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Tenancy Tribunal case 5334600 — Tenancy dispute at 171 Innes Road, Glasnevin, RD 2, Amberley 7482

Decided 14 Jan 2026 · Published 14 Jan 2026 · Application 5334600

Cleanliness
Exemplary damages
Harassment
Property damage

Party names are redacted in the official published order. This page summarises the dispute only — not individual identities.

View official order on MoJ →Explore similar cases

At a glance

Key facts from the published tribunal order.

Location

Amberley

Tribunal region

Dispute themes

Award balance

Gross awards, any bond applied per the order, and the remaining balance payable.

Gross award: $778.00
Total balance for Landlord to pay Tenant: $778.00

Claims & awards

What this tenancy cost at tribunal — claim, category, amount, and party awarded, with reconciled net total.

Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5334600 — net $778.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.
Claim	Tenant	Reason
Compensation for breach of quiet enjoyment	$750.00	Compensation for breach of quiet enjoyment
Filing fee reimbursement	$28.00	Filing fee reimbursement
Net award	$778.00
Total payable by Landlord to Tenant	$778.00

Claims and awards for application 5334600 — net $778.00 NZD. Verify on MoJ.

Order

An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal orders suppression of the Tenant name and identifying details.
Above And Beyond Property Management Limited Pip Blyth must pay [The tenant/s] $778.00 immediately, calculated as shown in the table below:

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing by video and telephone conference with Ms Blyth representing the landlord.
This was a fixed term tenancy of a rural property which commenced on 27 September 2024 and was to end on 27 September 2025. However, by mutual agreement, the parties ended the fixed term tenancy early on 30 July 2025 after the landlord found a replacement tenant.
The tenants claim compensation from the landlord for the following matters: a. Misrepresenting the land and paddocks included with the premises and the extent to which they could be used; b. Breach of quiet enjoyment by the landlord on three separate occasions.
Any party bringing a claim to the Tribunal has the burden of proving their claim. The Tenancy Tribunal applies a civil standard of proof, determining matters on the balance of probabilities. In other words, each applicant must prove that it is more likely than not that their alleged version of events took place. Further, the evidence should be reasonable with no probable defects such as inconsistency or improbability. The evidence should be supported by other acceptable evidence. Independent witnesses, corroborating documents such as emails, texts, and photographs are an important part of discharging the burden. Misrepresentation
Section 78(1)(g) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal may make an order varying, or setting aside an agreement where it appears to the Tribunal that it has been induced by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Section 78(1)(h) RTA also enables the Tribunal to make any other order that the High Court or the District Court may make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts.
The law regarding misrepresentation is now largely codified in sections 35 and 37 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (CCLA), although the common law remains relevant. Under s35 CCLA, if a party (party A) to a contract has been induced to enter it by a misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, made by another party (party B) to the contract, party A is entitled to damages from that party B in the same manner and to the same extent as if the representation were a term of the contract that has been broken.
The representation must be one of fact, not opinion. The representation must be false, and it must relate to a matter of present or past facts, including “half- truths”, not one which relates to the future. See the commentary in Gault on Commercial Law 1 and the Court of Appeal decision in Savill v NZI Finance Ltd. 2 a. If there is a misrepresentation, the other matters which must be proved by the tenant are: The misrepresentation must have induced the tenant to enter into the agreement, and the tenant must have acted reasonably in relying on, and therefore, being induced by the misrepresentation; 1 Gault on Commercial Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) 2 Savill v NZI Finance Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 135 b. The landlord must have intended to induce the tenant to enter the agreement, or the representation must have been such as would induce a normal person to contract. 3 Tenant case
The property was advertised as follows: “Live the rural dream and ditch suburbia. Near new modern 4 bedroom country home on 10 acres in popular Broomfield area. Warm, cosy and cost effective living. Views out to the hills and vineyard. Tenancy available as owners overseas. Paddocks available for a pony, sheep or cows. 5 mins from Amberley and 35 mins to the city.” [emphasis added]. The advertisement also stated that pets were negotiable.
The tenants viewed the property with Ms Blyth. They were particularly interested in using the paddocks for their horses. Next to the house there were three small paddocks comprising approximately 2-3 acres of land in total. There was also a large paddock comprising 7-8 acres of land.
The tenants say that Ms Blyth told them that the owners had an agreement with a contractor to cut the grass in the large paddock for baleage. However, they were told that they would be allowed to use the large paddock once the grass had been cut in Summer. Thery would then be able to use the large paddock for grazing their horses through until next Spring of 2025.
The conditions regarding the use of the large paddock were not recorded in the tenancy agreement, with the agreement simply referring to the postal address of the premises. The tenants were happy with this arrangement and having use of the paddock for the majority of the year because they had 3 horses that needed space and grass (for feed) over the colder months.
After the tenancy commenced, the grass was cut by the contractor on 29 November 2024 and the hay bales were stored in the large paddock. After this, the tenants’ horses were allowed into the large paddock and the smaller paddocks could be closed to allow the grass to grow there.
On 5 May 2025, the tenants received a text message from the contractor asking them to take the horses out of the large paddock as he was coming to access the paddock. By 7 May 2025 the contractor ploughed and re-seeded the paddock. The tenants did not know that the contractor intended to do this and were shocked to discover the large paddock, which the tenants intended to use to graze their horses over the winter, had been completely turned over into dirt and re-seeded. They thought the contractor was coming to remove the hay bales. This caused them immense stress as they now had to find an alternative 3 Savill v NZI Finance Ltd, above n2 way to feed their horses. The tenants also had no storage options for hay on the property and had to use their horse float to store horse feed.
The tenants advised Ms Blyth about their concerns and the impact of this on their horse’s welfare and the stress it caused them including the financial strain of having to now pay for extra feed. The owner offered to place a container on the land for them to store feed and offered to cancel the baleage contract for the next season so that the tenants could use the large paddock for grazing after November 2025. However, none of these options assisted the tenants with the immediate need to feed their horses. As a result, the tenants found another property and asked to end the tenancy early which was agreed.
When asked further about the initial conversation with Ms Blyth at the viewing about the large paddock, the tenants said she told them they could have access to the paddock when the contractor was not using it. While Ms Blyth did not have specific dates, she said he would come in the Summer to cut the hay for baleage and when it was to be shut up he would let them know. However, they believe she mentioned that they could access the paddock until Spring.
In summary, the tenants understood from Ms Blyth that they would have use of the large paddock from December 2024 through until September/Spring 2025. Had they known the large paddock was not available from May to December 2025 they say they would never have taken on the tenancy. One of the tenants is a qualified vet nurse. She says that she specifically asked Ms Blyth if the large paddock was available because the remaining small paddocks totalling 2- 3 acres of land was not enough for 3 horses. She explained that the minimum requirement is 1.5 acres of land for one horse and another 1 acre for every horse thereafter.
The tenants seek compensation of $600 for the extra cost incurred to purchase horse feed and further compensation of $1200 (2 weeks’ rent) on account of not having use if the full 10 acres of land as originally advertised. Landlord case
Ms Blyth says that the advertisement stated that the premises were “on 10 acres” and did not say that 10 acres was available. It also stated that pets were negotiable. In that regard, there were many options to suit different tenants and their needs. When these tenants viewed the property, they told her they had horses and she explained that it gets dry and they would need hay because they would otherwise run out of feed; that they could use the three smaller paddocks but the larger paddock was not available because it was subject to a baleage contract.
Ms Blyth maintains that the large paddock was only discussed for use when the contractor advised her that the tenants could use it after cutting the hay in late November 2024, after the tenancy had already started. She thinks she told the tenants they could have the paddock over summer of 2024/2025 but the contractor would then shut it up again for the next summer. She says that she did not know when the contractor needed the paddock back and she was merely relaying the contractor’s offer at that point. She says that she gave the contractor the tenants’ contact details.
Ms Blyth also notes that it is standard practice to re-sow pasture in autumn so that it can grow over winter until it is time to cut again in Spring/Summer.
In summary, Ms Blyth says the tenancy was offered to the tenants including the house and the three smaller paddocks. She says that she made them aware that the large paddock was used by a contractor and it was never available at the start of the tenancy. Discussion and findings
After carefully reviewing all the available evidence including each party’s oral evidence, I am satisfied that use of the large paddock was likely discussed at the viewing because it was important for the tenants to ensure that there was enough space and grazing for their horses. Therefore, I accept that they would have raised the issue. I also find on the evidence that Ms Blyth advised the tenants that the large paddock was available for use after the contractor cut the hay in Summer 2024. However, I am not satisfied that the landlord made a specific representation about the period during which the large paddock would be available for use by the tenants. Ms Blyth says that she did not know the exact date when the contractor would be closing off the paddock again. The tenants, also acknowledged in their evidence that Ms Blyth was unsure of the exact date with one of the tenants commenting at the hearing that she only “thought” Ms Blyth said that the paddock would not be shut off until the next Spring.
Given that the availability of the paddock was important to the tenants, I consider that it is not reasonable for them to rely on what was a loose indication from Ms Blyth at the viewing about the dates it would be available. They took the tenancy on without a specific agreement in writing about the availability of, and their entitlement to use, the large paddock.
I also consider that the letting advertisement is not sufficient to imply that the premises included 10 acres of land and all 4 paddocks. Recording that the home was situated on 10 acres of land does not in my view mean that the premises included 10 acres of land.
The tenancy agreement does not specify the boundaries and what was included. It n merely records the postal address as the premises. Arguably, therefore, all land and paddocks located at that postal address must be “the premises.” However, it is not disputed by the tenants that they were clearly told that the large paddock was subject to a baleage contract and therefore was not provided for their exclusive use.
In summary, I find there is insufficient evidence to establish that the landlord represented to the tenants that they would be entitled to use the large paddock from the Summer of 2024 through to the next Spring. Therefore, the claim for misrepresentation must be dismissed. Breach of quiet enjoyment
A landlord must not interfere with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of the tenant in their use of the premises. See section 38(2) RTA.
The tenants claim that the landlord breached their quiet enjoyment on three separate occasions.
Also relevant to the claim is section 48 RTA which provides that a landlord may not enter the premises during the tenancy except with the tenant's consent, in an emergency, or after giving the required notice for inspections and repairs and maintenance. See section 48(1) and (2) RTA. However, the definition of premises in s48 does not include land or facilities. Therefore, a landlord can enter the surrounding land without giving notice under s48. However, if a landlord does so, depending on the circumstances, entry onto the land without notice could be a breach of the tenants’ right to quiet enjoyment under s38. 23 June 2025
After the parties agreed to end the tenancy early, Ms Blyth messaged the tenants on 23 June 2025 asking to take some photos of the house that day while the tenants were at work. The tenants replied asking Ms Blyth to let them know what photos she needed and they would send them through. The landlord then tried to ring one of the tenants who replied advising that she could not take calls as she was at work and repeated that the tenants would prefer to take the photos and send them through. Ms Blyth responded that she would prefer to take her own photos from outside only and that she would pop down shortly to do that since the tenants were at work. Ms Blyth then proceeded to visit the property to photograph the house despite the tenants advising her that they did not want her to do so. They note the photo was the same as the photo used in the original advertising and were concerned that she was at the property for some other reason.
Ms Blyth says that the original photo had a car in it and she wanted one without it. She noted that the tenants did not want her to visit but she wanted to take her own photo and that is all she did. She says that she did not enter the house, so was not in breach of s48 and she was not upsetting their peace and enjoyment given they were not home. She also notes that she was doing them a favour to get replacement tenants as soon as possible and taking a photo for the advertising was part of that process.
It is clear on the evidence that the landlord asked for permission to visit the premises at short notice to take the photo which was declined by the tenants. In those circumstances, I find that Ms Blyth did not have the tenants’ consent and she ought to have respected the tenants wishes. While entry onto the land was not technically a breach of s48, I find that it was an interference with the tenants’ right to privacy in the use of the premises especially when they had not given Ms Blyth the consent she had sought in the first place. I appreciate that Ms Blyth was trying to re-tenant the premises for the tenants and it was easy and efficient for her to “pop down” and take the photos because she lives nearby. However, Ms Blyth’s actions demonstrated a complete disregard for the tenants wishes. While the breach of quiet enjoyment is perhaps at the lower end of the scale, it is nevertheless a breach. Tenants are entitled to a level of comfort and security that their landlord will respect their rights and not enter the property (including the grounds) even when they are not at home. 18 July 2025
A neighbour believed that the tenants horses had eaten trees he had planted along the fence line between their properties and approached one of the tenants to discuss this on or about 16 July. The tenant apologised and discussed it with him amicably. Subsequently, the neighbour messaged Ms Blyth about the issue which she forwarded to the tenants on 17 July asking them to address. They replied by email on 17 July at 7.35am advising that they had a chat with the neighbour and would sort something out before they vacated. In the same email they also advised Ms Blyth that they would be having house guests over the next few days with one of the tenants turning 40 and “would appreciate our disturbance kept to a minimum.”
At 3.32pm on 18 July, Ms Blyth sent the tenants a text advising that she would be calling in on her way home to discuss the issue with their neighbour. The tenants were unable to respond to the text before Ms Blyth turned up at the premises at 4.47pm on 18 July. They say she arrived at the ranch slider door to the house, and could see the tenants inside. She then opened the door to step inside. The tenants asked her to stop and leave the property several times. Ms Blyth remained and argued with the tenants for about 10 minutes about the issue with the neighbour, threatening to take money out of their bond to pay the neighbour. One of the tenants got upset and swore at her and asked her to leave the property again. She continued to send them texts and emails about the issue with the neighbour which they found harassing.
The tenants obtained advice from Tenancy Services which confirmed that the landlord was not entitled to deduct bond money in relation to a dispute with the neighbour. They sent her this advice which stopped her temporarily from harassing them about the issue.
Ms Blyth says that the neighbour had rung her complaining about the tenants’ horses eating his trees and she had sent several messages to the tenants asking them to address the issue which she says they stopped answering. At the hearing she said “through sheer frustration” she went to see the tenants without giving 48 hours’ notice but she sent a text to notify them she was on her way. She agreed at the hearing that she opened the ranch slider door into their house, after knocking first, but says she stood at the doorway only. She also argued that as this was not a tenancy issue, and she was visiting the premises as a neighbour, not in her capacity as the landlord.
I am satisfied after reviewing the evidence that the tenants sent a reply to Ms Blyth about the issue with the neighbour contrary to her assertion that they had ignored her messages. While they might not have responded to the continuing barrage of messages, I consider the response they gave was sufficient at the time. While it was acceptable for Ms Blyth to advise the tenants about the complaint she received from the neighbour, her turning up at the property without notice was not acceptable. I find Ms Blyth’s submission that she visited the tenants in her capacity as a neighbour is disingenuous. She was clearly there as the landlord/property manager.
I also find that Ms Blyth opening the door, even if she remained standing in the entrance to the premises, amounts to an unlawful entry under s48, on the basis that she has not given the required advance notice or obtained the tenants consent to enter the premises and opening the door is the first step for entering. Even if I am wrong, it is certainly a breach of the tenants’ right to quiet enjoyment under s38. 29 July 2025
A replacement tenant had been found with the last day of this tenancy to be 30 July. On 16 July, Ms Blyth emailed the tenants about various end of tenancy issues. She asked whether the final inspection could be done on 25 July or the next day; she advised that the new tenants were wanting access over the next few weeks to drop off some wood and outside plants and asked the tenants to confirm this was acceptable, and she advised: “Also container is due any day so I will need access to help driver place and will also be relocating other two at the same time-the horses may need to be relocated to back paddock while this is happening.” The landlord was placing a container on the property for the new tenants to use.
The tenants replied on 17 July as follows: “We get the keys to the new property on the 25 th but we will not be moved out completely on that day. As we are paying up til the 30 th it would be better to make that day the final inspection as it gives us time to get everything done. I will let you know if the property is ready before then. I would prefer new tenants don’t bring stuff over til we have moved over just because we do not want to be liable for any damage to their stuff or it accidentally gets taken with our stuff by movers. I will let you know once the house is empty and they can start then.”
On 29 July, the tenants had mostly vacated but still had one pony on the property who had some trauma issues with floating. The tenants called in a specific trainer who flew from Wellington to work with the pony and help shift her off the property.
Early in the morning, the tenants were working with the pony and did not see several messages from Ms Blyth at 7.50am in which she advised that the container would be dropped at the property that morning about 10am. She apologised that she was only advised about it that morning. At 9.51am the tenants messaged that they had a trainer working with the mare and could not have any distractions as it would make it more difficult for them to load her into the float. They asked Ms Blyth to wait until the mare was on the float. Ms Blyth said that was not possible as the container was already on its way. Ms Blyth arrived at the property soon after. Again, the tenants explained the problem and implored Ms Blyth to wait until they finished removing the pony. She refused to leave and threatened that the tenants would be charged the cost of travel for the container to return another day. After much argument, the tenants had little choice but to agree, but felt bullied.
The tenants were extremely upset and stressed by the situation with one of the tenants in tears. The process took 2 hours during which the mare had to be moved to the back of the paddock to enable unloading of the container. This delayed the training time as they had to desensitise the mare to work with a new large object (the container) in the paddock. They wish to claim an extra 2 hours of the trainer’s time of $100 as compensation as well as compensation for failure by the landlord to give adequate notice before arriving with the container and the resulting breach of quiet enjoyment.
Ms Blyth’s view is that she had already notified the tenants about the container. In a text message dated 29 May, Ms Blyth advised that the owner “will probs give you a ring to let you know when container coming.” Then in her email on 16 July she advised that the container was “due any day”. Therefore, the tenants were on notice and she contacted them as soon as she was advised, albeit on the day it was due. When asked why the landlord/owner could not give 48 hours’ notice and/or simply schedule the arrival of the container after the tenancy ended on 30 July, Ms Blyth could not explain why. It seems this was organised by the owner without discussion with her.
The tenants advised that they did not receive any advance call from the owner about the delivery date of the container and they dispute any suggestion that a specific delivery date or advance notice could not be given.
Ms Blyth believes that in raising these claims the tenants are not considering the help she was providing to find a replacement tenant so that they could end the fixed term early and end their liability for rent as soon as possible. She emphasized that she was negotiating with the owners, the new tenants and these tenants to ensure a smooth and early change of tenant.
I am satisfied on the evidence that this incident on 29 July was a breach of the tenants’ quiet enjoyment and significantly interfered with their use of the premises. The effect was exacerbated by the fact that they were in the final 2 days of the tenancy and all that entails with vacating, cleaning up, and removal of the pony. The owner failed to call the tenants as was indicated to discuss and warn of the delivery date. Ms Blyth’s indication on 16 July that delivery would be “any day” now did not turn out to be the case with delivery occurring two weeks later. While, technically, the notice provisions in s48 do not apply to entry onto the land, I consider the landlord should have warned the tenant of the delivery closer to the date. I also do not accept Ms Blyth’s claim that the landlord had no control over the date with the carrier and/or that they could not have asked for a delivery date after the tenancy ended on 30 July. There was no supporting evidence (e.g. from the carrier) to substantiate that claim.
While the landlord agreed to end the tenancy early and took the necessary steps to find new tenants, that does not mean that they are entitled to ignore their obligations under s38 or 48, as the case may be, and run roughshod over the tenants rights. In summary, the landlord’s actions (whether that be the owner or the property manager) in this instance, while not a breach of s48, is a breach of s38. Compensation for the breaches of quiet enjoyment
The tenants are entitled to some compensation for the quiet enjoyment breaches. It is a well settled principle when awarding damages that, so far as money can do it, the injured party shall be put in the same position as they would have been in, but for the breach of the tenancy agreement and the RTA.
It is clear here that the tenants’ relationship with Ms Blyth deteriorated after they realised the large paddock was not available for use after May 2025, and there was perhaps a loss of trust after that, rightly or wrongly, because they felt she had misled them. The subsequent instances of Ms Blyth turning up at the property with little warning exacerbated the situation and caused the tenants much stress and discomfort. I accept Ms Blyth was able to find a replacement tenant reasonably quickly, which was of considerable benefit to the tenants. However, I consider she lost sight of her professional obligations. Her position both as a neighbour and property manager became blurred with her assuming that it would be ok for her to “pop in” to the premises at short notice. I also consider she became too personally involved in the neighbour dispute which was really a matter for those parties to sort out between themselves. The resulting application brought by the tenants highlights how important it is for landlords to adhere strictly to the RTA obligations.
After carefully considering all the circumstances, I award the tenants $750 compensation for the landlord’s breaches of quiet enjoyment. This equates to one week’s rent or an average award of $250 per breach, although I consider that the breaches on 18 and 29 July were at the higher end of the scale than the breach on 23 June. Overall, I consider the award for all three breaches is justified.
I have not considered an award of exemplary damages which can be considered where the breaches of quiet enjoyment amount to harassment. That is because, exemplary damages are only available where a party makes a specific claim for exemplary damages. See section 109 RTA. The tenants application sought compensation only.
As the tenants have substantially succeeded with their claims, they are entitled to suppression of their name and identifying details. The landlord is not entitled to suppression. The tenants are also entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee. K Stirling, 14 January 2026

Topics & place

Topics are dispute themes across the order (not the same as claim-type money lines).

Cleanliness Exemplary damages Harassment Property damage Amberley

Residential Tenancies Act sections

s1, s109, s22, s35, s38, s38(2), s48, s48(1), s78(1)

Key findings

Dispute theme: cleaning
Dispute theme: exemplary damages
Dispute theme: harassment

Frequently asked questions

Common questions about this Tenancy Tribunal case.

What was Tenancy Tribunal case 5334600 about?

The tribunal order states: An application for suppression has been made in this case, and the Tribunal

How much money was awarded in case 5334600?

Compensation: $750.00 awarded to tenant; Filing Fee: $28.00 awarded to tenant

What type of tenancy dispute was case 5334600?

The dispute type was not classified.

Where can I read the official tribunal order for case 5334600?

The official Ministry of Justice published order is available at https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/TTV2/PDF/12967837-Tribunal_Order_Redacted.pdf.

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Claims and awards in Tenancy Tribunal application 5334600 — net $778.00 NZD. Amounts reconciled from the published order (claims sum and net total). Verify on MoJ.

Claim

Landlord

Tenant

Reason

Compensation for breach of quiet enjoyment

$750.00

Compensation for breach of quiet enjoyment

Filing fee reimbursement

$28.00

Filing fee reimbursement

Net award

$778.00

Total payable by Landlord to Tenant

$778.00

Reasons

Both parties attended the hearing by video and telephone conference with Ms Blyth representing the landlord.

This was a fixed term tenancy of a rural property which commenced on 27 September 2024 and was to end on 27 September 2025. However, by mutual agreement, the parties ended the fixed term tenancy early on 30 July 2025 after the landlord found a replacement tenant.

The tenants claim compensation from the landlord for the following matters: a. Misrepresenting the land and paddocks included with the premises and the extent to which they could be used; b. Breach of quiet enjoyment by the landlord on three separate occasions.

Any party bringing a claim to the Tribunal has the burden of proving their claim. The Tenancy Tribunal applies a civil standard of proof, determining matters on the balance of probabilities. In other words, each applicant must prove that it is more likely than not that their alleged version of events took place. Further, the evidence should be reasonable with no probable defects such as inconsistency or improbability. The evidence should be supported by other acceptable evidence. Independent witnesses, corroborating documents such as emails, texts, and photographs are an important part of discharging the burden. Misrepresentation

Section 78(1)(g) Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) provides that the Tribunal may make an order varying, or setting aside an agreement where it appears to the Tribunal that it has been induced by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. Section 78(1)(h) RTA also enables the Tribunal to make any other order that the High Court or the District Court may make under any enactment or rule of law relating to contracts.

The law regarding misrepresentation is now largely codified in sections 35 and 37 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (CCLA), although the common law remains relevant. Under s35 CCLA, if a party (party A) to a contract has been induced to enter it by a misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, made by another party (party B) to the contract, party A is entitled to damages from that party B in the same manner and to the same extent as if the representation were a term of the contract that has been broken.

The representation must be one of fact, not opinion. The representation must be false, and it must relate to a matter of present or past facts, including “half- truths”, not one which relates to the future. See the commentary in Gault on Commercial Law 1 and the Court of Appeal decision in Savill v NZI Finance Ltd. 2 a. If there is a misrepresentation, the other matters which must be proved by the tenant are: The misrepresentation must have induced the tenant to enter into the agreement, and the tenant must have acted reasonably in relying on, and therefore, being induced by the misrepresentation; 1 Gault on Commercial Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) 2 Savill v NZI Finance Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 135 b. The landlord must have intended to induce the tenant to enter the agreement, or the representation must have been such as would induce a normal person to contract. 3 Tenant case

The property was advertised as follows: “Live the rural dream and ditch suburbia. Near new modern 4 bedroom country home on 10 acres in popular Broomfield area. Warm, cosy and cost effective living. Views out to the hills and vineyard. Tenancy available as owners overseas. Paddocks available for a pony, sheep or cows. 5 mins from Amberley and 35 mins to the city.” [emphasis added]. The advertisement also stated that pets were negotiable.

The tenants viewed the property with Ms Blyth. They were particularly interested in using the paddocks for their horses. Next to the house there were three small paddocks comprising approximately 2-3 acres of land in total. There was also a large paddock comprising 7-8 acres of land.

The tenants say that Ms Blyth told them that the owners had an agreement with a contractor to cut the grass in the large paddock for baleage. However, they were told that they would be allowed to use the large paddock once the grass had been cut in Summer. Thery would then be able to use the large paddock for grazing their horses through until next Spring of 2025.

The conditions regarding the use of the large paddock were not recorded in the tenancy agreement, with the agreement simply referring to the postal address of the premises. The tenants were happy with this arrangement and having use of the paddock for the majority of the year because they had 3 horses that needed space and grass (for feed) over the colder months.

After the tenancy commenced, the grass was cut by the contractor on 29 November 2024 and the hay bales were stored in the large paddock. After this, the tenants’ horses were allowed into the large paddock and the smaller paddocks could be closed to allow the grass to grow there.

On 5 May 2025, the tenants received a text message from the contractor asking them to take the horses out of the large paddock as he was coming to access the paddock. By 7 May 2025 the contractor ploughed and re-seeded the paddock. The tenants did not know that the contractor intended to do this and were shocked to discover the large paddock, which the tenants intended to use to graze their horses over the winter, had been completely turned over into dirt and re-seeded. They thought the contractor was coming to remove the hay bales. This caused them immense stress as they now had to find an alternative 3 Savill v NZI Finance Ltd, above n2 way to feed their horses. The tenants also had no storage options for hay on the property and had to use their horse float to store horse feed.

The tenants advised Ms Blyth about their concerns and the impact of this on their horse’s welfare and the stress it caused them including the financial strain of having to now pay for extra feed. The owner offered to place a container on the land for them to store feed and offered to cancel the baleage contract for the next season so that the tenants could use the large paddock for grazing after November 2025. However, none of these options assisted the tenants with the immediate need to feed their horses. As a result, the tenants found another property and asked to end the tenancy early which was agreed.

When asked further about the initial conversation with Ms Blyth at the viewing about the large paddock, the tenants said she told them they could have access to the paddock when the contractor was not using it. While Ms Blyth did not have specific dates, she said he would come in the Summer to cut the hay for baleage and when it was to be shut up he would let them know. However, they believe she mentioned that they could access the paddock until Spring.

In summary, the tenants understood from Ms Blyth that they would have use of the large paddock from December 2024 through until September/Spring 2025. Had they known the large paddock was not available from May to December 2025 they say they would never have taken on the tenancy. One of the tenants is a qualified vet nurse. She says that she specifically asked Ms Blyth if the large paddock was available because the remaining small paddocks totalling 2- 3 acres of land was not enough for 3 horses. She explained that the minimum requirement is 1.5 acres of land for one horse and another 1 acre for every horse thereafter.

The tenants seek compensation of $600 for the extra cost incurred to purchase horse feed and further compensation of $1200 (2 weeks’ rent) on account of not having use if the full 10 acres of land as originally advertised. Landlord case

Ms Blyth says that the advertisement stated that the premises were “on 10 acres” and did not say that 10 acres was available. It also stated that pets were negotiable. In that regard, there were many options to suit different tenants and their needs. When these tenants viewed the property, they told her they had horses and she explained that it gets dry and they would need hay because they would otherwise run out of feed; that they could use the three smaller paddocks but the larger paddock was not available because it was subject to a baleage contract.

Ms Blyth maintains that the large paddock was only discussed for use when the contractor advised her that the tenants could use it after cutting the hay in late November 2024, after the tenancy had already started. She thinks she told the tenants they could have the paddock over summer of 2024/2025 but the contractor would then shut it up again for the next summer. She says that she did not know when the contractor needed the paddock back and she was merely relaying the contractor’s offer at that point. She says that she gave the contractor the tenants’ contact details.

Ms Blyth also notes that it is standard practice to re-sow pasture in autumn so that it can grow over winter until it is time to cut again in Spring/Summer.

In summary, Ms Blyth says the tenancy was offered to the tenants including the house and the three smaller paddocks. She says that she made them aware that the large paddock was used by a contractor and it was never available at the start of the tenancy. Discussion and findings

After carefully reviewing all the available evidence including each party’s oral evidence, I am satisfied that use of the large paddock was likely discussed at the viewing because it was important for the tenants to ensure that there was enough space and grazing for their horses. Therefore, I accept that they would have raised the issue. I also find on the evidence that Ms Blyth advised the tenants that the large paddock was available for use after the contractor cut the hay in Summer 2024. However, I am not satisfied that the landlord made a specific representation about the period during which the large paddock would be available for use by the tenants. Ms Blyth says that she did not know the exact date when the contractor would be closing off the paddock again. The tenants, also acknowledged in their evidence that Ms Blyth was unsure of the exact date with one of the tenants commenting at the hearing that she only “thought” Ms Blyth said that the paddock would not be shut off until the next Spring.

Given that the availability of the paddock was important to the tenants, I consider that it is not reasonable for them to rely on what was a loose indication from Ms Blyth at the viewing about the dates it would be available. They took the tenancy on without a specific agreement in writing about the availability of, and their entitlement to use, the large paddock.

I also consider that the letting advertisement is not sufficient to imply that the premises included 10 acres of land and all 4 paddocks. Recording that the home was situated on 10 acres of land does not in my view mean that the premises included 10 acres of land.

The tenancy agreement does not specify the boundaries and what was included. It n merely records the postal address as the premises. Arguably, therefore, all land and paddocks located at that postal address must be “the premises.” However, it is not disputed by the tenants that they were clearly told that the large paddock was subject to a baleage contract and therefore was not provided for their exclusive use.

In summary, I find there is insufficient evidence to establish that the landlord represented to the tenants that they would be entitled to use the large paddock from the Summer of 2024 through to the next Spring. Therefore, the claim for misrepresentation must be dismissed. Breach of quiet enjoyment

A landlord must not interfere with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of the tenant in their use of the premises. See section 38(2) RTA.

The tenants claim that the landlord breached their quiet enjoyment on three separate occasions.

Also relevant to the claim is section 48 RTA which provides that a landlord may not enter the premises during the tenancy except with the tenant's consent, in an emergency, or after giving the required notice for inspections and repairs and maintenance. See section 48(1) and (2) RTA. However, the definition of premises in s48 does not include land or facilities. Therefore, a landlord can enter the surrounding land without giving notice under s48. However, if a landlord does so, depending on the circumstances, entry onto the land without notice could be a breach of the tenants’ right to quiet enjoyment under s38. 23 June 2025

After the parties agreed to end the tenancy early, Ms Blyth messaged the tenants on 23 June 2025 asking to take some photos of the house that day while the tenants were at work. The tenants replied asking Ms Blyth to let them know what photos she needed and they would send them through. The landlord then tried to ring one of the tenants who replied advising that she could not take calls as she was at work and repeated that the tenants would prefer to take the photos and send them through. Ms Blyth responded that she would prefer to take her own photos from outside only and that she would pop down shortly to do that since the tenants were at work. Ms Blyth then proceeded to visit the property to photograph the house despite the tenants advising her that they did not want her to do so. They note the photo was the same as the photo used in the original advertising and were concerned that she was at the property for some other reason.

Ms Blyth says that the original photo had a car in it and she wanted one without it. She noted that the tenants did not want her to visit but she wanted to take her own photo and that is all she did. She says that she did not enter the house, so was not in breach of s48 and she was not upsetting their peace and enjoyment given they were not home. She also notes that she was doing them a favour to get replacement tenants as soon as possible and taking a photo for the advertising was part of that process.

It is clear on the evidence that the landlord asked for permission to visit the premises at short notice to take the photo which was declined by the tenants. In those circumstances, I find that Ms Blyth did not have the tenants’ consent and she ought to have respected the tenants wishes. While entry onto the land was not technically a breach of s48, I find that it was an interference with the tenants’ right to privacy in the use of the premises especially when they had not given Ms Blyth the consent she had sought in the first place. I appreciate that Ms Blyth was trying to re-tenant the premises for the tenants and it was easy and efficient for her to “pop down” and take the photos because she lives nearby. However, Ms Blyth’s actions demonstrated a complete disregard for the tenants wishes. While the breach of quiet enjoyment is perhaps at the lower end of the scale, it is nevertheless a breach. Tenants are entitled to a level of comfort and security that their landlord will respect their rights and not enter the property (including the grounds) even when they are not at home. 18 July 2025

A neighbour believed that the tenants horses had eaten trees he had planted along the fence line between their properties and approached one of the tenants to discuss this on or about 16 July. The tenant apologised and discussed it with him amicably. Subsequently, the neighbour messaged Ms Blyth about the issue which she forwarded to the tenants on 17 July asking them to address. They replied by email on 17 July at 7.35am advising that they had a chat with the neighbour and would sort something out before they vacated. In the same email they also advised Ms Blyth that they would be having house guests over the next few days with one of the tenants turning 40 and “would appreciate our disturbance kept to a minimum.”

At 3.32pm on 18 July, Ms Blyth sent the tenants a text advising that she would be calling in on her way home to discuss the issue with their neighbour. The tenants were unable to respond to the text before Ms Blyth turned up at the premises at 4.47pm on 18 July. They say she arrived at the ranch slider door to the house, and could see the tenants inside. She then opened the door to step inside. The tenants asked her to stop and leave the property several times. Ms Blyth remained and argued with the tenants for about 10 minutes about the issue with the neighbour, threatening to take money out of their bond to pay the neighbour. One of the tenants got upset and swore at her and asked her to leave the property again. She continued to send them texts and emails about the issue with the neighbour which they found harassing.

The tenants obtained advice from Tenancy Services which confirmed that the landlord was not entitled to deduct bond money in relation to a dispute with the neighbour. They sent her this advice which stopped her temporarily from harassing them about the issue.

Ms Blyth says that the neighbour had rung her complaining about the tenants’ horses eating his trees and she had sent several messages to the tenants asking them to address the issue which she says they stopped answering. At the hearing she said “through sheer frustration” she went to see the tenants without giving 48 hours’ notice but she sent a text to notify them she was on her way. She agreed at the hearing that she opened the ranch slider door into their house, after knocking first, but says she stood at the doorway only. She also argued that as this was not a tenancy issue, and she was visiting the premises as a neighbour, not in her capacity as the landlord.

I am satisfied after reviewing the evidence that the tenants sent a reply to Ms Blyth about the issue with the neighbour contrary to her assertion that they had ignored her messages. While they might not have responded to the continuing barrage of messages, I consider the response they gave was sufficient at the time. While it was acceptable for Ms Blyth to advise the tenants about the complaint she received from the neighbour, her turning up at the property without notice was not acceptable. I find Ms Blyth’s submission that she visited the tenants in her capacity as a neighbour is disingenuous. She was clearly there as the landlord/property manager.

I also find that Ms Blyth opening the door, even if she remained standing in the entrance to the premises, amounts to an unlawful entry under s48, on the basis that she has not given the required advance notice or obtained the tenants consent to enter the premises and opening the door is the first step for entering. Even if I am wrong, it is certainly a breach of the tenants’ right to quiet enjoyment under s38. 29 July 2025

A replacement tenant had been found with the last day of this tenancy to be 30 July. On 16 July, Ms Blyth emailed the tenants about various end of tenancy issues. She asked whether the final inspection could be done on 25 July or the next day; she advised that the new tenants were wanting access over the next few weeks to drop off some wood and outside plants and asked the tenants to confirm this was acceptable, and she advised: “Also container is due any day so I will need access to help driver place and will also be relocating other two at the same time-the horses may need to be relocated to back paddock while this is happening.” The landlord was placing a container on the property for the new tenants to use.

The tenants replied on 17 July as follows: “We get the keys to the new property on the 25 th but we will not be moved out completely on that day. As we are paying up til the 30 th it would be better to make that day the final inspection as it gives us time to get everything done. I will let you know if the property is ready before then. I would prefer new tenants don’t bring stuff over til we have moved over just because we do not want to be liable for any damage to their stuff or it accidentally gets taken with our stuff by movers. I will let you know once the house is empty and they can start then.”

On 29 July, the tenants had mostly vacated but still had one pony on the property who had some trauma issues with floating. The tenants called in a specific trainer who flew from Wellington to work with the pony and help shift her off the property.

Early in the morning, the tenants were working with the pony and did not see several messages from Ms Blyth at 7.50am in which she advised that the container would be dropped at the property that morning about 10am. She apologised that she was only advised about it that morning. At 9.51am the tenants messaged that they had a trainer working with the mare and could not have any distractions as it would make it more difficult for them to load her into the float. They asked Ms Blyth to wait until the mare was on the float. Ms Blyth said that was not possible as the container was already on its way. Ms Blyth arrived at the property soon after. Again, the tenants explained the problem and implored Ms Blyth to wait until they finished removing the pony. She refused to leave and threatened that the tenants would be charged the cost of travel for the container to return another day. After much argument, the tenants had little choice but to agree, but felt bullied.

The tenants were extremely upset and stressed by the situation with one of the tenants in tears. The process took 2 hours during which the mare had to be moved to the back of the paddock to enable unloading of the container. This delayed the training time as they had to desensitise the mare to work with a new large object (the container) in the paddock. They wish to claim an extra 2 hours of the trainer’s time of $100 as compensation as well as compensation for failure by the landlord to give adequate notice before arriving with the container and the resulting breach of quiet enjoyment.

Ms Blyth’s view is that she had already notified the tenants about the container. In a text message dated 29 May, Ms Blyth advised that the owner “will probs give you a ring to let you know when container coming.” Then in her email on 16 July she advised that the container was “due any day”. Therefore, the tenants were on notice and she contacted them as soon as she was advised, albeit on the day it was due. When asked why the landlord/owner could not give 48 hours’ notice and/or simply schedule the arrival of the container after the tenancy ended on 30 July, Ms Blyth could not explain why. It seems this was organised by the owner without discussion with her.

The tenants advised that they did not receive any advance call from the owner about the delivery date of the container and they dispute any suggestion that a specific delivery date or advance notice could not be given.

Ms Blyth believes that in raising these claims the tenants are not considering the help she was providing to find a replacement tenant so that they could end the fixed term early and end their liability for rent as soon as possible. She emphasized that she was negotiating with the owners, the new tenants and these tenants to ensure a smooth and early change of tenant.

I am satisfied on the evidence that this incident on 29 July was a breach of the tenants’ quiet enjoyment and significantly interfered with their use of the premises. The effect was exacerbated by the fact that they were in the final 2 days of the tenancy and all that entails with vacating, cleaning up, and removal of the pony. The owner failed to call the tenants as was indicated to discuss and warn of the delivery date. Ms Blyth’s indication on 16 July that delivery would be “any day” now did not turn out to be the case with delivery occurring two weeks later. While, technically, the notice provisions in s48 do not apply to entry onto the land, I consider the landlord should have warned the tenant of the delivery closer to the date. I also do not accept Ms Blyth’s claim that the landlord had no control over the date with the carrier and/or that they could not have asked for a delivery date after the tenancy ended on 30 July. There was no supporting evidence (e.g. from the carrier) to substantiate that claim.

While the landlord agreed to end the tenancy early and took the necessary steps to find new tenants, that does not mean that they are entitled to ignore their obligations under s38 or 48, as the case may be, and run roughshod over the tenants rights. In summary, the landlord’s actions (whether that be the owner or the property manager) in this instance, while not a breach of s48, is a breach of s38. Compensation for the breaches of quiet enjoyment

The tenants are entitled to some compensation for the quiet enjoyment breaches. It is a well settled principle when awarding damages that, so far as money can do it, the injured party shall be put in the same position as they would have been in, but for the breach of the tenancy agreement and the RTA.

It is clear here that the tenants’ relationship with Ms Blyth deteriorated after they realised the large paddock was not available for use after May 2025, and there was perhaps a loss of trust after that, rightly or wrongly, because they felt she had misled them. The subsequent instances of Ms Blyth turning up at the property with little warning exacerbated the situation and caused the tenants much stress and discomfort. I accept Ms Blyth was able to find a replacement tenant reasonably quickly, which was of considerable benefit to the tenants. However, I consider she lost sight of her professional obligations. Her position both as a neighbour and property manager became blurred with her assuming that it would be ok for her to “pop in” to the premises at short notice. I also consider she became too personally involved in the neighbour dispute which was really a matter for those parties to sort out between themselves. The resulting application brought by the tenants highlights how important it is for landlords to adhere strictly to the RTA obligations.

After carefully considering all the circumstances, I award the tenants $750 compensation for the landlord’s breaches of quiet enjoyment. This equates to one week’s rent or an average award of $250 per breach, although I consider that the breaches on 18 and 29 July were at the higher end of the scale than the breach on 23 June. Overall, I consider the award for all three breaches is justified.

I have not considered an award of exemplary damages which can be considered where the breaches of quiet enjoyment amount to harassment. That is because, exemplary damages are only available where a party makes a specific claim for exemplary damages. See section 109 RTA. The tenants application sought compensation only.

As the tenants have substantially succeeded with their claims, they are entitled to suppression of their name and identifying details. The landlord is not entitled to suppression. The tenants are also entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee. K Stirling, 14 January 2026