How much money was awarded in case 5425430?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5425430?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5425430?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13185072-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

How much money was awarded in case 5425430?

Verified claim lines are listed on this page.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5425430?

The primary dispute was 14-day notice. Related themes: Harassment.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5425430?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/13185072-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5425430 — 14-day notice

Q: What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5425430 about?

The tribunal order states: The Tribunal orders suppression of the tenant’s name and identifying details,

Order

[As amended on 25 February 2026]

The Tribunal orders suppression of the tenant’s name and identifying details, Person X’s name and Witness A’s name.
The tenancy of [The tenant/s] at [Tenancy address suppressed] is terminated, and possession is granted to Kāinga Ora–Homes And Communities, at 11:59pm on 25 February 2026.
immediately, being reimbursement of the filing fee for this application.

Reasons

This is a reserved decision. The first hearing for this matter took place at Waitakere District Court on 11 February 2026. A representative of the landlord attended the hearing for the landlord. The tenant did not attend the hearing. The tenant had not communicated with the Tribunal as to why she would not attend the hearing and the hearing proceeded in her absence.
At the hearing on 11 February 2026, the Tribunal tried to contact the landlord’s witness. The witness was unavailable, and it was agreed that a telephone hearing would take place on 13 February 2026 for the purpose of the witness providing evidence. The hearing was adjourned to 13 February 2026.
The hearing took place on 13 February 2026 via telephone. Two witnesses gave evidence. Due to an error, the tenant was not contacted at the start of the hearing. For this reason, the matter was adjourned to 15 February 2026 to determine if the tenant wished to participate in the proceedings.
The hearing took place on 15 February 2026. Unfortunately, due to an administrative error, the Notice of Hearing was not sent in advance of the hearing and I am not satisfied that the tenant received notice of the hearing. The hearing was further adjourned to 20 February 2026.
The hearing took place on 20 February 2026 via telephone. The landlord’s representative attended the hearing. Several efforts were made to contact the tenant by telephone, but they were successful. I am satisfied that the tenant was served notice of the hearing in accordance with the RTA. The tenant has not communicated with the Tribunal as to why she would not attend the hearing. I am satisfied that the tenant has not been prejudiced by the failure to contact her at the start of the hearing on 13 February 2026.
The landlord says that on 07 December 2025 the tenant and her partner (Person X) had an argument on the street which resulted in Person X threatening a neighbour and the son of another tenant of the landlord.
The landlord has applied for termination of the tenancy under either section 55(1)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) or section 56 of the RTA.
This is a civil jurisdiction which means when looking at the claims the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Put simply, this means the landlord must establish, with evidence, that their claim is more likely than not. If the landlord fails to do so then the application will be dismissed, whether it has merit or not. The landlord’s evidence:
The landlord says that the tenant is the sole tenant at the premises and has lived at the premises since April 2021.
The landlord said that the tenant’s partner (Person X) is often at the premises.
The first witness put forward by the landlord is a fifteen-year-old boy who resides with his mother in the same street as the tenant (“Witness A”). Witness A’s mother is a tenant of the landlord.
Witness A said that on 7 December 2025 at around 3.30pm he was relaxing in the house and was talking on his mobile phone with his girlfriend. Witness A said he could hear an argument on the street, and he decided to see what was happening. Witness A said he opened the front door and looked out on the street where he saw the neighbours from the premises. Witness A identified them as the neighbours who live at the premises, being the tenant and Person X.
Witness A said while he was standing at the door, he had his mobile phone in his hand as he was speaking with his girlfriend on speaker phone. Witness A said Person X looked directly at him and he believed that Person X thought he had or was calling the police because his phone was in his hand. Witness A said Person X said to him “are you calling the cops?” and he replied “no”. Witness A said Person X then said something along the lines of “stay out of your business”. Witness A said he closed the door.
Witness A said that shortly after this, he heard a sound which sounded like a rock being thrown at the house. Witness A said this led him to look out the kitchen window and where he saw Person X in his car stopped in front of Witness A’s house. Witness A said that Person X could see him through the window, that he looked directly at him and said something like “I’m’ going to burn your house down” .
Witness A said he called his mother who was not home and that she called the police, and the police visited their house shortly afterwards.
Witness A’s mother also provided a statement based on what Witness A had told her about the incident on referred to above. I note that some of this evidence conflicted with Witness A’s evidence. I prefer Witness A’s evidence because his mother’s evidence is mostly hearsay.
The second witness was Ms Shaikh, a team leader for the landlord of the premises. Ms Shaikh said that she had dealt with the tenant and Person X on several occasions over the past 4 years. Ms Shaikh said during that time there has been a number of complaints from neighbours. She said that they have tried to engage with the tenant regarding the issues, but she has been hard to reach over the phone, she does not attend meetings they have tried to arrange via letters and when they have attended the premises to speak with the tenant, Person X has been a barrier to engaging with the tenant.
In addition to the above evidence, the landlord also provided documentary evidence showing that since 2023, the tenant has been sent a number of letters raising concerns about arguments on the street and other disruptive behaviour including two anti-social behaviour notices. Termination of the tenancy under section 56 of the RTA – the law:
Section 56 of the RTA provides that the Tribunal may terminate the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that— (a) the other party has committed a breach of any of the provisions of the tenancy agreement (including provisions relating to the payment of rent) or of this Act; and ... (c) that the breach is of such a nature or of such an extent that it would be inequitable to refuse to make an order terminating the tenancy.
Section 40(2)(c) of the RTA provides that the tenant shall not: ... cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any of the landlord’s other tenants in the use of the premises occupied by those other tenants, or with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any other person residing in the neighbourhood. [emphasis added]
The issues for the Tribunal to consider when deciding whether to terminate the tenancy in accordance with section 56 of the RTA for a breach of section 40(2)(c) of the RTA are: a. Did the tenant and/or Person X interfere with reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any of the neighbours? b. If the answer to the above is that Person X has interfered with the neighbours reasonable, peace comfort and privacy, did the tenant permit the interference? c. If the answer is yes, was the breach capable of remedy? d. If the answer is no, is the breach of such a nature or of such an extent it would be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy? Did Person X interfere with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy?
I accept Witness A’s version of events.
I find that by asking Witness A if he had called the police followed by telling Witness A “to stay out of your business”, threatening to burn down the Witness A’s house, and arguing in the street, was an interference with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of Witness A, a neighbour and the son of another tenant of the landlord. Did the tenant permit Person X to interfere with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy?
The next issue to consider is whether the tenant permitted Person X to behave in this manner described above.
In cases decided under section 40(2) of the RTA, the word ‘permit’ has been interpreted as “to turn a blind eye to the obvious” or “not taking reasonable steps to prevent”. 1
As the tenant did not attend the hearing, I did not have the benefit of asking her if she had taken steps to prevent Person X from acting in this manner. For example, did the tenant call the police herself during or shortly after the incident on 07 December 2026? Following the incident, did the tenant evict T from the premises?
I am not satisfied that the tenant took reasonable steps to prevent Person X from interfering with the neighbour’s peace. Therefore, I find that the tenant permitted Person X’s interference with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy.
In reaching this finding, I note that it is quite possible that the tenant is a victim of family violence. This factor may have influenced what steps the tenant did or did not take. As set out above, the tenant did not attend the hearing and therefore, the Tribunal has not had the benefit of her explaining what actions she took and if steps were taken, why in these particular circumstances, the steps taken by her were reasonable.
I have also taken into account the intent of section 55(1)(c) of the RTA which is to protect the class of persons referred to such as the landlord’s other tenants and the neighbours of the premises.

Is the breach capable of remedy?

Where the breach is not capable of remedy, the landlord is not expressly required to serve a 14-day breach notice on the tenant. A breach is not capable to remedy where the thing done, or its effect, cannot be undone.
The requirement to not permit interference with the neighbour’s reasonable comfort and privacy is a negative covenant. In Vincent Dean Huff v Central Property Management [2020] NZDC 19229 at [46] – [47], the District Court discussed whether breach of a negative covenant was capable of remedy. The case involved a breach of section 48(4)(b) RTA by the tenant. This section states that it is an unlawful act for a tenant to prohibit a landlord from entering the premises in circumstances where the landlord is entitled to do so, without a reasonable excuse. The District Court held: [46] Section 48(4)(b) imposes a negative obligation on the tenant. Several cases have held that breach of a negative covenant in a tenancy agreement is not capable of remedy in terms of s 56(1)(b). The breach irremediably arises when the specified failure occurs. 1 See Hughes v Housing New Zealand (DC, Porirua, 4 December 2006); Housing New Zealand v Salt (DC, Auckland, 12 September 2008.) [47] It is not always the case, however, that breach of a negative covenant is incapable of remedy. Whether a negative covenant is capable of remedy will depend on the nature of the breach and, when viewed within the context of s 56(1)(b)(i), whether the harm that might be caused by the breach can be effectively remedied within a reasonable period being not less than 14 days.
In this case, I consider that the nature of the breach is such that it cannot be undone and, therefore, it is not capable of remedy.

Would it be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy?

In Vincent Dean Huff v City Central Property Management [2020] NZDC 19229 (Judge Rowe), the Court needed to consider the extent of section 56(1)(c), which requires consideration of whether the breach: ...is of such a nature or of such an extent that it would be inequitable to refuse to make an order terminating the tenancy.
The Court set out a range of factors that would be relevant in that case, being: a. The history of the tenancy; b. Whether there had been a persistent failure after repeated warnings; c. Whether the history of breaches was such it was unlikely the tenant would comply with their obligations in the future; d. Whether the breach was inadvertent or deliberately committed; e. The conduct of the landlord; f. The gravity of the breach; g. Whether termination is a proportionate response to the breach.
In this case, the documentary evidence shows there has been a long history of the tenant interfering with or permitting an interference with the neighbours’ peace, comfort and privacy. There have been several warnings given by the landlord which appear to have been ignored by the tenant. I consider that given the history of the tenancy and the tenant’s failure to attend the hearing, it is unlikely the tenant will comply with her obligations in the future.
While the breach may not have been deliberate on the tenant’s part, I am satisfied that the tenant has permitted the conduct of Person X as explained above.
The breach is serious, and I consider termination to be a proportionate response to the breach.
As I have ordered that the tenancy be terminated under section 56 of the RTA, it is not necessary for me to determine if the tenancy should be terminated under section 55(1)(c) of the RTA. The filing fee and suppression:
The landlord has wholly succeeded with the claim. For this reason, I must order reimbursement of the filing fee.
Pursuant to section 95A(4) of the RTA, the Tribunal may, on the application for any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name of any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. I do not believe there is any public interest in publishing the name of Witness A, given his young age and the nature of the threat that was directed at him.
Due to my concerns that the tenant may be a victim of family violence, I have also suppressed the tenant’s name and the tenancy address.
I have also suppressed the name of Person X. This is because the findings in this Order in relation to Person X’s actions are serious. Person X is not a party to these proceedings and did not have an opportunity to defend himself. In addition, identifying Person X is also likely to identify the tenant and, possibly, Witness A.

Order

[As amended on 25 February 2026]

The Tribunal orders suppression of the tenant’s name and identifying details, Person X’s name and Witness A’s name.

The tenancy of [The tenant/s] at [Tenancy address suppressed] is terminated, and possession is granted to Kāinga Ora–Homes And Communities, at 11:59pm on 25 February 2026.

immediately, being reimbursement of the filing fee for this application.

Reasons

This is a reserved decision. The first hearing for this matter took place at Waitakere District Court on 11 February 2026. A representative of the landlord attended the hearing for the landlord. The tenant did not attend the hearing. The tenant had not communicated with the Tribunal as to why she would not attend the hearing and the hearing proceeded in her absence.

At the hearing on 11 February 2026, the Tribunal tried to contact the landlord’s witness. The witness was unavailable, and it was agreed that a telephone hearing would take place on 13 February 2026 for the purpose of the witness providing evidence. The hearing was adjourned to 13 February 2026.

The hearing took place on 13 February 2026 via telephone. Two witnesses gave evidence. Due to an error, the tenant was not contacted at the start of the hearing. For this reason, the matter was adjourned to 15 February 2026 to determine if the tenant wished to participate in the proceedings.

The hearing took place on 15 February 2026. Unfortunately, due to an administrative error, the Notice of Hearing was not sent in advance of the hearing and I am not satisfied that the tenant received notice of the hearing. The hearing was further adjourned to 20 February 2026.

The hearing took place on 20 February 2026 via telephone. The landlord’s representative attended the hearing. Several efforts were made to contact the tenant by telephone, but they were successful. I am satisfied that the tenant was served notice of the hearing in accordance with the RTA. The tenant has not communicated with the Tribunal as to why she would not attend the hearing. I am satisfied that the tenant has not been prejudiced by the failure to contact her at the start of the hearing on 13 February 2026.

The landlord says that on 07 December 2025 the tenant and her partner (Person X) had an argument on the street which resulted in Person X threatening a neighbour and the son of another tenant of the landlord.

The landlord has applied for termination of the tenancy under either section 55(1)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) or section 56 of the RTA.

This is a civil jurisdiction which means when looking at the claims the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Put simply, this means the landlord must establish, with evidence, that their claim is more likely than not. If the landlord fails to do so then the application will be dismissed, whether it has merit or not. The landlord’s evidence:

The landlord says that the tenant is the sole tenant at the premises and has lived at the premises since April 2021.

The landlord said that the tenant’s partner (Person X) is often at the premises.

The first witness put forward by the landlord is a fifteen-year-old boy who resides with his mother in the same street as the tenant (“Witness A”). Witness A’s mother is a tenant of the landlord.

Witness A said that on 7 December 2025 at around 3.30pm he was relaxing in the house and was talking on his mobile phone with his girlfriend. Witness A said he could hear an argument on the street, and he decided to see what was happening. Witness A said he opened the front door and looked out on the street where he saw the neighbours from the premises. Witness A identified them as the neighbours who live at the premises, being the tenant and Person X.

Witness A said while he was standing at the door, he had his mobile phone in his hand as he was speaking with his girlfriend on speaker phone. Witness A said Person X looked directly at him and he believed that Person X thought he had or was calling the police because his phone was in his hand. Witness A said Person X said to him “are you calling the cops?” and he replied “no”. Witness A said Person X then said something along the lines of “stay out of your business”. Witness A said he closed the door.

Witness A said that shortly after this, he heard a sound which sounded like a rock being thrown at the house. Witness A said this led him to look out the kitchen window and where he saw Person X in his car stopped in front of Witness A’s house. Witness A said that Person X could see him through the window, that he looked directly at him and said something like “I’m’ going to burn your house down” .

Witness A said he called his mother who was not home and that she called the police, and the police visited their house shortly afterwards.

Witness A’s mother also provided a statement based on what Witness A had told her about the incident on referred to above. I note that some of this evidence conflicted with Witness A’s evidence. I prefer Witness A’s evidence because his mother’s evidence is mostly hearsay.

The second witness was Ms Shaikh, a team leader for the landlord of the premises. Ms Shaikh said that she had dealt with the tenant and Person X on several occasions over the past 4 years. Ms Shaikh said during that time there has been a number of complaints from neighbours. She said that they have tried to engage with the tenant regarding the issues, but she has been hard to reach over the phone, she does not attend meetings they have tried to arrange via letters and when they have attended the premises to speak with the tenant, Person X has been a barrier to engaging with the tenant.

In addition to the above evidence, the landlord also provided documentary evidence showing that since 2023, the tenant has been sent a number of letters raising concerns about arguments on the street and other disruptive behaviour including two anti-social behaviour notices. Termination of the tenancy under section 56 of the RTA – the law:

Section 56 of the RTA provides that the Tribunal may terminate the tenancy if the Tribunal is satisfied that— (a) the other party has committed a breach of any of the provisions of the tenancy agreement (including provisions relating to the payment of rent) or of this Act; and ... (c) that the breach is of such a nature or of such an extent that it would be inequitable to refuse to make an order terminating the tenancy.

Section 40(2)(c) of the RTA provides that the tenant shall not: ... cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any of the landlord’s other tenants in the use of the premises occupied by those other tenants, or with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any other person residing in the neighbourhood. [emphasis added]

The issues for the Tribunal to consider when deciding whether to terminate the tenancy in accordance with section 56 of the RTA for a breach of section 40(2)(c) of the RTA are: a. Did the tenant and/or Person X interfere with reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of any of the neighbours? b. If the answer to the above is that Person X has interfered with the neighbours reasonable, peace comfort and privacy, did the tenant permit the interference? c. If the answer is yes, was the breach capable of remedy? d. If the answer is no, is the breach of such a nature or of such an extent it would be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy? Did Person X interfere with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy?

I accept Witness A’s version of events.

I find that by asking Witness A if he had called the police followed by telling Witness A “to stay out of your business”, threatening to burn down the Witness A’s house, and arguing in the street, was an interference with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of Witness A, a neighbour and the son of another tenant of the landlord. Did the tenant permit Person X to interfere with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy?

The next issue to consider is whether the tenant permitted Person X to behave in this manner described above.

In cases decided under section 40(2) of the RTA, the word ‘permit’ has been interpreted as “to turn a blind eye to the obvious” or “not taking reasonable steps to prevent”. 1

As the tenant did not attend the hearing, I did not have the benefit of asking her if she had taken steps to prevent Person X from acting in this manner. For example, did the tenant call the police herself during or shortly after the incident on 07 December 2026? Following the incident, did the tenant evict T from the premises?

I am not satisfied that the tenant took reasonable steps to prevent Person X from interfering with the neighbour’s peace. Therefore, I find that the tenant permitted Person X’s interference with the neighbour’s reasonable peace, comfort or privacy.

In reaching this finding, I note that it is quite possible that the tenant is a victim of family violence. This factor may have influenced what steps the tenant did or did not take. As set out above, the tenant did not attend the hearing and therefore, the Tribunal has not had the benefit of her explaining what actions she took and if steps were taken, why in these particular circumstances, the steps taken by her were reasonable.

I have also taken into account the intent of section 55(1)(c) of the RTA which is to protect the class of persons referred to such as the landlord’s other tenants and the neighbours of the premises.

Is the breach capable of remedy?

Where the breach is not capable of remedy, the landlord is not expressly required to serve a 14-day breach notice on the tenant. A breach is not capable to remedy where the thing done, or its effect, cannot be undone.

The requirement to not permit interference with the neighbour’s reasonable comfort and privacy is a negative covenant. In Vincent Dean Huff v Central Property Management [2020] NZDC 19229 at [46] – [47], the District Court discussed whether breach of a negative covenant was capable of remedy. The case involved a breach of section 48(4)(b) RTA by the tenant. This section states that it is an unlawful act for a tenant to prohibit a landlord from entering the premises in circumstances where the landlord is entitled to do so, without a reasonable excuse. The District Court held: [46] Section 48(4)(b) imposes a negative obligation on the tenant. Several cases have held that breach of a negative covenant in a tenancy agreement is not capable of remedy in terms of s 56(1)(b). The breach irremediably arises when the specified failure occurs. 1 See Hughes v Housing New Zealand (DC, Porirua, 4 December 2006); Housing New Zealand v Salt (DC, Auckland, 12 September 2008.) [47] It is not always the case, however, that breach of a negative covenant is incapable of remedy. Whether a negative covenant is capable of remedy will depend on the nature of the breach and, when viewed within the context of s 56(1)(b)(i), whether the harm that might be caused by the breach can be effectively remedied within a reasonable period being not less than 14 days.

In this case, I consider that the nature of the breach is such that it cannot be undone and, therefore, it is not capable of remedy.

Would it be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy?

In Vincent Dean Huff v City Central Property Management [2020] NZDC 19229 (Judge Rowe), the Court needed to consider the extent of section 56(1)(c), which requires consideration of whether the breach: ...is of such a nature or of such an extent that it would be inequitable to refuse to make an order terminating the tenancy.

The Court set out a range of factors that would be relevant in that case, being: a. The history of the tenancy; b. Whether there had been a persistent failure after repeated warnings; c. Whether the history of breaches was such it was unlikely the tenant would comply with their obligations in the future; d. Whether the breach was inadvertent or deliberately committed; e. The conduct of the landlord; f. The gravity of the breach; g. Whether termination is a proportionate response to the breach.

In this case, the documentary evidence shows there has been a long history of the tenant interfering with or permitting an interference with the neighbours’ peace, comfort and privacy. There have been several warnings given by the landlord which appear to have been ignored by the tenant. I consider that given the history of the tenancy and the tenant’s failure to attend the hearing, it is unlikely the tenant will comply with her obligations in the future.

While the breach may not have been deliberate on the tenant’s part, I am satisfied that the tenant has permitted the conduct of Person X as explained above.

The breach is serious, and I consider termination to be a proportionate response to the breach.

As I have ordered that the tenancy be terminated under section 56 of the RTA, it is not necessary for me to determine if the tenancy should be terminated under section 55(1)(c) of the RTA. The filing fee and suppression:

The landlord has wholly succeeded with the claim. For this reason, I must order reimbursement of the filing fee.

Pursuant to section 95A(4) of the RTA, the Tribunal may, on the application for any party to proceedings or on its own initiative, having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest, order that all or part of the evidence given or the name of any identifying particulars of any witness or party not be published. I do not believe there is any public interest in publishing the name of Witness A, given his young age and the nature of the threat that was directed at him.

Due to my concerns that the tenant may be a victim of family violence, I have also suppressed the tenant’s name and the tenancy address.

I have also suppressed the name of Person X. This is because the findings in this Order in relation to Person X’s actions are serious. Person X is not a party to these proceedings and did not have an opportunity to defend himself. In addition, identifying Person X is also likely to identify the tenant and, possibly, Witness A.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5425430 — 14-day notice

At a glance

Claims & awards

Tenancy Tribunal case 5425430 — 14-day notice

At a glance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Is the breach capable of remedy?

Would it be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

Order

Reasons

Is the breach capable of remedy?

Would it be inequitable to refuse to terminate the tenancy?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions