What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4645650 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4645650?

Cleaning: $69.00 awarded to landlord; Filing Fee: $20.44 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4645650?

The primary dispute was Cleanliness.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4645650?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/9402747-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 4645650 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 4645650?

Cleaning: $69.00 awarded to landlord; Filing Fee: $20.44 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4645650?

The primary dispute was Cleanliness.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4645650?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/9402747-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 4645650 — Cleanliness

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4645650 — net $89.44 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Carpet cleaning] invoice	$69.00	ar breach by the tenant. 28.As part of this decision, I order the tenant to pay $69.00 .
Filing fee reimbursement	$20.44	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$89.44
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$89.44

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord name and identifying details.
Britteny Alicia Nolan must pay [The landlord/s] $89.44 immediately, calculated as shown in table below:
All other applications are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 8 September 2023.
The tenancy relates to premises at [Tenancy address suppressed] (“the premises”).
The tenancy commenced on 10 September 2020 and is current as of the date of the hearing.
The landlord seeks termination of the tenancy as a result of a threatened assault by the tenant.
The parties agree on the essential elements of the threat.
The parties agree that the landlord had arranged for a [Carpet cleaning company] contractor to attend the premises on 31 July 2023.
What was in dispute was the landlord’s attendance on that day.
The landlord said that he had been told by the tenant, that the tenant would not be present on 31 July 2023. The landlord asked if the tenant’s partner Daniel would be present to let the contractor into the premises. He says that he did not receive a response to the question.
The tenant says that on receiving the enquiry from the landlord, she told the landlord by txt message that Daniel would be present and as a result there was no need for the landlord to attend the premises. The landlord says that he did not receive that message from the tenant and so he went to the premises to let the contractor in.
The contractor arrived first at the premises on 31 July 2023 and knocked at the door. The tenant was present and spoke to the contractor.
The landlord arrived at the premises and parked his car. He got out of his car and walked towards the front door where the tenant was speaking to the contractor.
The tenant said that having told the landlord that Daniel would be present, was upset to see the landlord. She told the landlord that he did not need to be there and that he didn’t get to walk around in her house. At this point, Daniel walked to the door.
The landlord said that Daniel threatened him by saying “he wants a smacking.”
The tenant accepted that this was said by Daniel, with the only variation being that Daniel included an expletive and was that “this **** needs a smack in the head.”
The tenant said that once Daniel said this, she pushed Daniel inside the premises.
The landlord feeling threatened, returned to his car and drove off.
The tenant says that she spoke to the contractor and told him that he could come inside. He did not do so and drove off.
Despite the minor variations to the version of events, I accept that a threat was made by Daniel to the landlord. A threat to assault another is an expression to do harm to another person and does not require an intention or capacity to act on the threat.
In this matter the term “tenant” is extended to include any person present at the premises with the consent of the tenant. The tenant confirmed that Daniel was present at the premises with her consent.( see s.41 RTA).
The relevant law is set out as follows; 55 Termination on non-payment of rent, damage, or assault (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, on any application made to it under this section by the landlord, the Tribunal shall make an order terminating the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that— (c)the tenant has assaulted, or has threatened to assault, or has caused or permitted any person to assault, or to threaten to assault, any of the following persons: (i)the landlord or any member of the landlord’s family...”
The Tribunal must terminate the tenancy if it is satisfied that the tenant has assaulted or threatened to assault any of the persons listed in s 55(1)(c) RTA.
In R v Meek [1981] 1 NZLR 499 (CA) the Court discussed what is meant by “threatened to assault” and considered that: “To threaten to assault means just what it says: It is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. The fact of the threat can be enough. Even under the criminal law, there is no need to intend to act on the threat; or to have the capacity to act on it; or that it be passed on to the person to whom the threat relates.”
I am satisfied that Daniel threatened the landlord. Having come to that decision, the Tribunal must then consider the discretion contained in s.55 (2) RTA. That section provides that; “(2)The Tribunal may refuse to make an order under subsection (1) of this section if, but only if, it is satisfied that the breach has been remedied (where it is capable of remedy), the landlord has been compensated for any loss arising from the breach, and it is unlikely that the tenant will commit any further breach of a kind to which this section applies [(but see also section 78A(3)(b))”.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s 55(2) is exercisable only if all three limbs are satisfied, namely: the breach has been remedied (where capable of remedy); the landlord has been compensated; and it is unlikely the tenant will commit any further breach of the kind to which s 55 applies.
In Collins v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2004-409-717, 2 July 2004, the District Court interpreted s. 55(2) RTA as permitting the Tribunal a residual discretion, even when a breach could not be remedied (as with the threatened assault in that case and this), to refuse to make a mandatory termination order in cases where the Tribunal considered that the landlord could be compensated for any loss and there was unlikely to be any further breach. The Court held that: “... A threat once made, or an assault once committed, cannot be remedied. But I am loathe to conclude that, once the Tribunal finds as a fact a threat or an assault, the discretion becomes spent. That could mean that a technical assault, or words in haste, could pre-empt the Tribunal from considering the two remaining issues s. 55(2) presents, which are of equal significance. I prefer the interpretation that, if the breach cannot be remedied, that issue is to be set to one side and the Tribunal is to consider the two remaining issues. There may well be cases where the Tribunal concludes, despite the fact of breach, the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. The Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order.”
The District Court in Haitana v Housing New Zealand Corporation DC Christchurch CIV-2006-009-3335, 28 November 2006 considered that the correct approach to s. 55(2) was that set out in Collins: “In essence, Keane J held that the fact that a breach may not be capable of remedy, i.e. in the context of an assault which has been committed, is not determinative in the section 55(2) context. As Keane J put it ... the preferable interpretation of section 55(2) is to put aside a breach which cannot be remedied and then consider the issue of termination by reference to the other two preconditions for the exercise of the discretion, i.e. compensation, if any, to the landlord and the likelihood or otherwise of any further similar breach by the tenant.”
Having found that there has been a threatened assault, which much like an actual assault, cannot be remedied, the Tribunal is required to consider; • Compensation to the landlord; and • The likelihood or otherwise of any further similar breach by the tenant.
As part of this decision, I order the tenant to pay $69.00 . This is the amount which the [Carpet cleaning company] contractor has invoiced the landlord for his journey to the premises. This will result in the landlord being compensated for his loss.
Having heard the tenant, I am persuaded that tenant and anyone at the premises with her consent, is unlikely to further threaten the landlord. Any further threat by the tenant or her guests, will inevitably result in a further claim to the Tribunal by the landlord. In those circumstances, the landlord will no doubt ensure that any future adjudicator is made aware of this order. That would almost inevitably result in any proven claim leading to a termination of the tenancy.
As [The landlord/s] have substantially succeeded with the claim, I have ordered the tenant to reimburse the filing fee.
The landlord has applied for name suppression. The landlord has substantially succeeded in this matter and suppression of the landlord name and details is ordered.

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4645650 — net $89.44 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Reason
Carpet cleaning] invoice	$69.00	ar breach by the tenant. 28.As part of this decision, I order the tenant to pay $69.00 .
Filing fee reimbursement	$20.44	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$89.44
Total payable by Tenant to Landlord	$89.44

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Landlord name and identifying details.
Britteny Alicia Nolan must pay [The landlord/s] $89.44 immediately, calculated as shown in table below:
All other applications are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing on 8 September 2023.
The tenancy relates to premises at [Tenancy address suppressed] (“the premises”).
The tenancy commenced on 10 September 2020 and is current as of the date of the hearing.
The landlord seeks termination of the tenancy as a result of a threatened assault by the tenant.
The parties agree on the essential elements of the threat.
The parties agree that the landlord had arranged for a [Carpet cleaning company] contractor to attend the premises on 31 July 2023.
What was in dispute was the landlord’s attendance on that day.
The landlord said that he had been told by the tenant, that the tenant would not be present on 31 July 2023. The landlord asked if the tenant’s partner Daniel would be present to let the contractor into the premises. He says that he did not receive a response to the question.
The tenant says that on receiving the enquiry from the landlord, she told the landlord by txt message that Daniel would be present and as a result there was no need for the landlord to attend the premises. The landlord says that he did not receive that message from the tenant and so he went to the premises to let the contractor in.
The contractor arrived first at the premises on 31 July 2023 and knocked at the door. The tenant was present and spoke to the contractor.
The landlord arrived at the premises and parked his car. He got out of his car and walked towards the front door where the tenant was speaking to the contractor.
The tenant said that having told the landlord that Daniel would be present, was upset to see the landlord. She told the landlord that he did not need to be there and that he didn’t get to walk around in her house. At this point, Daniel walked to the door.
The landlord said that Daniel threatened him by saying “he wants a smacking.”
The tenant accepted that this was said by Daniel, with the only variation being that Daniel included an expletive and was that “this **** needs a smack in the head.”
The tenant said that once Daniel said this, she pushed Daniel inside the premises.
The landlord feeling threatened, returned to his car and drove off.
The tenant says that she spoke to the contractor and told him that he could come inside. He did not do so and drove off.
Despite the minor variations to the version of events, I accept that a threat was made by Daniel to the landlord. A threat to assault another is an expression to do harm to another person and does not require an intention or capacity to act on the threat.
In this matter the term “tenant” is extended to include any person present at the premises with the consent of the tenant. The tenant confirmed that Daniel was present at the premises with her consent.( see s.41 RTA).
The relevant law is set out as follows; 55 Termination on non-payment of rent, damage, or assault (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, on any application made to it under this section by the landlord, the Tribunal shall make an order terminating the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that— (c)the tenant has assaulted, or has threatened to assault, or has caused or permitted any person to assault, or to threaten to assault, any of the following persons: (i)the landlord or any member of the landlord’s family...”
The Tribunal must terminate the tenancy if it is satisfied that the tenant has assaulted or threatened to assault any of the persons listed in s 55(1)(c) RTA.
In R v Meek [1981] 1 NZLR 499 (CA) the Court discussed what is meant by “threatened to assault” and considered that: “To threaten to assault means just what it says: It is an expression of intent to do harm to another person by use of force. The fact of the threat can be enough. Even under the criminal law, there is no need to intend to act on the threat; or to have the capacity to act on it; or that it be passed on to the person to whom the threat relates.”
I am satisfied that Daniel threatened the landlord. Having come to that decision, the Tribunal must then consider the discretion contained in s.55 (2) RTA. That section provides that; “(2)The Tribunal may refuse to make an order under subsection (1) of this section if, but only if, it is satisfied that the breach has been remedied (where it is capable of remedy), the landlord has been compensated for any loss arising from the breach, and it is unlikely that the tenant will commit any further breach of a kind to which this section applies [(but see also section 78A(3)(b))”.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s 55(2) is exercisable only if all three limbs are satisfied, namely: the breach has been remedied (where capable of remedy); the landlord has been compensated; and it is unlikely the tenant will commit any further breach of the kind to which s 55 applies.
In Collins v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2004-409-717, 2 July 2004, the District Court interpreted s. 55(2) RTA as permitting the Tribunal a residual discretion, even when a breach could not be remedied (as with the threatened assault in that case and this), to refuse to make a mandatory termination order in cases where the Tribunal considered that the landlord could be compensated for any loss and there was unlikely to be any further breach. The Court held that: “... A threat once made, or an assault once committed, cannot be remedied. But I am loathe to conclude that, once the Tribunal finds as a fact a threat or an assault, the discretion becomes spent. That could mean that a technical assault, or words in haste, could pre-empt the Tribunal from considering the two remaining issues s. 55(2) presents, which are of equal significance. I prefer the interpretation that, if the breach cannot be remedied, that issue is to be set to one side and the Tribunal is to consider the two remaining issues. There may well be cases where the Tribunal concludes, despite the fact of breach, the landlord can be compensated for any loss, and there is unlikely to be any further breach. The Tribunal might then well be justified in deciding to refuse to make the otherwise mandatory order.”
The District Court in Haitana v Housing New Zealand Corporation DC Christchurch CIV-2006-009-3335, 28 November 2006 considered that the correct approach to s. 55(2) was that set out in Collins: “In essence, Keane J held that the fact that a breach may not be capable of remedy, i.e. in the context of an assault which has been committed, is not determinative in the section 55(2) context. As Keane J put it ... the preferable interpretation of section 55(2) is to put aside a breach which cannot be remedied and then consider the issue of termination by reference to the other two preconditions for the exercise of the discretion, i.e. compensation, if any, to the landlord and the likelihood or otherwise of any further similar breach by the tenant.”
Having found that there has been a threatened assault, which much like an actual assault, cannot be remedied, the Tribunal is required to consider; • Compensation to the landlord; and • The likelihood or otherwise of any further similar breach by the tenant.
As part of this decision, I order the tenant to pay $69.00 . This is the amount which the [Carpet cleaning company] contractor has invoiced the landlord for his journey to the premises. This will result in the landlord being compensated for his loss.
Having heard the tenant, I am persuaded that tenant and anyone at the premises with her consent, is unlikely to further threaten the landlord. Any further threat by the tenant or her guests, will inevitably result in a further claim to the Tribunal by the landlord. In those circumstances, the landlord will no doubt ensure that any future adjudicator is made aware of this order. That would almost inevitably result in any proven claim leading to a termination of the tenancy.
As [The landlord/s] have substantially succeeded with the claim, I have ordered the tenant to reimburse the filing fee.
The landlord has applied for name suppression. The landlord has substantially succeeded in this matter and suppression of the landlord name and details is ordered.

Tenancy Tribunal case 4645650 — Cleanliness

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 4645650 — Cleanliness

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions