What was Tenancy Tribunal case 9070344 about?

The tribunal order states: The application is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9070344?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9070344?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9070344?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12951466-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 9070344 about?

The tribunal order states: The application is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 9070344?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 9070344?

The primary dispute was Unit Titles.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 9070344?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12951466-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

Napier South, Napier Tenancy Tribunal Case 9070344 — Unit Titles

Order

The application is dismissed.
Costs should lie where they fall.

Reasons

Mr Duncan and his counsel Ms Joanna Pidgeon attended the hearing on 16 December 2025. The body corporate is not legally represented.
I adjourned the initial hearing on 9 October 2025 to allow the body corporate to be properly represented.
On 9 October, Mr Doug Ducker had not been appointed in any capacity to represent the body corporate. At the time, Mr Ducker says he was merely the former chairperson of the body corporate.
On the 9 October hearing, I had hoped that an authorised representative or committee member/chairperson of the body corporate can be confirmed at a general meeting to represent the body corporate at the adjourned hearing.
In light of the current lack of cohesion between members of the body corporate, I considered it appropriate that notice of proceedings be given to all unit owners of this unit title development so that they can have an opportunity to be heard on the present application before the Tribunal.
In adjourning the hearing on 9 October, I also recorded and clarified the applicant’s current claims which are only against the body corporate, as expressed by counsel for the applicant Ms Pidgeon at [28] of her 9 October 2025 written submissions as follows: [28] The Applicant requests that the Tribunal make orders that: a. The adjournment of the annual general meeting was improperly made, and should have been reconvened to a place date and time shortly thereafter rather than being left at large and delaying reconvening the AGM for an extended period of time. b. The reconvened 3rd meeting did not comply with the UTA requirements for notice for reconvening a meeting. c. That the Body Corporate pay the Applicant’s legal costs and refund its filing fee.
I note that the initial claim as filed and as stated on the application form asks the Tribunal to reconvene and complete without further delay the annual general meeting that was adjourned on 4 December 2024.
Mr Duncan says that the body corporate held an AGM in 4th December 2024, which was adjourned due to time constraints. The applicant says that despite repeated written requests from the major unit owners, the Chairperson and Property Strata Manager have failed to reconvene the meeting or provide a timeline. Mr Duncan requests that the Tribunal make a declaration that the body corporate has not fulfilled its obligations under section 88 of the Unit Titles Act 2010, and order that the AGM be reconvened without further delay.
The parties confirm at the hearing on 16 December 2025 that an AGM has since been held on 5 October 2025 and completed on that date.
Under those circumstances the substantive order sought by the applicant, namely for body corporate to reconvene and complete its annual general meeting has been satisfied.
Further, the parties also accept that the 2025 annual general meeting has been held and completed. This indicates that governance processes have continued.
The applicable principle is Tribunal proceedings should only address live controversies.
The subject matter of the application is now moot and should be struck out. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear moot cases.
In Body Corporate 375933 v Tenancy Tribunal [2017] NZHC 1619, the High Court held at [35] that: “...The Tenancy Tribunal is an inferior tribunal, and unless statute provides otherwise, it does not have the power to declare the law, and therefore to finally resolve issues of controversy in legal interpretation. Only the High Court and appellate Courts can do that. This means that the reasons why the higher courts may hear moot cases in exceptional circumstances – essentially to declare and clarify the law where it is in the public interest to do so – cannot apply to tribunals. So, while the higher courts have exceptional jurisdiction to hear moot cases in narrow circumstances, inferior tribunals do not...”
The remaining relief sought by Mr Duncan are declaratory in nature. They require the Tribunal to “declare that the 2024 adjournment of the annual general meeting was improperly made, and should have been reconvened to a place date and time shortly thereafter rather than being left at large and delaying reconvening the AGM for an extended period of time”. The High Court in Body Corporate 375933 v Tenancy Tribunal confirmed that the Tenancy Tribunal, being an inferior tribunal, does not have power to declare and clarify the law even where it is in the public interest to do so. The Tribunal therefore does not have jurisdiction to proceed further once the primary relief has been dealt with and satisfied.
For those reasons, the application filed herein must be dismissed on the basis that it is moot.
The adjourned hearing on 16 December 2025 was formally attended to by Mr Doug Ducker in his capacity as chairperson of the body corporate. However, the body corporate did not resolve to appoint counsel to represent the body corporate at the hearing. Therefore, the body corporate was not legally represented at the adjourned 16 December hearing.
Given my above decision to dismiss the application on grounds that the application is moot and that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to make general declaratory orders on matters consequential to the primary relief (which is now moot), I consider that costs should lie where they fall.
While I have permitted Mr Clinton Baker of Price Baker Berridge to be heard, Mr Baker confirmed that he was only representing individual owners of Level 2 units 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D rather than the body corporate.
The orders sought by the applicant are solely against the body corporate.
For those reasons, I do not consider that costs should be awarded to the owners of units 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D. Conclusion
The application is dismissed.
There will be no orders as to costs.

Order

The application is dismissed.
Costs should lie where they fall.

Reasons

Mr Duncan and his counsel Ms Joanna Pidgeon attended the hearing on 16 December 2025. The body corporate is not legally represented.
I adjourned the initial hearing on 9 October 2025 to allow the body corporate to be properly represented.
On 9 October, Mr Doug Ducker had not been appointed in any capacity to represent the body corporate. At the time, Mr Ducker says he was merely the former chairperson of the body corporate.
On the 9 October hearing, I had hoped that an authorised representative or committee member/chairperson of the body corporate can be confirmed at a general meeting to represent the body corporate at the adjourned hearing.
In light of the current lack of cohesion between members of the body corporate, I considered it appropriate that notice of proceedings be given to all unit owners of this unit title development so that they can have an opportunity to be heard on the present application before the Tribunal.
In adjourning the hearing on 9 October, I also recorded and clarified the applicant’s current claims which are only against the body corporate, as expressed by counsel for the applicant Ms Pidgeon at [28] of her 9 October 2025 written submissions as follows: [28] The Applicant requests that the Tribunal make orders that: a. The adjournment of the annual general meeting was improperly made, and should have been reconvened to a place date and time shortly thereafter rather than being left at large and delaying reconvening the AGM for an extended period of time. b. The reconvened 3rd meeting did not comply with the UTA requirements for notice for reconvening a meeting. c. That the Body Corporate pay the Applicant’s legal costs and refund its filing fee.
I note that the initial claim as filed and as stated on the application form asks the Tribunal to reconvene and complete without further delay the annual general meeting that was adjourned on 4 December 2024.
Mr Duncan says that the body corporate held an AGM in 4th December 2024, which was adjourned due to time constraints. The applicant says that despite repeated written requests from the major unit owners, the Chairperson and Property Strata Manager have failed to reconvene the meeting or provide a timeline. Mr Duncan requests that the Tribunal make a declaration that the body corporate has not fulfilled its obligations under section 88 of the Unit Titles Act 2010, and order that the AGM be reconvened without further delay.
The parties confirm at the hearing on 16 December 2025 that an AGM has since been held on 5 October 2025 and completed on that date.
Under those circumstances the substantive order sought by the applicant, namely for body corporate to reconvene and complete its annual general meeting has been satisfied.
Further, the parties also accept that the 2025 annual general meeting has been held and completed. This indicates that governance processes have continued.
The applicable principle is Tribunal proceedings should only address live controversies.
The subject matter of the application is now moot and should be struck out. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear moot cases.
In Body Corporate 375933 v Tenancy Tribunal [2017] NZHC 1619, the High Court held at [35] that: “...The Tenancy Tribunal is an inferior tribunal, and unless statute provides otherwise, it does not have the power to declare the law, and therefore to finally resolve issues of controversy in legal interpretation. Only the High Court and appellate Courts can do that. This means that the reasons why the higher courts may hear moot cases in exceptional circumstances – essentially to declare and clarify the law where it is in the public interest to do so – cannot apply to tribunals. So, while the higher courts have exceptional jurisdiction to hear moot cases in narrow circumstances, inferior tribunals do not...”
The remaining relief sought by Mr Duncan are declaratory in nature. They require the Tribunal to “declare that the 2024 adjournment of the annual general meeting was improperly made, and should have been reconvened to a place date and time shortly thereafter rather than being left at large and delaying reconvening the AGM for an extended period of time”. The High Court in Body Corporate 375933 v Tenancy Tribunal confirmed that the Tenancy Tribunal, being an inferior tribunal, does not have power to declare and clarify the law even where it is in the public interest to do so. The Tribunal therefore does not have jurisdiction to proceed further once the primary relief has been dealt with and satisfied.
For those reasons, the application filed herein must be dismissed on the basis that it is moot.
The adjourned hearing on 16 December 2025 was formally attended to by Mr Doug Ducker in his capacity as chairperson of the body corporate. However, the body corporate did not resolve to appoint counsel to represent the body corporate at the hearing. Therefore, the body corporate was not legally represented at the adjourned 16 December hearing.
Given my above decision to dismiss the application on grounds that the application is moot and that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to make general declaratory orders on matters consequential to the primary relief (which is now moot), I consider that costs should lie where they fall.
While I have permitted Mr Clinton Baker of Price Baker Berridge to be heard, Mr Baker confirmed that he was only representing individual owners of Level 2 units 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D rather than the body corporate.
The orders sought by the applicant are solely against the body corporate.
For those reasons, I do not consider that costs should be awarded to the owners of units 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D. Conclusion
The application is dismissed.
There will be no orders as to costs.

Tenancy Tribunal case 9070344 — Unit Titles in Napier South, Napier

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 9070344 — Unit Titles in Napier South, Napier

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions