At the tenant’s request, the Adjudicator telephoned the tenant on her landline so that the tenant could participate. The fact that the tenant retains a landline suggests that she is able to use it without difficulty. The tenant advised that she used the landline to talk to family and friends with whose voice she is familiar. However, having watched and listened to the video and audio recording of the hearing, there is nothing in the tenant’s participation to indicate that she was unable to hear or contribute to the hearing. She was repeatedly given opportunities to respond to the landlord’s submissions and to make further submissions of her own. She could have complained during the hearing and asked for an adjournment to an in-person hearing but did not do so.
The tenant’s medical evidence regarding her hearing issues was dated 27 October 2010 and states that tests indicated “normal hearing on the right, and moderate to severe conductive loss in the left ear”. At the hearing, the tenant stated that a recent opinion was that she had 75% hearing in her right ear and no hearing in her left ear. No medical evidence was produced in support of this.
The tenant had received the Notice of Hearing more than three weeks before the hearing date. It clearly states that the hearing’s mode was a video hearing. She had adequate time within which to object to the mode and ask for an in- person hearing. She did not do so. Her evidence shows that she has suffered from hearing difficulties for at least 15-years. With such a longstanding issue, it would be reasonable for the tenant have drawn this to the Tribunal’s attention and requested an in-person hearing in her application or, at the latest, when she received the Notice of Hearing.
There is a risk of an injustice if the Tribunal makes a decision without having regard to relevant evidence. However, there is also a duty on all parties to present all relevant evidence at the date of the hearing. The Tribunal will not grant a re-hearing simply because a party has “additional” evidence (of which there is a potentially limitless supply) but will consider a rehearing if a party has “new” evidence, meaning evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the original hearing.
The new evidence was received by the tenant after the hearing on 12 June 2026, after the Tribunal’s Order had been issued on 15 June 2026. The tenant’s explanation for the delay in its production is that she had been unwell and been unable to follow up the council after its inspection on 7 July 2025.
In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190, the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: “The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency”.
The Tribunal is not persuaded that the evidence the tenant wishes to produce could not have been made available with reasonable diligence for the original hearing, nor are the circumstances exceptional nor the grounds compelling. Nor is the new evidence regarding council approval cogent. It raises an issue that has arisen after the hearing and that was not raised by the tenant with the landlord before the termination notice was issued. It was not therefore a right the tenant was exercising at the time the notice was given and so cannot have motivated the landlord in any way to issue the termination notice.
The claim that the landlord did not give any reasons for issuing the termination notice is not ground for a rehearing. It is a claim that the Adjudicator’s decision was flawed. That the Adjudicator was wrong in her conclusion based on the evidence presented at the hearing is a ground for an appeal to the District Court. It is not a ground for granting a rehearing.
The standard set for a rehearing is a high one. Being unhappy with the decision and finding it unfair do not establish grounds for a rehearing. There was no procedural error in this case: the parties were notified of the hearing, they attended the hearing and they both participated without objection. That the tenant does not accept the result is not a ground for a rehearing. No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The tenant’s application is dismissed.
Because the Adjudicator at the first hearing granted name suppression to both parties, this order is to be suppressed also.

Order

The Tribunal orders suppression of the parties’ names and identifying details.
The application for rehearing is dismissed.
The stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s Order is lifted.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On 15 June 2026 the Tribunal made an order dismissing the tenant’s application to have the landlord’s termination notice declared retaliatory under section 54 Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA).
On 22 June 2026 the tenant applied for a rehearing on the following grounds that: a. She “was disadvantaged by not having an in-person hearing and I believe it materially impacted the decision that adjudicator came to... Particularly given the fact that I could not adequately listen and communicate throughout the duration of the remote hearing, restricting the efficacy of my participation”. b. She has “new evidence that supports my legal position” being an email from the local council dated 17 June 2026 that states “A Council Compliance Officer visited the property last year and did not identify any health or safety concerns associated with the existing shed. The property owner was subsequently advised that the Council records do not show approval for the conversion of the building into multiple flats.” (the Council email). She claims that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the hearing. c. The landlord did not give any reasons for issuing the termination notice when they did, despite the tenant having lived in the premises for over nine years. d. The Adjudicator was wrong in her conclusion based on the evidence presented at the hearing.
Section 105(1) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually, the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons the tenant has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
At the tenant’s request, the Adjudicator telephoned the tenant on her landline so that the tenant could participate. The fact that the tenant retains a landline suggests that she is able to use it without difficulty. The tenant advised that she used the landline to talk to family and friends with whose voice she is familiar. However, having watched and listened to the video and audio recording of the hearing, there is nothing in the tenant’s participation to indicate that she was unable to hear or contribute to the hearing. She was repeatedly given opportunities to respond to the landlord’s submissions and to make further submissions of her own. She could have complained during the hearing and asked for an adjournment to an in-person hearing but did not do so.
The tenant’s medical evidence regarding her hearing issues was dated 27 October 2010 and states that tests indicated “normal hearing on the right, and moderate to severe conductive loss in the left ear”. At the hearing, the tenant stated that a recent opinion was that she had 75% hearing in her right ear and no hearing in her left ear. No medical evidence was produced in support of this.
The tenant had received the Notice of Hearing more than three weeks before the hearing date. It clearly states that the hearing’s mode was a video hearing. She had adequate time within which to object to the mode and ask for an in- person hearing. She did not do so. Her evidence shows that she has suffered from hearing difficulties for at least 15-years. With such a longstanding issue, it would be reasonable for the tenant have drawn this to the Tribunal’s attention and requested an in-person hearing in her application or, at the latest, when she received the Notice of Hearing.
There is a risk of an injustice if the Tribunal makes a decision without having regard to relevant evidence. However, there is also a duty on all parties to present all relevant evidence at the date of the hearing. The Tribunal will not grant a re-hearing simply because a party has “additional” evidence (of which there is a potentially limitless supply) but will consider a rehearing if a party has “new” evidence, meaning evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the original hearing.
The new evidence was received by the tenant after the hearing on 12 June 2026, after the Tribunal’s Order had been issued on 15 June 2026. The tenant’s explanation for the delay in its production is that she had been unwell and been unable to follow up the council after its inspection on 7 July 2025.
In Rae v International Insurance Brokers (Nelson Marlborough) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 190, the Court of Appeal set out relevant considerations regarding further evidence: “The principles upon which further evidence is admitted are designed to balance the interests of the person seeking to adduce such evidence on the one hand with the interests of the opposite parties on the other. They are also designed to reflect the public interest in ensuring, so far as possible, that parties put up their best case at trial. Any other approach would be very wasteful of public resources. The conventional requirements are that the further evidence must be fresh, it must be credible and it must be cogent. Evidence is not regarded as fresh if it could with reasonable diligence have been produced at the trial...While the absence of freshness is not an absolute disqualification, the criteria for admission in such circumstances must be very strict. In our view, when the evidence is not fresh it should not be admitted unless the circumstances are exceptional and the grounds compelling. In addition, it will need to pass the tests of credibility and cogency”.
The Tribunal is not persuaded that the evidence the tenant wishes to produce could not have been made available with reasonable diligence for the original hearing, nor are the circumstances exceptional nor the grounds compelling. Nor is the new evidence regarding council approval cogent. It raises an issue that has arisen after the hearing and that was not raised by the tenant with the landlord before the termination notice was issued. It was not therefore a right the tenant was exercising at the time the notice was given and so cannot have motivated the landlord in any way to issue the termination notice.
The claim that the landlord did not give any reasons for issuing the termination notice is not ground for a rehearing. It is a claim that the Adjudicator’s decision was flawed. That the Adjudicator was wrong in her conclusion based on the evidence presented at the hearing is a ground for an appeal to the District Court. It is not a ground for granting a rehearing.
The standard set for a rehearing is a high one. Being unhappy with the decision and finding it unfair do not establish grounds for a rehearing. There was no procedural error in this case: the parties were notified of the hearing, they attended the hearing and they both participated without objection. That the tenant does not accept the result is not a ground for a rehearing. No substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur.
The tenant’s application is dismissed.
Because the Adjudicator at the first hearing granted name suppression to both parties, this order is to be suppressed also.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5506569 — Tenancy dispute at 88A Linton Street, West End, Palmerston North 4410

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5506569 — Tenancy dispute at 88A Linton Street, West End, Palmerston North 4410

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Frequently asked questions