What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5521932 about?

The tribunal order states: [The tenant/s] tenant/s] must vacate 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua and give

How much money was awarded in case 5521932?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5521932?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5521932?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/14023992-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5521932 about?

The tribunal order states: [The tenant/s] tenant/s] must vacate 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua and give

How much money was awarded in case 5521932?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5521932?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5521932?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/14023992-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua 3115 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5521932 — Unit Titles

Order

[The tenant/s] tenant/s] must vacate 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua and give vacant possession to the Applicants by 5.00pm on Thursday, 27 August 2026.
[The tenant/s] tenant/s] must pay the Applicants $4,027.00, comprising: a. $4,000.00 as a contribution towards legal costs; and b. $28.00 filing fee.

Reasons

The application concerns possession of 289 Sunset Road, Rotorua. The Respondent is a child of the late Te Aomarama Kameta (Te Aomarama).
Before Te Aomarama’s death the Respondent was permitted to live at the property. The Applicants and the Respondent are siblings.
Te Aomarama died intestate on 28 September 2023. Administration of the estate was granted on 6 March 2026. The current Record of Title, searched on 27 July 2026, records Karena Huirangi Markel and [The tenant/s] landlord/s] as Administrators as the registered owners of the fee simple estate.
There had been discussions within the family about the Respondent leaving for some time. The evidence records that in July and August 2025 the Respondent said that she and her family intended to move out at an undefined later date.
On 22 March 2026 she proposed making payments in order to remain. That proposal was declined and she was told that legal steps would be taken to recover possession.
A formal notice to vacate was given on 30 March 2026 requiring the Respondent to leave by 14 April 2026. On 14 April 2026 the Respondent provided evidence that she had engaged with Te Pokapu for housing support. A transitional housing profile had been created and a referral made to MSD. A social housing assessment was also being arranged.
On 3 May 2026 the Respondent again told family members that she and her family would be moving out within a few weeks and that she would return the key through the lawyers. Possession was not returned and proceedings followed.
Both parties attended the hearing on 6 August 2026. The Respondent explained she was a child of the deceased. She did not, however, advance a legal basis entitling her to continue occupying the property. She accepted that she would have to leave but that she needed more time. Her position was that she required further time to obtain alternative accommodation. Are the Applicants entitled to a possession order under s 65 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and, if so, when should possession be given? A further issue is whether an award of costs should be made.
Section 65(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies on the application of a person entitled to possession of residential premises where another person is in possession as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to a right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to grant that right. If satisfied of those matters, the Tribunal must make a possession order.
Section 65(3) confirms jurisdiction exists even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Under s 24 of the Administration Act 1969, upon the grant of administration the unadministered estate of the deceased vests in the administrator.
Section 27 gives an administrator power to sell real estate on an intestacy. Sections 29 and 30 provide that the administrator represents the deceased’s real estate and the persons interested in it and has the corresponding rights and duties in respect of that real estate.
Section 102(1) generally prevents the Tribunal from awarding costs except in the circumstances specified in that section. Under s 102(2)(b), the Tribunal has a discretion to award costs where any party is represented by counsel. Under s 102(3)(b), the order may be for the reasonable costs of the other party in connection with the proceedings. If the applicant is wholly successful, s 102(4)(a) requires the respondent to reimburse the filing fee.
The leading authority concerning a reasonable contribution to actual legal costs is Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd. 1 The judgment emphasises that the amount is a “reasonable contribution”, rather than full indemnity, and identifies a middle range of “40% to 70%” of reasonable actual costs as providing useful guidance.
Holden also emphasises the broader principle behind a costs award. McGechan J observed that “Court time is a valuable public resource” and that there should be disincentives to unnecessary proceedings and inefficient litigation. Relevant considerations commonly include the length of the hearing, the amount at stake, legal and factual complexity, whether arguments lacking substance were advanced, and the degree of success achieved.
Recent Tribunal decisions suggest a contribution around 50 per cent may be appropriate where the successful party reasonably incurred legal costs.
In Toomey v Body Corporate 561437, actual legal costs were $33,085.97 and the Tribunal considered a claim for 50 per cent to be reasonable. 2 Similarly, in Luxon Properties Ltd v Body Corporate, the Tribunal adjusted the reasonable actual costs before awarding 50 per cent, noting that the resulting award was about 44 per cent of the costs actually incurred and within the Holden range. 3 Possession
I inspected the Record of Title. The Applicants are the registered owners of the property in their capacity as Administrators. That registered position is consistent with the statutory vesting of the deceased's estate in the administrators. I am satisfied that they are persons entitled to possession for the purposes of s 65.
The Respondent is a child of the deceased and may have an interest in the ultimate distribution of the estate. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Tribunal to determine that entitlement in these proceedings. The question under s 65 is whether she had a subsisting right to occupy the property.
Nor is it necessary to determine the precise legal character of the Respondent’s historical occupation. Her mother permitted her to live at the property. The hearing did not examine whether that arrangement amounted to a licence, tenancy, or some other familial arrangement or interest. I make no finding on that issue. 1 Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd (1996) 7 NZCLC 260,976; [1997] 3 NZLR 143 (HC), McGechan J, at 149. 2 Toomey v Body Corporate 561437 [2026] NZTT 9061604 at [18]-[20]. 3 Luxon Properties Ltd v Body Corporate 398644 [2026] NZTT 9052824 at [11]-[15].
At the time of the hearing, the Applicants had established their legal title and entitlement to possession. The Respondent did not identify any subsisting contractual, proprietary, or other legal (or equitable) right entitling her to remain. Being a child of the deceased did not, without more, establish such a right. Plainly, the Respondent accepted that she had to leave but sought further time.
That was consistent with the documentary evidence. The Respondent had on several occasions indicated that she intended to leave, including on 3 May 2026 when she said that she would move within a few weeks. Her engagement with housing support from April 2026 was also consistent with her seeking alternative accommodation.
I am satisfied that the Applicants are entitled to possession.
The Respondent sought time to relocate. Having heard the parties as to timing, I consider it appropriate that possession take effect at 5.00 pm on Thursday, 27 August 2026. Costs
An award is appropriate. The Applicants had sought possession without Tribunal proceedings. There had been repeated requests and discussions, followed by formal notice, and further legal steps. The Respondent had on several occasions indicated that she would leave, but possession was not returned.
Ultimately the Applicants were required to commence proceedings and obtain a possession order.
I am also satisfied that legal representation was reasonably required. Counsel's submissions record that advice was required as to the lawful means of obtaining possession and that attempts had been made to resolve the position before the Tribunal application was brought.
There are, however, reasons not to award costs toward the upper end of the Holden range. The hearing did not require determination of the potentially more difficult questions concerning the original nature of the Respondent’s occupation or any claimed equitable interest. The Respondent did not advance a substantive legal case for a continuing entitlement to possession. Her principal concern at the hearing was obtaining sufficient time to leave. I also make no finding that her conduct at the hearing was improper or that costs should be punitive.
Standing back, I consider $4,000 to be a reasonable contribution to the Applicants' legal costs. It represents approximately one half of the amount claimed and is consistent with the approach in Holden and the Tribunal decisions referred to above.

Order

[The tenant/s] tenant/s] must vacate 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua and give vacant possession to the Applicants by 5.00pm on Thursday, 27 August 2026.
[The tenant/s] tenant/s] must pay the Applicants $4,027.00, comprising: a. $4,000.00 as a contribution towards legal costs; and b. $28.00 filing fee.

Reasons

The application concerns possession of 289 Sunset Road, Rotorua. The Respondent is a child of the late Te Aomarama Kameta (Te Aomarama).
Before Te Aomarama’s death the Respondent was permitted to live at the property. The Applicants and the Respondent are siblings.
Te Aomarama died intestate on 28 September 2023. Administration of the estate was granted on 6 March 2026. The current Record of Title, searched on 27 July 2026, records Karena Huirangi Markel and [The tenant/s] landlord/s] as Administrators as the registered owners of the fee simple estate.
There had been discussions within the family about the Respondent leaving for some time. The evidence records that in July and August 2025 the Respondent said that she and her family intended to move out at an undefined later date.
On 22 March 2026 she proposed making payments in order to remain. That proposal was declined and she was told that legal steps would be taken to recover possession.
A formal notice to vacate was given on 30 March 2026 requiring the Respondent to leave by 14 April 2026. On 14 April 2026 the Respondent provided evidence that she had engaged with Te Pokapu for housing support. A transitional housing profile had been created and a referral made to MSD. A social housing assessment was also being arranged.
On 3 May 2026 the Respondent again told family members that she and her family would be moving out within a few weeks and that she would return the key through the lawyers. Possession was not returned and proceedings followed.
Both parties attended the hearing on 6 August 2026. The Respondent explained she was a child of the deceased. She did not, however, advance a legal basis entitling her to continue occupying the property. She accepted that she would have to leave but that she needed more time. Her position was that she required further time to obtain alternative accommodation. Are the Applicants entitled to a possession order under s 65 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and, if so, when should possession be given? A further issue is whether an award of costs should be made.
Section 65(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies on the application of a person entitled to possession of residential premises where another person is in possession as a squatter or trespasser, or otherwise than pursuant to a right of occupation granted by a person having lawful authority to grant that right. If satisfied of those matters, the Tribunal must make a possession order.
Section 65(3) confirms jurisdiction exists even though the premises are not subject to a tenancy agreement.
Under s 24 of the Administration Act 1969, upon the grant of administration the unadministered estate of the deceased vests in the administrator.
Section 27 gives an administrator power to sell real estate on an intestacy. Sections 29 and 30 provide that the administrator represents the deceased’s real estate and the persons interested in it and has the corresponding rights and duties in respect of that real estate.
Section 102(1) generally prevents the Tribunal from awarding costs except in the circumstances specified in that section. Under s 102(2)(b), the Tribunal has a discretion to award costs where any party is represented by counsel. Under s 102(3)(b), the order may be for the reasonable costs of the other party in connection with the proceedings. If the applicant is wholly successful, s 102(4)(a) requires the respondent to reimburse the filing fee.
The leading authority concerning a reasonable contribution to actual legal costs is Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd. 1 The judgment emphasises that the amount is a “reasonable contribution”, rather than full indemnity, and identifies a middle range of “40% to 70%” of reasonable actual costs as providing useful guidance.
Holden also emphasises the broader principle behind a costs award. McGechan J observed that “Court time is a valuable public resource” and that there should be disincentives to unnecessary proceedings and inefficient litigation. Relevant considerations commonly include the length of the hearing, the amount at stake, legal and factual complexity, whether arguments lacking substance were advanced, and the degree of success achieved.
Recent Tribunal decisions suggest a contribution around 50 per cent may be appropriate where the successful party reasonably incurred legal costs.
In Toomey v Body Corporate 561437, actual legal costs were $33,085.97 and the Tribunal considered a claim for 50 per cent to be reasonable. 2 Similarly, in Luxon Properties Ltd v Body Corporate, the Tribunal adjusted the reasonable actual costs before awarding 50 per cent, noting that the resulting award was about 44 per cent of the costs actually incurred and within the Holden range. 3 Possession
I inspected the Record of Title. The Applicants are the registered owners of the property in their capacity as Administrators. That registered position is consistent with the statutory vesting of the deceased's estate in the administrators. I am satisfied that they are persons entitled to possession for the purposes of s 65.
The Respondent is a child of the deceased and may have an interest in the ultimate distribution of the estate. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Tribunal to determine that entitlement in these proceedings. The question under s 65 is whether she had a subsisting right to occupy the property.
Nor is it necessary to determine the precise legal character of the Respondent’s historical occupation. Her mother permitted her to live at the property. The hearing did not examine whether that arrangement amounted to a licence, tenancy, or some other familial arrangement or interest. I make no finding on that issue. 1 Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd (1996) 7 NZCLC 260,976; [1997] 3 NZLR 143 (HC), McGechan J, at 149. 2 Toomey v Body Corporate 561437 [2026] NZTT 9061604 at [18]-[20]. 3 Luxon Properties Ltd v Body Corporate 398644 [2026] NZTT 9052824 at [11]-[15].
At the time of the hearing, the Applicants had established their legal title and entitlement to possession. The Respondent did not identify any subsisting contractual, proprietary, or other legal (or equitable) right entitling her to remain. Being a child of the deceased did not, without more, establish such a right. Plainly, the Respondent accepted that she had to leave but sought further time.
That was consistent with the documentary evidence. The Respondent had on several occasions indicated that she intended to leave, including on 3 May 2026 when she said that she would move within a few weeks. Her engagement with housing support from April 2026 was also consistent with her seeking alternative accommodation.
I am satisfied that the Applicants are entitled to possession.
The Respondent sought time to relocate. Having heard the parties as to timing, I consider it appropriate that possession take effect at 5.00 pm on Thursday, 27 August 2026. Costs
An award is appropriate. The Applicants had sought possession without Tribunal proceedings. There had been repeated requests and discussions, followed by formal notice, and further legal steps. The Respondent had on several occasions indicated that she would leave, but possession was not returned.
Ultimately the Applicants were required to commence proceedings and obtain a possession order.
I am also satisfied that legal representation was reasonably required. Counsel's submissions record that advice was required as to the lawful means of obtaining possession and that attempts had been made to resolve the position before the Tribunal application was brought.
There are, however, reasons not to award costs toward the upper end of the Holden range. The hearing did not require determination of the potentially more difficult questions concerning the original nature of the Respondent’s occupation or any claimed equitable interest. The Respondent did not advance a substantive legal case for a continuing entitlement to possession. Her principal concern at the hearing was obtaining sufficient time to leave. I also make no finding that her conduct at the hearing was improper or that costs should be punitive.
Standing back, I consider $4,000 to be a reasonable contribution to the Applicants' legal costs. It represents approximately one half of the amount claimed and is consistent with the approach in Holden and the Tribunal decisions referred to above.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5521932 — Unit Titles at 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua 3115

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5521932 — Unit Titles at 289 Sunset Road, Sunnybrook, Rotorua 3115

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Reduce avoidable tribunal risk with proper tenant checks.

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Reduce avoidable tribunal risk with proper tenant checks.