What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5302144 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders that possession of the premise at 8 Edmund Hillary

How much money was awarded in case 5302144?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5302144?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5302144?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12516477-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5302144 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders that possession of the premise at 8 Edmund Hillary

How much money was awarded in case 5302144?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5302144?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5302144?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12516477-Tribunal_Order.pdf.

8 Edmund Hillary Avenue, Papakura, Papakura 2110 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5302144 — Exemplary damages

Order

The Tribunal orders that possession of the premise at 8 Edmund Hillary Avenue, Papakura, Papakura 2110 return to Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities at 9:00am on Tuesday 21 October 2025.
The tenants applications are dismissed.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider applications filed by both the tenant and landlord.
The landlord seeks possession of the premises, following a termination notice issued to the tenant. The tenant opposes possession being granted and seeks various orders in relation to the termination, which the tenant considers was unlawful.

BACKGROUND

The background in this case can be summarised as follows.
Ms White has a tenancy with the Kāinga Ora, that tenancy commenced in 2013.
Over the years, the landlord has undertaken various improvements to the premises.
In more recent times, the landlord advised the tenant in April 2025, that it was looking to sell the premises. The landlord offered to find an alternate tenancy for the tenant to move to.
In order to facilitate that transfer, Kāinga Ora requested the tenant to sign a particular form called a Business Initiated Transfer form, or ‘BIT’.
The tenant refused to sign the BIT form because it included a term that the tenant was voluntarily relinquishing the tenancy. The tenant did not consider the process to be at all voluntary, rather that she was being coerced into signing the form or she would be made homeless.
The Tenant subsequently determined that the ‘official’ BIT form from Kāinga Ora had been amended to include the ‘voluntary’ words, and she considers that the Kāinga Ora officers who did that, did so unlawfully and fraudulently.
On 29 May 2025, the landlord issued a notice terminating the tenancy. The notice states: Notice to end your tenancy We are giving you notice under section 51(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 that the tenancy for the property at 8 Edmund Hillary Ave Papakura will end Tuesday, 02 September 2025.
The notice also advised that the landlord would work with Ms White to try and find her another property, but ultimately advised that if Ms White did not vacate the premises, an application would be made to obtain possession of the premises via the Tenancy Tribunal.
The tenant objected to the termination and entered into communications with the landlord around this.
On 9 July 2025, the tenant filed her application with the Tribunal.
When the tenant did not vacate the premises by 2 September 2025, the landlord filed its application seeking a possession order; that application was filed on 17 September 2025.
A hearing was convened in Papakura on 6 October 2025, as above, both parties were in attendance.

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

At the hearing, the landlords representative confirmed that the only order Kāinga Ora is seeking, is a possession order.

TENANTS CLAIMS

At the hearing, the tenant confirmed her claims are as follows: a. An order setting aside the termination notice b. Exemplary damages c. Orders in relation to unlawful conduct with four staff members.

LANDLORDS SUBMISSIONS

The landlord seeks a possession order.
The landlord’s position is that the house is now 70 years old and the house is to be put up for sale. The landlord issued a 90-day notice to the tenant, in order to obtain possession of the premises to allow the sale to proceed.
The tenant has refused to move out of the premises, so the landlord now seeks an order granting possession.
In response to the tenants’ claims, as I will address below, the landlord’s position is that the BIT form is simply an internal form used by Kāinga Ora which is then sent to MSD who coordinate applications and transfers. The landlord’s representative states that without the form being signed, a transfer cannot be processed.
Otherwise, the landlord’s position is that it is not legally obligated to find another tenancy for the tenant.
However, it was confirmed that in the event possession is granted, the tenant could have a further two weeks to vacate the premises.

TENANTS SUBMISSIONS

The primary outcome sought by the tenant is to have the termination notice set aside, and to decline to order possession.
The tenant considers that the landlord has provided incorrect information in its submissions in relation to her family.
The tenant also raises significant concerns around how Kāinga Ora have dealt with her in relation to the transfer of her tenancy.
The tenant considers that if she were to sign the document knowing it is a falsehood, that is the ‘voluntary relinquishment’ clause, it would be wrong and she would be agreeing to a “falsehood”. Further the tenant considers that she has been threatened by Kāinga Ora that if she did not sign the form, she would not get another tenancy.
The tenant considers that the landlord should have done more to find her an alternate property, as it said it would do in the 29 May 2025 termination notice.
The tenant considers that the landlord does not have any basis to conclude that the house should be sold, and the tenant has made an OIA request in relation to that, for which she is awaiting the response. The tenant seeks an adjournment of this hearing so she can advance claims around the sale.

ANALYSIS

In this case the landlord seeks a possession order so it can enforce the termination notice, whereas the tenant seeks an order setting that notice aside, and other associated orders. The primary question then, is whether the termination notice was valid and that also means lawful.

Was the termination notice valid?

The landlord issued a termination notice under section 50(1) of the RTA. Section 51(1) is a general termination provision which allows a landlord to terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant 90 days’ notice. The landlord does not need to have any particular reason to issue a 90-day termination notice, and they are not required to tell the tenant why the tenancy is to terminate.
As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Winther v Housing Corporation of New Zealand [2010] NZCA 601: A notice given under s 51 need not give reasons
The only restriction on any termination notice issued under section 51, is that it cannot be a retaliatory termination notice, which I will discuss shortly.
Section 51(3) sets out some mandatory requirements for termination notices, that is they must be in writing, record the premises to which it relates, specify the date possession is to be returned, and be signed by the landlord. In this case, the 29 May 2025 termination notice meets all of those requirements.
I am also satisfied that the termination notice has been served on the tenant.
On the face of it therefore, the termination notice appears to be legally correct, and therefore valid.
As indicated above, one of the requirements for a termination notice to be valid, is that it cannot be retaliatory. At the hearing today, Ms White claimed that the notice was retaliatory. The criteria for a retaliatory notice is set out in section 54 of the Act, but in short, a retaliatory termination notice is one that is issued in response, even partly, to the tenant exercising some right, power, authority, remedy, or complaint in relation to the tenancy.
I am entirely satisfied that the termination notice was not retaliatory. The landlord indicated in April that it intended to sell a property and end the tenancy. The termination notice was the natural progression of that process. While the landlord had attempted to engage with the tenant to find her an alternate property, and while it was a dispute around that, that does not change the fact that the primary reason for the termination was the sale of the property as had been stated well before the termination notice was issued.
Finding as I do that the notice complies with the statutory criteria, and that it was properly served, and as it was not retaliatory, I find that the notice was valid.

Are there other grounds to set the notice aside?

There are no other grounds that I can see, upon which the termination notice could be set aside.
The tenant is concerned that the landlord has acted unlawfully, by including in the transfer application (the BIT form) the words I / We understand that by signing this agreement, I / we voluntarily relinquish our current tenancy with effect from the date in which the new tenancy commences.
Ms White considers that requiring her to sign this form is unlawful, and that those words have been added into a standard Kāinga Ora form by a staff member of the Landlord, and the tenant says that makes the actions unlawful.
Even if the tenant was right, and that one of the Kāinga Ora staff had changed that form by including the above words, I know of no law that would make that amendment unlawful or fraudulent, as the tenant asserts.
Whether a staff member had authority to make the change is a different matter, that would be an employment matter, but it does not make the change to the form unlawful. In saying that, I wish to emphasise that I am expressing no suggestion that the form was altered without the necessary authority to do so, I am simply observing that the tenant’s argument is unsustainable in this forum.
But putting that into the context of the RTA, and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, there is no requirement in the RTA for a landlord to agree to transfer a tenant to another of its properties. The BIT form is certainly not a statutory form.
In my assessment, Ms White has conflated the termination of her tenancy with the administrative actions of the landlord in finding her a new property. They are related in the sense that one may follow the other, but the termination falls within the jurisdiction of the RTA and Tribunal, the administrative actions around the transfer do not.
The tenant considers that she has been threatened that unless she signed the BIT form, she would not get another tenancy. I do not have the same concern on this matter that Ms White has. It seems entirely reasonable that before the landlord takes action to transfer Ms White’s tenancy, they first obtain the tenant’s consent to do that; in fact, if the landlord went through with transferring the tenancy without the tenant’s consent, then the landlord would be acting unlawfully.
Many of the matters that the tenant has raised, relate to issues the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider, such as the actions of any of the landlord’s officers in allegedly changing a Kāinga Ora form, or the decision to sell the property. The tenant is able to pursue those matters in other forums if she should wish, but the Tenancy Tribunal cannot consider those issues.
When I asked the tenant what jurisdiction I would have to make the orders she is seeking, the tenant referred me to section 85 of the RTA.
Section 85(2) is a provision that requires the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction according to the general principles of law and the substantive merits and justice of the case, but confirms the Tribunal is not bound to give effect to strict legal rights, obligations, legal forms or technicalities: (2)The Tribunal shall determine each dispute according to the general principles of the law relating to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall not be bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities.
There are normally no issues arising as far as the Tribunal’s expectation to apply the general law, but issues can arise as to the extent the Tribunal should depart from the general law to follow substantive merits and justice.
In Ziki Investments (Properties) Limited v McDonald HC AK CIV 2008-404- 0038, the Court needed to consider the extent of the substantive merits and justice requirement in section 85(2). The Court confirmed that the starting point must be the general legal obligations, and that merits and justice need to be assessed in light of those general law obligations: Tribunal should exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that is most likely to ensure the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes. Section 85(2) does not therefore give the Tribunal a carte blanche to decide the case on its perception of merits and justice. However, it can be an aid to interpretation. To an extent, s 85(2) has been of assistance in assessing in this appeal how s 58 should be interpreted.
That approach is consistent with the earlier decision of the High Court in Welsh v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC WN AP35/2000 9 March 2001, where Doogue and Goddard JJ confirmed that section 85 did not provide a licence for the Tribunal to impose its own view on the case, unless its determination was based on general principles of the law. The Court in Welsh confirmed: The provision does not create a license for the Tenancy Tribunal to impose its views of the substantial merits and justice of the case upon one or other disputant unless its determination is based on general principles of law relating to the dispute.
In that case, the Housing New Zealand tenant made considerable improvements to his tenancy without the consent of his landlord. After moving to a different property, the tenant claimed compensation for those works. The Tribunal ordered compensation of $9,527 based on section 85(2) (as there was no other express provision in the RTA such an order could have been made). That decision was overturned in the District Court, with the High Court also confirming the Tribunal’s approach was incorrect.
The Court in Ziki (supra) distinguished the approach required in RTA from that required in the Disputes Tribunal under section 18(6) of the Disputes Tribunal Act, with the Court noting Unlike the Tenancy Tribunal, the Disputes Tribunal was not required to determine the dispute according to the general principles of law at all. In contrast, in the Tenancy Tribunal the general principles of law must be applied.
What all of that means in this case, is because there are no legal provisions in the RTA which take into consideration matters such as the administration around the transfer of a tenant to another premises, whether a landlord should sell the property, whether it would be fair to terminate the tenancy with a 90 day notice, health related issues of occupants – then I cannot use section 85 to provide a remedy, where there is no general legal obligation that exists.
I find, therefore, that there is no other basis identified upon which the termination notice could be set aside. Result of the tenants’ claims
The result must be that the tenant’s claims are dismissed. In particular: a. There is no breach or legal basis upon which the termination notice could be set aside. b. There is no unlawful act on the part of the landlord, so exemplary damages cannot be ordered. c. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to make orders in relation to the conduct of Kāinga Ora staff members, such as around matters relating to the BIT form.
I note two further matters that arose in submissions.
The tenant has claimed a loss of economic opportunity on the basis that the termination of the tenancy has had an impact on the tenant’s business that she is in the process of developing. While I am not certain what relief the tenant is seeking in relation to this matter, I cannot see any basis for making orders in her favour. The premises that are rented are residential premises, not business premises. While there may well be an impact to her business from needing to move premises, that is a natural consequence of a lawful termination of the tenancy, which has occurred here.
Finally, the tenant seek an adjournment until she receives a response to an OIA request. That request was around the decision to sell the premises. Because the Tribunal could not review the decision made to sell the dwelling, it would not be reasonable to adjourn the hearing for that further consideration to occur.

ADJUDICATORS OBSERVATION

I conclude by noting that this has been a challenging and sensitive case.
The situation has reached an impasse, as the landlord has expressed a willingness to assist the tenant in securing an alternative property; however, progress has been hindered by the tenant’s position regarding the signing of the BIT form.
Ms White holds strong views about what she perceives to be a significant wrong. As outlined above, I do not accept that assessment. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that it will be distressing and difficult for Ms White to leave her home. She has advised that she resides with her mother, who has health concerns, and I appreciate that this process has placed strain on them both.
Ms White now faces two possible paths: one in which Kāinga Ora assists her into another property, which would provide stability and continuity; and another in which she is no longer a social housing tenant, requiring her to secure alternative accommodation within the next two weeks.
I strongly encourage Ms White to engage constructively with Kāinga Ora to facilitate a transfer to another property. If completing a BIT form is necessary for that process, then I urge Ms White to take that step so that suitable housing support can continue.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5302144 — Exemplary damages at 8 Edmund Hillary Avenue, Papakura, Papakura 2110

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5302144 — Exemplary damages at 8 Edmund Hillary Avenue, Papakura, Papakura 2110

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

TENANTS CLAIMS

LANDLORDS SUBMISSIONS

TENANTS SUBMISSIONS

ANALYSIS

Was the termination notice valid?

Are there other grounds to set the notice aside?

ADJUDICATORS OBSERVATION

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

TENANTS CLAIMS

LANDLORDS SUBMISSIONS

TENANTS SUBMISSIONS

ANALYSIS

Was the termination notice valid?

Are there other grounds to set the notice aside?

ADJUDICATORS OBSERVATION

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions