What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5355983 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5355983?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5355983?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Cleanliness.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5355983?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13597943-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5355983 about?

The tribunal order states: The application for rehearing is dismissed.

How much money was awarded in case 5355983?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5355983?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Cleanliness.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5355983?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13597943-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

216 George Street, Stokes Valley, Lower Hutt 5019 Tenancy Tribunal Case 5355983 — 14-day notice

Order

The application for rehearing is dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
On 30 October 2025, the Tribunal made an order terminating the tenancy and granting possession of the premises to the landlord on 30 October 2025.
On 26 November 2025, the tenant applied for a rehearing out of time on the grounds that: he was held in custody at the time of the hearing and could not attend; and he has a defence to the landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy which should be heard.
Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.
Section 105(2) RTA provides that an application for a rehearing shall be lodged with the appropriate Registrar of the Tribunal within 5 working days after the date of the decision, or within such further time as the Tribunal may allow. The application for rehearing has been lodged more than 5 working days after the date of the decision. Therefore, the first issue to determine is whether the Tribunal ought to exercise the discretion available in s105(2) and allow further time for the application.
In cases where a party seeks a rehearing after they failed to attend the hearing (as in this case), the Tribunal will also consider the following factors when deciding whether a rehearing should be granted: a. Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable? b. When the tenant became aware of the orders did they move promptly to apply for a rehearing? c. Is there a defence which ought to be heard? d. Will the other party suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?
Questions 6a and b are also relevant when considering whether to allow the late filing of the rehearing application.

Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable?

The landlord lodged their Tribunal application on 30 September 2025. Tenancy Services records show that they messaged the tenant notice that the application had been filed by email and SMS message that same day.
On 18 October 2025, Tenancy Services sent a Notice of Hearing together with a copy of the application and supporting evidence uploaded by the landlord to the tenant. This was also sent to him via email and SMS message and was posted to the tenancy address.
Reminder messages about the hearing date were also sent to the tenant by email and SMS message on 25 October and 29 October 2025.
The tenant advised that he was arrested and held in custody on 26 October 2025, and he has remained in custody since then.
The tenant also advises that the contact cell phone number and email address used by Tenancy Services were temporary contacts and they are not his address for service on the tenancy agreement. He says that he did not receive a copy of the proceedings in the post.
In any event, he was unable to attend the hearing because he was in custody at the time with no access to devices for emails and text messages.
I am satisfied in the circumstances that the tenant’s failure to attend the hearing on 30 October 2025 was excusable. When the tenant became aware of the orders did they move promptly to apply for a rehearing?
The tenant says that he was made aware of the Tribunal Order dated 30 October 2025, the next day on 1 November 2025. He says that he had a bail hearing that day and his counsel advised the Court that he could not be bailed to the address of the premises due to the termination order made.
Subsequently, it was difficult for the tenant to obtain the form required to lodge a rehearing application while still held in custody. He was unable to obtain the papers and have them filed until 27 November 2025.
I accept the difficulties that the tenant faced and am satisfied that he lodged the rehearing application as soon as he was reasonably able to do so.
It also follows, given the above findings, that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion under s105(2) and I allow the tenant to bring his application for a rehearing out of time.

Is there a defence which ought to be heard?

To determine whether there is a defence to be heard, it is necessary to set out the background to the proceedings.
On 17 June 2025, the Tribunal under application 5248911 made the following work orders (the June work order) against the tenant:
The tenant must carry out the following work to the premises, which must be completed by 5.00 pm Tuesday 8 July 2025: a. Remove rubbish from inside the premises, b. Remove rubbish from the exterior of the premises, c. Remove spa pools, d. Clean premises to a reasonable standard.
As an alternative to compliance with Order 2, the tenant must pay the landlord $3,603.14 immediately.
If the tenant fails to comply with either Order 2 or 3 above, then the landlord may undertake the work and charge the tenant the costs of this work up to a. $1,208.00 for interior rubbish removal, b. $895.14 for exterior rubbish removal, c. $1,500.00 bio clean (cleaning with biohazard materials due to needles on premises.)
The tenancy was terminated by the Tribunal on 30 October 2026 under s56 RTA for the following reasons: a. The tenant failed to comply with the June work order by 8 July 2025, and failed to complete the work despite the landlord giving extensions of time for doing so; and b. The tenant failed to comply with the alternative money order; and c. The tenant failed to give the landlord/the landlord’s contractors access to the premises so that they could undertake the work as permitted by the June work order; d. The landlord also served further 14 days notices on the tenant for breaches of the tenancy which he did not remedy. These notices required him to return the mailbox he had removed from the front gate; repair the damaged front fence; and remove graffiti from the front of the house.
Mr McKay submits as follows: a. In April 2025, he was in custody and squatters moved into the premises and “trashed the house.” He notified the landlord, but they did nothing. This is what led to the June work orders. I note that Mr McKay did not apply for a rehearing or appeal of that order and the order stands. I cannot consider any circumstances that might suggest the order should not have been made. b. He does not dispute that he did not comply with the June work order by conducting or arranging the work himself by 8 July 2025 nor within the extensions of time granted by the landlord. He also did not pay the alternative money order. However, he says he opted to have the landlord do the work at and charge him for it. c. The landlord gave him a 48-hour notice that their contractor would be attending the premises on Friday, 26 September 2025 to complete the cleaning work in accordance with the June work order. Mr McKay spoke to the contractor and asked him to return on Monday 29 September at 9am. The contractor returned on that date and Mr McKay asked him to come back the following Thursday 2 October at 3pm. Mr McKay says that the contractor agreed to this but never returned. The landlord agrees that they did not allow the contractor to return; d. Mr McKay says that he had agreed with the contractor to do 90% of the work and have all rubbish stacked ready to be collected when the contractor returned on the Thursday and the tenant says that he did in fact clean up the house. However, the landlord did not allow the contractor to return. He says that this was unfair given that the contractor agreed to this. He argues that it is the landlord’s fault that the premises were not cleaned in accordance with the June work order. He suggests that they are in breach of an agreement reached with the contractor. That being the case, he says that there were no grounds for terminating the tenancy because the failure to comply with the work order is because the landlord prevented their contractor from doing the work. When I asked Mr McKay whether he then contacted the landlord to ask for the contractor to return, he says that he did not because he was not on good terms with his tenancy manager. e. In relation to other 14-day breach notices issued by the landlord for the mailbox and front fence, Mr McKay thought that these items were included in the June work order. f. Mr McKay also claims that the front fence was rotten from the tenancy start date and when he complained about it, nothing was done. However, Mr McKay has not filed an application against the landlord in relation to outstanding maintenance or repairs at the property. Therefore, I cannot consider those matters. g. Photos were produced in evidence of the premises taken by the landlord on 17 December 2025 showing the property in an extremely dirty, untidy condition and filled with rubbish. Mr McKay says that he contacted the landlord’s call centre who confirmed that squatters were found in the premises when they went to change the locks. He alleges that squatters caused the mess.
I have carefully considered the landlord’s evidence in support of their application to terminate the tenancy, and the matters raised by Mr McKay in defence. I am not persuaded that Mr McKay has a defence to the landlord’s claim.
I find on the evidence that Mr McKay breached the June work order repeatedly by failing to get the work done by the due date; failing to get the work done with the extensions of time given by the landlord and failing to pay the alternative money order.
There is no evidence to suggest that Mr McKay “opted” to have the landlord do the work at his cost. Rather the landlord took the initiative to have the work done because of his failure to comply with the June work order. I also note that the landlord was not required to take this step. The June work order simply states that the landlord “may” take this step. Once they did so, Mr McKay, by his own admission, prevented the contractor from completing the work, rescheduling the proposed access twice.
The landlord explained that they are charged every time a contractor attends a job regardless of whether a tenant grants access. A “futile” payment is charged. While the landlord will generally allow a reschedule they are not obliged to do so. A line must be drawn somewhere. In this case, given Mr McKay’s history of non-compliance, they did not allow the contractor to return for a third time because they had no confidence that the tenant would allow access. I find that the landlord’s stance is perfectly reasonable.
I am also not persuaded that the tenant could possibly be mistaken in thinking that breach notices issued after the June work order were somehow covered by that order, and he has not provided a credible defence to those matters.
The landlord gave the tenant multiple opportunities to comply with the June work order and he failed to do so at every turn.
In summary, I do not accept that the tenant has any defence to the landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy.

Will the landlord suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?

When making an order that the application for rehearing be set down for consideration, I also made an order granting a stay of proceedings, provided the Tribunal order terminating the tenancy and granting possession to the landlord had not already been enforced by the landlord. If the landlord had already enforced the order and taken back possession of the premises, the stay did not operate to reverse that enforcement.
The landlord had already taken possession of the premises before the tenant applied for a rehearing. Therefore, the stay was of no effect. That also means that the termination cannot now be reversed.
The landlord obtained work orders which the tenant failed to comply with repeatedly, despite extensions of time. The landlord did not have to undertake the work orders, but they did so, and still the tenant prevented the work from being done. Putting the landlord’s contractor off for a third time was unacceptable in circumstances where he was already firmly in breach of the June work orders.
A landlord is entitled to expect that a Tribunal work order can be relied on and that blatant breaches will be addressed in an appropriate manner. The property was also proved to be in an extremely bad condition such that I have no trouble finding that the effect of failing to comply with the work orders was to cause substantial damage to the premises.
While granting a rehearing may not cause irreparable harm to the landlord (because the termination cannot be undone), there is harm in the sense that it undermines the landlord’s confidence in and reliance on Tribunal orders validly obtained. In the present case, the delay in determining the matter has an impact on the condition of the premises and the damage that can arise though tenants ignoring their obligations to keep the premises in a reasonably clean and tidy condition.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

In summary, I do not find a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. Weighing all the factors, the absence of a defence is the overriding reason for dismissing the application.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.

On 30 October 2025, the Tribunal made an order terminating the tenancy and granting possession of the premises to the landlord on 30 October 2025.

On 26 November 2025, the tenant applied for a rehearing out of time on the grounds that: he was held in custody at the time of the hearing and could not attend; and he has a defence to the landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy which should be heard.

Section 105(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal has the power to order a rehearing where “a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur”.

Section 105(2) RTA provides that an application for a rehearing shall be lodged with the appropriate Registrar of the Tribunal within 5 working days after the date of the decision, or within such further time as the Tribunal may allow. The application for rehearing has been lodged more than 5 working days after the date of the decision. Therefore, the first issue to determine is whether the Tribunal ought to exercise the discretion available in s105(2) and allow further time for the application.

In cases where a party seeks a rehearing after they failed to attend the hearing (as in this case), the Tribunal will also consider the following factors when deciding whether a rehearing should be granted: a. Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable? b. When the tenant became aware of the orders did they move promptly to apply for a rehearing? c. Is there a defence which ought to be heard? d. Will the other party suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?

Questions 6a and b are also relevant when considering whether to allow the late filing of the rehearing application.

Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable?

The landlord lodged their Tribunal application on 30 September 2025. Tenancy Services records show that they messaged the tenant notice that the application had been filed by email and SMS message that same day.

On 18 October 2025, Tenancy Services sent a Notice of Hearing together with a copy of the application and supporting evidence uploaded by the landlord to the tenant. This was also sent to him via email and SMS message and was posted to the tenancy address.

Reminder messages about the hearing date were also sent to the tenant by email and SMS message on 25 October and 29 October 2025.

The tenant advised that he was arrested and held in custody on 26 October 2025, and he has remained in custody since then.

The tenant also advises that the contact cell phone number and email address used by Tenancy Services were temporary contacts and they are not his address for service on the tenancy agreement. He says that he did not receive a copy of the proceedings in the post.

In any event, he was unable to attend the hearing because he was in custody at the time with no access to devices for emails and text messages.

I am satisfied in the circumstances that the tenant’s failure to attend the hearing on 30 October 2025 was excusable. When the tenant became aware of the orders did they move promptly to apply for a rehearing?

The tenant says that he was made aware of the Tribunal Order dated 30 October 2025, the next day on 1 November 2025. He says that he had a bail hearing that day and his counsel advised the Court that he could not be bailed to the address of the premises due to the termination order made.

Subsequently, it was difficult for the tenant to obtain the form required to lodge a rehearing application while still held in custody. He was unable to obtain the papers and have them filed until 27 November 2025.

I accept the difficulties that the tenant faced and am satisfied that he lodged the rehearing application as soon as he was reasonably able to do so.

It also follows, given the above findings, that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion under s105(2) and I allow the tenant to bring his application for a rehearing out of time.

Is there a defence which ought to be heard?

To determine whether there is a defence to be heard, it is necessary to set out the background to the proceedings.

On 17 June 2025, the Tribunal under application 5248911 made the following work orders (the June work order) against the tenant:

The tenant must carry out the following work to the premises, which must be completed by 5.00 pm Tuesday 8 July 2025: a. Remove rubbish from inside the premises, b. Remove rubbish from the exterior of the premises, c. Remove spa pools, d. Clean premises to a reasonable standard.

As an alternative to compliance with Order 2, the tenant must pay the landlord $3,603.14 immediately.

If the tenant fails to comply with either Order 2 or 3 above, then the landlord may undertake the work and charge the tenant the costs of this work up to a. $1,208.00 for interior rubbish removal, b. $895.14 for exterior rubbish removal, c. $1,500.00 bio clean (cleaning with biohazard materials due to needles on premises.)

The tenancy was terminated by the Tribunal on 30 October 2026 under s56 RTA for the following reasons: a. The tenant failed to comply with the June work order by 8 July 2025, and failed to complete the work despite the landlord giving extensions of time for doing so; and b. The tenant failed to comply with the alternative money order; and c. The tenant failed to give the landlord/the landlord’s contractors access to the premises so that they could undertake the work as permitted by the June work order; d. The landlord also served further 14 days notices on the tenant for breaches of the tenancy which he did not remedy. These notices required him to return the mailbox he had removed from the front gate; repair the damaged front fence; and remove graffiti from the front of the house.

Mr McKay submits as follows: a. In April 2025, he was in custody and squatters moved into the premises and “trashed the house.” He notified the landlord, but they did nothing. This is what led to the June work orders. I note that Mr McKay did not apply for a rehearing or appeal of that order and the order stands. I cannot consider any circumstances that might suggest the order should not have been made. b. He does not dispute that he did not comply with the June work order by conducting or arranging the work himself by 8 July 2025 nor within the extensions of time granted by the landlord. He also did not pay the alternative money order. However, he says he opted to have the landlord do the work at and charge him for it. c. The landlord gave him a 48-hour notice that their contractor would be attending the premises on Friday, 26 September 2025 to complete the cleaning work in accordance with the June work order. Mr McKay spoke to the contractor and asked him to return on Monday 29 September at 9am. The contractor returned on that date and Mr McKay asked him to come back the following Thursday 2 October at 3pm. Mr McKay says that the contractor agreed to this but never returned. The landlord agrees that they did not allow the contractor to return; d. Mr McKay says that he had agreed with the contractor to do 90% of the work and have all rubbish stacked ready to be collected when the contractor returned on the Thursday and the tenant says that he did in fact clean up the house. However, the landlord did not allow the contractor to return. He says that this was unfair given that the contractor agreed to this. He argues that it is the landlord’s fault that the premises were not cleaned in accordance with the June work order. He suggests that they are in breach of an agreement reached with the contractor. That being the case, he says that there were no grounds for terminating the tenancy because the failure to comply with the work order is because the landlord prevented their contractor from doing the work. When I asked Mr McKay whether he then contacted the landlord to ask for the contractor to return, he says that he did not because he was not on good terms with his tenancy manager. e. In relation to other 14-day breach notices issued by the landlord for the mailbox and front fence, Mr McKay thought that these items were included in the June work order. f. Mr McKay also claims that the front fence was rotten from the tenancy start date and when he complained about it, nothing was done. However, Mr McKay has not filed an application against the landlord in relation to outstanding maintenance or repairs at the property. Therefore, I cannot consider those matters. g. Photos were produced in evidence of the premises taken by the landlord on 17 December 2025 showing the property in an extremely dirty, untidy condition and filled with rubbish. Mr McKay says that he contacted the landlord’s call centre who confirmed that squatters were found in the premises when they went to change the locks. He alleges that squatters caused the mess.

I have carefully considered the landlord’s evidence in support of their application to terminate the tenancy, and the matters raised by Mr McKay in defence. I am not persuaded that Mr McKay has a defence to the landlord’s claim.

I find on the evidence that Mr McKay breached the June work order repeatedly by failing to get the work done by the due date; failing to get the work done with the extensions of time given by the landlord and failing to pay the alternative money order.

There is no evidence to suggest that Mr McKay “opted” to have the landlord do the work at his cost. Rather the landlord took the initiative to have the work done because of his failure to comply with the June work order. I also note that the landlord was not required to take this step. The June work order simply states that the landlord “may” take this step. Once they did so, Mr McKay, by his own admission, prevented the contractor from completing the work, rescheduling the proposed access twice.

The landlord explained that they are charged every time a contractor attends a job regardless of whether a tenant grants access. A “futile” payment is charged. While the landlord will generally allow a reschedule they are not obliged to do so. A line must be drawn somewhere. In this case, given Mr McKay’s history of non-compliance, they did not allow the contractor to return for a third time because they had no confidence that the tenant would allow access. I find that the landlord’s stance is perfectly reasonable.

I am also not persuaded that the tenant could possibly be mistaken in thinking that breach notices issued after the June work order were somehow covered by that order, and he has not provided a credible defence to those matters.

The landlord gave the tenant multiple opportunities to comply with the June work order and he failed to do so at every turn.

In summary, I do not accept that the tenant has any defence to the landlord’s application for termination of the tenancy.

Will the landlord suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?

When making an order that the application for rehearing be set down for consideration, I also made an order granting a stay of proceedings, provided the Tribunal order terminating the tenancy and granting possession to the landlord had not already been enforced by the landlord. If the landlord had already enforced the order and taken back possession of the premises, the stay did not operate to reverse that enforcement.

The landlord had already taken possession of the premises before the tenant applied for a rehearing. Therefore, the stay was of no effect. That also means that the termination cannot now be reversed.

The landlord obtained work orders which the tenant failed to comply with repeatedly, despite extensions of time. The landlord did not have to undertake the work orders, but they did so, and still the tenant prevented the work from being done. Putting the landlord’s contractor off for a third time was unacceptable in circumstances where he was already firmly in breach of the June work orders.

A landlord is entitled to expect that a Tribunal work order can be relied on and that blatant breaches will be addressed in an appropriate manner. The property was also proved to be in an extremely bad condition such that I have no trouble finding that the effect of failing to comply with the work orders was to cause substantial damage to the premises.

While granting a rehearing may not cause irreparable harm to the landlord (because the termination cannot be undone), there is harm in the sense that it undermines the landlord’s confidence in and reliance on Tribunal orders validly obtained. In the present case, the delay in determining the matter has an impact on the condition of the premises and the damage that can arise though tenants ignoring their obligations to keep the premises in a reasonably clean and tidy condition.

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

In summary, I do not find a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has or may have occurred or is likely to occur. Weighing all the factors, the absence of a defence is the overriding reason for dismissing the application.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5355983 — 14-day notice at 216 George Street, Stokes Valley, Lower Hutt 5019

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5355983 — 14-day notice at 216 George Street, Stokes Valley, Lower Hutt 5019

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable?

Is there a defence which ought to be heard?

Will the landlord suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Was the tenant's failure to appear excusable?

Is there a defence which ought to be heard?

Will the landlord suffer irreparable harm if the rehearing is granted?

Has a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions