What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5315421 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders continued name suppression to apply for the tenants.

How much money was awarded in case 5315421?

Property Damage: $2,000.00 awarded to tenant; Property Damage: $3,250.00 awarded to tenant; Filing Fee: $28.00 awarded to tenant

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5315421?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5315421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13322931-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5315421 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders continued name suppression to apply for the tenants.

How much money was awarded in case 5315421?

Property Damage: $2,000.00 awarded to tenant; Property Damage: $3,250.00 awarded to tenant; Filing Fee: $28.00 awarded to tenant

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5315421?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5315421?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13322931-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5315421 — Exemplary damages

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5315421 — net $5,278.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Tenant	Reason
Exemplary damages: Harassment	$2,000.00	Harassment
Exemplary damages: Unlawful termination notice	$3,250.00	Unlawful termination notice
Filing fee reimbursement	$28.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$5,278.00
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant	$5,278.00

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5315421 — net $5,278.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Tenant	Reason
Exemplary damages: Harassment	$2,000.00	Harassment
Exemplary damages: Unlawful termination notice	$3,250.00	Unlawful termination notice
Filing fee reimbursement	$28.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$5,278.00
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant	$5,278.00

Order

The Tribunal orders continued name suppression to apply for the tenants.
Miao Wang and Andrew Meurant must pay [The tenant/s] $5,278.00 immediately, calculated as shown in table below:
The landlords application for orders in relation to unreasonable withholding of consent for entry to the premises is dismissed.
The landlords application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

The Tribunal must consider applications from both the landlords and tenants. DescriptionTenant Exemplary damages: Harassment$2,000.00 Exemplary damages: Unlawful termination notice$3,250.00 Filing fee reimbursement$28.00 Total payable by Landlord to Tenant$5,278.00
The tenancy is owned by two landlords and is the subject of a relationship property dispute between them. Within the course of that dispute, one of the owners (Ms Wang) rented the premises to the tenants on a five-year fixed-term basis. That was not consistent with the wishes of Mr Meurant, and created issues as far as an order from the Family Court for the sale of the premises was concerned. The Family Court issued an updated order, being an occupation order for Mr Meurant – but at that time, the tenants were living in the premises, so they had lawful possession of the premises. The Family Court has ordered that the premises be sold.
The Tribunal has made an earlier order confirming that there is a valid tenancy, and confirming that the sole landlord was Mr Meurant. The Tribunal also reminded the owners of their obligations to abide by the Residential Tenancies Act in their engagement with the tenants, and also the tenants to consent to valuers and Real Estate agents visiting the premises.
There continued to be friction between the parties, including that Mr Meurant says the tenants did not permit the agents’ entry. Ms Wang raised concerns around how Mr Meurant has managed the premises as landlord. Ultimately the premises were sold by the Bank of China in a mortgagee sale, and the settlement for that is on 10 December 2025.

BACKGROUND

The dwelling that is the subject of this dispute, is jointly owned by Miao Wang and Andrew Jason Meurant.
An order was made in the Family Court on 24 July 2025, sealed that same day, directing that both Ms Wang and Mr Meurant sell the premises at [Address 1] and [Address 2]. This tenancy is [Address 2].
Ms Wang engaged a property manager, By Realty Limited, and instructed the property manager to rent the premises.
On 25 July 2025 (the day following the Family Court order), a tenancy agreement was entered into. The agreement records the landlord as By Realty Limited. The three co-tenants are [Tenant 1], [Tenant 2] and [Tenant 3]. The tenancy address is [Address 2].
The tenancy is a five year fixed-term tenancy from 25 July 2025 to 24 July 2030.
A bond lodgement form was completed by the landlord and tenants, also dated 25 July 2025, in relation to a bond of $4,000.00. I have reviewed the Bond Centres’ records, which confirm that the bond was received by the Bond Centre on 22 August 2025.
On 29 July 2025, the tenants filed an application with the Tribunal against By Realty Limited, Miao Wang and Mr Meurant. The tenant’s application seeks orders confirming the validity and enforceability of the tenancy agreement, and orders that the Real Estate Agent cease interfering with them.
The evidence is that Mr Meurant undertook intensive efforts to obtain possession of the premises, and that is relevant for the claims I must consider. I will set out below a portion of the communications between the parties to reflect the communications that occurred.
In a formal letter of 6 August 2025, Mr Noble, Mr Meurant’s legal representative, wrote to the tenants, concluding “We ask [the tenants] move themselves and their ‘stuff’ out within one week of today.”
On 8 August 2025, an application was filed by both Andrew Jason Meurant and Miao Wang, although while Ms Wang’s name is on the application, I am not convinced that she consented to being an applicant. The respondents were [The tenant/s].
A hearing in the Tribunal was scheduled for 27 August 2025. However, in advance of the hearing, Adjudicator Northwood issued an interim decision dated 22 August 2025, adjourning the hearing, but importantly ordering a stay on efforts to remove the tenants: The Tribunal Orders a stay on any actions by the landlords to obtain possession of the tenancy from the tenants until the substantive hearing of this matter.
On 6 October 2025, the Family Court sealed an order for the sale of premises at [Address 1], and [Address 2]. Mr Meurant was granted an occupation order pursuant to s27(1) and (2) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
On 6 October 2025, the tenants wrote to the Tribunal noting that the police had attended the premises, and noting that the Family Court order was in conflict with the stay ordered by the Tribunal. The tenants applied for orders confirming that the Tribunal’s interim stay remained enforceable, and confirmation that it took precedence over the Family Court order. The tenants note that an application for a stay of enforcement had been filed with the High Court. The tenants noted that: Our household includes six family members and a newborn baby. We have no alternative accommodation and face serious hardship if evicted.
On 7 October 2025, Mr Meurant served a trespass notice on the tenants.
An urgent telephone hearing was convened on 8 October 2025. The parties were advised that the hearing was to determine whether Mr Meurant is entitled to possession of the premises as a result of the Family Court order. I issued an order that same day. In summary, the order did the following: a. Confirmed there was a valid tenancy, and that the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) applied. b. Confirmed that the initial landlord was Ms Wang. c. Following the occupation order, Mr Meurant became the sole landlord as a result of section 58. d. Mr Meurant would be able to give notice ending the tenancy (and specifically referring to 90 days’ notice) e. The landlord is entitled to have a valuer or real estate agent come inside the premises with the consent of the tenants, but the tenants cannot unreasonably withhold that consent (s48(3).
The hearing was then scheduled for an in-person hearing on 27 November 2025.
The next day, on 9 October 2025, Mr Noble wrote to the tenants stating: Andrew Meurant hereby gives you notice pursuant to s 51(2)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 that the tenancy will terminate 42 days from now, ie on 20 November 2025 as Mr Meurant will be occupying the property as per the Family Court occupation order of 19 September 2025 which has previously been sent to you. He will be occupying the property as his principle place of residence. High Court order
Ms Wang applied to the High Court for orders, staying the order from the family court issued on 19 September 2025. That was the subject of a decision from Justice Peters dated 21 October 2025. Justice Peters notes that: For reasons set out below, the July 2025 orders have been overtaken by steps taken by the first mortgagee of both properties, the Bank of China.
What I take Justice Peters to be saying, is that the Bank of China were proceeding with a mortgagee sale.
But it is important to emphasise that Justice Peters dismissed Ms Wang’s application, and certainly the occupation order in favour of Mr Meurant had not been overturned. Justice Peters states: [13] I decline to make any of the orders sought, for the following reasons. ... [18] Accordingly, whilst the events of 6 October 2025 were no doubt deeply distressing to Ms Wang, I decline to interfere with them. The orders stand. Tribunals reminder to the parties
Following the High Court order, it came to the Tribunal’s attention that there was further friction between the parties. On 23 October 2025, I sent the following reminder to the parties: •The Tribunal has made an order that applies to tenancy; nothing I have seen in the memorandum from the High Court changes what this Tribunal has ordered. The order is binding and must be followed by all parties. For the avoidance of doubt, even if there is a mortgagee sale in place from the Bank of China, that does not change the landlord / tenant obligations as I have set out in the my order. •As directed in the Tribunal’s order, the landlord is now Mr Meurant. If Mr Meurant has directed that rent be paid to him or his lawyer, then the tenants must comply with that. •If the tenants are not paying Mr Meurant rent as directed, then the landlord can apply to terminate the tenancy based on rent arrears. •The landlord is entitled to enter the premises for valuations or showing the premises for sale, but can only do so with the consent of the tenants. The tenants must not unreasonably withhold that consent. •If the landlord considers that the tenants are withholding that consent, then that is a civil matter for the Tribunal to consider; it is not a police matter. The landlord can apply to the Tribunal for orders in relation to a claimed unreasonable refusal to allow entry if necessary. •If the tenants are concerned about breaches of their quiet enjoyment, that will need to be considered at the hearing (there is already a claim for breach of quiet enjoyment) •If Ms Wang seeks a rehearing, she must apply for this on the correct form available from the registry. •I have directed the hearing to be brought forward to a hearing on my next available hearing day, which will be 27 November 2025 in [Location suppressed] District Courthouse. Rehearing application
On either 23 or 24 October 2025, Ms Wang filed an application for rehearing in relation to the 8 October 2025 order. An extensive written explanation for the rehearing request was filed, summarised as follows: A substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred because the Tribunal’s order (8 Oct 2025) is inconsistent with the later High Court judgment Wang v Meurant [2025] NZHC 3144 (Peters J, 21 Oct 2025). The High Court held that the first mortgagee (Bank of China) has overtaken the earlier orders and that nothing be done to upset the mortgagee sale(s). The Tribunal’s order, as presently framed, permits rent to be collected by the respondent personally and allows steps that risk upsetting the mortgagee sale, contrary to the High Court’s binding directions. This is a material error of law and a jurisdictional inconsistency that requires rehearing. The High Court judgment was issued after the Tribunal’s order; it is new evidence / a supervening legal development that could not have been presented within the original timeframe. Leave to apply out of time should therefore be granted in the interests of justice. Premises sold
The premises were sold by the Bank of China in a mortgagee sale. I was advised that the settlement date was to be 10 December 2025.
The tenants advised they have been contacted by the purchaser, who would like to keep them on as tenants, which the tenants advised they were pleased to accept.

TENANTS CLAIMS

At the hearing, the Tenants confirmed their claims are as follows: a. Exemplary damages for breach of the tenant’s quiet enjoyment. b. Orders that the termination notice issued on 8 October 2025 is unlawful, and that there was no intention for Mr Meurant to live in the premises as claimed.

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

At the hearing, the landlords confirmed their claims are as follows: a. Ms Wang’s rehearing application. b. Mr Meurant’s application that there has been a failure to allow entry for agents and valuers.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”).
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations.
That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
It is the applicant that must prove their case. As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence. Exemplary damages
The Tribunal must consider a claim for exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages are designed to punish and to deter. They are like a fine. In Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] NZLR 732 the Court of Appeal (Cooke P) said: Exemplary and punitive [damages] are different words for the same thing. The damages are exemplary because they are meant to teach an example to the guilty officer and others. They are punitive because they are meant to punish. They are like a fine, though they go to the citizen who has been the victim of conduct.
Exemplary damages are awarded at the Tribunal’s discretion when one party has proved that the other party has committed a defined unlawful act. If that is proven, and before the Tribunal may award exemplary damages, it must take account of the factors set out in section 109 RTA.
Section 109 of the RTA relates to exemplary damages, and confirms that exemplary damages can be awarded if the unlawful act was committed intentionally, and having regard to: a. The intent of the person committing the unlawful act. b. The effect of the unlawful act. c. The interests of the landlord or tenant against whom the unlawful act was committed. d. The public interest; and e. Whether it is just to make the award.
The maximum levels of exemplary damages are set out in Schedule 1A of the Act.

ANALYSIS

As indicated above, the landlord from 25 July 2025 to 5 October 2025 was Ms Wang. From 6 October 2025, the landlord became Mr Meurant. Claim 1 – Tenants’ claim for quiet enjoyment
The tenants say that from the first day they moved in, they have been getting harassed from the landlords about wanting them to move out, and almost every day they have been getting emails about getting evicted. The tenants say that mentally they cannot live in this house under this pressure, it has been mentally difficult for them.
Ms Wang says in reply that it is wrong for anyone to approach the tenants and put pressure on the tenants to move out as has occurred. Ms Wang states that she has had a good relationship with the tenants, and they should not have experienced the harassment they have faced. Ms Wang says the level of harassment has been “extreme”.
Mr Meurant says that in July they received an order from the Family Court which required the house to be vacant. Mr Meurant said that at the hearing with the Family Court Judge, Ms Wang did not say there were tenants in the premises despite the Judge asked that question. Mr Meurant said that there was no authority for the tenants to be put in the house in the first instance.
Mr Meurant considers that actions which are the subject of the tenants claim, were advanced by his legal representative and Ms Wang. Mr Meurant considers that the tenants have taken steps to escalate the dispute. Analysis
Section 38 of the RTA confirms that the tenants “shall be entitled to have quiet enjoyment of the premises without interruption by the landlord”, and further at subsection 2 that the landlord “shall not cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in the use of the premises by the tenant.” The Act further confirms that contravention of subsection 2 in circumstances that amount to harassment of the tenant, is declared to be an unlawful act.
The term “Harassment” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in s 3 of the Harassment Act 1997 which deals with harassment in the context of either a criminal charge or the making of a restraining order against a person. However Judge Harland in MacDonald v Dodds (CIV-2009-019-1524, District Court Hamilton, 26 February 2010), considered that the dictionary definition of “harassment” was more appropriate in the context of s 38(3), rather than the definition in the Harassment Act. The Court in that case adopted the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines “harassment” as “to trouble, worry, or distress” or “to wear out, tire out or exhaust”. The Judge accepted that harassment indicates a particular pattern of behaviour directed towards another person.
In the Concise Oxford Dictionary “harass” is defined as “torment by subjecting to constant interference or intimidation”. Further assistance can be obtained from the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary where harassment is defined as: Words, conduct, or action (usu. repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose.
From these definitions, it seems that there must be evidence of some ongoing intentional actions directed at a specific person which causes distress to them.
In the circumstances of this case, I have no doubt that the landlords have harassed the tenants.
The evidence is overwhelming, that shortly after the Tenancy commenced, Mr Meurant engaged in concerted efforts to remove the tenants from the premises, those efforts would have disturbed even robust tenants. I say here that while many of those communications are from Mr Noble, as Mr Meurant’s legal representative, Mr Noble’s actions are deemed to be the actions of Mr Meurant.
For example, Mr Noble advised in an email that “I will be advising my client to sue [the tenant] and the other tenants if the house sells for less than it would have in a sale where the purchasers had the opportunity to visit the house”.
On 27 July 2025, the tenants wrote to the property manager: Andrew arrived at the property unannounced and demanded that we vacate the premises immediately, claiming ownership and stating we were on his property. He explicitly told us to leave the house and be out by Tuesday, even though he is not the landlord who signed the tenancy agreement with us. His behaviour was demanding and threatening, causing significant distress right at the start of our tenancy.
On 28 July 2025, the agent appointed to sell the premises emailed the tenants, referring to a letter from Mr Noble saying “please note on the lawyer’s letter, you have to move out in 2 week time. Please call [Mr Noble] to understand better the consequences”.
In an email from 5 September 2025, Mr Noble alleged the tenants were in contempt of court and denied there was even a tenancy: By stopping her doing her job both of you are essentially guilty of contempt of Court. [Tenant 1] – you are not a lawful tenant as you do not have a rental agreement with both owners of the property – you need to understand that – you are only there currently due to the Tenancy Tribunal’s slowness to act.
Notwithstanding the stay ordered by the Tribunal on 22 August 2025, ordering that no actions be taken to obtain possession of the tenancy from the tenants, the tenants report that Mr Meurant requested the police to evict the tenants. In an email to the Tribunal of 6 October 2025, the tenants say: On 22 August 2025, the Tribunal granted an Interim Stay Order confirming that the landlords are stayed from taking any action to obtain possession of the tenancy until the substantive hearing. We have complied fully with our tenancy obligations and continue to pay rent to By Realty Ltd, the property manager for owner Miao Wang. However, on 6 October 2025, police attended our address and informed us that one of the property owners, **Mr Andrew Meurant**, has stated that we must vacate the property immediately or be trespassed on 7 October 2025. He is relying on a **Family Court order dated 19 September 2025 (sealed 6 October 2025)** which names us explicitly, despite us never being parties to that proceeding and never receiving notice of any hearing.
In an email to the Tribunal on 7 October 2025, Mr Noble corroborates what the tenants said, that the police had been instructed to assist with removing the tenants: The Tenancy Tribunal has no jurisdiction as there is no signed tenancy agreement between the 2 landlords and the alleged tenants and the tenants have known this for 2.5 months and are staying in the property simply so as to frustrate the Family Court orders and likely in return for free/ reduced rent from Aimee Wang. Ivy Bai’s signing of a tenancy agreement was illegal as she was not the agent of the landlords and she knew she was not the agent of the landlords. My client will be proceeding with removing the squatters as he is entitled to occupy [Address 2] - he has issued a trespass notice to [The tenant/s] and will be seeking their removal with the assistance of the Police today.
Similarly on 7 October 2025, Mr Noble wrote: You have had 2.5 months now to leave since it became obvious that one of the owners of the property never agreed to you becoming a tenant - there are and have been plenty of rental properties available in [Suburb] for awhile now . It is time for you to immediately find elsewhere to live. It is also on you and the other alleged tenants bringing a new born baby onto the property when you knew from day one that you would not be able to stay for long.
Later on 7 October 2025, Mr Noble wrote to the Tribunal, copying in the tenants: Please see the above Order of the family Court dated 19/9/25. Mr Meurant is now in occupation of [Address 1] and the Police have indicated yesterday that they will assist him to take occupation of [Address 2] today as per the Order. The alleged tenants are not legitimate tenants and need to leave – The Residential Tenancies Act 1986 cannot protect parties who are not legitimate tenants.
On 21 October 2025, Mr Noble wrote to the tenants, threatening that if they did not allow the agent to enter the premises, and that if the premises sold for ‘less’, that his advice would be that Mr Meurant: ...sue the 3 tenants for damages for the $100,000 loss caused by the refusal of you 2 tenants to allow purchasers, agents and valuers to come onto the property. The 3 tenants need to think very clearly about this as this is not a game – if Andrew got a judgment against the 3 of you for $100,000 for instance he could get attachment order on your wages / salaries for the next 20 years. The 3 of you are playing with fire here. I urge you to be sensible.
Also on 21 October 2025, Mr Noble emailed the tenants saying: You appear to have selective reading. The high court judge says that Aimee and Andrew must have the opportunity to sell via the Family Court order prior to the mortgagee sale. I am going to be involving the Police as you are opening flouting court orders. Unless you confirm by 10 am tomorrow that you will cooperate with the Court appointed real estate agent and valuer I will be advising the Police of your acting contrary to Court and Tribunal orders.
On 22 October 2025 the tenants emailed the Tribunal: Since the High Court decision, my co-tenants and I have been receiving repeated threatening emails from Mr Jerry Noble, the landlord’s solicitor. These communications have been deeply disturbing and have again threatened police action against us, even though we are complying with the High Court’s ruling and the mortgagee’s lawful instructions. This conduct has seriously affected the peace and quiet enjoyment of our home.
That same day, Mr Noble wrote to the Tribunal confirming that he was “to notify Police at 10 am today” if access is not approved, and “I will be seeking the Police’s assistance for the TT Orders of 8/10/25 to be complied with by the tenants.
This email was one of the reasons the Tribunal sent the reminder to the parties on 23 October 2025.
What can be seen from those communications is a continuous degree of pressure applied by the landlord against the tenants. That pressure was either expressly with the intention of having them leave the premises, or otherwise unreasonably pressure them to take a particular position in a dispute between the two owners.
Taking into account the statutory test for a breach of quiet enjoyment at section 38, I find that the landlord has caused, and / or permitted an interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, and privacy of the tenants in the use of their premises, by them. That is an unlawful act.
The question then becomes whether exemplary damages should be ordered. I have taken into consideration the section 109 factors, and find that exemplary damages must be ordered.
I consider the breach was intentional. The landlord has been legally represented throughout, so could be expected to have received advice around the expectations that would apply. The effect on the tenants were significant. I accept their evidence that they have been deeply disturbed by what has occurred, they have not enjoyed living in the property. There are very strong interests for tenants, as well as the public generally, that landlords do not harass their tenants.
The maximum level of exemplary damages that the Tribunal could order for harassment is $3,000.00. In this case, I have determined that exemplary damages at 66% of the maximum, or 2/3, would be indicated. The harassment has been over a long period of time, and it has been egregious. I therefore order the landlords to pay the tenants exemplary damages to the sum of $2,000.00.
I record that I’ve made this order against both landlords. The harassment occurred while. Ms Wang and Mr Meurant were the landlords. While I accept that the behaviour was not from Ms Wang, I consider there is more that she could have done to have stopped what was occurring to the tenants, and to that extent she permitted it to occur. There were legal avenues available to Ms Wang, which she could have been taken, that I consider a reasonable landlord would have exercised those. Claim 2 – Unlawful termination notice
The tenants state that the landlord has wrongly issued a 42-day notice, noting that the earlier order from the Tribunal expressly said the notice period was 90 days.
Mr Meurant states that he did get someone to look over the Tribunal’s earlier order, and there was a discussion around possibly needing to undertake work to bring the property up to scratch for sale. Mr Meurant states that he would have moved into the property.
I asked Mr Meurant about the email from Mr Noble (as below) of 7 October 2025, Mr Meurant confirmed that he was living in [Address 1] at that time. Analysis
Section 60AA of the RTA is relevant. That confirms it is unlawful for a landlord to terminate a tenancy without grounds. That provision holds: A landlord commits an unlawful act if they give or purport to give a notice to terminate to the tenant or apply or purport to apply to the Tribunal for an order terminating the tenancy knowing that they are not entitled, under this Act, to give the notice or to make the application.
There are only limited grounds upon which a landlord can give notice terminating a tenancy. Those are set out in section 51, and include the following: (2) A landlord may terminate a periodic tenancy by giving at least 42 days’ notice if— (a) the owner of the premises requires the premises, within 90 days after the termination date, as the principal place of residence for at least 90 days for the owner or a member of the owner’s family; or
Section 51 otherwise confirms that the landlord can terminate the tenancy after giving 90 days notice. No reason is needed to give a 90-day notice.
I am not persuaded that the landlord likely had grounds to issue a 42 termination notice under section 51(2)(a) for these reasons: a. The termination notice, was issued the day following the Tribunal’s order confirming the tenants’ rights, and also noting the restrictions on the landlord trying to obtain possession back from the tenants. The communications on file do not reflect Mr Meurant earlier seeking to obtain possession so he could move into the property prior to that date. It seems most likely that the decision to give 42 days’ notice, as opposed to 90 days, was because it appeared to be a vehicle available to obtain possession earlier. It must be remembered that there has been a continuous campaign from Mr Meurant to obtain this tenancy back from the tenants, from the very start of the tenancy. Therefore, I consider the most likely explanation for giving the notice was simply to obtain the tenancy sooner. b. There is an email from Mr Noble dated 7 October 2025, in which Mr Noble states “Mr Meurant is now in occupation of [Address 1]...” in order to comply with section 51(2)(a) it must be the case that the landlord intends to use the premises as their principal place of residence, which is not consistent with having concurrent occupation of other premises, especially given its close proximity to this tenancy. c. Finally, in order to give notice under section 51(2)(a), the landlord must intend the premises to be their principle place of residence for at least 90 days. It must be remembered that the Family Court order placed severe restrictions on the landlords, in order to have a speedy sale of the premises, and of course that would be the expectation in a mortgagee sale. Mr Meurant could not reasonably have believed that he would have been able to live in the premises up to 132 days after he gave that notice. That is, the 42 days that the notice requires, plus the additional statutory 90 days.
I consider it very likely that the notice was given by the landlord knowing that the notice could not be given, which is an unlawful act under section 60AA.
Taking into consideration the section 109 factors, I consider that the breach was intentional on the part of the landlord. The effect for the tenants is that the tenancy had, on the face of it, been terminated. I am sure that would have caused them significant distress. There are strong interest for tenants, and the public generally that landlords do not unlawfully terminate tenancies.
The maximum level of exemplary damages that can be ordered for terminating a tenancy without grounds, is $6,500.00. In this case I consider an order at 50% of the maximum would be reasonable, and that is ordered. Mr Meurant is to pay $3,250.00 to the tenants, given he was the sole landlord when this act occurred. Claim 3 – Failure to allow access
Mr Meurant states that the tenants did not allow the Real Estate agent access to the premises except on one occasion, and they would not allow valuers or anyone else in. On some occasions, the tenants said the person could enter the premises, but then withdrew that consent.
Mr Meurant states that because the agent and valuer were not allowed access to the premises, there has been a loss of around $500,000 from the mortgagee sale versus what they purchased the house for.
The tenants said that after they got the termination notice, it was very stressful for them, and they got sick. The tenants say that they did try to reschedule the visits, but in the circumstances, they did not feel safe allowing the agents and valuers in. They did not want to let anyone into the house who would threaten them. When the landlord would ask for people to come to the house, it would be followed up with a threatening email. The tenants said that they would have complied if they had not been threatening Analysis
As indicated previously, in order for the valuer or Real Estate agent to enter the premises, the consent of the tenant must first be obtained. However, section 48(3A) confirms that the tenant “may not withhold his or her consent unreasonably”.
This application is finely balanced, but I find overall, that the tenants have presented reasonable reasons for declining entry to the premises.
I accept that there was a huge amount of engagement with the tenants around the house sale in October 2025, including embroiling them in the dispute between the landlords, and with the landlord trying to get them to leave unlawfully. There was also the hearing before myself on 8 October, which was expedited because of the concerns the Tribunal held in relation to the behaviour of the landlords.
But the evidence points to the tenants being open with agreeing to the inspections. That is reflected in an email sent by the tenants to the landlord on 8 October, confirming: Hi Jerry, Mark and Cherry, Thank you for your email regarding proposed access to [Address 2]. Please note that the Tenancy Tribunal’s order dated 8 October 2025 ([2025] NZTT 5322099, 5315421) confirms: •There is a valid residential tenancy in place; and •Any access by a valuer or real-estate agent must comply with section 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986, which requires our prior consent and allows tenants to attach reasonable privacy and safety conditions. We want to reassure you that our household is willing to cooperate fully with any lawful inspection or valuation that complies with the RTA and the Tribunal’s directions. However, the proposed inspection for tomorrow, 9 October 2025, cannot be accommodated due to the short notice period and our family’s circumstances. We are happy to discuss and agree on a more suitable time provided at least 48 hours’ written notice is given, and subject to the following reasonable conditions:
Identification: Please confirm the full names and roles of all people who will enter the premises.
Photography: We do not consent to any photography, filming, or recording that includes our personal belongings, furniture, children’s items, documents, or other identifying household effects. Photos may be taken only of vacant rooms, hallways, or exterior areas where no personal items are visible.
Copies of materials: We request copies of all photographs and documents taken or produced during any visit for our records.
Presence: At least one tenant will be present during any agreed entry. Please also note that the Tribunal’s interim stay order dated 22 August 2025 remains in force, which prohibits any actions by the landlords or their agents to obtain possession or interfere with our occupation until the substantive hearing takes place. All access arrangements must therefore comply fully with both the stay and the Tribunal’s order
Taking into consideration that the proposed valuation assessment was the day after the 8 October hearing (and my order was issued late in the afternoon), it was not unreasonable for the tenants to require further time to prepare for this inspection scheduled on 9 October.
I was hoping that the order from 8 October 2025, would have settled matters for the parties, unfortunately, that was not meant to be. There was subsequently the order from the High Court, and it is plain from that order, that the tenants were receiving conflicting directions from Ms Wang and Mr Meurant. There is some support in the documentation that the tenants needed to make a decision on what they should do, and they concluded that the appropriate course of action, based on their assessment of the High Court order, was to comply with the bank’s instructions only. That is reflected in an email sent by the tenants on 21 October to the landlords and agents, stating. While the Family Court order technically remains on record, the High Court decision of 21 October 2025... makes clear that it cannot override the Bank of China’s rights as first mortgagee. At paragraph [17], Justice Peters stated that “ it is critical that nothing be done to upset the Mortgagee sale” this direction confirms that the Bank of China’s mortgage sale takes priority over any Private or family court- ordered sale. The Bank has now placed its own mortgage-sale signage at the property, and his appointed its authorised agent to manage the process, accordingly, we will follow the Banks instructions only and cannot permit viewings or evaluations arranged under the family court order.
I accepted when the tenants made their decision, they did so in good faith, making the best decision that they could at the time.
But I also consider that there is some evidence that delays do not fall at the feet of the tenants. For example, on 16 October 2025, the valuer emailed the tenants advising that he had made an error with his scheduling, and requesting another agreed date, so that reschedule was not a refusal of entry on the part of the tenants.
There is also evidence supporting health-related reasons for declining a visit. On 15 October 2025, the tenants emailed the valuer advising that they were sorry, but they could not accommodate a visit scheduled for that Thursday, because their child had recently been immunised and was unsettled, and a few of the family had come down with a cold. Those reasons are entirely consistent with what the tenants advised me at the hearing. I accept the explanation and consider that it would be a reasonable basis for declining the valuer’s attendance.
Overall, I am not persuaded that there is evidence to show that the tenants unreasonably refused entry to the premises. Claim 4 – Application for rehearing
Ms Wang submits that I should exercise my discretion to approve a rehearing filed out of time, because Mr Meurant is not properly looking after the premises as a landlord, such as management of the bond (transfer from the property manager), paying insurance, mortgage payments, and rates. Further, Ms Wang says that the rent payments have been misused and not properly disclosed, around the $10,000 mark.
Ms Wang also said that she was not ready to consider the arguments around who was the landlord at the last hearing.
Mr Meurant submits that there is no utility in having a rehearing, given the settlement will occur on 10 December. Mr Meurant disputes some of the facts that Ms Wang claims. Analysis
Ms Wang seeks a rehearing of the Tribunal’s hearing and order from 8 October 2025.
Section 105 of the RTA allows the Tribunal to approve a rehearing if there has been a miscarriage of justice or substantial wrong, or even the potential of either situation occurring.
However, there is a time limit for seeking a rehearing, and that time limit is five working days from the date of the decision. The application for rehearing in this case, was filed outside that five-day period. Section 105(2) says: An application for a rehearing shall be lodged with the appropriate Registrar of the Tribunal within 5 working days after the date of the decision, or within such further time as the Tribunal may allow.
This means there is no ability to obtain a rehearing, unless the Tribunal was to exercise its discretion to allow the late acceptance of that application.
In the circumstances, I find that the late filing of the application must be declined for these reasons.
The application for rehearing is likely to be moot now, given the mortgagee sale, where settlement was to occur on 10 December. Any of the matters relating to the issues raised by Ms Wang on 27 November would be better considered within the jurisdiction of the Family Court, as relationship property issues. For example, if Mr Meurant has received rental that he has not accounted for, then Ms Wang would be able to have that taken into account under the relationship property dispute.
Further, the High Court has confirmed that the Tribunal cannot adjudicate applications which are moot or academic. In the decision of Body Corporate 375933 v Tenancy Tribunal [2017] NZHC 1619), Justice Williams explained: [14] It has long been the case that the Courts (at least) will not answer “purely abstract questions in anticipation of an actual controversy”, whether in future negotiations or court action. This principle was reiterated relatively recently in Omaha Beach Residents Society Inc v Townsend Brokers, in which the plaintiff sought clarification of the effect of a restrictive covenant. O’Regan P found: [T]he courts will normally decline as a matter of discretion to issue a declaration in a case in which the factual context is either hypothetical or a prediction of future events. [15] Although both cases occurred in the context of a formal application for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, the principle is broadly applicable and referable to the use of scarce court time, as well as the limited role of the courts in our system of law and government, a subject to which I will return below. [16] There is no reason, in my view, to consider that the Tenancy Tribunal is in any different position to the ordinary courts in the respects described by McCarthy P and O’Regan P. Mr Grieve’s claim to the Tenancy Tribunal must be taken at face value. Since there are no other extant proceedings between these parties, the claims (b) and (c) lodged by the second defendant in this case, can only be taken to be moot.
I consider that approving the rehearing would be moot. Nothing would now be gained from the Tribunal making an order that Ms Wang is now the landlord. In fact, there is no prospect that if a rehearing was approved, that a new hearing could be held before settlement.
However, if I were wrong in that first reason, the other reasons raised by Ms Wang for a rehearing, are disputes between the owners, not the tenants. For example, if one owner decided not to insure the premises, that is a decision they can make, but it has nothing to do with the tenants. Likewise, if rates or water payments are not made, that also has nothing to do with the tenants. It would be an abuse of process to approve a rehearing in order to ventilate those sorts of issues, where the tenants would need to engage, and no doubt take time off work or expend their time, to attend a hearing which did not relate to them.
For those reasons, the Tribunal declines to extend its discretion to accept the late application. The application is therefore out of time, it is dismissed.

NAME SUPPRESSION

The Tribunal has previously ordered name suppression to apply for the tenants, that is to continue. The tenants have been successful in their applications, and they are entitled to name suppression.

FILING FEE

Because the applicant has been wholly successful in their application, I must award the filing paid to commence the proceeding in the Tribunal.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5315421 — Exemplary damages

At a glance

Award balance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5315421 — Exemplary damages

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

TENANTS CLAIMS

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

ANALYSIS

NAME SUPPRESSION

FILING FEE

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

BACKGROUND

TENANTS CLAIMS

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

ANALYSIS

NAME SUPPRESSION

FILING FEE

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions