What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9036726?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9036726?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9036726?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9036726?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/9152263-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 9036726?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9036726?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9036726?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9036726?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/9152263-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

newlynn, auckland Tenancy Tribunal Case 9036726 — Unit Titles

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Only the unit owner attended the hearing on 6 July 2023 to consider the rehearing application. The body corporate filed written submissions ahead of the hearing.
On 23 May 2023, I made an order dismissing the unit owner’s claim for reimbursement of towing charges and consequential loss.
The unit owner applied for a rehearing on grounds that the Tribunal was wrong have ignored his evidence that he has duly complied with the parking rules by leaving the area between 8.30 to 10.30am on 1 June 2022
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. See section 171 Unit Titles Act 2010; section 96(4) Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons, the unit owner has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
The unit owner merely reiterated that they saw a sign on the parking space about 96 hours maximum allowable parking and has duly moved the car between 830am to 1030am within the 96 hours parking period. The unit owner maintained his conclusion that he had complied with car parking rules in the unit title common parking area.
The unit owner’s understanding is that as long as he vacates within 96 hours, he is in the right. He insists that he has proof and has provided proof of his absence from the car park for 2 hours.
The unit owner’s assertions however do not affect the original outcome of the hearing. Those defences have been argued at the initial hearing. No new evidence has been provided.
I have already accepted the unit owner’s evidence that he had temporarily moved his car away for 2 hours within the 96 hours period in question.
The material reasons for finding against the unit owner have been summarised in my original decision as follows: i. I find however that the applicant has, in substance, breached Rule 7 of the body corporate rules on several fronts. ii. Rule 7(f) that stipulates a maximum 4 days of consecutive car parking is not the sole and operative provision that governs the unit owners’ use of the residents’ car park. iii. A fair use policy applies as each owner is entitled to 1/97th share of the common area car parks but there is insufficient car park space for all unit owners’ use of the residents’ car park at any one time. Rule 7(f) provides that slots at the residents’ car park are not to be used for permanent parking and Rule 7(k) specifically prohibits “shepherding”, ie., residents from the same house or unit are not to reserve common area car parks. iv. I consider the applicant to have breached collective and substantive body corporate rules prohibiting shepherding and use of the residents’ car park for permanent parking despite her removing the vehicle temporarily on 1 June 2022 for 2 hours in the morning between
30am and 10.30am. I consider the applicant’s returning and reparking her vehicle at the same spot at about 10.30am on 1 June 2022 to be a continuation of her initial car parking at the residents’ car park at 7.50am on 30 May 2022. v. In my view, the period between 7.50am on 30 May 2022 and 10am on 3 June 2022 exceeded the 4 days maximum car parking rules set out in Rule 7 and the brief departure of the vehicle from the area between
30am to 10.30am on 1 June 2022 before returning to the same area/spot nevertheless offends Rule 7 when interpreted objectively and purposefully, having regard to the fair use policy and ultimate car parking policy that the residents’ car park is not to be used for permanent parking. vi. It appears that the applicant has deliberately chosen a non-busy period in the morning after residents have gone about their day between
30am and 10.30am on 1 June 2022 in an attempt to circumvent Rule
I consider the applicant to be in breach of Rule 7 despite the brief removal of her vehicle from the residents’ car park for 2 hours. vii. I consider that the applicant has breached the body corporate’s mischief and purpose in the rule prohibiting no shepherding and no permanent parking; the 4 day maximum car parking rule under Rule 7(f) should not be read in isolation as it is clearly open to abuse by residents who are bent on using the area for permanent car parking. viii. Reading the 4 day maximum car parking rule literally and solely would also lead to unenforceable consequences for the body corporate as most vehicles would likely be used and driven away at least once every 96 hours or 4 days. ix. A purposive interpretation of Rule 7 is required and expected of unit owners using the residents’ car park. I accept the body corporate’s evidence that the applicant has been previously warned on repeated infringements of Rule 7 by misusing the residents’ car park for permanent car-parking. x. For the above reasons, I conclude that the applicant’s car was correctly towed away by agents of the body corporate on 3 June 2022; I find the parking by the unit owner at the residents’ car park since 30 May 2022 to have contravened the body corporate rules. xi. Consequently, the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of towing charges and consequential loss must fail.
Ultimately there is no new evidence or material being supplied before the Tribunal which might affect the outcome of the original hearing.
For the above reasons, the rehearing application must fail.

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Only the unit owner attended the hearing on 6 July 2023 to consider the rehearing application. The body corporate filed written submissions ahead of the hearing.
On 23 May 2023, I made an order dismissing the unit owner’s claim for reimbursement of towing charges and consequential loss.
The unit owner applied for a rehearing on grounds that the Tribunal was wrong have ignored his evidence that he has duly complied with the parking rules by leaving the area between 8.30 to 10.30am on 1 June 2022
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Usually the party applying for the rehearing must show that something went wrong with the Tribunal’s procedure, for example, that they did not receive notice of the hearing or they were not able to properly present their case. A rehearing may also be granted where there is new evidence that was not reasonably available at the first hearing, if it could have affected the outcome. See section 171 Unit Titles Act 2010; section 96(4) Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
The District Court has held that if the Tribunal was simply wrong in its findings of fact, or its application of the law, this is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice: a rehearing is not an alternative to an appeal. Furthermore, a rehearing will not be granted just because a party is unhappy with the decision, or to give them a second opportunity to present their case.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

For the following reasons, the unit owner has failed to establish the grounds for a rehearing.
The unit owner merely reiterated that they saw a sign on the parking space about 96 hours maximum allowable parking and has duly moved the car between 830am to 1030am within the 96 hours parking period. The unit owner maintained his conclusion that he had complied with car parking rules in the unit title common parking area.
The unit owner’s understanding is that as long as he vacates within 96 hours, he is in the right. He insists that he has proof and has provided proof of his absence from the car park for 2 hours.
The unit owner’s assertions however do not affect the original outcome of the hearing. Those defences have been argued at the initial hearing. No new evidence has been provided.
I have already accepted the unit owner’s evidence that he had temporarily moved his car away for 2 hours within the 96 hours period in question.
The material reasons for finding against the unit owner have been summarised in my original decision as follows: i. I find however that the applicant has, in substance, breached Rule 7 of the body corporate rules on several fronts. ii. Rule 7(f) that stipulates a maximum 4 days of consecutive car parking is not the sole and operative provision that governs the unit owners’ use of the residents’ car park. iii. A fair use policy applies as each owner is entitled to 1/97th share of the common area car parks but there is insufficient car park space for all unit owners’ use of the residents’ car park at any one time. Rule 7(f) provides that slots at the residents’ car park are not to be used for permanent parking and Rule 7(k) specifically prohibits “shepherding”, ie., residents from the same house or unit are not to reserve common area car parks. iv. I consider the applicant to have breached collective and substantive body corporate rules prohibiting shepherding and use of the residents’ car park for permanent parking despite her removing the vehicle temporarily on 1 June 2022 for 2 hours in the morning between
30am and 10.30am. I consider the applicant’s returning and reparking her vehicle at the same spot at about 10.30am on 1 June 2022 to be a continuation of her initial car parking at the residents’ car park at 7.50am on 30 May 2022. v. In my view, the period between 7.50am on 30 May 2022 and 10am on 3 June 2022 exceeded the 4 days maximum car parking rules set out in Rule 7 and the brief departure of the vehicle from the area between
30am to 10.30am on 1 June 2022 before returning to the same area/spot nevertheless offends Rule 7 when interpreted objectively and purposefully, having regard to the fair use policy and ultimate car parking policy that the residents’ car park is not to be used for permanent parking. vi. It appears that the applicant has deliberately chosen a non-busy period in the morning after residents have gone about their day between
30am and 10.30am on 1 June 2022 in an attempt to circumvent Rule
I consider the applicant to be in breach of Rule 7 despite the brief removal of her vehicle from the residents’ car park for 2 hours. vii. I consider that the applicant has breached the body corporate’s mischief and purpose in the rule prohibiting no shepherding and no permanent parking; the 4 day maximum car parking rule under Rule 7(f) should not be read in isolation as it is clearly open to abuse by residents who are bent on using the area for permanent car parking. viii. Reading the 4 day maximum car parking rule literally and solely would also lead to unenforceable consequences for the body corporate as most vehicles would likely be used and driven away at least once every 96 hours or 4 days. ix. A purposive interpretation of Rule 7 is required and expected of unit owners using the residents’ car park. I accept the body corporate’s evidence that the applicant has been previously warned on repeated infringements of Rule 7 by misusing the residents’ car park for permanent car-parking. x. For the above reasons, I conclude that the applicant’s car was correctly towed away by agents of the body corporate on 3 June 2022; I find the parking by the unit owner at the residents’ car park since 30 May 2022 to have contravened the body corporate rules. xi. Consequently, the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of towing charges and consequential loss must fail.
Ultimately there is no new evidence or material being supplied before the Tribunal which might affect the outcome of the original hearing.
For the above reasons, the rehearing application must fail.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9036726 — Unit Titles in newlynn, auckland

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 9036726 — Unit Titles in newlynn, auckland

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions