What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5277243 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5277243?

Compensation: $150.00 awarded to tenant; Property Damage: $150.00 awarded to tenant; Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Carpet (50% Of Depreciated Value: $181.88 awarded to landlord; Zinsser Stain Sealer: $100.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5277243?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5277243?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12204783-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5277243 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5277243?

Compensation: $150.00 awarded to tenant; Property Damage: $150.00 awarded to tenant; Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Filing Fee: $27.00 awarded to landlord; Carpet (50% Of Depreciated Value: $181.88 awarded to landlord; Zinsser Stain Sealer: $100.00 awarded to landlord

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5277243?

The primary dispute was Exemplary damages.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5277243?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12204783-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

New Zealand Tenancy Tribunal Case 5277243 — Exemplary damages

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5277243 — net $948.12 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Tenant	Reason
Repairs: Carpet (50% of depreciated value	$181.88		Repairs: Carpet (50% of depreciated value
Repairs: Zinsser stain sealer	$100.00		Repairs: Zinsser stain sealer
Filing fee reimbursement	$27.00		Filing fee reimbursement
Compensation for failing to lodge bond		$150.00	99. I make an order for the landlord to pay $150.00 in exemplary damages, ten percent of the maximum available, for its breach of s48(4)(a) of the RTA.
Exemplary damages: Unlawful entry- 14 May 2025		$150.00	99. I make an order for the landlord to pay $150.00 in exemplary damages, ten percent of the maximum available, for its breach of s48(4)(a) of the RTA.
Filing fee reimbursement		$27.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Bond held by landlord		$930.00	Bond held by landlord
Total award	$308.88	$1,257.00
Net award		$948.12
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant		$948.12

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5277243 — net $948.12 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Landlord	Tenant	Reason
Repairs: Carpet (50% of depreciated value	$181.88		Repairs: Carpet (50% of depreciated value
Repairs: Zinsser stain sealer	$100.00		Repairs: Zinsser stain sealer
Filing fee reimbursement	$27.00		Filing fee reimbursement
Compensation for failing to lodge bond		$150.00	99. I make an order for the landlord to pay $150.00 in exemplary damages, ten percent of the maximum available, for its breach of s48(4)(a) of the RTA.
Exemplary damages: Unlawful entry- 14 May 2025		$150.00	99. I make an order for the landlord to pay $150.00 in exemplary damages, ten percent of the maximum available, for its breach of s48(4)(a) of the RTA.
Filing fee reimbursement		$27.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Bond held by landlord		$930.00	Bond held by landlord
Total award	$308.88	$1,257.00
Net award		$948.12
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant		$948.12

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant’s and the Landlord’s names and identifying details.
[The landlords] must pay [The tenant] $948.12 immediately, calculated as shown in table below.

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing.
The tenant applied for compensation, exemplary damages, refund of the bond, and reimbursement of the filing fee following the end of the tenancy.
The landlords made a cross application for compensation, refund of the bond, and reimbursement of the filing fee following the end of the tenancy.

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The relevant law that applies is found in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (“RTA”). Evidential burden
With any claim before the Tenancy Tribunal, the Tribunal applies the usual civil law standards and expectations.
That includes a requirement that the party bringing the claim (the applicant), establish their claims “on the balance of probabilities”. The balance of probabilities means more likely than unlikely, or in mathematical terms, has a fractionally more than 50% likelihood. The Tribunal does not need to be certain or very sure about any claim, only that what is claimed is likely.
This obligation carried by the applicant is referred to as the “burden of proof”. Independent witnesses, corroborating documents and photographs are an important part of discharging this burden.
As noted by the District Court in Kaipo v Clarke & McCarthy (DC) TT233/02, in practical terms this means that: ... [L]ike anyone who brings an application before a Tribunal or Court, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the evidence necessary to prove the case. If the applicant fails to do that, then their application will be dismissed whether it has merit or not because it is up to the applicant to provide the necessary evidence. It is not up to the other parties, and it is certainly not up to the Tribunal to extract evidence.
In summary, I do not need to be completely certain, but I need to be more certain than uncertain. In deciding any claim, I must consider all the evidence presented (including oral evidence during the hearing). I must weigh this evidence to decide what is more likely. If any claim is not established to the balance of probability, it must be dismissed.
The Tribunal has reviewed and considered all evidence, though not all is specifically referenced in this decision. General legal principles in relation to the award of compensation or exemplary damages
The Tribunal can award compensation where a party has been in breach of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the RTA) or has been in breach of the tenancy agreement, and the other party has suffered a loss because of that breach. Awards of compensation in the Tribunal are generally modest. When awarding compensation, the accepted principle is that the injured party should be put in the same position as they would have been but for the breach, since there is liability for losses flowing from the breach. Factors such as the loss of amenity, stress and inconvenience suffered by the party that has proven the breach are considered when deciding the quantum of any compensation awarded.
Exemplary damages can also be awarded for breaches listed in Schedule 1A of the RTA, provided the Tribunal is satisfied that the breach was intentional. Exemplary damages are a penalty designed to deter parties from intentionally engaging in the kind of behavioural conduct provided for in Schedule 1A of the RTA.

JURISDICTION

Background

Prior to the tenancy commencing, the landlord says she contacted Tenancy Services about whether letting the self-contained granny flat off the main house’s master bedroom ensuite was considered flat sharing or a residential tenancy. The landlord says Tenancy Services advised her that this was a flat sharing situation as the granny flat is attached to the main house, via the master bedroom ensuite, is not its own entity, and does not have its own power box so power is included in board. There are no water rates in Rotorua, so there is no need for a separate water meter.
The tenant did not challenge the landlord as to whether the flat sharing agreement the parties signed accurately reflected the nature of the rental relationship. It was only after damage related issues arose at the end of the tenancy that the issue of the jurisdiction of the Tenancy Tribunal to hear the parties’ claims became an issue.
The tenant confirmed the premise she originally rented is a fully self-contained granny flat, located off the master bedroom ensuite with one bedroom, kitchen and laundry facilities and exclusive use of the master bedroom ensuite. Power was included in the rental payable of $300.00 per week and an additional $10.00 per week was payable for the tenant’s use of the landlord’s internet facilities. A flat sharing agreement was signed by both parties on 17 November 2023. The tenancy commenced on 18 November 2023.
The parties confirmed the master bedroom ensuite was used exclusively by the tenant during her tenancy and that the door to the ensuite was permanently locked during the tenancy. They also confirmed that there was no shared use of any facilities, and that the landlord and the tenant did not share meals together or access one another’s exclusive living spaces without consent. The landlord lived in the main house with her husband.
When the tenant’s daughter was moving back to Rotorua and had nowhere to live, the parties agreed the tenant’s daughter and her cat could stay short term in the landlord’s sleepout until she found a new place to live. The landlord’s agreement was conditional on the tenant’s daughter using the granny flat facilities, the cat having been fully house trained and the tenant paying an additional $50.00 per week to cover the increase in power consumption. The tenant agreed to these terms and her daughter moved into the sleepout. The parties did not record this variation to the flat sharing agreement in writing as clause 7 of the agreement provided for the landlords to charge the tenant for any additional persons staying at the premise for more than 50% of the week.
The tenant’s daughter remained living in the sleepout, pursuant to the terms agreed by the tenant and the landlords until the tenant gave notice on 10 May 2025 to end the tenancy and move out on 30 May 2025. Relevant law
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear disputes between landlords and tenants provided the dispute relates to a tenancy to which the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 applies.
The onus of proving that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction falls on the party asserting that the Tribunal does not have Jurisdiction (see section10 RTA). In this case, that onus falls on Ms Baker.
Section 77 and 82(1) RTA, gives the Tenancy Tribunal sole originating jurisdiction to determine in accordance with the RTA all disputes arising between landlords and tenants in relation to any tenancy to which the RTA applies.
Section 2 of the RTA sets out the following material definitions: landlord, in relation to any residential premises that are the subject of a tenancy agreement, means the grantor of a tenancy of the premises under the agreement tenant, in relation to any residential premises that are the subject of a tenancy agreement, means the grantee of a tenancy of the premises under the agreement tenancy, in relation to any residential premises, means the right to occupy the premises (whether exclusively or otherwise) in consideration for rent; and includes any tenancy of residential premises implied or created by any enactment; and, where appropriate, also includes a former tenancy residential premises means any premises used or intended for occupation by any person as a place of residence, whether or not the occupation or intended occupation for residential purposes is or would be unlawful Premises is defined as including: a. Any part of any premises; and b. Any land and appurtenances, other than facilities; and c. Any mobile home, caravan, or other means of shelter placed or erected upon any land and intended for occupation on that land. tenancy agreement, in relation to any residential premises, means any express or implied agreement under which any person, for rent, grants or agrees to grant to any other person a tenancy of the premises;
Section 4 of the RTA provides that the RTA applies to every tenancy for residential purposes except as specifically provided.
The exceptions to the RTA are contained in section 5. Section 5(n) specifically excludes arrangements where the premises are being used for residence by the landlord or family. This section envisages owners of a home renting out their spare rooms in a flatmate or boarding type situation.
The District Court in Adams v Massey University Palmerston North TT 43/94, 10 October 1994, stated that in order to give effect to the RTA’s true intent and meaning, the exemptions in section 5 should be interpreted strictly and not liberally. Separate household units
As the dwelling is a building, the requirements of the Building Act 2004 (“the Building Act”) apply to it.
One of the types of buildings categorised in the Building Act is called a “household unit”. A household unit is defined in section of 7 of the Building Act as a building: “or part of a building that is used or intended to be used only or mainly for residential purposes; and is occupied, or intended to be occupied, exclusively as the home or residence of not more than 1 household”.
The Tenancy Tribunal deals predominantly with household units (with the exception of boarding houses).
The question of whether a premises is a separate household unit arose in the recent High Court decision Harding v Schellevis, Tan and Caroto [2021] NZHC 1265.
In that case, the landlord entered into a “flatmate/house-sharing agreement” with the tenants, which expressly recorded an acknowledgement that the premises were the primary residence of the landlord’s family and that therefore the Act did not apply (see section 5(n) exclusion).
However, the Auckland Council previously confirmed to the landlord that the premises could not be tenanted as a separate household unit (e.g., no fire rated walls etc).
Analysing the actual situation, the Tribunal determined that the RTA did apply and that the building consisted of two separate and distinct household units.
The landlord appealed that finding to the District Court, which confirmed the Tribunal’s finding, and dismissed the landlord’s appeal.
The landlord then appealed to the High Court and the High Court confirmed both the District Court and Tribunal’s decision. Justice Walker in the High Court determined that: a. the natural and ordinary meaning of “premises” contemplates that there could be more than one “premises” within a larger premises; b. residential premises can include part of any premises used or intended for occupation as a place of residence; c. the Act supports a generous approach to jurisdiction for the Tribunal and conversely a strict approach to exceptions; d. the tenants did not have a right to occupy the areas used by the landlord, and there were no shared or common areas that would normally characterise a flat share. There was also no ability for the parties to enter the other parties dwelling, other than with consent.
Justice Walker concluded: “In my view, the decisive factor in this case must be the self-contained character of the granny flat, its exclusive use by the respondent occupiers and the exclusive use of the rest of the dwelling by the appellant and her family. There were no communal living or shared spaces but two separate and distinct household units within the dwelling. In these circumstances, the term “premises” cannot be interpreted as referring to the property in its entirety. The relevant premises is instead the functionally independent granny flat. That was not principally a place of residence of the appellant. It was solely occupied by the respondent. Section 5(1)(n) of the Act does not apply.”
The self-contained nature of the granny flat was decisive in Harding v Shellevis. However, even where there is some shared use of facilities, such as a toilet or shower, the RTA may still apply to a largely self-contained dwelling. This is because a tenancy agreement can include facilities provided for the non- exclusive use of the tenant. A couple of older Tribunal authorities illustrate this principle.
In Whitelock v McConway (Tenancy Tribunal Blenheim, 13 July 1995) the tenant occupied a sleepout a couple of meters from the main home occupied by the landlord. This comprised a bedroom, shower, toilet, and wash house attached to the garage. The tenant used a shared kitchen to prepare his breakfast and lunch.
Evening meals were mainly provided by the landlord. The landlord regarded the tenant as a boarder with free access to the facilities in the home.
The tenant was sharing kitchen, bathroom and laundry facilities with the landlord.
The Tribunal held that the area occupied by the tenant was part of the family home, because it did not have separate cooking facilities and contained the only shower and laundry. The tenant’s room was part of the landlord’s home and was excluded from jurisdiction pursuant to section 5(1)(n) RTA.
In Barnett v Dempsey (Tenancy Tribunal Auckland, 13 June 2003, TT 790/03) the tenant lived in a room in a converted garage a few meters from house occupied by the landlord and her daughter. The tenant had a fridge and a cooktop. The tenant had to wash his dishes in the kitchen of the house. He had a key to gain access to the house to use the shower and toilet. The tenant only used the lounge in the house when invited to do so by the landlord.
The Tribunal held that, despite the sharing of facilities, the RTA was not excluded.
The tenant’s room comprised “premises” for the purpose of the RTA: “That the premises did not have their own toilet and washing facilities is not...fatal to their [sic] being “premises” because the definition of “facilities” in the Act appears to envisage a situation where other facilities are to be provided to the tenant by the landlord “for the use and enjoyment of the tenant, otherwise than as a part of the premises that are the subject of the agreement”, such as toilet and washing facilities...”.
These decisions were decided on their own facts. But they show that the Tribunal is sometimes required to assess whether the extent of shared facilities or spaces means the living arrangements are to be properly characterised as a tenancy, or as a flat share (or boarding) arrangement. Analysis
In the circumstances of this case and the living arrangements as outlined by both parties at the hearing, I find that [Landlord’s names suppressed] meet the definition of a landlord, in that they leased residential premises to [Tenant’s name supressed] in consideration of rent.
[Tenant’s name supressed] falls within the definition of being a tenant, given that she is the grantee of residential premises. [Tenant name suppressed] has the exclusive right to occupy the self-contained granny flat, and more laterally also the sleep out, on the basis of the payment of rent. No other person occupied the self-contained granny flat and/or sleepout or was entitled to occupy those areas from the time the tenant commenced paying rent to exclusively occupy and use those areas of the premise.
There was no formal written agreement in relation to the addition of the sleepout to the premises being rented by [Tenant name suppressed], but there was a flat sharing agreement signed by the parties in relation to the granny flat. The parties intent and the type of agreement signed by them is not determinative of the nature of the relationship, although it is one of the factors I can take into account when determining the true nature of the relationship.
The evidence establishing a flatmate arrangement falls well short in this situation. The difference between a flatmate and a tenant is that a tenant obtains a right to occupy the premises (in this case, the granny flat and sleep out and master bedroom ensuite) rented from the landlord. A flatmate resides in the premises by way of a licence from either the owner, or a tenant who would have a contractual relationship with the landlord. This is not a case where [Tenant name suppressed] was only residing in the granny flat and sleepout and master bedroom ensuite by way of licence. She had exclusive rights to occupy the granny flat and sleepout and master bedroom ensuite and to have her daughter as a boarder.
In Musson v Dobrisek & Ors DC Lower Hutt CIV-2006-032-36, 5 May 2006, Judge Broadmore considered the definition of a flatmate. The court held that: “...the use of the word “flatmate” does not in itself define the legal relationship between flatmate and landlord. “By ‘flatmate’ I understand a co-operative arrangement whereby, in a functional sense, all occupants are on the same footing in that they have exclusive occupation of their own rooms and shared use and occupation of common areas such as kitchens.”
There was no evidence [Tenant name suppressed] had access to shared or common areas (including cooking) in [Landlords names suppressed] house or that [Tenant name suppressed] had a right to occupy areas used by [Landlords names suppressed]. There was no evidence of a co-operative arrangement between the parties’ sharing facilities in this case, such that a flatting arrangement might exist. The evidence is clear that the two separate households lived independently.
As noted above, even where there is some shared use of facilities, such as a toilet or shower, the RTA may still apply to a largely self-contained dwelling. This is because a tenancy agreement can include facilities provided for the nonexclusive use of the tenant.
In Holler & Rouse v Osaki [2016] NZCA 130, the Court of Appeal stated that the RTA is “consumer protection legislation”. Where there is any uncertainty as to whether any particular arrangement falls within the scope of the RTA, consideration of this consumer protection aspect of the RTA ought to weigh in favour of bringing the arrangement under the umbrella of the Act and giving the tenant (and the landlord) access to the remedies that the Tenancy Tribunal can provide.
The next matter to consider is whether or not section 5(1)(n) RTA operates to exclude the agreement from the operation of the RTA.
The District Court in Musson v Dobrisek DC Lower Hutt, CIV- 2006-032-36, 5 May 2006, held that the correct question for the Tribunal to answer when considering section 5(1)(n) RTA is: “Is the principal use of these premises as a place of residence by the landlord or the owner of the premises or by any member of the landlord’s or owners’ family.”
If the house as a whole was the relevant “premises” then I would easily conclude that section 5(1)(n) applied in this case. However, I find that is not the case, rather I consider that the self-contained granny flat, and more latterly also the sleep out, is a separate premise to the rest of the house.
The Court has previously determined in Kahi v Lucus HC Auckland, 81/96, 23 September 1996 and Harding v Schellevis & Ors that there can be a separate premises within a larger premises. I note the definition of premises in section 2(1) includes “any part of any premises.” I also adopt the reasoning of the High Court in Harding v Schellevis & Ors that “premises” includes “a part of a building.”
While this was physically one building, there were two separate and distinct household units within that building. [Tenant name suppressed] had her own separate premises (with its own separate entrance and exit) that was not shared with the landlord. She did not utilise the main areas where [Landlords names suppressed] were living. The house as a whole was not shared, and there was a clear separation of households. [Tenant name suppressed] and her daughter had their own separate living space that [Landlords names suppressed] understood they could not enter without consent. [Tenant name suppressed] treated [Landlords names suppressed] as privately occupying the main house and did not enter this area without consent or invitation. There were 2 separate premises, each with exclusive possession, rather than a sharing of the house and its facilities.
Accordingly, the relevant “premises” for the purposes of section 5(1)(n) is the self- contained granny flat and sleepout only. The question, then, is whether the self- contained granny flat and sleep out was used, during the tenancy, principally as a place of residence by the landlord or the owner of the premises or by any member of the landlord’s or owner’s family.
It is clear that the self-contained granny flat and sleep out was not used principally as a place of residence for [Landlords names suppressed] as the landlord or a member of their family.
Bearing in mind the above, my finding in this proceeding is that [Tenant name suppressed] and her daughter occupied the largely self-contained granny flat and sleep out as a separate household.
I find that there was a residential tenancy of the self-contained granny flat, master bedroom ensuite, and sleep out to which the RTA applies. This was not a flatmate sharing arrangement. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not excluded by section 5(1)(n) RTA.
That said, I am mindful that this arrangement is not what [Landlords names suppressed] anticipated at the time of agreeing to let the premise to [Tenant’s name suppressed or to support her daughter temporarily to stay with her while she got on her feet financially and integrated back into life in Rotorua and the finding that this is a residential tenancy will have significant flow on effects for both parties.

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

Is the tenant responsible for the damage to the premises?

A landlord must prove that damage to the premises occurred during the tenancy and is more than fair wear and tear. If this is established, to avoid liability, the tenant must prove they did not carelessly or intentionally cause or permit the damage. Tenants are liable for the actions of people at the premises with their permission. See sections 40(2)(a), 41 and 49B RTA.
Where the damage is careless, and occurs after 27 August 2019, section 49B RTA applies. If the landlord becomes aware of the damage after 27 August, the damage is presumed to have occurred after that date unless the tenant proves otherwise.
Where the damage is caused carelessly, and is covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to the lesser of the insurance excess or four weeks' rent (or four weeks' market rent in the case of a tenant paying income- related rent). See section 49B(3)(a) RTA.
Where the damage is careless and is not covered by the landlord's insurance, the tenant's liability is limited to four weeks' rent (or market rent). See section 49B(3)(b) RTA. Where insurance money is irrecoverable because of the tenant's conduct, the property is treated as if it is not insured against the damage. See section 49B(3A)(a) RTA.
Tenants are liable for the cost of repairing damage that is intentional or which results from any activity at the premises that is an imprisonable offence. This applies to anything the tenant does and anything done by a person they are responsible for. See section 49B(1) RTA.
Damage is intentional where a person intends to cause damage and takes the necessary steps to achieve that purpose. Damage is also intentional where a person does something, or allows a situation to continue, knowing that damage is a certainty. See Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541.
The landlords claim the following damage was caused during the tenancy: a. Damage to the carpet in the sleepout from the tenant’s daughter’s cat urinating in the corner of the room. This damaged the carpet and underlay, and the urine could not be lifted with carpet cleaning. The carpet and underlay had to be lifted, the floor cleaned, and new carpet and underlay laid. Further, the tenant’s attempt to clean a stain from under the bed in the sleepout bleached the carpet a different colour to the rest of the carpet; and b. The windowsill in the sleep out was damaged by the tenant’s daughter’s salt lamp and the tenant’s attempt to remedy this made the issue worse and required the windowsill be sanded and stained and sealed. Carpet
The tenant says the sleepout carpet was badly worn and stained at the start of the tenancy and that the landlord acknowledged its poor condition and said not to worry about the cat urine damage as the carpet was due for replacement anyway. The landlords deny having said this and state the carpet is five years old and while it did have some stains on it, it would not have had to be replaced but for the cat urine as there was no other way to get rid of the odour except to lift and relay underlay and carpet as steam and chemical cleaning could not get the stain and odour out.
The landlords’ also state that the bleached carpet was unsightly and in a position in the room that was not easy to cover.
I am satisfied that this damage was caused during the tenancy by the tenant’s daughter’ cat and the tenant’s cleaning of the carpet and that the tenant is liable for the damage to the carpet.
I find the damage is more than fair wear and tear, and the tenant has not disproved liability for the damage.
The amount ordered are proved.
I have considered betterment and depreciation. The landlord should be returned to the position they would have been in had the tenant not breached their obligations and should not be better or worse off. In calculating depreciation, I have considered the age and condition of the carpet at the start of the tenancy and their likely useful lifespan.
The current Inland Revenue depreciation rates (IR265) states that carpet has a life span of 8 years and should be depreciated at around 13 percent each year over those 8 years. The landlords have confirmed the carpet was 5 years old and cost $970.00 to replace with new carpet. I find that the depreciation on this carpet over the 5 years of its life was $606.25 and that the cost minus this depreciation comes to $363.75. I consider it fair to award the landlords half of this amount as there was some prior staining and wear of the carpet. I award $181.88 to the landlords for the carpet damage. Windowsill
The tenant accepted liability for the windowsill damage but claimed the make landlord stated the landlord had asked her to fix the damage herself and when her remediation was not to a reasonable standard, he said he would remedy it at no charge as he could undertake the work and had the materials necessary to do it already.
The landlords deny this. There is no evidence the landlord asked the tenant to remedy the work herself. When she messaged him saying she would fix it, he thought she intended to get her own tradesperson to undertake the work, not that she would try to do it herself.
The landlords confirmed that they did agree to remedy the damage, and not charge the tenant for labour, and that they would not charge for product if they had the necessary product already. The landlords supplied the majority of the products required at no cost, and the labour at no cost, but sought compensation for $100.00 for the Zinsser stain sealer that they had to purchase as they did not have any of this.
I am satisfied the tenant is liable for the damage and that it is fair for the tenant to pay the $100.00 it cost the landlords to purchase the sealer and award them that amount.
The amount ordered is proved. Should the landlord be paid deception money because the tenant charged her boarder more rent than was being paid to the landlord for the addition of the sleepout to the tenancy?
The parties agreed to vary the tenancy agreement to provide for the sleep out to be used as temporary guest accommodation for the tenant’s daughter and her cat.
The landlords asked the tenant for an additional $50.00 rent each week to cover any additional power usage. The tenant agreed to that condition and paid $350.00 rent per week and $10 per week for her internet usage.
The landlords later found out the tenant’s daughter was paying her $100.00 board per week.
The landlords say the tenant has financially benefited from the additional $50.00 board she received each week that was not passed on to them.
The tenant and her daughter gave evidence that $50.00 of the board was for accommodation and the other $50.00 per week was for her food, toiletries, and cleaning products etc and that this money did not cover the additional costs she incurred as a result of her daughter and the cat boarding with her.
The landlords have asked for the Tribunal to award them $500.00 as a penalty for the tenant’s alleged deception resulting in her profiting from having her daughter boarding with her.
There is no provision in the RTA which I can see, nor which the landlords have identified, from which this claim can be based.
Because I have no jurisdiction to make the order sought, this claim must be dismissed. TENANT’S CLAIMS

[The tenant] claims the landlord has entered the premises without consent or notice.
A landlord may not enter the premises during the tenancy except with the tenant's consent, in an emergency, or after giving the required notice for inspections and repairs and maintenance. See section 48(1) and (2) Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
Breaching this obligation is an unlawful act for which exemplary damages may be awarded up to a maximum of $1,500.00. See section 48(4)(a) and Schedule 1A Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
The tenant says that on 14 May 2025, the landlords were given permission to take a potential new tenant to view the granny flat, but he moved a number of her personal belongings, cleaned up parts of the flat, fixed a curtain hook in the bedroom and moved furnishing around to stage the granny flat the way they wanted it to look for the viewing.
The landlords confirm that they moved the coffee table and the clothes rack and fixed the curtain hook but did not clean the granny flat or move the tenant’s personal belongings out of sight.
I am satisfied that the landlords more likely than not entered the premise to have this little tidy up, just before the viewing and not during the viewing, in order to ensure the premise could be seen by the prospective new tenant as being more spacious and in a reasonable state of repair. The tenant’s consent was solely given for the viewing and not for a pre-viewing tidy up.
I find the landlords have committed an unlawful act.
Where a party has committed an unlawful act intentionally, the Tribunal may award exemplary damages where it is satisfied that it would be just to do so, having regard to the party’s intent, the effect of the unlawful act, the interests of the other party, and the public interest. See section 109(3) Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
I am satisfied it would be just to require the landlords to pay a sum in exemplary damages because: a. The landlord ought reasonably to have known the tenant’s permission to enter the premise was for the sole purpose of taking a prospective tenant through the granny flat to view it and not for the purposes of a pre-viewing tidy up; b. The tenant felt intimidated and harassed and that the landlords had been disrespectful of her privacy when they had touched her belongings and furnishings without her knowledge or consent; c. it is in the interests of the tenant to receive exemplary damages for the unlawful entry; and d. it is in the public interest for landlord’s to be penalised as a disincentive to breaching their obligations to enter a tenant’s home without notice or consent or for purposes other than the purpose for which they were granted consent.
I make an order for the landlord to pay $150.00 in exemplary damages, ten percent of the maximum available, for its breach of s48(4)(a) of the RTA. accordingly.
The tenant also claims the landlord entered the sleepout to feed and look after the cat at times that had not been arranged with or consented to by the tenant or her daughter. The tenant had no evidence to support this claim. It is therefore dismissed as it had not been proven on the balance of probabilities. Did the landlords breach the tenant’s quiet enjoyment and/or privacy?
[The tenant] claims the landlords have harassed her and breached her quiet enjoyment and privacy.
Section 38 of the RTA confirms that the tenant “shall be entitled to have quiet enjoyment of the premises without interruption by the landlord”, and further at subsection 2 that the landlord “shall not cause or permit any interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in the use of the premises by the tenant.”
The RTA further confirms that contravention of section 38(2) in circumstances that amount to harassment of the tenant, is declared to be an unlawful act for which exemplary damages may be awarded up to a maximum of $3,000.00. See section 38(3) and Schedule 1A RTA.
The term “Harassment” is not defined in the Act. It is defined in s 3 of the Harassment Act 1997 which deals with harassment in the context of either a criminal charge or the making of a restraining order against a person. However, Judge Harland in MacDonald v Dodds (CIV-2009-019-1524, District Court Hamilton, 26 February 2010), considered that the dictionary definition of “harassment” was more appropriate in the context of s 38(3), rather than the definition in the Harassment Act. The Court in that case adopted the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines “harassment” as “to trouble, worry, or distress” or “to wear out, tire out or exhaust”. The Judge accepted that harassment indicates a particular pattern of behaviour directed towards another person.
In the Concise Oxford Dictionary “harass” is defined as “torment by subjecting to constant interference or intimidation”. Further assistance can be obtained from the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary where harassment is defined as: Words, conduct, or action (usu. repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose.
From these definitions, it seems that there must be evidence of some ongoing intentional actions directed at a specific person which causes distress to them. Therefore, a single act of interference with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment would be unlikely to amount to harassment. However, in Whatiura v Shoulder (Palmerston North TT 12/87, 16 March 1987) the Adjudicator noted that “although the term usually refers to repeated acts of some kind, I take the view that it can extend to a single act on one occasion of sufficient seriousness.”
The tenant states the landlords had audio visual cameras around the premise that focused on the granny flat and sleep out and that this breached the tenant and her daughter’s privacy and was a breach of their quiet enjoyment of the premise they were paying rent to enjoy. Specifically, the tenant says the landlords told her at the start of the tenancy that the cameras were there but told her they were recording pictures and not sound. She says she was shocked to hear from a mutual acquaintance that the male landlord had been bragging about having recorded the tenant and her daughter’s conversations without their knowledge.
The tenant and her daughter confirmed they had some intensely personal and private conversations in the patio area that had a camera adjacent to it and were concerned that these conversations had been recorded and viewed by the landlords for their entertainment.
The landlords produced footage that proves the cameras do not point into the tenant and her daughter’s private spaces, and only record motion that is sensed by the cameras for around 10 to 20 seconds and alerts the landlords that there is motion in that area so they can check for intrusions if the motion is at a time or in a place that is not expected.
The landlords state the camera in the patio area is not working as it was shorted out by rain and has never been replaced. They say they have left it there as a deterrent to intruders, who would not be aware that it is not working.
The landlords deny telling the tenant the cameras were visual only and not audio and confirm that none of the tenant or her daughter’s conversations were ever recorded and that the system is not set up to allow the continual recording of any conversation. The landlords also deny that they have ever told anyone they have recorded the tenant or her daughter’s conversations.
In this case, I am not of the view that the tenant or her daughter’s privacy or quiet enjoyment has been breached. The cameras are security camera that are located in non-intrusive areas of the premise and are not recording the tenant or her daughter’s movement inside the premise or their comings and goings, nor is there any compelling evidence that the landlords were recording the tenant and her daughter’s private conversations when they were availing themselves of the outside patio area to have private and confidential conversations.
For the reasons set out above, the tenant’s claims for exemplary damages for breach of her quiet enjoyment is dismissed.

Did the landlords fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

[The tenant] claims the landlord has not lodged the bond with the Bond Centre within the required time.
A landlord must send any bond payment to the Bond Centre within 23 working days after the payment is received. See section 19(1) Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
Breaching this obligation is an unlawful act for which the Tribunal may award exemplary damages up to a maximum of $1,500.00. See section 19(2) and Schedule 1A Residential Tenancies Act 1986.
The tenant has proven the landlords never lodged the bond, either during the tenancy or as at the date of today’s hearing.
However, the landlords have not intentionally failed to lodge the bond within the statutory timeframe as they were acing under the advice of Tenancy Services that this was a flat sharing situation and that they did not need to lodge the bond.
Having regard to the landlords’ intent, the effect of the unlawful act, the interests of the other party, and the public interest, I find that while the landlords have technically committed an unlawful act by not lodging the bond with the Bond Centre, they did not do so intentionally or due to lack of knowledge of the requirement to do so in relation to all residential tenancies.
I find it would be just to require the landlord to pay compensation of $150.00 to the tenant in recognition of the fact the tenant is entitled to rely on the Bond Centre protecting her bond money, which the landlords held in their own bank account because of the incorrect advice they had from Tenancy Services. Nevertheless, this led to the tenant’s bond money not being protected by a third independent party for the duration of the tenancy and this risk warrants some form of recognition.

OTHER CLAIMS

Reimbursement of filing fees

Section 102(4) of the RTA confirms that applicants that are wholly or substantially successful in proving their claims will have their filing fee reimbursed.
Because [the landlords] have substantially succeeded with the claim I must reimburse the filing fee.
Because [the tenant] has substantially succeeded with the claim I have reimbursed the filing fee. Name suppression
The tenant applies for non-publication of her name and identifying details.
The Tribunal must, on the application of a party that has wholly or substantially succeeded in proceedings, order that the party’s name or identifying particulars not be published, unless the Tribunal considers that publication is in the public interest or is justified because of the party’s conduct or any other circumstances of the case.
The tenant has substantially succeeded in her proceedings. I do not consider publication is in the public interest or justified because of the tenant’s conduct.
The landlords have also been substantially successful in their claims, I have used the Tribunal’s discretion to supress their names and identifying details as publication is not in the public interest or is justified because of the landlords conduct or any other circumstances of the case.
Non-publication of both parties’ names and identifying details is ordered.

Tenancy Tribunal case 5277243 — Exemplary damages

At a glance

Tenancy Tribunal case 5277243 — Exemplary damages

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

JURISDICTION

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

Is the tenant responsible for the damage to the premises?

Did the landlords fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

OTHER CLAIMS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

JURISDICTION

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

Is the tenant responsible for the damage to the premises?

Did the landlords fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

OTHER CLAIMS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

At a glance

At a glance

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

JURISDICTION

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

Is the tenant responsible for the damage to the premises?

Did the landlords enter the premise without consent or notice?

Did the landlords fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

OTHER CLAIMS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions

Award balance

Claims & awards

Order

Reasons

RELEVANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

JURISDICTION

LANDLORDS CLAIMS

Is the tenant responsible for the damage to the premises?

Did the landlords enter the premise without consent or notice?

Did the landlords fail to lodge the bond with the Bond Centre?

OTHER CLAIMS

Topics & place

Residential Tenancies Act sections

Key findings

Frequently asked questions