Reasons
- The Tribunal must consider a further application filed by a Unit Owner against the Body Corporate.
- The premises comprise some 10 commercial units, forming the body corporate under the Unit Titles Act 2010 (UTA).
- Things have not gone smoothly, and it is clear that there is considerable conflict between the applicant and the Body Corporate, including the Body Corporate Chair, Mr Meyers. That conflict is part of the claims currently before the Tribunal.
- What is clear, is that Mr Lazarevic, the Unit Owner, disagrees with various decisions that the Body Corporate including Committee, has made. That has resulted in a previous application in the Tribunal, and has also seen Mr Lazarevic contacting other unit owners and service contractors like the lawyers for the Body Corporate.
- The parties have attended mediation in an attempt to resolve the underlying disputes, but unfortunately that has not been successful, so the matter has now proceeded to the Tribunal. Unit Owners case
- The Unit Owner seeks orders in relation to three particular matters. Relationship issues
- The Applicant submits that the actions of the Body Corporate have denied enjoyment and use of the unit. An example was given where the Unit Owner was sent an on-charge for an earlier mediation (considered further below).
- The Applicant states that the has attended a committee meeting to try to resolve concerns, but this has not been efficacious. Mr Lazarevic provided examples of conflict with Mr Meyer, which he considers is behaviour intended to bully, intimidate or abuse him. Mr Lazarevic notes that he has trespassed Mr Meyers.
- The Applicant seeks guidance on how to move forward. Mediation invoice
- The second issue is a request to strike out the invoice for the mediation preparation, being an on-charge. Insurance levy
- The third issue is insurance. All units have an identical footprint, with identical sidewalls and floors. The unit AB, which faces Rongotai Road, has cover for $730,000, where other units are insured for $430,000. Unit AB is owned by a member of the Committee. Mr Lazarevic considers that committee members are benefiting from better insurance cover than the other units. When the issue has been raised with Mr Meyer, he responds that that is how the insurance broker told them how to do it.
- Mr Lazarevic considers that leaseholder improvements should not be insured by the Body Corporate. Body Corporate’s case
- The Body Corporate was represented by Mr Meyer. Relationship issues
- Mr Meyer states that he has received excessive communications where he is being criticised for actions of the Body Corporate. There are further issues where Mr Lazarevic has gone directly to suppliers or others directly, rather than going to the Committee. It is agreed that the warnings have been provided to Mr Lazarevic about these concerns. Mediation invoice
- In terms of the mediation invoice, that cost could have been avoided if the Unit Owner had simply engaged with the Committee. Insurance levy
- In relation to the insurance levy, the calculation is based on the valuation assessment. Mr Meyer notes that this valuation, as well as the insurance policy is available to the Applicant on the portal.
ANALYSIS
- As I noted at the hearing today, the role of the Tribunal is to adjudicate disputes. It is not the role of the Tribunal to advocate for one party or another, if we were to do that, we would no longer be independent. It is also not the role of the Tribunal to provide advice; if legal advice is required, then parties need to instruct their own legal advisors for that.
- When any claim is made to the Tribunal, the onus sits with the person making the claim to provide the evidence and arguments to establish the claim. That means it is Mr Lazarevic who must prove the claim, which means he must show that the Body Corporate has breached some obligation to him.
- I will now consider the three orders requested: Relationship issues
- There is no doubt that there are considerable relationship issues arising between the parties. The Tribunal cannot make orders to fix that.
- A body corporate by its very nature, is a group of unit owners. It is the collective owners who are responsible for decision-making. While there could be some delegation to a committee, ultimately the buck stops with the body corporate – that is all unit owners collectively.
- For a body corporate to work effectively, that does require the owners to have professional and respectful engagement with co-unit owners, but that is not an obligation found in the Unit Titles Act or anywhere in the law, it is simply a human expectation.
- However, it is fair that I observe the general processes which arise around body corporate governance. As noted above, decisions are made by the body corporate, but some decisions are made by the committee. To that extent, I accept the observation Mr Meyers made, that if Mr Lazarevic has concerns, in the first instance, those should be directed to the body corporate committee. But ultimately there will be some decisions where any unit owner may disagree with them, and if that is the case there is the ability to raise those concerns at an AGM or EGM in the usual way.
- But beyond making that observation, I cannot see any other orders that Tribunal can make here. Mediation invoice
- Mr Lazarevic considers that he should not have been invoiced the $270.25 for an ‘on charge’ for ‘preparation for mediation’, as was invoiced on 18 February 2026.
- I cannot see any basis upon which that invoice could be raised.
- There are provisions in the Unit Titles Act that allow for the recovery of money, and in particular section 126 allows for recovery when the body corporate does any work or act which is substantially for the benefit of one unit owner, or some unit owners. In this case, I am not persuaded that attending a mediation would be simply for the benefit of Mr Lazarevic’s unit, the benefit of rebuilding relationships to ensure the complex is operating efficiently is a benefit for all unit owners equally.
- There is also an ability under section 127 for money to be recovered where a person is at fault. That provision holds: This section applies if the body corporate does any repair, work, or act that it is required or authorised to do, by or under this Act, or by or under any other Act, and the repair, work, or act was rendered necessary by reason of any wilful or negligent act or omission on the part of, or any breach of the Act, the body corporate operational rules, or any regulations by, any unit owner or his or her tenant, lessee, licensee, or invitee.
- In order for money to be recovered under that provision, the work necessary, preparation for mediation in this case, would need to have been incurred because of a wilful or negligent act or omission, or a breach of the Act or operational rules and regulations. The problem for the body corporate is that none of those criteria apply. Certainly, proceeding to a mediation is not a result of a breach of any Act, regulation, or operational rule. It is also not a result of a negligent act on the part of Mr Lazarevic. The only other criteria would be if it was necessary because of some wilful act on the part of Mr Lazarevic.
- The High Court has considered how ‘wilful’ is to be interpreted in Hart v Body Corporate 180455 CIV-2005-404-1429, where that question was extensively considered by Courtney J. That was an appeal under the Unit Titles Act 1972, however section 34 of that Act is materially similar to section 127 under the current Act, as section 34 looks also to “Recovery of money expended were person at fault”, an identical heading. Both provisions consider the situation where the work or act “was rendered necessary by reason of any wilful or negligent act or omission...” by an owner or occupier. The decision records: Was the Defence of the Proceedings Rendered Necessary by a Wilful
Act?
[19] This leaves the question whether the defence of the legal proceedings was rendered necessary by the wilful act of Ms Hart. This depends on whether “wilful” means simply any deliberate act or whether it carries a connotation of fault. Mr Allan submits that in this context, the word simply means any deliberate act. He says that the purpose of s 34 is to ensure that unit holders meet costs connected with their units rather than unfairly burdening other unit holders. Therefore, the phrase “wilful or negligent” must have been intended to capture as wide a range of activity as possible and it would be inapt to construe it so as to import an overtone of fault. [20] Mr Darby says that s 34 should be construed in light of its heading “Recovery of money expended where person at fault” and that “wilful” means conduct that is wrongful in some way. He says that Ms Hart has done nothing wrong, as she was entitled to exercise her right to seek relief under s 43.
[21] I accept that I am able to take the heading of s 34 into account by virtue of s 5 Interpretation Act 1999, though it would not override a plain meaning appearing from the section itself read in its proper context. [22] The Oxford English Dictionary gives several meanings for “wilful”. The most apt for present purposes is the following: 5 Done on purpose or wittingly; purposed, deliberate, intentional; not accidental or casual. Chiefly, now always, in bad sense, of an action either evil in itself or blameworthy in the particular case; often, with colour of sense (1) implying “perverse, obstinate”. Also transf of the agent, as wilful murderer, one who commits wilful murder [23] The cases in which “wilful” and “wilful act” have been considered vary as to whether they carry a negative connotation. Overall however, I think that the position is fairly represented by the statement in Wheeler v New Merton Board Mills [1933] 2 KB 669. The case involved a claim under the Workman’s Compensation Act 1925 and the meaning of “wilful act”. In considering whether the provision of a dangerous machine for use by employees was a wilful act Talbot J said: “Wilful act” is plain English, and I can entertain no doubt that the installing of this machine without guard or fence for use in a factory was a wilful act by someone. It was an act, and it was intentional. It is true that though “wilful” and “intentional” are synonymous... “wilful” is more commonly used in modern speech of bad conduct or actions than of good, though it does not necessarily connote blame...(emphasis added) [24] I think that in current use “wilful” does carry a connotation of bad rather than good conduct. Interpreting “wilful” in this way would be consistent with the section and with other parts of the Act. While the heading is not decisive by any means, it is a helpful indicator and does not contradict anything in the wording of the section itself. Secondly, if Parliament had intended to capture all conduct, whether wrongful or innocent, it could simply have omitted the words “wilful or negligent” leaving only “act or omission”. The decision to qualify “act or omission” is consistent with the heading and indicates an intention to capture particular types of conduct rather than all conduct. [25] Finally, the likely intention is illuminated by s 33, which opens with identical words and specifically provides for the unequal
imposition of expenditure where one unit benefits more than the others. This is the very objective that Mr Allan asserts s 34 is intended to achieve. Had Parliament intended to treat both innocent and wrongful conduct in the same way then s 33 alone would have been adequate. There is no apparent reason to add s 34 unless it was intended to make different provision for proprietors who acted wrongfully vis-à-vis their fellow unit holders. [26] I further consider that in order to constitute a wilful act the deliberateness of the act must be directed towards the harm complained of (Daniel v Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings (1996) 9 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-297 at 76,338). In this case, it would mean that Ms Hart must have intended that the Body Corporate would be put to cost through her application. I do not consider the fact that cost to the Body Corporate was an inevitable consequence of her bringing the application was sufficient to render it wilful for the purposes of s 34.
- The approach in Hart was endorsed in the later High Court decision of Aquila 1 , where Gordon J confirmed: The provision [section 127] gives no guidance as to which act should be preferred but a causative link to the damage, harm or loss caused would be the most relevant consideration. As Courtney J held in Hart v Body Corporate No 180455, “... in order to constitute a wilful act the deliberateness of the act must be directed towards the harm complained of”. A high degree of proximity between the two is required because the Body Corporate’s act must be rendered necessary by the act of another. This can be illustrated by way of physical damage to the property. For example, if a visitor to a unit, who is an invitee of a unit owner, damages an access door, the damage caused is a direct consequence of the action of the visitor.
- Like in Hart, the Court looked to the Interpretation Act 1999, to the section title to assist in the interpretation of section 127. That same approach is taken in the Legislation Act 2019, were section 10 confirms that headings form an indicator for the interpretation of the meaning of legislation.
- Ultimately, the Court in Aquila confirmed that to fall within the definition of wilful for the purpose of the Unit Titles Act, there needed to be bad or wrongful conduct, and that the conduct be directed toward the harm complained of. 1 Body Corporate 170989 (In Administration) v Aquila Holdings Limited [2020] NZHC 758.
- I am certain that in Mr Lazarevic’s case, that the mediation did not arise because of bad or wrongful conduct on the unit owners behalf, and I am convinced that Mr Lazarevic did not proceed to mediation simply intending that the Body Corporate incur the base charge. For that reason, I cannot see that the mediation cost could be recovered on the basis of a wilful act of the unit owner.
- To that extent, the Tribunal declares that the applicant is not liable for the preparation for mediation on-charge. Insurance levy
- Section 135 of the Unit Titles Act requires that the body corporate insure all buildings and other improvements on the base land to the full insurable value.
- In this case, it appears that the body corporate has had a proper valuation undertaken of the building and improvements, that was provided to the Tribunal at the hearing today. It was ultimately for the body corporate to decide the precise figure that the insurance would apply for, and that would appear to be what the body corporate has done.
- Based on what I have seen, the level of the insurance cover seems reasonable; the amount was reached based on an independent valuation of the premises, which is entirely principled.
- Mr Meyers explained that the levy for the insurance premium is divided based on ownership interest. As I noted at the hearing today, the division should be based on utility interest, but I am not certain if the ownership interest and utility interest figures are the same; often they are, in which case it makes no difference.
- What remains is that the applicant has not established a breach of any obligation as it relates to the calculation or raising of the insurance premium.
COSTS
- An application has been made for reimbursement of the filing fee.
- While this is an application under the UTA, the mechanical provisions that relate to the operation of the Tenancy Tribunal, and the orders that can be made, are found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA). Section 102 relates to costs, and confirms that in a case where a party has only been partly successful, that the Tribunal has a discretion on whether the filing fee should be awarded.
- In this case, I have determined that costs should lie with a fall for both parties. Of the three applications, the applicant has only succeeded with one of those claims, that is the mediation on-charge. I am minded that this on-charge is about half of the filing fee. I consider the interests of justice would require each party to carry its own costs in this proceeding.