What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4819087?

The tribunal order states: 7 is to be offset to an applicable extent by any rent

How much money was awarded in case 4819087?

The reconciled net award was $8,382.43.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4819087?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: 14-day notice, Smoke alarms, Cleanliness, Healthy homes, Exemplary damages, Harassment, Leaks, Compensation.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4819087?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10604026-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

What was the outcome of Tenancy Tribunal case 4819087?

The tribunal order states: 7 is to be offset to an applicable extent by any rent

How much money was awarded in case 4819087?

The reconciled net award was $8,382.43.

What type of tenancy dispute was case 4819087?

The primary dispute was Rent arrears. Related themes: 14-day notice, Smoke alarms, Cleanliness, Healthy homes, Exemplary damages, Harassment, Leaks, Compensation.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 4819087?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/10604026-Tenancy_Tribunal_Order.pdf.

2053 Wharerata Road, Muriwai, RD 2, Manutuke 4072 Tenancy Tribunal Case 4819087 — Rent arrears

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4819087 — net $8,382.43 NZD. Verify amounts on MoJ.
Claim	Category	Amount	Awarded to	Reason
Net award	$8,382.43

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 4819087 — net $8,382.43 NZD. Verify amounts on MoJ.
Claim	Category	Amount	Awarded to	Reason
Net award	$8,382.43

Order

7 is to be offset to an applicable extent by any rent arrears owing.

All other claims are dismissed.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing held on 11 June 2024. Mr Kohere and Mr Wauchop represented Home Rental Services (HRS). Mr Hyland the owner also attended. 1 Mr and Mrs Venter attended; Mr Venter as the tenant, Mrs Venter as a support person.
I note firstly the background. This tenancy commenced in August 2022 and in October 2023 both parties filed claims against the other 2 . The Tribunal made orders regarding those claims on 3 November (hereafter referred to as the first decision). At that stage it appears that the parties were prepared to proceed amicably, however that was not to be.
The following applications were subsequently filed: 4763717 by the landlord on 15 December 4781478 by Mr Venter on 14 January 4813304 by Mr Venter on 20 February 4819087 by Mr Venter on 24 February
The applications were initially heard by way of case conference on 28 March where the claims were clarified, and some struck out. On 12 June, the day after the substantive hearing, consent orders and filing directions were issued as discussed at the hearing (the consent order). This decision is regarding the remainder of the claims.
The property is the main house on a lifestyle block approximately 25km outside of Gisborne. There are two other dwellings on the block that are not related to this tenancy named the cabin and the cottage. The cottage is rented, and that 1 When I refer to the ‘landlord’ I this decision I refer to Mr Hyland and HRS collectively pursuant to section 2 of the RTA. 2 Application numbers 4701115 and 4724849 tenant will be referred to as Steve in this decision as he is involved in this dispute. The cabin is currently uninhabited.
There are a number of questions before the Tribunal. For the landlord: i. Should any monies be paid by Mr Venter to My Hyland for his electricity use between November 2023 3 and May 2024 4 ? If so, how much?
For Mr Venter as the tenant: i. Is the rent increase above market rent? ii. Has, and if so how has the landlord breached the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) and/or the tenancy agreement? iii. Should any compensation be paid? iv. Should any exemplary damages be paid? v. Should the landlord be restrained from further actions? vi. Should Mr Venter be awarded costs?
I discuss each of these claims separately below. Before doing so, however, it is useful if I outline the requirements for proof. In the Tenancy Tribunal, applicants are required to establish the case to the civil standard of “balance of probabilities”. This means that they must establish that the situation is more likely than not to be as they argue or allege. I discuss the claims with this burden in mind.
A considerable number of documents were provided by the parties, particularly Mr Venter in these proceedings. As such, it would be wholly impractical to refer to all of the evidence filed in this decision however the parties can be assured that it has all 5 been carefully considered.
As an aside, Mr Venter has made claims in his submissions regarding the cabin and cottage. As they are not subject to this tenancy, no findings are made with respect to them. Landlord’s claim

Who should pay for the electricity?

I start with the issue that is at the heart of the parties’ dispute: who should pay the electricity bills. 3 Being the date of the first decision 4 Just prior to the consent order 5 Including the evidence filed just prior to the issuing of this decision
The issue has arisen because clause 16.1 of the tenancy agreement does not reflect the reality. In short, as it has been discussed previously 6 , the tenancy agreement says the tenant is to set up his own electricity connection, however he cannot as the entire block is already provided with electricity from Mr Hyland’s connection, each building having its own separate check meter.
In the consent order the parties agreed how electricity is going to be paid from the June bill on, effectively an amendment to clause 16.1 (the electricity amendment). I note that the parties have copied the Tribunal into their discussions regarding the June invoice however as specified in the consent order, that process is already agreed, and they themselves must resolve the amount owing in accordance with that order. In an effort to assist them, whilst this decision was being prepared I referred the matter of the June bill to mediation with the parties’ consent.
The landlord seeks reimbursement for the electricity used by the Venters between the first order and the June bill (November to May). They say the Venters should pay for it because they have used it. They have detailed their claim to show how much of the bill pertains to the Venter’s exclusive use.
The landlord says that Mr Venter confirmed verbally when he signed the tenancy agreement and on 4 September 2022 that the electricity would be in Mr Hyland’s name and he would invoice Mr Venter for his use. The dispute has arisen because Mr Venter is not satisfied that the landlord is only charging him for his specific use.
After the first decision the landlord proposed an addendum to the tenancy agreement (the addendum) to clarify the verbal arrangement but after protracted negotiations, it was not agreed.
Mr Venter says he should not have to pay these bills for the following reasons: a. There was no agreement that he pay them because the tenancy agreement details a different scenario. He specifically refers to the first decision which dismissed the landlord’s application for reimbursement of prior electricity use. b. He cannot be satisfied that the bills only relate to his usage because the cabin is connected to his supply and although it is ostensibly turned off, it could at any time, without his knowledge be turned back on. c. The calculations do not add up. d. He should not have to be liable until the consent order. e. They could have resolved it earlier however the landlord was difficult, disingenuous and evasive. 6 The first decision paragraphs 4-21 and the consent order
Adjudicator Price found 7 that there had been no agreed amendment to the tenancy agreement to reflect that Mr Venter should reimburse Mr Hyland for his electricity use under Mr Hyland’s supply. Therefore, in the absence of an amendment, the tenancy agreement stated the legal situation 8 , i.e., it was for the tenant to arrange his own electricity connection.
Section 39 of the RTA states that tenants are responsible for their use of electricity. Section 11 of the RTA allows landlords to waive their entitlements under the Act.
Given the contracted agreement between the parties could not be kept to due to the landlord’s own arrangements, I consider that the landlord forfeited the right to collect these payments. The landlord drafted the tenancy agreement; therefore they are responsible for it. When the discrepancy between the tenancy agreement and reality was discovered, they had two options: to change the set-up to allow Mr Venter to connect his own supply, or come to an agreement with him as to an alternative.
An agreement was not reached, and they did not change the set-up; accordingly Mr Venter remained not liable for the charges. As is just, the parties have now come to an agreement going forward. It is right that Mr Venter pay for his use of electricity, provided it is established by the landlord that the charges he is billed for are solely for his use.
I therefore must dismiss the landlord’s claim for reimbursement of electricity between November and May. Clause 16.1 has been an expensive drafting error for the landlord.
Regarding the consent electricity amendment to clause 16.1 9 I urge the parties to deal with each other respectfully and pragmatically when agreeing the amounts owed. They are aware of the law on the issue and the procedure they are to employ is clearly documented. It should only be in cases of extreme concern that they should consider re-applying to the Tribunal for relief.
As an aside I note that Mr Venter claims that Mr Hyland has “delayed a year’s worth of power accounts against an earlier Tenant but failed to inform the Tenant of that practice”10. There is no evidence substantiating this claim and as it relates to another tenancy I make no findings regarding the claims.
In summary, to be clear: i. The parties have agreed to an amendment of clause 16.1 by Consent Order. 7 At paragraph 19 8 Until the Consent Order 9 By Consent Order 12 June 2024 10 Letter from Stainton Chellew dated 28/10/23 ii. Mr Venter is liable for his own electricity usage costs from June 2024, to be calculated as per the Consent Order. iii. Mr Venter has no liability for his power usage prior to June 2024. Tenant’s claims

Is the rent above market rent?

On 24 January 2024 the landlord gave Mr Venter notice that the rent was going to increase from $580 to $700 on 28 March. Mr Venter says this takes the rent to above market rent.
The property is a 4-bedroom, 2-bathroom, private semi-lifestyle property 25km outside of Gisborne. The house was built in the 1990s and has a substantial footprint (200sqm). With the tenancy was the ability to have 2 dogs and 3 cats.
Mr Venter says this is a substantial increase given no improvements have been made to the property over the tenancy. He points out that the property is some way from Gisborne, there is no garage, is not fully carpeted, does not have gas, and is in worn condition. He also refers to section 28 of the RTA saying that the increase should not be allowed because it does not come alongside substantial improvements. Section 28 refers to an agreement between a landlord and tenant as to a rent increase and as such is not relevant here. This claim is dismissed.
Mr Venter further seeks reasoning and justification for the rental increase however this is not required by the RTA as a landlord is entitled to raise the rent provided it is done so in compliance with sections 24 and 25 of the RTA.
I therefore only discuss Mr Venter’s claim that $700 is above market rent. Mr Venter provides the following information in support of his submission (I have made my comments next to his for ease of reference, italicized for clarity): a. They have friends who rent 7km out of Gisborne for $680, and friends who rent in Bushmere 15km out for between $500 and $550. Both are in 4- bedroomed homes. No other information/documentation was provided on these properties. b. 406 Whatatutu Road, Te Karaka, 3 beds, 1 bath, carport: $550 pw. This property is further away and smaller. No detailed information was provided. c. Tenancy Services data for average rents in Gisborne between 1 June 2023 and 23 November 2023 being $390 to $550. d. Stats NZ shows rental increases rose from 4.1% in July to 6.2% in August, not the approximately 20% sought. e. A 4-bedroomed property, 127 College Road, Hexton that is 15 minutes outside of Gisborne. $525. It has a smaller footprint and smaller section. The pictures provided are only of the outside and show an older home. f. 3 bedroom, 1 bath, with a garage for $650 pw: 46A Chalmers Rd, Elgin. Limited information on this property was provided. g. 18a Montrose Street, Kaiti which is 4 bedrooms and rented for $600. It is a shared dwelling as the downstairs is also rented out. He provides information that indicates that the median rental price in Kaiti is $630. This evidence provides me with little assistance as it is not based on size or amenity. Kaiti is on the outskirts of Gisborne city. h. 32 Kanakanaia Road, Te Karaka, 3 beds, 1 bath, $ 550 pw. This property is 29 minutes outside of Gisborne, and inland rather than coastally that the tenancy is. The house is what appears to be an older state house. i. 15 Grundy Street, Mangapapa, Gisborne, 3 beds, 1 bath, $ 550 pw. This home is in Gisborne and also looks like an ex-state house. It is not comparable aesthetically or location-wise to Mr Venter’s home. j. Mr Venter also says that his home is dated and wearing especially as very little maintenance has been done. In particular he points out that there is only carpet in two bedrooms, there is no garage or carport, the exterior is not recently painted or varnished, they do not have gas and only have one leaking water tank, and their chattels are dated.
The landlord considers $700 is fair given the rent has not been increased over the 1.5-year tenancy and costs have increased. They say they came to this amount by assessing the market evidence but did not provide any evidence of this assessment.
Mr Wauchop provides the following properties as evidence that $700 is market rent: a. 126 Haisman Road, 3 bedroom 2 bathroom $725 per week. This is closer to Gisborne and smaller. Mr Venter submits that it is incomparable as it is 11 minutes outside of Gisborne, is newer and better maintained. b. 213 Taurau Valley road, 4 bedrooms 1 bathroom $800 per week. This is closer to Gisborne with a recent renovation. Mr Venter says this locality is more desirable as it is closer to Gisborne and has better amenities such as a garage, carport and two water tanks. c. 53 Glenelg Road, Makauri, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom $700 per week. Closer to Gisborne with a recent renovation but smaller. Mr Venter submits again that this property is closer to Gisborne and has a garage with newer features. d. 27 Main Rd, Makaraka, 4 bedrooms $850, close to Gisborne. Mr Venter says this property is not rural and has a garage and better carpeting. e. 510 Wharerata Road, Patutahi, 2 bedrooms $550 per week. Mr Venter’s comments are that this property is closer to Gisborne, dated, partially furnished and has a garage. f. 389a Matawai Rd Makauri 2 beds 1 bath $525/week. Mr Venter says this is closer to Gisborne and has a garage so is also incomparable.
All properties provided by the landlord are closer to Gisborne. The law
Sections 25(1) and (3) RTA provide: (1) On an application made to it at any time by the tenant, the Tribunal may, in accordance with the succeeding provisions of this section, on being satisfied that the rent payable or to become payable for the tenancy exceeds the market rent by a substantial amount, make an order reducing the rent to an amount, to be specified in the order, that is in line with the market rent. (3) For the purposes of this Act, the market rent for any tenancy shall be the rent that, without regard to the personal circumstances of the landlord or the tenant, a willing landlord might reasonably expect to receive and a willing tenant might reasonably expect to pay for the tenancy, taking into consideration the general level of rents (other than income-related rents within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Public and Community Housing Management Act 1992) for comparable tenancies of comparable premises in the locality or in similar localities and such other matters as the Tribunal considers relevant.
As such, the test for market rent is the amount “a willing landlord might reasonably expect to receive and a willing tenant might reasonably expect to pay for the tenancy”.
The concept of the 'market' is constrained by the requirement that both parties be 'willing', and that the rent meets their 'reasonable' expectations. These terms are not defined by the Act. The Oxford English dictionary defines willing as: "having a ready will; disposed to consent or comply; ready to do (what is specified or implied) without reluctance"; and reasonable as "having sound judgement; sensible ... not asking for too much ... not extravagant or excessive; moderate".
The factors the Tribunal may have regard to are “the general level of rents ... for comparable tenancies of comparable premises in the locality or in similar localities and such other matters as the Tribunal considers relevant”.
The test in section 25(3) is an objective one, and the initial focus of enquiry must be on an assessment of the level of rent being paid for comparable tenancies of comparable premises, before any other relevant factors are considered. The District Court in Thai v Mahmood, DC Christchurch, CIV2003-009-2542 stated: “When considering claims that a rental being charged is too high, the first consideration is to assess the general level of rents for comparable tenants of comparable premises in similar locations. It is not open to the tribunal to make a determination as to market rents having regard only to such matters as the tribunal considers relevant.”
The evidence in market rent cases for comparable rents is usually based on advertisements for similar premises in the locality. Unfortunately, that is not possible here as there are no other similar properties nearby.
The evidence on other properties in the greater Gisborne area also has its limitations. Although advertisements usually list the essential features of the property advertised, there is often limited qualitative information available for comparison. Further, advertisements only cover houses currently on the market and do not necessarily reflect the overall level of rents charged for existing similar tenancies in the area.
The parties here have also referred to the 'market rent' statistics published by Tenancy Services. These statistics cover the rents charged for tenancies where bonds have been lodged over the preceding 6 months. The statistics include median rent as well as upper and lower quartile. This evidence is of limited value as there is no reference to amenities in the data. Further there is no evidence of bonds specifically lodged in this particular locality given it is so small.
The Tribunal may also consider “such other matters as [it] considers relevant” to market rent. In Housing New Zealand v Hobman (DC Lower Hutt, TT89/97, 27 November 1997) the Court said the other factors to be considered must be of the same kind as the preceding specified factors. It is arguable however that the term ‘other matters’ is broad enough to cover any anything relevant to the ‘reasonable’ expectations of a ‘willing’ landlord or tenant.
While section 25(3) of the RTA lists a number of factors that the Tribunal should have regard to, no one factor should take precedence or priority over the others. Recognition must also be had that market rent assessments are not a science but one that is primarily based on the evidence available to the Tribunal.
Mr Venter as applicant therefore must establish to the balance of probabilities that the rent exceeds market rent by a “substantial amount”. The term 'substantial' is not defined in the RTA, but it is the opposite of ‘minor’ or ‘insignificant’. Some earlier Tribunal cases suggested a 'rule of thumb' of 10% over market rent. However, a rule of thumb based on a specific percentage has no legal status and is not appropriate where rents rise at a rate significantly above income inflation. Discussion
It is a substantial increase from $580 to $700 however section 23 does not allow me to consider the extent of the increase, rather I am tasked with assessing what the market rent for such a property is and then whether $700 is substantially over it.
I consider the following relevant to my assessment: a. The section is set rurally and is only 500sqm. b. The tenant can enjoy a lifestyle property without being required to undertake the usual maintenance associated with such. c. The grounds are aesthetically pleasing, and the house has a wraparound deck. d. The section is part of a greater block upon which another tenant lives and the owner frequents. e. The house is large, well laid out and in relatively good condition although tired and worn in parts. f. The house has wooden floors and beams which are attractive. It is an aesthetically pleasing home. g. The property is 25km from Gisborne central. This can be seen as an attribute or impairment. h. Pets are permitted. i. The landlord is to mow the lawns (see below discussion). j. Such properties are rare.
One of the challenges that I have faced in this case, is that neither party has provided evidence of rental rates for what I consider to be comparable premises.
All of the homes provided by Mr Venter are of a lower spec than his. They are relatively basic and simple homes and do not have the same rural character as his home.
The landlord’s evidence of similarly rural properties in Makauri and Manutuke provide the best location evidence although both are inland. None of the properties provided have a similar layout to this one.
53 Glenelg Road is rented for $700 and is smaller and in much better condition. 213 Taurau Valley Road is higher spec and newer and rented for $800. 126 Haisman Road is of similar spec and rented at $725. None of the localities are similar.
It is relevant that on a number of the advertisements provided by the parties there is a note to the effect that open homes are not being held due to the high level of interest. This is highly indicative of the level of interest in rental properties of this calibre in the Gisborne area. I also note that over the time of writing this decision there were between 9 and 13 three-bedroom homes, and only two 4-bedroom homes to rent in the entire wider Gisborne area.
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the market rent for Muriwai as it is relatively unique and there are currently no other comparable properties for rent nearby. There are currently no properties for rent on the East Coast between Gisborne central and Wairoa at all.
Having assessed the evidence that the parties have provided to me and bearing in mind its limitations, I find that the market rent for this property is approximately $700. I make this finding taking into account the above and that the current rental market for such properties is competitive. The market for such rural properties is consumer driven and relatively unique. I would consider it highly likely that should the property be marketed at $700 per week, a tenant would be found relatively quickly.
I therefore accept that $700 is the market rent for this property.
Given the unique nature of this property and the lack of relevant evidence available, I made a direction post hearing allowing time for the parties to provide rental appraisals from independent registered agents in the locality. I did this to ensure that my finding was accurate.
The landlord has provided a rental appraisal from local agents Ray White that assesses the rental to be between $700 and $750. The report does have some mistakes as it notes there is two car garaging when there is not, and that the land area is 72,700sqm which it is not. Despite these errors, I am satisfied that it is sufficiently close to my assessment of the market rent to indicate that my assessment is appropriate.
This claim is therefore dismissed. As such, the rental increase which commenced on 28 March 2024 was lawful.

Who should mow the lawns?

Both parties disagree as to who should mow the lawns. Before I discuss that incongruity, I must first decide what area constitutes the lawns, as there is also disagreement over that. This situation is complicated because the entire land block comprising 2053 Wharerata Road is not clearly delineated between the three buildings (the main house, cabin and cottage) and their respective areas. There appears to be some areas which are “common”, i.e. any of the occupants can use. This has been evidenced by the area behind the fruit trees Mr Venter has used for his chickens that has not been formally objected to by the landlord.
The landlord’s submission is that it is clearly evident what area of the lawns go with the home as they flow naturally on to each other. He says there was no need to specifically spell the area out in discussions constructing the tenancy as it is “obvious”. He did say that Mr Venter had mowed the lawns on his previous lifestyle block and was happy to do them here because he had a hydrogen fuelled mower.
The following depicts the area of land:
Both parties now agree that the fruit trees area is not exclusive to this tenancy. The disputed area is the space known as the tennis court. The landlord considers that the tenancy includes the tennis court. Mr Venter submits that the ‘tenancy area’ is not logical as all areas flow into each other. He considers that the lawns pertaining to the tenancy should only be the area around the house, comprising approximately 500sqm.
Mr Venter says he never agreed or knew the tennis court area was a part of his property, he considered it communal land given Mr Hyland’s son and Steve’s children play there on occasion. He also says that if he did have to cut the grass on all of this area that would amount to 1936.09m2 11 or 1877.09m2 or 2377.09m2 (he refers to all measurements for the same area at different times in his submissions) which is unrealistic and unfair. The area he submits is approximately 500sqm which is fairer. He says that Steve cut the entire area for the first year and five months of the tenancy and that should continue.
The parties did not have a clear discussion about the specific areas at the commencement of the tenancy. There was no advertisement for the property so there is no extraneous material available on the point. Emails between the parties are also of no assistance. For example, emails between Mr Kohere and Mr Venter in January 2024 show Mr Kohere asking for the “areas around the house and court” to be cut and later clarifying that included the fruit trees.
The tenancy agreement defines the premises or property as all the land and buildings subject to this tenancy (unless specifically excluded in this tenancy agreement) and includes all outbuildings, garages, 12 sheds, the grounds and the gardens. 13 It notes the full address for the property as the tenancy address. This is clearly inaccurate as the total land area of 2053 Wharerata Road is 71,700m2 which includes another tenancy and owner area (cabin and cottage).
The tenancy agreement is explicit in detail on many points, right down to issues such as wearing gang patches, but does not clearly detail which areas of the vast property pertain to this tenancy. This is another drafting error of the landlords that has led to confusion and misunderstanding.
In interpreting a contract where there is opacity, the common law doctrine of “contra proferentem” must be applied. Also known as “interpretation against the draftsman", it is a doctrine of contractual interpretation providing that, where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning should be the one that works against the interests of the party who provided the wording. The doctrine is often applied to situations involving standardised contracts or where the parties are of unequal bargaining power, and I find both of those features are present here. The reasoning behind this rule is to encourage the drafter of a contract to be as clear and explicit as possible and to take into account as many foreseeable situations as it can. Contra proferentem also places the cost of losses on the party who was in the best position to avoid the harm. This is generally the person who drafted the contract. 11 This includes the fruit trees area which has been agreed by the parties not to constitute part of the tenancy 12 There are none 13 Clause 1.1
Also relevant to my interpretation of the situation is section 85 of the RTA which requires the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction in a fair manner. It allows me to consider the substantial merits and justice of the situation.
In applying these principles, I am satisfied that as the tenancy agreement is silent as to what area of land is included within this tenancy, it is just to take the smaller and more logical area; Mr Venter’s interpretation. I consider that the tennis court falls into the same nature of space as does the fruit tree area, therefore if the latter is to be a common space, so too should the tennis court. This is because both areas flow naturally from the area surrounding the house and cabin.
In coming to this conclusion, I accept Mr Venter’s submission that it would be unjust to expect him to maintain such a large area without specific discussion as to doing so (i.e., specification in the tenancy agreement) or the provision of special tools (i.e., a ride on lawn mower such as that which has been provided to Steve).
I do not find it established in evidence that there was a conversation between the parties when Mr Venter said he would mow the area because he was happy to use his own mower. Nor is the fact that he did so at his previous rental relevant. I also do not accept that the approximately six occasions Mr Venter did mow the area to assist Steve constitute an acceptance of the area belonging to the tenancy or an agreement to mow the full area.
I therefore turn to the question of who should mow the 500sqm around the house which I have found is the land pertaining to the tenancy premise.
The agreement states at clause 18.1 that the tenant undertakes to mow the lawns regularly.
The history of the mowing has been contentious. Despite what the tenancy agreement states, the tenancy commenced with Steve mowing the lawns as can be seen on the ingoing inspection report where Mr Kohere has stated that Steve will mow the lawns. 14 The same statement was made on the 18 August 2023 inspection.
Throughout 2022 and 2023 both Steve and Mr Venter mowed the lawns either together or on different occasions, with Steve doing the vast majority. This is evidenced by a photo and also Mr Venter invoicing the landlord for his services. Mr Venter clarifies that he only did so on six occasions.
Then at the 31 October hearing the landlord told Mr Venter not to do any more maintenance on the property as that was an issue of dispute between them at that time. Mr Venter says he understood this to include the lawns because they 14 Steve has the use of Mr Hyland’s ride on lawn mower and is supposed to be provided with petrol from him. were talking about both maintenance and the lawns at the same time. Steve also ceased mowing the lawns as Mr Hyland’s mower he used broke contemporaneously. As a result, the lawns got very overgrown.
On 31 January the landlord issued Mr Venter with a 14-day notice to mow the lawns (the 14-day notice); an act that exacerbated the already tenuous relationship. Mr Venter says his mower at the time was broken so he had to hire one to comply with the 14-day notice, and now seeks that cost back from the landlord.
Mr Wauchop says Steve is responsible for the lawns on the wider areas of the property (not relating to this tenancy) and that is an agreement Mr Hyland has made directly with him (Steve did not give evidence on this). He says any time Steve mowed the lawns for this property was done in good faith and was not indicative of an amendment to the agreement. The reference on the ingoing inspection was for him to ensure the property complied with their obligation to provide the home in a reasonable condition at the start of the tenancy.
Mr Venter says he should not have to mow any of the areas because Steve has done so since the commencement of the tenancy which can be taken as an amendment to the tenancy agreement. Mr Venter has also provided a screen shot of a conversation with the previous tenant which is in Dutch and allegedly says Steve cut the lawns when they lived there. He therefore says he should have the same arrangement as the previous tenants.
I have listened to the audio of the October hearing. Approximately 1 hour and 12 minutes through the hearing Mr Kohere clearly says that there was an agreement that Steve would spray the weeds and mows the lawns for Mr Venter’s property. Both he and Mr Hyland clarified orally that as such there was no obligation on Mr Venter to mow the lawns, therefore clause 18.1 was amended by a verbal understanding from the start that Steve would mow the lawns because he has the ride-on mower provided by Mr Venter to do so. Adjudicator Price clarified this very clearly and it was agreed that Mr Venter was not to undertake maintenance without consent and that included doing the lawns and weed spraying. 15
Given this very clear discussion as evidence and the practice that was in place from the beginning, I am satisfied that clause 18.1 was amended by verbal understanding to omit the words: undertakes to mow the lawns regularly. Accordingly, Mr Venter has no obligation to mow the lawns for this tenancy.
Although this order is being made as sought by Mr Venter, it is surprising given his obvious displeasure at Mr Hyland mowing the lawns around the fruit trees given how close they are to his house. As the landlord will now be responsible 15 An excerpt from the transcript of the relevant discussion is included in schedule A to this decision. for mowing the lawns directly around the home regularly, Mr Venter will have to accept some level of disturbance for this to happen.
Mr Venter claims reimbursement of the invoice from EDF he has submitted for the hire of a mower to respond to the 14-day notice. In some submissions he says he only invoiced through EDF but did the mowing himself. In others he says he ‘employed’ EDF to mow the lawns. In a similar argument Mr Venter also says that it is not himself claiming the invoice but EDF Maintenance seeking payment.
Mr Wauchop challenges the veracity of this invoice as he says EDF is a previous company that Mr Venter was the sole director of; this is confirmed on the companies register. He also does not think that Mr Venter actually hired a mower but thinks it likely he used his own.
I asked Mr Venter for proof he paid the $323 hire fee noted on the invoice. He provided a handwritten receipt in the name of Savage Seas Industries. Such a company does not appear to exist and there is no detail on the invoice as to what the invoice is for nor about the company such as contact details or GST number.
EDF is a company Mr Venter previously directed however it has been removed from the companies register. EDF Maintenance Mr Venter says is his wife’s business.
I dismiss Mr Venter’s claim for reimbursement of this invoice. The cost has not been substantiated in evidence and I am not satisfied that it is a legitimate claim.

Has the landlord failed in their maintenance requirements?

Mr Venter claims that the landlord has breached their obligations under section 45 of the RTA by failing in their maintenance responsibilities. I discuss each claim separately below and note that these findings are to be read in conjunction with the consent work orders made at order 11 on 12 June and repeated here for ease of reference:
The landlord consents to the following work orders: i. Repair the gutter join within 21 days of this order. ii. Investigate and repair the remaining six faulty light fittings within 21days. iii. Investigate and repair, if necessary, the broken cement on the cattle stop within 21 days. iv. Seal the basement floor and walls to mitigate any flooding within 21 days. v. Investigate and repair, if necessary, the oven seals and hinges within 14 days. vi. Continuously monitor and fill the potholes in the driveway as necessary.
Breaching any of the obligations in section 45 of the RTA is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages may be awarded up to a maximum of $7,200.00. See section 45(1A) and Schedule 1A RTA.
It is well settled that, the landlord’s obligation under section 45 is to investigate and repair a defect brought to its attention within a timeframe which is reasonable in the circumstances, and as to what that time is, depends on the gravity of the problem but also on the objective attempts made by the landlord to investigate, and put right, whatever the problem might be. Furthermore, a tenant has a statutory duty to advise of any defects under section 40(1)(d) of the RTA. Therefore, a tenant should promptly notify a landlord of any defects and a landlord should be given a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect before being liable for any failure to do so.
Section 45 of the RTA does not impose absolute liability on a landlord, and the courts and Tribunal have adopted a “common sense” approach when assessing a landlord’s responsibility for maintenance issues. Bearing on this approach is how any issue affects a tenant but also that the landlord, as owner of the property, is entitled to choose their own tradespeople, provided they are of a professional standard.
I note firstly that Mr Venter claims that the landlord does not intend to meet his maintenance obligations and has never intended to. There is no evidence to establish this claim and I do not accept it as a general statement. Water tanks
An amendment to the agreement 16 and work order have now been agreed to regarding the issue of the water tank, and the gutters have been repaired. I have amended the tenancy agreement by way of declaration to clarify that clause 23.1 of the tenancy agreement is of no effect.
Mr Venter additionally seeks exemplary damages and/or compensation for the landlord’s alleged breach of section 45 of the RTA in not dealing with the raised concern earlier.
Mr Venter says there is no evidence that the tank was full at the commencement of the tenancy, the tank has run dry due to the cracks, and it cannot be refilled due to the cracks. The tenancy agreement states that the 16 Order 10 of 12 June 2024. The tenancy agreement is also amended by consent to state that the landlord is to ensure the tenant has a continuous supply of water. To that end, the landlord shall regularly monitor the level of water in the water tank. If the water level is less than a quarter full, the landlord will re-fill the water tank at his own cost. tenant is responsible for refilling the tank and Mr Venter says this is unfair when there are cracks.
Mr Venter first reported the leaks in the water tank and broken guttering on 23 March 2023 and followed up many times subsequent. In November Mr Wauchop said they would look at it when the level got below the leaks, he also said they would discuss refilling if they ran out of water. 17 When the water level allegedly got below the leaks in December Mr Wauchop said he would issue a work order. Mr Venter then followed up on a number of occasions but does not appear to have had a response for some time until it was explained they were trying to get contractors to look at it some time later. He issued a 14-day notice to repair and refill on 28 January 2024 which has not been remedied.
Mr Wauchop says that by the nature of concrete tanks they will always leak to some extent. He says the tank was fully repaired in 2020 and they have tried to contact that repairman several times but he has not been available. Mr Kohere says the drip in the guttering is not significant which is why they have not repaired it a second time.
The email evidence establishes the landlord was investigating the issue, but it was difficult to repair. They clearly state that they will replenish the water if they run out 18 however they have not been clear with Mr Venter as to what was happening with the repairs. The gutter was repaired in February 2024 but started leaking again soon after. The tank does not appear to have been investigated by a tradesperson.
There is no evidence that Mr Venter and his family have ever run out of water. They did arrange a free refill but were not obliged to. The tank is cement and the only way of checking its levels is to climb on top, open the lid and measure the level. There is no evidence Mr Venter has done this and there is no evidence his water supply ever got concerningly low.
He has however certainly been concerned they would run out of water which I consider is a reasonable concern given his tenancy agreement required him to fill the tank and this was his only water source.
Mr Venter met his obligations in raising the leaks in the tank and guttering with the landlord on numerous occasions. He seeks a rent rebate for the relevant period on the basis that they had to ration water which meant they could not shower and wash clothes on a regular basis, and exemplary damages for the breach.
I am satisfied that the landlord was investigating the issue, but I do not find they did so within a reasonable time frame. The gutter could have easily been 17 Email 29 November 2023 18 Email from Mr Kohere 21 February 2024 repaired when it was notified at the outset and then again when the first repair did not work. I appreciate that the issue of the tank is more complicated, and trades are hard to find, however active steps were not taken in a timely way. The landlord has minimised Mr Venter’s concerns for a number of months.
Accordingly, I find that the landlord breached their maintenance obligations to investigate and remedy after being notified of the leaks in March 2023. They have quite rightly now amended the tenancy agreement to take responsibility for the refill and I am satisfied that from 29 November Mr Venter was on notice that they took this position.
I consider exemplary damages below and turn to Mr Venter’s claim for a rent rebate now.
Throughout 2023 Mr Venter emailed Mr Kohere regarding his concern for the water. In May he pulled the creeper away from the tank and took photos of the leak to send to Mr Kohere. He also says the matter was discussed at each inspection.
Whilst I have not found that they ran out of water, I do accept the frustration and concern surrounding the issue given the lack of interaction from the landlord. I accept the evidence that the family were conservative with water during this period because of that concern. It was 36 weeks from when Mr Venter first notified of the issue and Mr Kohere agreed to fill the tanks if they ran out. In assessing the situation, I consider an award of $720 being a rent reduction of $20 per week for the relevant 36 weeks just. Cattle stop and driveway
An amendment to the tenancy agreement and work order was agreed regarding the issue of the driveway including the cattle stop, and contractors have been arranged. Mr Venter additionally seeks exemplary damages and/or compensation for the landlord’s alleged breach of section 45 of the RTA in not dealing with the issue earlier.
Mr Venter sent a 14-day notice to repair the cattle stop and driveway on 28 January. He followed up on 11 February. The holes in the driveway were filled just prior to the hearing in June and the cattle stop has not been investigated. The issue with the cattle stop is that the cement is cracked and has potential to break at any time which would provide a hazard. It is therefore not a current hazard but a potential hazard.
The 14-day notice was therefore not complied with and was in fact ignored. There is no reason the repairs could not have been undertaken earlier. I am satisfied that this was a breach of section 45.
I do not find it established in evidence that the Venters have suffered any financial loss from this breach, it has however been an inconvenience. The cattle stop has not yet fully broken and is really only a potential hazard.
I consider a small ($5 per week) rent rebate for the 18 weeks between the 14- day notice and the fill of the holes and work order. I find that an award of $90 is just in the circumstances.
I discuss the claim for exemplary damages below. Oven seals
A work order has been agreed regarding the issue of the oven and contractors arranged. Mr Venter additionally seeks exemplary damages and/or compensation for the landlord’s alleged breach of section 45 of the RTA in not responding earlier.
The malfunctioning oven seals were first reported at the November 2022 inspection and on 11 December 2023 a trade was sent to replace them however he did not have the correct seals. Mr Venter then issued a 14-day notice on 30 January asking for the repair to be completed and raised it again at the February inspection. He says they are not using the oven as the broken seals make it inefficient.
Nothing further was done until the hearing when the landlord agreed to a work order.
I accept the landlord’s evidence that they were under the impression that the issue had been repaired as per the trade’s invoice. 19 However, the 14-day notice should have alerted them that it had not. Further the response time between November 2022 and December 2023 is unacceptable and apparently unnecessary.
Accordingly, this is a breach of section 45 as the landlord has not followed the issue up satisfactorily. It was remiss of them to ignore the 14-day notice and await the hearing, let alone taking a year to send the trade out to investigate after the initial notification. I discuss exemplary damages below.
The evidence does not establish that Mr Venter clearly notified the landlord that the oven did not function adequately without the seals either in November 2022 or in the 14-day notice. They were therefore not aware the oven was not being used. There is also no evidence that it could not be used despite the worn seals. However, he did tell them in January that the repair had not worked. I consider an award of $660 being a rent reduction of $10 per week for the 19 weeks between the 14-day notice and the hearing, and initial 12 month delay, adequate compensation. Lights 19 Keith Allen Appliances 26/12/23
A work order was agreed regarding the remaining 6 malfunctioning light fittings 20 and they have now been repaired. Mr Venter additionally seeks exemplary damages and/or compensation for the landlord’s alleged breach of section 45 of the RTA in not replacing them earlier.
Mr Wauchop says the issue with the electrics was difficult to resolve and took some time and investigation. They had not realised that the fix in February had left 6 lights malfunctioning.
The evidence has not established that this issue was clearly communicated as ongoing by Mr Venter. The landlord was certainly working on it and it was a complicated matter. I do not consider there was a breach of s45 here or that a monetary award is just in the circumstances. This claim is accordingly dismissed. Basement
A work order has now been agreed to for sealing the basement to prevent against the potential of future leaks in the basement. Mr Venter seeks exemplary damages and/or compensation for the landlord’s alleged breach of section 45 of the RTA in not doing so earlier.
The basement has flooded three times since cyclone Gabriel in February 2023. Mr Hyland has sent a 14-day notice 21 to seal the basement, which has not been remedied. The landlord has offered to pay for the wet vac Mr Venter purchased but he wishes to keep it so refused the offer.
The communication on this matter by the landlord appears on the evidence I have to be insufficient. There is no reason why the sealing could not have been done earlier. In saying that the basement has not flooded since the 14-day notice and the flooding appears to have primarily related to Cyclone Gabriel. There is no evidence of any financial loss of the Venters.
In the circumstances I do not consider any monetary orders appropriate and dismiss the claim.

Was the home HHS compliant?

Section 45(1)(bb) of the RTA requires compliance with the Residential Tenancies (Healthy Homes Standards) 2019 (HHS). Mr Venter submits that the property did not comply with the ventilation HHS standard.
The tenancy commenced on 19 August 2022. The home was therefore required to be HHS compliant within 90 days: 18 November 2022. It was noted in the ingoing inspection that an extractor fan was to be installed in the 20 The other 13 light fittings were replaced on 8 February 2024. 21 30 January 2024 downstairs bathroom. On 23 February 2024 the kitchen extractor fan was installed. The bottom bathroom extractor fan was installed on 8 February 2024.
Mr Venter says he first raised the issue when he moved in and then at the November 2022 inspection. On 30 January 2024 Mr Venter issued a 14-day notice to install the bathroom and kitchen extractor fans. Mr Kohere has no reason for the delay other than an oversight.
The home has therefore failed to comply with the HHS ventilation standard for 64 weeks. For this breach I discuss exemplary damages below. I consider compensation in the form of a $25 per week rent rebate ($1,600) appropriate. I do not accept this was an oversight; the landlord is a professional management organisation and was regularly reminded by Mr Venter.

Were the correct documents provided with the tenancy agreement?

It is agreed that there was not a HHS compliance statement provided with the tenancy agreement as is required by s13A(1CA) of the RTA. It is also not disputed that when Mr Venter requested it on 29 January 2024 it was also not provided.
Pursuant to section 45 of the RTA, a landlord must, if requested by the tenant, supply the records or other documents that relate to the landlords’ compliance with the HHS within 21 days after receiving the request.
Breaching this obligation without a reasonable excuse is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages may be awarded up to a maximum of $750.00. See section 45(1AD) and Schedule 1A RTA.
I am satisfied that the landlord has breached sections s13A(1CA) and 45(1AD) of the RTA, which were intentionally unlawful acts. HRS is a professional property management company; therefore they are deemed to know the law they operate within. I discuss exemplary damages below.
Mr Venter seeks a rent rebate for the breaches. Mr Venter did have to follow the matter up and it is important for parties interested in a particular dwelling to have accurate information regarding the compliance of the home they are considering renting. In saying that, he suffered no loss as he only requested it within these proceedings. Accordingly, I do not consider an award of compensation just in the circumstances.
Mr Venter also claims exemplary damages for the failure to include the insulation statement and insurance statement required by section 13A of the RTA. He says he requested the insurance statement on 3 March, but it was not provided.
The insurance statement was provided as part of these proceedings however had not been previously. This is therefore a breach of s13A(2) of the RTA and I discuss exemplary damages below.

Were sufficient smoke alarms provided?

Mr Venter claims exemplary damages for a breach of s45(1)(ba) of the RTA as he says that the property was not provided with compliant smoke alarms and he had to install his own one outside the bedrooms at a cost of $12.43 after he asked Mr Kohere to and he did not. There was one at the top of the hallway and in the kitchen but not within 3 metres of the bedrooms.
The landlord in oral evidence could not remember this discussion at the commencement of the tenancy.
Given the lack of evidence from the landlord I must accept Mr Venter’s evidence that the home was provided without sufficient smoke alarms. He should be reimbursed the cost of the alarm and I discuss exemplary damages below.

Mr Venter claims that Mr Hyland has entered the premises without consent or notice. As discussed in my analysis of the responsibility for the lawns, the premise only consists of the 500sqm around the home. There is no evidence that Mr Hyland has entered that area, let alone the house, without providing notice, therefore this claim must be dismissed.
I also note that the definition of premises in s48 does not include land or facilities. Therefore, entry onto the land, but not the interior of the premises, might not be a breach of s48 RTA. However, in some circumstances, entry onto the land could be a breach of quiet enjoyment under s38 RTA.

Did the landlord harass the tenants?

Mr Venter claims the landlord has breached his quiet enjoyment of the property. Specifically, he considers the following amounts to harassment: a. He was served with a 14-day notice to mow the lawns 22 when Steve was concurrently given a repaired mower for his similar breach. It is the differing treatment that has upset Mr Venter. b. The rent increase. c. The application to the Tribunal for the electricity addendum to be ratified and note by email that if the addendum was not agreed, Mr Hyland would need to move into the home. 23 d. Attending the land block under the auspices of cutting the lawns on the wider property regularly but with the actual intention of undertaking secret inspections, and being there late at night disturbing their peace. e. Mr Hyland allegedly looking at and into their home and intimidating his children when he was attending to the wider property’s maintenance. f. Including his wife’s name on Tribunal claims, the 14-day notice, electricity bills and other tenancy documentation when she is not lawfully a tenant. g. By Mr Hyland speaking to Mrs Venter at the pharmacy on two occasions about tenancy related matters. h. By Mr Hyland agreeing to pay Mr Venter for any maintenance work he did but then failing to pay the invoices rendered. i. Being set up to breach the law by being told to do the lawns which is actually maintenance.
Mr Venter issued a 14-day notice on 31 January 2024 to the landlord requesting that they cease their ‘retaliatory harassment’.
Section 38(2) of the RTA states that a landlord must not interfere with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of the tenant in their use of the premises. Breaching this obligation in circumstances that amount to harassment is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages may be awarded up to a maximum of $3,000.00. See section 38(3) and Schedule 1A RTA.
Section 38(1) is a broad statement and codifies the common law standard of a right to have quiet enjoyment of the premises without interruption. However, while s38(2) states that the landlord must not cause any interference, the duty is modified by the degree of interference being to the “reasonable peace, comfort or privacy” of the tenant. It is clear from these sections that temporary discomfort or inconvenience does not constitute a basis for breach of the covenant. There are several circumstances, as with this case, where the 22 30 January 2024 23 Email 13/12/23 from Mr Wauchop to Mr Venter: To put this into effect will require a contract addendum...We propose this option in good faith on the basis that the owners are not able to cover the electricity consumed by the tenant of the main house plus his mortgage for the property and will be left with no option but to move his family into the house. landlord’s rights (such as to carry out maintenance or renovations) are inconsistent with the tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment. In those cases, it is a balancing act to determine the level of intrusion or nuisance that a tenant can reasonably expect to endure. The landlord is entitled to carry out maintenance, but those actions can quickly breach reasonable peace, comfort and privacy if they are not well managed.
In summary, whether the interference complained of breaches the quiet enjoyment covenant is a question of reasonableness having regard to all the circumstances, including prior knowledge of the work being carried out, and the length and degree of intrusion.
Harassment means "to trouble, worry or distress" or "to wear out, tire, or exhaust" and "indicates a particular pattern of behaviour directed towards another person". MacDonald v Dodds, CIV-2009-019-001524, DC Hamilton, 26 February 2010. These actions indicate that generally there must be evidence of some ongoing intentional actions directed at a specific person or persons which causes distress. Therefore, a single act of interference with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment would generally be unlikely to amount to harassment. The definitions also require the act to be intentional; careless or negligence is not sufficient.
In considering each of the circumstances I make the following findings: a. The lawns. i. Mr Venter says the 14-day notice was issued after an unlawful inspection. As discussed elsewhere, I do not find that claim substantiated as Mr Hyland was entitled to be on his property being the wider block, and did not enter the tenancy premise. ii. The landlord had already agreed that Mr Venter did not need to mow the lawns at the October hearing. To then change their position three months later is unacceptable and a breach of section 38 of the RTA. iii. The notice was antagonistic and disingenuous in a situation of distrust, and could have been approached more constructively. iv. Although Mr Venter has made extensive submissions on the point, I do not find it established that the landlord set him up to breach the law by issuing the notice. They certainly wanted him to mow the lawns which they were not entitled to seek, but I do not find that the motivation was specifically to breach the law. v. Mr Venter’s arrangements with the landlord are different to Steve’s, therefore incomparable. b. The rent increase. i. A landlord is entitled to increase the rent pursuant to section 24 of the RTA. ii. Mr Venter however says that the timing of it was in retaliation to his stance on the electricity addendum. iii. I discuss the timing of the rent increase below, however do find the timing disingenuous. For the reasons set out in the further discussion below, I accept Mr Venter’s submission that it was more likely than not that the reason the landlord issued the increase was in response to Mr Venter’s actions. This is a breach of section 38 as the motivation was not genuine. c. The continued seeking of reimbursement for electricity usage. i. This is not an example of a breach of quiet enjoyment as the landlord was entitled to pursue this matter given the advice given to them at the October hearing. It was reasonable of them to do so given Mr Venter was not paying for the electricity he was using. ii. However, as discussed below I do consider the veiled threat to end the tenancy by saying Mr Hyland would need to move in if the proposal was not agreed, was unnecessary and intimidating. d. Mr Hyland’s attendances on the wider block. i. Mr Hyland agrees that he does come to tend to the property around this premise but tries to avoid looking at the Venters so they don’t feel encroached on. I accept this evidence. ii. The time the children went to feed the chickens Mr Hyland says he was just there mowing the lawns. He said hello as they walked past but that was the only interaction. iii. The cabin is not occupied and remains Mr Hyland’s property. He therefore has the legal right to be there. iv. I do not find it established that Mr Hyland ever restricted Mr Venter’s sons’ movement or intimidated them. Mr Venter’s sons are in their late teens and were on Mr Hyland’s land at the time. v. The evidence does not establish that Mr Hyland was undertaking covert inspections while being nearby. vi. There is no evidence that Mr Hyland was abusing his right to be on his own land in an effort to distress Mr Venter. Accordingly I am not satisfied that a breach of section 38 has been established here. e. Naming Mrs Venter. i. I accept the landlord’s submission that this was an oversight as their internal documents name both Mr and Mrs Venter because they are both contact points for the tenancy. ii. It was remiss of them to name Mrs Venter in Tribunal proceedings and the 14-day notice, but I do not find this was done intentionally to harass Mr Venter. iii. Accordingly, I do not find a breach of section 38 established here. f. Speaking with Mrs Venter. i. It was not appropriate of Mr Hyde to attempt a discussion with Mrs Venter outside the pharmacy. She is not an official tenant and could well have felt intimidated by this interaction. Mrs Venter is entitled to expect that she can visit the pharmacy (Mr Hyland’s place of work) without being approached to discuss the tenancy. ii. I am satisfied this was a breach of section 38 of the RTA. g. Failing to pay for maintenance. i. This was a matter dealt with in the first decision and as such I decline to deal with it here.
Having carefully assessed the evidence, I have found that the landlord has breached Mr Venter’s right to quiet enjoyment by issuing the 14-day notice to mow the lawns, increasing the rent at the time they did and Mr Hyland approaching Mrs Venter directly when she was shopping.
The 14-day notice on 20 January and the rent increase on 24 January were both issued at the time Mr Venter was refusing to negotiate further on the electricity addendum and had just (14 January) filed his application to the Tribunal. The landlord had filed their application with the Tribunal on 15 December and the parties’ relationship had deteriorated.
The 14-day notice was clearly inappropriate given it represents a reversal in position from the October hearing. The action of issuing that notice appears indicatory of the view the landlord was taking of Mr Venter at the time. They were clearly frustrated with his stance on the proposed amendment and then his Tribunal claim. Additionally, they were not dealing with maintenance issues he had raised and had to subsequently issue 14-day notices for. They then ignored the majority of these until the hearing in June.
I am satisfied that the timing of both notices strongly indicates that the landlord was taking a disingenuous stance against Mr Venter. They were focussed on getting reimbursed for the electricity usage, an issue that had arisen because of their poor drafting, and were disregarding his rights and requests.
The direct contact with Mrs Venter by Mr Hyland I find was likely to have occurred because he was frustrated with Mr Venter’s position. It was inappropriate and as such I direct that the landlord should not contact Mrs Venter again, without permission, given she is not lawfully a tenant.
Having assessed all of the evidence very carefully, I am satisfied that the landlords’ breaches of section 38, amount to harassment, which is an unlawful act. I find it borne out in evidence that the landlord was intentionally acting in a way intended to wear Mr Venter down.
I discuss exemplary damages and compensation below.

Did the landlord attempt to unlawfully terminate the tenancy?

Mr Venter submits that the landlord has attempted to unlawfully end the tenancy on four occasions: i. By increasing the rent to a level that he cannot pay thereby meaning that he has to leave. Mr Venter says this rent increase was issued in retaliation for him pursuing his rights by way of 14-day notices to remedy and applying for relief to the Tribunal. He also refers to Mr Kohere’s email 24 which states that if he can’t afford the rent he would need to find somewhere he could afford. ii. By issuing the 14-day notice to mow the lawns highlighting that failure to comply may mean that the landlord would be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for termination of the tenancy. iii. By seeking reimbursement for power used in addition to the increase in rent thereby demanding amounts of money designed to force Mr Venter to vacate. iv. By email of 13 November 2023 from Mr Wauchop during the electricity addendum discussion saying: We propose this option in good faith on the basis that the owners are not able to cover the electricity consumed by the tenant of the main house plus his mortgage for the property and will be left with no option but to move family into the house. 25
Under Section 60AA of the RTA a landlord must not give a notice to terminate the tenancy or apply to the Tribunal for such an order, knowing they are not entitled to do so. The landlord has not applied to the Tribunal for termination and has not served notice to terminate the tenancy, accordingly they have not breached section 60AA. 24 28 Jan 2024 25 Mr Wauchop’s emphasis added
Mr Venter also applies pursuant to section 54 of the RTA that the rent increase be declared retaliatory and set aside. Section 54 refers specifically to notices issued to terminate a tenancy under section 51 of the RTA. The rent increase is not such a notice, therefore this claim is dismissed.
However, I must also consider the landlord’s actions holistically. Mr Venter feels the landlord is trying to force him out of the tenancy without giving him the required notice pursuant to section 51 of the RTA.
Mr Venter is essentially asking the Tribunal to assess whether the landlord was attempting to evade their obligations under the RTA and force him to end the tenancy. Specifically, whether the notice of the rent increase combined with the 14-day notice, coming less than two months after an email indicating that if he didn’t agree to the amendment the tenancy may be terminated, were intended or had the effect of avoiding the landlord’s obligation to issue a valid notice to end the tenancy pursuant to section 51 of the RTA.
The evidence Mr Venter provides in support of his contention is that it is a steep rent increase, it came at a time both parties had filed applications with the Tribunal and Mr Venter was not agreeing to their proposed amendment regarding utilities, Mr Wauchop had already indicated that My Hyland might decide to move in, and the relationship between the parties was acrimonious. Essentially however he is saying that because he would not agree to their proposed electricity amendment, they attempted to make him leave by forcing the rent up to a level he could not afford and scaring him with a 14-day notice. He also provides an email from Mr Kohere that says that if he cannot afford the rent, he would need to find somewhere else to live. I have discussed many of these points above when I found the landlord breached section 38 of the RTA to the extent of harassment.
Mr Wauchop says the rent increase was well overdue and the timing was coincidental. They did not know if Mr Venter could afford the new rent and they assessed this level of rent based on market data. He further says they had to issue the 14-day notice as the lawns were getting overgrown.
As I have found above, these actions amounted to a breach of Mr Venter’s right to enjoy his tenancy in peace. Given they have met that threshold, I am satisfied that they were more likely than not intended to encourage Mr Venter to leave the property.
It is clear the landlord was finding Mr Venter’s position regarding the electricity amendment extremely challenging, and it was an issue of utmost import for them. This was to the extent that Mr Wauchop indicated by email that if it was not resolved, Mr Hyland would move in, thereby terminating the tenancy. 26 26 Email 13 November
The 14-day notice specifically refers to the landlord’s right upon breach of the notice to apply to the Tribunal to terminate the tenancy and these words are written in bold as can be seen by the below excerpt:
Mr Kohere’s response to Mr Venter by email regarding the rent increase does say that if he can’t afford the property he would need to leave.
Having assessed the evidence very carefully, I accept Mr Venter’s submission that the landlord was attempting to wear him down to a point where he would have to give notice and leave the tenancy. Summarised, I make this finding for the following reasons: i. On 13 November it was indicated to Mr Venter that if he did not agree to their proposed addendum Mr Hyland may need to move into the home, thereby ending the tenancy. ii. On 20 January the 14-day notice was issued with the possible result of termination bolded. iii. On 23 January the rent was increased by $120, and Mr Venter was told that if he could not afford it he would have to vacate.
The combination of these events demonstrates that more likely than not, the landlord was so frustrated by Mr Venter’s refusal to agree to the addendum that they were hoping the tenancy would end. This is an attempt to evade their responsibilities under the RTA to give lawful notice to end the tenancy.
I find this is a breach of section 137 of the RTA which I discuss below.

Has the landlord required the tenant to enter into unlawful agreements?

Mr Venter alleges that the landlord required him to make a number of agreements which contravened his rights under the RTA in breach of section 137.
No person may enter into any transaction, contract or arrangement, or do anything: a. that contravenes, or will contravene, any provision of the RTA; or b. for the purpose, or having the effect of, evading, defeating or preventing the operation of any provision of that Act. 27
In addition to an attempt to end the tenancy using a process outside of those provided for in the RTA, Mr Venter says the landlord breached section 137 in other ways.
Firstly, Mr Venter says that by the 14-day notice to mow the lawns he was being required to undertake maintenance on the property which is in breach of the RTA, the tenancy agreement and the oral agreement made at the November hearing.
As above, Mr Kohere clearly stated that Mr Venter did not have an obligation to mow the lawns at the 31 October hearing. To then issue a 14-day notice to mow the lawns several months later when Mr Venter was not agreeing to their proposed amendment is unacceptable. I am satisfied that the landlord did attempt to contravene section 45(1)(b) of the Act which requires landlord to undertake maintenance. It had been clarified that in this instance the lawns were included as maintenance and as such, an obligation of the landlord. This was an unlawful act.
Secondly, Mr Venter says the following sections of the tenancy agreement were unlawful and he should not have been required to enter into them: a. Clause 2 which refers to a letting fee. This claim is dismissed because although a letting fee is referred to, none was charged. It is an outdated clause but is not unlawful. The landlord is advised to omit the words “letting fee” from their standard clauses. b. Clause 7.1 regarding damage. This clause refers to the Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2019 when in fact it should refer to the RTA but is otherwise correct. This claim is dismissed. c. Clause 7.2 requiring the tenant to replace light bulbs. This became an issue because there were problems with the electrics causing the lights to short regularly. As such Mr Venter says he had to replace an excessive number of light bulbs. I am not satisfied that a requirement to replace light bulbs is an unlawful clause. It is standard practice for tenancies to be provided with functioning light bulbs and for them to be replaced during the tenancy by tenants. There is also evidence that the landlord provided replacement bulbs. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. In this situation however there was an issue with the electricity that meant the bulbs blew more frequently than usual. This is also an issue of maintenance which has already been discussed. There is no evidence that 27 See section 137(1) RTA. this clause was included with the knowledge that it would be such a burden. Therefore, this claim is dismissed. d. Clause 5.1 omitting listing Mr Venter’s wife as an occupant. I am satisfied this was an oversight rather than an unlawful clause. Mr Venter could have also picked up on this when he signed the agreement. This claim is dismissed. e. Clause 11.2 requires tenants to fumigate the premise and clean the carpet at the end of the tenancy if pets are present. This is not lawful as the landlord cannot require a tenant to fumigate or carpet clean unless the tenant breaches section 40(1)(e)(iii) of the RTA and fails to leave the property clean and tidy when they vacate, to the extent that fumigation or carpet cleaning is required to remedy that breach. This clause therefore contravenes the RTA and places an obligation on the tenant that exceeds his obligation to leave the carpet reasonably clean. a. Clause 16.1 regarding utilities. This has been discussed at length elsewhere and resolved. It was an incorrect clause but not unlawful as it accords with section 39 of the RTA. b. Clause 17 directing the tenant to keep the property ventilated which he says is not possible as there were insufficient extractor fans. It is not unlawful to require a tenant to ventilate a premise especially as this clause is written generally. There are still windows to open, and the issue of fans is dealt with elsewhere. This claim is dismissed. c. Clause 18 requires the tenant to mow the lawns. Mr Venter says that as the area they are seeking to have cut is excessive, this clause is unlawful. This issue is dealt with elsewhere and the clause complies with the RTA; as such it is dismissed. d. Clause 24.2 requires the keys to be returned at midday on the last day of the tenancy. Mr Venter quite rightly points out that any day of a tenancy, i.e. a day rent is paid for, is a full day, therefore cannot end at midday. Mr Kohere submits that this was intended to read return of the keys the day after the tenancy ends. I do not accept this as the plain reading of the clause clearly refers to midday on the last day of the tenancy. This clause is therefore unlawful. e. Clause 30 confirms that a facsimile copy of the agreement constitutes agreement. This clause was not utilised here as neither party used a fax machine. It is redundant and outdated but not unlawful.
In summary I have found that clauses 11.2 and 24.2 are unlawful clauses. It is a serious matter to mislead tenants about their obligations and lead them to spend more of their income than they are required to. It is in the public interest that landlords do not pressure tenants to exceed their obligations. Providing a long, detailed tenancy agreement with clauses such as these within them, can be seen as exerting such pressure.
Accordingly, I find the landlord has committed unlawful acts by: a. attempting to end the tenancy without giving the required notice; and b. requiring the tenant to undertake maintenance; and c. providing a tenancy agreement with unlawful clauses.
I discuss an award of exemplary damages below.
I do not find an award of compensation justified with respect to the tenancy agreement as the relevant clauses relate to events at the end of the tenancy which has not yet occurred. I do declare however that the following sections of the relevant clauses shall be of no effect:
2 Should the Landlord allow pets or animals on the Premises, the Tenant hereby undertakes upon termination of the tenancy to fumigate the interior of the Premises for fleas and have the carpets thoroughly cleaned.
2 The Tenant must give to the Landlord 28 day's written notice that he or she intends terminating this Tenancy Agreement, including at the end of a fixed term tenancy, and shall deliver the keys to the Landlord by 12.00 noon on the date of the notified termination. The tenant may however vacate the Premises prior to this date and deliver the keys to the Landlord but acknowledges that liability for rent may continue up to the notified date of termination.
I do consider compensation justified for the attempts to end the tenancy and with respect to the 14-day notice and findings of harassment as above as they all relate to damages for stress and inconvenience. The Tribunal has the authority 28 to make such an award on the basis that the law of contract allows such damages where the purpose or one of the purposes of the contract is the peace and comfort of the party and, in the case of a tenant, that is regarded as one of the purposes of a tenancy agreement.
Nevertheless, it is not something that the Tribunal does lightly. The normal rules for damages apply and the tenant must prove breach of an obligation or right, damage, that the damage was foreseeable and that an amount of damages is appropriate.
As a starting point the Tribunal adopts the position that a tenancy agreement involves a relationship: relationships are rarely smooth, and a tenant must expect some disruption or inconvenience from to time to time. Inevitably there is likely to be disruption when a tenancy approaches its end, even if both parties act entirely lawfully. Commonly there is disagreement and negotiation and often this is because of disagreement over rights and obligations. Some degree of 28 77(2)(n) RTA anxiety and stress has been considered an inevitable corollary to rights based on promises, and a contracting party has traditionally been deemed to take the risk. Accordingly, when considering the level of damages to award, it is well established that where the loss suffered is intangible, awards must be kept modest.
The landlord here has breached their obligations pursuant to sections 38 and 137 of the RTA. Frustration and stress to those breaches were obvious corollaries.
Nice Place Property v Ogbourne and Couzens (2017) NZTT 4046775 is a previous case which suggests appropriate bands where making awards for emotional harm damages. Those amounts have been increased in the 2022 Tribunal case A v Singh 29 to take into account inflation: “ A. At the lower end of the scale, where a breach causes inconvenience, frustration, annoyance, or disappointment: an award of $200.00 to $1,000.00. B. Where due to the breach the party has endured more inconvenience and a higher level of mental distress such as worry, stress, tension, or anxiety: an award of $1,000.00 to $2,000.00. C. At the upper end of the scale, where the party has experienced hardship, insecurity, humiliation, intimidation, aggravation, or fear: an award of $2,000.00 and upwards.”
Adopting that formular, I consider this a situation of worry, stress and tension with elements of insecurity. As discussed, Mr Venter considered the landlord was on a campaign to end his tenure. As such, I find that an award of $1,8000 is reasonable in the circumstances.

Should Exemplary damages be awarded?

I have found that the landlord has breached the following sections of the RTA next to which I have noted the maximum awardable for each breach: 30 a. Section 38: breach of quiet enjoyment. $3,000. b. Section 45(1)(bb) failure to comply with the HHS (ventilation). $7,200. c. Section 45(1AD): failure to provide HHS documentation. $750. d. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the water source between March and November 2023. $7,200. e. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the driveway between January and June 2024. $7,200. 29 [2022] NZTT Auckland 4315225 30 Pursuant to Schedule 1A of the RTA f. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the oven between January and June 2024. $7,200. g. Section 45(1)(ba): failure to provide compliant smoke alarms. $7,200. h. Section 137 contravening the RTA. $1,800.
Where a party has committed an unlawful act intentionally, the Tribunal may award exemplary damages where it is satisfied it would be just to do so, having regard to the party’s intent, the effect of the unlawful act, the interests of the other party, and the public interest. See section 109(3) RTA. As can be seen above, breaches of different sections accrue different levels of maximum exemplary damages but only one award can be made for each event/section breach. Exemplary damages are designed to be a fine or penalty imposed to punish and deter and to mark disapproval of the conduct.
I am satisfied that all the unlawful acts were intentional as the HRS is a professional property management company and as such ought to know the law they operate within.
Firstly, I must decline the applications for exemplary damages relating to the smoke alarms, unlawful clauses in the tenancy agreement and HHS as under s.109(2)(b), an application for exemplary damages must be brought within 12 months of the commission of the unlawful act. I therefore turn to the other unlawful acts: sections 38, 45 and 137 RTA.
Exemplary damages cannot be claimed for the same conduct under multiple unlawful acts. 31 Therefore, I consider one award of exemplary damages for the breach of section 38 (quiet enjoyment) and section 137 (attempts to contravene the RTA). In doing so I note: a. When Mr Venter did not agree to their proposed addendum the landlord has taken a number of actions that have been distressing for Mr Venter. In particular he has had the termination of his tenancy referred to three times. b. The issue with the electricity has been brought about by poor drafting from the landlord. c. The landlord was not consistently dealing with Mr Venter respectfully or genuinely over this process. d. It is a rare case where a landlord is found to breach section 38 to the level of harassment, but that has occurred here. e. The relevant time period is from just after the first decision in early November until late January and resulted in Mr Venter filing for relief in the Tribunal. 31 Manage My Rental Limited v Baxter [2015] NZDC 12011 and Syed v Hub Realty Ltd [2022] NZTT 4292049 and 4307811 f. It is in the public interest that landlord not attempt to evade the RTA in order to achieve their desired end.
Having considered all of the above I find an award of $1,500 justified in the circumstances for the breaches of sections 38 and 137.
I further consider one award for the landlord’s failures to provide HHS documentation, failure to maintain the water source, driveway and oven. In the assessment I take the following into account: a. The failure to provide the HHS documentation frustrated Mr Venter but did not result in any tangible loss. The tenancy had commenced well over a year prior to the request and as such had no material impact on him. b. The failures to maintain were frustrating and concerning particularly with respect to the water. The oven has not been able to be used fully for a number of months. c. The landlord’s conduct with respect to this tenancy has been rather lackadaisical and primarily focussed on the recoup of monies paid for electricity to the detriment of their maintenance responsibilities. d. The fact that despite the 14-day notices issued by Mr Venter, action was not taken until just prior and at the hearing, indicates that the landlord was not taking their obligations seriously. e. In many cases the landlord ignored the 14-day notices. This is not appropriate and is not an action that can be sanctioned. f. It is clearly in the public interest for landlords to abide by their obligations under the RTA without the need for a tenant to apply to the Tribunal for relief. g. Parliament has signalled that they consider breaches of section 45 to be extremely serious given the high level of exemplary damages awardable.
Having considered all of the above I find an award of $2,000 justified in the circumstances for the breaches of section 45.

Should costs be awarded?

Mr Venter makes two claims for costs, one relating to an alleged advisor, ‘Koru’, and the second for his lawyer’s fees. I discuss each separately.
Mr Venter originally sought reimbursement of invoices he received from ‘Koru’ totalling $42,500. He now says he has had this amount reduced to $5,000. He has provided the invoices and emails covering the invoices in support of this claim.
The landlord challenges the existence of Koru pointing out that they have no online presence, the documents filed in support of their existence are minimal and lack credibility and there is no phone number provided to confirm their actuality.
I do not find that the evidence has established the veracity of these invoices for the following reasons: a. The “website” could not be accessed on the day of the hearing but could subsequently when challenged. b. The website is made through a free basic graphic design website, canva which lacks authenticity. c. The emails from the alleged company come from two different platforms (protonmail and gmail). d. There is no phone number provided in any of the documentation filed regarding Koru, nor can one be obtained from an online search. e. The email of 7 November states that they are sending their first four invoices which is not usual procedure. f. The invoices are not specific and do not have a GST allocation. g. Koru is not a registered company. h. The address provided for the business is immediately next door to a previous place of residence of the Venters. i. The amounts initially invoiced for are exorbitant ($42,400) j. No evidence of the advice received has been filed. Only the invoices and covering emails were filed. k. The ‘advertisement’ for Koru states: Do you as a tenant in NZ have a tendency problem? The misspelling of tenancy to tendency is an error Mr Venter has made in his own submissions.
Accordingly, this claim is dismissed and Mr Venter is warned against providing misleading evidence to the Tribunal. Section 111 of the RTA states: Every person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who, after promising to tell the truth pursuant to section 97(2), makes any assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge knowing that assertion to be false and intending thereby to mislead the Tribunal.
Mr Venter also seeks legal costs totalling $7,565.25 relating to the period October 2023 to February 2024. The amount claimed exceeds the amount on the invoices provided which total $5460. The costs are for taking instructions, perusing information, writing several letters to the landlord, and advising on the Tribunal process.
Mr Venter says he had to engage a lawyer during the discussion regarding the addendum because the landlord was not listening to him. He says if the landlord had removed the water pipe to the cabin as he had asked (to ensure the power usage was exclusive) he would not have needed to incur legal fees.
Generally costs are not awarded in the Tribunal, except in limited circumstances. This is because the Tribunal is a ‘people’s court’ and is set up to be accessible to unrepresented litigants. Tenancy Services provides a website and call centre to assist people to navigate the process.
Section 102 of the RTA details the limited circumstances in which costs can be awarded. None have occurred here. Specifically: a. I do not consider the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or ought not to have been brought. 32 b. Neither of the parties were represented by counsel. Mr Venter took legal advice well in advance of the hearing but he was not represented in the proceedings by counsel. The advice he obtained from his lawyer regarding filing a cross application was readily available through Tenancy Services. The majority of the advice obtained was regarding the addendum which occurred before the hearing and was not decided upon by the Tribunal. 33 c. I do not consider the dispute ought to have been settled at mediation prior to the hearing; these are complicated matters. 34 d. Both parties attended. 35
I therefore find that I do not have the power to award costs, even if they had been justified, and this claim is dismissed.
I note that even had I been authorised to award costs I would be reluctant to do so because of the inefficient way in which Mr Venter’s claims were presented. Firstly, Mr Venter filed three claims which was unnecessary and resulted in a number of documents being replicated.
Secondly, he has filed a considerable number of documents, for example over 1500 pages on just one of his claims. Because of this, the time the Tribunal, and no doubt the landlord, has been required to spend on interpreting the documents has been extensive. I am not therefore satisfied that Mr Venter has 32 Section 102(2)(a) RTA 33 Section 102(2)(b) RTA 34 Section 102(2)(c) RTA 35 S102(2)(d) RTA approached the prosecution of his claim, or his defence to the landlords claim, in an efficient way.

Should restraining orders be made?

Mr Venter seeks restraining orders pursuant to section 109A of the RTA for all unlawful acts found by the Tribunal. This was not discussed at the hearing and as such the landlord was provided with time post hearing to respond to the claims, to which they did.
I have found that the landlord has engaged in the following unlawful acts: a. Section 38: breach of quiet enjoyment. b. Section 45(1)(bb) failure to comply with the HHS (ventilation). c. Section 45(1AD): failure to provide HHS documentation. d. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the water source between March and November 2023. e. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the driveway between January and June 2024. f. Section 45(1)(b): failure to maintain the oven between January and June 2024. g. Section 45(1)(ba): failure to provide compliant smoke alarms. h. Section 137: contravening the RTA.
The Tribunal is entitled to make restraining orders if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, to restrain the person from committing a further act of the same kind.
I do note that this has been an expensive exercise for the landlord. Because of their drafting errors Mr Hyland has had to pay for Mr Venter’s use of electricity for almost two years. They have been financially penalised by compensation and exemplary damage awards made in this order. I consider it likely therefore that they have learnt from their mistakes and there is no necessity for restraining orders.
I do not consider the drafting errors were made maliciously or with an intent to deceive as suggested by Mr Venter, the evidence is more that the tenancy has been instituted and managed lackadaisically. The evidence has not substantiated claims that the landlord has undertaken such behaviour previously. Accordingly, I do not find restraining orders necessary in the public interest.
This claim is dismissed.

Should the filing fee be reimbursed?

As stated, Mr Venter filed three applications, the landlord one. Both parties claim reimbursement of their filing fees.
As both parties have only been partially successful in their applications it is not appropriate to award reimbursement of the filing fee to either party. Although Mr Venter paid two more filing fees than the landlord, he did not need to as all his claims could have been included in his one application.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the costs of filing these applications should lie where they fall. A note on the monetary orders made
I have ordered that the landlord owes Mr Venter $8,382.43. I also note that given I have found the rental increase was lawful, as of 28 March 2024 Mr Venter may be in rent arrears if he has not been paying the increased amount. I therefore direct that any rent arrears may be deducted from the amounts ordered by this decision.

Should suppression orders be made?

Mr Venter seeks suppression orders in his favour but says that the landlord’s name should be published to educate other landlords and hold them to account. He submits that even if his name is suppressed, the damage to his reputation by these proceedings, given he lives in a small town, will be considerable.
The landlord seeks suppression because of the “numerous inaccuracies and character defamation statements” included in Mr Venter’s documents and that he took photos of Mr Hyland’s young son. In particular they say Mr Venter has made a number of defamatory comments which should not be made public.
It would only ever be my decision that is published therefore Mr Wauchop’s submission regarding the photographs is unnecessary.
Section 95A of the RTA directs the Tribunal to suppress an applicant party’s details when that applicant has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case. 36
The Tribunal also has discretion to make suppression orders having regard to the interests of the parties and to the public interest. 37 36 Section 95A(1) RTA
Neither party has wholly nor substantially succeeded in their claims. Both parties have acted at times disingenuously. As such, I find no reason to suppress either party’s identifying details. Accordingly, both claims for suppression are dismissed.
Finally, Mr Venter applies for this to be an “open case” as his view is that the landlord has undertaken similar unlawful acts against other parties and by leaving this case “open” other tenants can join the claim. I dismiss this application. I have no jurisdiction to make the order sought, nor is there any need. Other tenants, if any, may bring their own claims.

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Who should pay for the electricity?

Is the rent above market rent?

Who should mow the lawns?

Has the landlord failed in their maintenance requirements?

Was the home HHS compliant?

Were the correct documents provided with the tenancy agreement?

Were sufficient smoke alarms provided?

Did Mr Hyland enter the premise without consent?

Did the landlord harass the tenants?

Did the landlord attempt to unlawfully terminate the tenancy?

Has the landlord required the tenant to enter into unlawful agreements?

Should Exemplary damages be awarded?

Should costs be awarded?

Should restraining orders be made?

Should the filing fee be reimbursed?

Should suppression orders be made?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

Who should pay for the electricity?

Is the rent above market rent?

Who should mow the lawns?

Has the landlord failed in their maintenance requirements?

Was the home HHS compliant?

Were the correct documents provided with the tenancy agreement?

Were sufficient smoke alarms provided?

Did Mr Hyland enter the premise without consent?

Did the landlord harass the tenants?

Did the landlord attempt to unlawfully terminate the tenancy?

Has the landlord required the tenant to enter into unlawful agreements?

Should Exemplary damages be awarded?

Should costs be awarded?

Should restraining orders be made?

Should the filing fee be reimbursed?

Should suppression orders be made?

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Property management

Frequently asked questions