How much money was awarded in case 9063964?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9063964?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9063964?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13191051-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

How much money was awarded in case 9063964?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9063964?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9063964?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13191051-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Onehunga, Auckland Tenancy Tribunal Case 9063964 — Unit Titles

Q: What was Tenancy Tribunal case 9063964 about?

The tribunal order states: [The party] must pay Body Corporate 202682 $7,321.03 immediately for its costs.

Order

[The party] must pay Body Corporate 202682 $7,321.03 immediately for its costs.

Reasons

This is a decision on costs.
Both parties’ counsel have filed submissions.
The body corporate seeks its full legal costs. Ms Chandra urges the Tribunal to order reduced costs or no costs. Legal principles
The Tribunal has the power to order costs in limited circumstances. 1 One of those circumstances applies in this case: the parties are represented by counsel. Section 102 of the RTA, which governs costs relevantly provides: 1 See for example Barfoot & Thomson Limited and Lei v Cullum [2021] NZTT Remote Location 4272190, 4188182, 4209293 at [14]. Sections 124 and 127 of the Unit Titles Act 2010 provide for the body corporate to recover its costs in levy claims and where the unit owner is at fault, but those provisions do not apply here. 102 Costs (1) Except in a case to which any of subsections (2), (4), or (5) apply, the Tribunal shall have no power to award costs to or against any party to proceedings before it. (2) The Tribunal may make an order of a kind referred to in subsection (3) in any of the following cases: (a) where, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or ought not to have been brought: (b) where any of the parties was represented by counsel: (c) where, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the matter in dispute ought reasonably to have been settled before the Tenancy Mediator but that the party against whom the order is to be made refused, without reasonable excuse, to take part in proceedings before a Tenancy Mediator or acted in any such proceedings in a contemptuous or improper manner: (d) where any applicant to the Tribunal, after receiving notice of the hearing, fails to attend the hearing without good cause. (3) In any case to which subsection (2) applies, the Tribunal may order a party to pay— (a) to the Crown, any 1 or more of the following: (i) ... (b) to another party, the reasonable costs of that other party in connection with the proceedings.
In Commissioner of Police v Andrews, 2 the High Court considered the Human Rights Review Tribunal’s developing approach to legal costs. Mallon J recognised the Human Rights Review Tribunal has the power to develop its own costs principles: 3 [60] ...The guiding principles that were adopted by the Tribunal are not specified in the legislation or in regulations, in contrast with the position under the District and High Court Rules. Greater flexibility in approach is available. New guiding principles may develop which better reflect the jurisdiction in which the Tribunal operates. If they are to be developed, it is appropriate that the Tribunal do so in the way that it did, by clearly signalling its intention to do so and the reasons why it wished to do so. (Footnotes omitted)
Mallon J also endorsed the Human Rights Review Tribunal’s caution in applying the conventional civil costs regime to its jurisdiction: [61] I consider the Tribunal is right to express caution about applying the conventional civil costs regime to its jurisdiction. Statutory tribunals exist “in order to provide simpler, speedier, cheaper, and more accessible justice than do the ordinary courts.” The imposition of large fees to bring a claim and the imposition of adverse costs orders 2 Commissioner of Police v Andrews [2015] NZHC 745. 3 Commissioner of Police v Andrews [2015] NZHC 745 at [60]. “undermines the cheapness and accessibility long recognised as important advantages of tribunals over courts.” (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted)
Andrews is authority for tribunals to (subject to their governing statutes): a. Decide and develop costs principles that accord with their own unique jurisdiction. b. Develop such principles in way that avoids “imposition of costs orders that undermine the cheapness and accessibility long recognised as important advantages of tribunals over courts”.
Section 96(4) of the RTA provides the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure: (4) Except as expressly provided in this Act or in any regulations made under this Act, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.
The Tribunal, therefore, has a broad discretion whether to order costs where the s 102 exceptions apply. It may order no costs, reasonable costs, or anything in between those two extremes. The Tribunal has no costs rules or guideline judgments setting out costs principles. However, it has traditionally applied the conventional civil litigation costs principles. As the author of one of the leading textbooks on residential tenancy law, Stewart Benson, has written, “In principle, costs are awarded to the successful party”. 4 The author of the other leading textbook, David Grinlinton wrote: 5 The general principles that are applied by the courts on the quantum of costs, may also be applied by the Tribunal. What is considered a “reasonable contribution” to a successful party's costs will depend on many factors, but there is authority that a figure of 60 per cent is regarded as the average, with most awards falling within the range of 40 - 70 per cent of actual costs.
The District Court approves of that approach. 6 Generally, the Tribunal should order costs where “the parties are represented by counsel, the dispute is complex, and the amount of the claim is substantial: Westwood v Western [1994] DCR 759”. 7 4 Stewart Benson Residential Tenancy Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters New Zealand Limited 2018) at p 284. 5 David Grinlinton Residential Tenancies: The Law and Practice (4 th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2012) at 8.3.5. 6 See for example, French v Ryan DC Auckland CIV-2012-004-000711, 29 November 2012. Judge Taumanu increased the Tribunal’s costs award applying the conventional civil litigation principles. 7 Civil Procedure: District Courts and Tribunals Westlaw online service at TE3.05.
What will amount to a reasonable contribution to costs will depend on a range of factors. The following factors are often relevant to be considered when assessing costs: (a) The length of the hearing. (b) The sum of money involved. (c) The legal and factual complexity. (d) Whether argument lacking substance was advanced. (e) The degree of success achieved by the parties.
In Holden v Architectural Finishes Ltd Justice McGechan held that: 8 ...the sum in issue is a ‘reasonable’ ‘contribution’. It is not some mere gesture. It is not some virtual payment in full. It is merely a contribution, and a reasonable one. At the outer limits, proportions of reasonable actual fees can afford some guidance. A 10% or even 20% contribution – very little indeed – may seldom qualify. A 90% or 80% contribution, virtually the total, may be regarded as likewise...if the ‘reasonable contribution’ earlier determined falls within a middle range, say 40% to 70%,there is a feeling of some comfort...
His Honour went on to emphasis the important principles underlying “shopping lists” of specific factors for determining a reasonable contribution: 9 These specific factors, generally referred to as the first port of call, have their important place, but a Court should not forget the ultimate question, or overlook the principles which underlie. There is a wood as well as these trees. The ultimate question always remains: What is a reasonable contribution in these particular circumstances? In my view, there are two underlying principles to be kept in mind. They underlie most if not all of the "shopping list" factors just noted. They interweave, and at times conflict. (1) The wrongdoer should pay the costs of the injured party obtaining compensation for the wrong, unless good reason exists to the contrary. The wrongdoer - not the injured party - should bear that further expense. That, I suggest, is a matter of elementary justice. It is not comprehensive. As noted, there is a threshold rule that costs nevertheless will be a "reasonable contribution" only, and not a total recovery. That is for public policy reasons. However, the Court's first inclination properly can be to lean toward a high level of compensation for the injured party, rather than the other way. (2) Court time is a valuable public resource. It is expensive, and in short supply. It always has been, and I fear it always will be. As a matter of public interest, Court time must not be wasted. There should be corresponding disincentives to unwarranted proceedings, or elements of proceedings, and to inefficient practice within proceedings. An injured party can expect some initial leaning towards a high level of recovery from the wrongdoer, but there must be a significant leaning the other way to the extent the injured party's own proceeding has been misguided or inefficient. The unsuccessful party should be placed under the same discipline. So far as disincentives to waste are concerned, this public interest coincides with and shelters the 8 [1997] 3 NZLR 143. 9 Ibid p 149. opposite and affected successful party. In reaching any final decision as to "reasonable contribution", Courts should include a broader consideration in principle along these lines, as well as focusing on traditional specific factors.
Further, the Tribunal has a wider perspective beyond conventional civil litigation costs principles when deciding costs. In doing so, the Tribunal should turn to the provisions of the RTA that bear on costs orders. The long title to the RTA relevantly states that it is: An Act to reform and restate the law relating to residential tenancies, to define the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants of residential properties, to establish a tribunal to determine expeditiously disputes arising between such landlords and tenants... (emphasis added)
Section 85 of the RTA states the Tribunal is to exercise its jurisdiction fairly and expeditiously and having regard to the substantial merits and justice: 85 Manner in which jurisdiction is to be exercised (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any regulations made under this Act, the Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that is most likely to ensure the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes between landlords and tenants of residential premises to which this Act applies. (2) The Tribunal shall determine each dispute according to the general principles of the law relating to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall not be bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities. (emphasis added)
Therefore, in deciding costs the Tribunal should be mindful of all the relevant circumstances of the case before it. It should consider a broad range of factors to ensure the order is fair to both parties, based on sound principles, and does not deter parties from bringing meritorious claims. 1 Discussion
The body corporate seeks an order for its full reasonable costs based on the wording of s 102(3)(b), which is similar to ss 124 and 127 of the Unit Titles Act 2010, and it relies on decisions decided under those latter sections. I accept that the body corporate’s costs are reasonable. However, s 102(3)(b)’s use of the word “may” (unlike ss 124 and 127) preserves to the Tribunal the discretion as to consider ordering only a reasonable contribution to costs and that is the Tribunal’s general approach as explained above.
Ms Chandra emphasises she discontinued her claim, a claim which counsel submits was meritorious. However, Ms Chandra shown that her claims were meritorious. It would have been preferable that she had not brought her claim at all.
Ms Chandra submits, “members of the body corporate should not be deterred from raising issues in a forum such as the tribunal by way of imposition of significant substantial costs awards against members of a body corporate.” That is a valid principle, but it does not apply to Ms Chandra as she has not shown any of her claims had merit, she repeatedly did not comply with timetabling directions, and she continued the claim for nine months. Rather, this is a case where as McGechan J put it the “proceeding has been misguided or inefficient”. 10 Conclusion
A reasonable contribution to costs in this case is 70 percent of the actual costs.
The Tribunal orders the tenant to pay $7,321.03 towards the body corporate’s legal costs.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9063964 — Unit Titles in Onehunga, Auckland

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 9063964 — Unit Titles in Onehunga, Auckland

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions